JUDGMENT : R.P. Nagrath, J. The appellants and one Kulwant Singh faced trial in FIR No. 165 dated 08.11.2006, Police Station 'B' Division, Amritsar for offences under Sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short 'the Act'). The specific charge against Paramjit Singh @ Pamma-appellant No. 1 (A-1) was that on 08.11.2006 in the area of Sultanwind road, Amritsar he was found in possession 4 kgs. Of heroin without any permit or licence and Resham Singh-appellant No. 2 (A-2) in possession of 1 kg. of heroin on the same date and time. The third head of charge against the appellants and co-accused Kulwant Singh (since acquitted) was that they had entered into a criminal conspiracy to commit the offence under Chapter IV of the Act. In fact there was no admissible evidence to prove charge against Kulwant Singh @ Kanta accused and so he was acquitted of the charge framed against him. The charge against both the appellants was held proved and they were convicted under Section 29 of the Act. The learned trial Court awarded sentence to the appellants to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to pay fine of Rs.1 lac each, in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year each. 2. The Intelligence Wing of Punjab State Police headed by Additional Director General of Police (Intelligence), Punjab had initiated a large scale drive to crack smuggling of narcotic and psychotropic substances. 3. The facts of the case briefly stated are that; On 08.11.2006, PW-1 SI Harwinderpal Singh of the Special Narcotic Cell, Punjab was present in his office at Amritsar where he received a secret information against A-1, who had escaped from police custody while being produced in the court in the year 2005 and was a proclaimed offender. The information against A-1 was that he was actively involved in smuggling of heroin and present near Punjab National Bank situated on Sultanwind road with his motorcycle No. PB-46-8897 make Bajaj Pulsar of black colour alongwith his co-accused A-2 and waiting for some party for delivery of heroin. It was further informed that if a raid is conducted, the accused persons could be apprehended alongwith heavy quantity of heroin. 4. This information was brought to the notice of Makhan Singh, Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP), Special Narcotic Cell, Punjab, Amritsar. It was further informed that if a raid is conducted, the accused persons could be apprehended alongwith heavy quantity of heroin. 4. This information was brought to the notice of Makhan Singh, Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP), Special Narcotic Cell, Punjab, Amritsar. PW-1 collected old photographs of Paramjit Singh @ Pamma (A-1) from the record of Narcotic Cell. 5. The investigating officer proceeded towards the spot on the directions of Senior Superintendent of Police, Narcotic Cell and supervision of Jasbir Singh, Inspector of Special Narcotic Cell. A raiding party was organized and all the members of police party were briefed about the specific information. They went to the spot in official mini bus and reached near premises of the Bank. 6. A-1 was found sitting on motorcycle No. PB-46-8897, make Bajaj Pulsar of black colour and he tried to kick start his motorcycle. The other accused, namely; Resham Singh (A-2) started walking swiftly towards Sultanwind village. The investigating officer apprehended both the appellants with the assistance of members of his party. PW-1 introduced himself to the accused persons and expressed his suspicion against the appellants for being in possession of some intoxicating substance and that search of their bag and motorcycle was to be conducted. The appellants were apprised of their right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate. Appellants wanted the search to be made in the presence of a gazetted officer. In respect of these proceedings separate memos with regard to offer made to both the appellants Ex. PA and Ex. PB were prepared signed by the appellants and attested by other members of police party. 7. PW-1 SI Harwinderpal Singh gave message on his mobile phone to DSP Special Narcotic Cell to reach the spot. In the meanwhile, pedestrians walking on the road were requested to associate the police party after informing them about the facts of the case. After a great effort two of the members of public, namely; Sanjeev Kumar and Gurmukh Singh, who were present in the locality for their personal work, agreed to become witnesses in the proceedings. 8. After about 20-25 minutes, PW-2 Raj Pal Singh, DSP, Special Narcotic Cell, Punjab, Amritsar reached there and he was briefed about the facts and circumstances and that two of the members of public have already been associated. 9. 8. After about 20-25 minutes, PW-2 Raj Pal Singh, DSP, Special Narcotic Cell, Punjab, Amritsar reached there and he was briefed about the facts and circumstances and that two of the members of public have already been associated. 9. PW-2 Raj Pal Singh, DSP, who was in his uniform, introduced himself to the accused persons that he was DSP posted in the Special Narcotic Cell and a gazetted officer. The appellants were informed that the bags held by them and the motorcycle are suspected to be containing some intoxicating substance and that PW-2 has been called to reach the spot for effecting search. Still PW-2 informed the accused persons of their legal right as to whether they want their search to be made in the presence of PW-2 or any other gazetted officer or a Magistrate. The appellants reposed confidence in PW-2 and their consent memos Ex. PC and Ex. PD were reduced into writing which were signed by both the appellants and attested by PW-5 SI Dalbir Singh and both the independent witnesses. These memos were prepared under the signatures of PW-2 Raj Pal Singh DSP. 10. Under the supervision of PW-2, the search of A-1 was first conducted. A bag of black colour was hanging around the neck of A-1. This bag was found containing four packets of heroin. One packet was bearing the round stamp of "Manzoor Pharmacy Charrahi Pagman" featuring lion and also figure 99 was written. Two other packets featuring lion were bearing blue coloured oval shaped seal and some words inscribed in Urdu were written. The fourth packet was also bearing blue coloured round stamps with impression of some readable words of English language. 11. The police party made arrangements of weights and scales at the spot. Each packet was found weighing 1 kg. of heroin. 5 gms. Out of each packet was taken out and prepared into separate parcels. The sample parcels and remaining heroin in the packets each containing 995 gms. Were sealed with seal impression 'HS' by the investigating officer. The four packets were numbered as I to IV and the sample parcels as S-I to S-IV. Thereafter, the DSP sealed all these parcels with his own seal bearing impression 'RS'. The case property was taken into possession by preparing recovery memo Ex. PE which was attested by SI Dalbir Singh and both the independent witnesses and also the DSP. The four packets were numbered as I to IV and the sample parcels as S-I to S-IV. Thereafter, the DSP sealed all these parcels with his own seal bearing impression 'RS'. The case property was taken into possession by preparing recovery memo Ex. PE which was attested by SI Dalbir Singh and both the independent witnesses and also the DSP. From personal search of A-1 cash amount of Rs.680/- and a mobile phone Nokia 3120 containing SIM No. 98144-18965 were recovered for which separate memo Ex. PF was prepared. 12. PW-1 then conducted search of A-2 and a packet containing heroin in yellow coloured polythene bag bearing mark "THANKS & WELCOME" and also some words in Urdu language contained in black coloured bag held by A-2 was recovered. The packet was bearing round black coloured stamp transcript of which was unreadable. This packet was found containing 1 kg. of heroin. 5 gms. Of heroin was separated as sample and similarly the same was prepared into separate parcel and sealed with seals of PW-1 and PW-2 the DSP. Cash amount of Rs.210 was recovered for which separate memo was prepared. 13. Ruqa Ex. PL was sent from the spot to the Police Station 'B' Division, Amritsar and FIR Ex. PL/1 on its basis was registered. 14. On reaching Police Station 'B' Division, Amritsar, within whose jurisdiction the recovery was made, the case property and the accused persons were produced before PW-4 Inspector Balkar Singh and the case property was kept in the safe custody by PW-4. On the next day PW-4 handed over the case property to PW-1 the investigating officer for being produced before the Area Magistrate. Sample parcels were again brought by PW-1 SI Harwinderpal Singh and handed over to PW-4 and he kept the same in the double lock up in the police station. The sample parcels were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), Punjab, Chandigarh and vide report Ex. PR, Deputy Director (Toxicology), FSL, Punjab, Chandigarh found the contents of five parcels to be containing diacetylmorphine (heroin). The percentage of diacetylmorphine in each sample was found ranging from 75% to 76% in all these five parcels. Each parcel was containing 5 gms. Of the light grey coloured material as per report Ex. PR. The challan was presented before the Judge, Special Court, Amritsar on completion of investigation. 15. The percentage of diacetylmorphine in each sample was found ranging from 75% to 76% in all these five parcels. Each parcel was containing 5 gms. Of the light grey coloured material as per report Ex. PR. The challan was presented before the Judge, Special Court, Amritsar on completion of investigation. 15. The prosecution examined six witnesses in support of its case. On the application filed by the investigating officer, the two independent witnesses, namely, Sanjeev Kumar and Gurmukh Singh, were given up on 27.02.2009 as won over by the accused. The appellants in their examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the prosecution evidence. Both of them further pleaded that they were picked up from their houses and falsely implicated in the present case as the police nursed a grievance against them. The appellants did not lead any evidence in defence. 16. The trial Court convicted appellants and awarded sentence to them as aforesaid. 17. The version of prosecution as discussed in the story has been brought-forth by PW-1 SI Harwinderpal Singh, the investigating officer. He is corroborated by PW-2 DSP Raj Pal Singh and PW-5 SI Dalbir Singh, a member of police party. As per prosecution story and testified by PW-1 and the other witnesses to the recovery, the seal of PW-1 after use on the parcels was handed over to a public witness Sanjeev Kumar whereas DSP kept the seal with himself. PW-5 SI Dalbir Singh who was a member of police party also attested all the memos prepared at the spot. The rough sketch of the place of recovery prepared by PW-1 is Ex. PM. 18. The case property was produced during examination of PW-1. This is comprising of the parcels which were marked I to IV as Ex. P-1 to Ex. P-4. The sample parcels marked S-I to S-IV as Ex. P-5 to Ex. P-8. These sample parcels were returned by the office of FSL after examination of the samples, as stated by PW-1. The bag recovered from Paramjit Singh @ Pamma (A-1) is Ex. P-9, which contained packets of heroin. The envelope containing the currency notes was also produced as Ex. P-11. The mobile phone Nokia 3120 is Ex. P-10. 19. Similarly, the parcel of heroin marked V recovered from A-2 is Ex. P-12. The sample S-V is Ex. The bag recovered from Paramjit Singh @ Pamma (A-1) is Ex. P-9, which contained packets of heroin. The envelope containing the currency notes was also produced as Ex. P-11. The mobile phone Nokia 3120 is Ex. P-10. 19. Similarly, the parcel of heroin marked V recovered from A-2 is Ex. P-12. The sample S-V is Ex. P-13 and the same was also returned from the office of Chemical Examiner, as stated by the witness. The money recovered from A-2 is Ex. P-14. Separate panchnama Ex. PK for taking into possession the motorcycle Ex. P-15 was also prepared. 20. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants, the State counsel and thoroughly gone thorough the records with their able assistance. 21. Learned counsel for the appellants challenged the conviction of appellants inter alia on the grounds; (i) That provisions of Section 42 of the Act have not been complied with; (ii) that the present case lacks compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 50 of the Act; (iii) that only one sample was drawn from each of the packet which is in violation of the standing instructions; (iv) that SI Harwinderpal Singh who received the secret information has proceeded with the investigation of the case and being the complainant he should have entrusted the investigation to some other competent officer and in this way the investigation is vitiated; (v) that the link evidence is highly suspicious as there was 13 days of delay in sending the samples to the FSL; and (vi) that there are material contradictions in the evidence of recovery witnesses and such a version in support of which independent witnesses were not examined would cause serious dent to the story. 22. On the other hand learned State counsel supported the judgment of conviction on the submission that contentions have been validly dealt with by the trial Court while recording conviction. 23. The non-compliance of mandatory provisions of Section 42 of the Act was the star argument of learned counsel for appellants. It was contended that PW-1 received prior information while present in the office of Narcotic Cell but the same was not reduced into writing. PW-1 stated in cross-examination that while he received the secret information at 03.00 p.m. in the office, SSP Makhan Singh and DSP Raj Pal Singh were also present in their respective offices at that time. It was contended that PW-1 received prior information while present in the office of Narcotic Cell but the same was not reduced into writing. PW-1 stated in cross-examination that while he received the secret information at 03.00 p.m. in the office, SSP Makhan Singh and DSP Raj Pal Singh were also present in their respective offices at that time. He did not communicate the secret information to the DSP in the office nor reduced the same into writing or conveyed to the senior officers. Similarly, PW-2 stated that information which was received by PW-1 was not passed on to him by PW-1 though he was present in the office. He does not know when PW-1 had left the office but PW-2 got the information at about 04.40 p.m. 24. In the case of Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, 2000 (2) SCC 513 , a three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court held that compliance of Section 42 of the Act is mandatory and failure to take down the information in writing and forthwith send a report to his immediate official superior would cause prejudice to the accused. In the case of Sajan Abraham v. State of Kerala, 2001 (6) SCC 692 , another three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Section 42 of the Act was not mandatory and substantial compliance was sufficient. In view of the conflicting opinions regarding the scope of applicability in the matter of conducting search, seizure and arrest without warrant or authorization, the appeals were placed before the Constitution Bench to resolve the issue in Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana, 2009 (8) SCC 539 . 25. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Karnail Singh's case (supra) held as under:- "(a) The officer on receiving the information of the nature referred to in Sub-section (1) of section 42 from any person had to record it in writing in the concerned Register and forthwith send a copy to his immediate official superior, before proceeding to take action in terms of clauses (a) to (d) of section 42(1). (b) But if the information was received when the officer was not in the police station, but while he was on the move either on patrol duty or otherwise, either by mobile phone, or other means, and the information calls for immediate action and any delay would have resulted in the goods or evidence being removed or destroyed, it would not be feasible or practical to take down in writing the information given to him, in such a situation, he could take action as per clauses (a) to (d) of section 42(1) and thereafter, as soon as it is practical, record the information in writing and forthwith inform the same to the official superior. © In other words, the compliance with the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) in regard to writing down the information received and sending a copy thereof to the superior officer, should normally precede the entry, search and seizure by the officer. But in special circumstances involving emergent situations, the recording of the information in writing and sending a copy thereof to the official superior may get postponed by a reasonable period, that is after the search, entry and seizure. The question is one of urgency and expediency. (d) While total non-compliance of requirements of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 42 is impermissible, delayed compliance with satisfactory explanation about the delay will be acceptable compliance of section 42. To illustrate, if any delay may result in the accused escaping or the goods or evidence being destroyed or removed, not recording in writing the information received, before initiating action, or non-sending a copy of such information to the official superior forthwith, may not be treated as violation of section 42. But if the information was received when the police officer was in the police station with sufficient time to take action, and if the police officer fails to record in writing the information received, or fails to send a copy thereof, to the official superior, then it will be a suspicious circumstance being a clear violation of section 42 of the Act. Similarly, where the police officer does not record the information at all, and does not inform the official superior at all, then also it will be a clear violation of section 42 of the Act. Similarly, where the police officer does not record the information at all, and does not inform the official superior at all, then also it will be a clear violation of section 42 of the Act. Whether there is adequate or substantial compliance with section 42 or not is a question of fact to be decided in each case. The above position got strengthened with the amendment to section 42 by Act 9 of 2001." 26. It was also held in Karnail Singh's case (supra) that if the statutory provisions under Section 41(2) and 42(2) of the Act of writing down the information is interpreted as a mandatory provision, it will disable the haste of an emergency situation and may turn out to be in vain with regard to the criminal search and seizure. These provisions should not be misused by the wrongdoers/offenders as a major ground for acquittal. Consequently, these provisions should be taken as discretionary measure which should check the misuse of the Act rather than providing an escape to the hardened drug-peddlers. 27. Strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for the appellants to Kishan Chand v. State of Haryana, 2013 (2) SCC 502 . Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Section 42 does not admit any ambiguity. The question of substantial compliance of these provisions would amount to misconstruction of these relevant provisions. It is a settled canon of interpretation that the penal provisions, particularly with harsher punishments and with clear intendment of the legislature for definite compliance, ought to be construed strictly. The doctrine of substantial compliance cannot be called in aid to answer such interpretations. The principle of substantial compliance would be applicable in the cases where the language of the provision strictly or by necessary implication admits of such compliance. That was a case in which admittedly a secret information was received against the accused but the investigating officer did not reduce the secret information into writing nor sent it to the higher officers or to the police station for registration of the case. 28. Kishan Chand's case (supra) was thus of total noncompliance of mandatory provisions of Section 42 of the Act. The present, however, is not such a case for suggesting total noncompliance. PW-1 stated in chief-examination that the information which he received was immediately brought to the notice of SSP, Special Narcotic Cell, Punjab under whose guidance the whole operation was planned. Kishan Chand's case (supra) was thus of total noncompliance of mandatory provisions of Section 42 of the Act. The present, however, is not such a case for suggesting total noncompliance. PW-1 stated in chief-examination that the information which he received was immediately brought to the notice of SSP, Special Narcotic Cell, Punjab under whose guidance the whole operation was planned. In cross-examination, PW-1 stated that he received the information at about 03.00 p.m. in his office while SSP and DSP of the Narcotic Cell were also present in their respective offices. He did not communicate the information to DSP but no such question was put to PW-1 about communication of the information to SSP as was stated by the witness in the chief-examination. So this part of the statement was virtually not challenged. 29. The most important circumstance is the immediate dispatch of ruqa from the spot to the Police Station detailing the whole information of the facts. It has appeared in the evidence that on receipt of secret information at about 03.00 p.m. a raid was organized and after a briefing with members of police party they started from the office at about 04.00 p.m. According to PW-1, the place where the accused was present was just about 2 kilometers from the office of Narcotic Cell and they reached there within 15 to 20 minutes. The DSP was sent a message at 04.45 p.m., and he reached the spot at 05.15 p.m. After separating samples, putting seals over them and preparing panchnamas, the ruqa was dispatched from the spot at about 09.20 p.m. as per endorsement made thereon. The ruqa was sent through HC Jagjit Singh as testified by PW-1. FIR Ex. PL/1 was completed at about 11.20 p.m. and copy of it was sent to the area Magistrate and other senior officers. The endorsement on FIR Ex. PL/1 shows that the same was delivered to the Magistrate at 03.00 a.m. on the same night, which shows a prompt delivery of the FIR to the Magistrate and other senior police officers and would be sufficient compliance of the requirement of Section 42 of the Act. 30. The endorsement on FIR Ex. PL/1 shows that the same was delivered to the Magistrate at 03.00 a.m. on the same night, which shows a prompt delivery of the FIR to the Magistrate and other senior police officers and would be sufficient compliance of the requirement of Section 42 of the Act. 30. In Bahadur Singh v. State of Haryana, 2010 (4) SCC 445 , the facts were that the police inspector was present on patrol duty at the turning of Bhawani Khera and received a secret information that the petitioner therein was selling poppyhusk in his house. The police party, thereafter, raided the house of the petitioner, who was present, and on being interrogated the petitioner disclosed that he had concealed six bags in a locked room under the wheat chaff and that the key was with him. The disclosure statement made by the petitioner was reduced into writing and a wireless message was sent to the DSP who rushed to the spot and in whose presence the recovery, pursuant to the disclosure statement, was made. One of the contention on behalf of the petitioner before Hon'ble Supreme Court was noncompliance of the requirement of Section 42 of the Act. Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that it cannot but be noticed that with the advancement of technology and the availability of high speed exchange of information, some of the provisions of the NDPS Act, including Section 42, have to be read in the changed context. It was further held that the delay caused in complying with the provisions of Section 42 could result in the escape of offender or even removal of the contraband, there would be substantial compliance, if the information received were subsequently sent to the superior officer. It was further observed that apart from decision in Sajan Abraham's case (supra), the decision of Constitution Bench in Karnail Singh's case (supra) has made it clear that non-compliance with the provisions of Section 42 may not vitiate the trial if it did not cause any prejudice to the accused. Furthermore, whether there is adequate compliance of Section 42 or not, is a question of fact to be decided in each case. 31. Furthermore, whether there is adequate compliance of Section 42 or not, is a question of fact to be decided in each case. 31. A similar contention was raised before a Division Bench of this Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, 2013 (2) RCR (Criminal) 580.It was observed that the investigating officer was competent to search the place of recovery and arrest the appellant in terms of Section 42 (1) (d) of the Act, as obtaining of search warrants would have afforded opportunity to the appellant for concealment of the contraband, as also, for his escape. The information of this recovery was also sent by the investigating officer to the area Magistrate as also to the higher police officers. It was, thus, held from the facts of that case that compliance of Section 42 of the Act stood made by the investigating officer by sending ruqa to the police station where formal FIR was registered, copy of which was sent to the area Magistrate as well as to the higher police officers. That was moreover a case where recovery was effected on 29.01.2000 even before the amendment of subsection (2) of Section 42 w.e.f. 02.10.2001 by amendment Act No. 9 of 2001 and as per provision then in force the information was required to be sent to the officer immediately superior forthwith but now it is provided that information which has been reduced into writing shall be sent within 72 hours. As already observed, FIR, Ex. PL/1, was completed in Police Station 'B' Division, Amritsar at 11.20 p.m. and it was delivered to the area Magistrate within about 3= hours as there is endorsement of the Magistrate for having received the FIR at 03.00 a.m. (midnight) on 09.11.2006. It was also recorded in the FIR that FIR is being sent to the area Magistrate and senior officers of the police through a head constable. 32. The recovery in this case was effected from person of both the appellants who were present at a public place. If that be so, Section 43 of the Act would be attracted. It was also recorded in the FIR that FIR is being sent to the area Magistrate and senior officers of the police through a head constable. 32. The recovery in this case was effected from person of both the appellants who were present at a public place. If that be so, Section 43 of the Act would be attracted. Section 43 says that any officer of any of the departments mentioned in section 42 may; (a) seize in any public place or in transit, any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance in respect of which he has reason to believe an offence punishable under this Act has been committed, and, along with such drug or substance, any animal or conveyance or article liable to confiscation under this Act, any document or other article which he has reason to believe may furnish evidence of the commission of an offence punishable under this Act or any document or other article which may furnish evidence of holding any illegally acquired property which is liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of this Act; (b) detain and search any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed an offence punishable under this Act, and if such person has any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance in his possession and such possession appears to him to be unlawful, arrest him and any other person in his company. 33. In Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 2015 (2) RCR (Criminal) 779, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Section 43 of the Act contemplates seizure made in the public place. There is a distinction between Section 42 and Section 43 of the Act. Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that if a search is made in a public place, the officer taking the search is not required to comply with sub Sections (1) and (2) of Section 42 of the Act. The seizure was made in that case from beneath a bridge of public road accessible to public. The officer was an empowered officer under Section 42 of the Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that as the place is a public place and Section 43 comes into play, the question of non-compliance of Section 42 (2) does not arise. 34. The officer was an empowered officer under Section 42 of the Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that as the place is a public place and Section 43 comes into play, the question of non-compliance of Section 42 (2) does not arise. 34. For this view reliance can also be placed upon Durgo Bai and another v. State of Punjab, 2004 (7) SCC 144 . It was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that Section 43 of the Act is attracted and not Section 42. It was observed to be not a case of entering into or searching any building, conveyance or enclosed place. Even in State of Haryana v. Jarnail Singh and others, 2004 Crl. L.J. 2541, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- "Sections 42 and 43, therefore, contemplate two different situations. Section 42 contemplates entry into and search of any building, conveyance or enclosed place, while Section 43 contemplates a seizure made in any public place or in transit. If seizure is made under Section 42 between sunset and sunrise, the requirement of the proviso thereto has to be complied with. There is no such proviso in Section 43 of the Act and, therefore, it is obvious that if a public conveyance is searched in a public place, the officer making the search is not required to record his satisfaction as contemplated by the proviso to Section 42 of the NDPS Act for searching the vehicle between sunset and the sunrise." 35. The Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Karnail Singh's case (supra) also held on this aspect as under:- "12. The material difference between the provisions of Sections 42 and 43 is that Section 42 requires recording of reasons for belief and for taking down of information received in writing with regard to the commission of an offence before conducting search and seizure, Section 43 does not contain any such provision and as such while acting under Section 43 of the Act, the empowered officer has the power of seizure of the article etc. and arrest of a person who is found to be in possession of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance in a public place where such possession appears to him to be unlawful. 36. and arrest of a person who is found to be in possession of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance in a public place where such possession appears to him to be unlawful. 36. It is the prosecution version and also brought-froth by PW-1 and PW-3 that there was information that the appellants were present near Punjab National Bank, Sultanwind road, Amritsar for delivery of huge consignment of heroin and such a situation required urgent action so that the culprits do not escape or the appellants are not able to deliver contraband to the persons for whom they were statedly waiting. PW-1 and PW-5 both stated that when they reached the spot they spotted two persons standing near the motorcycle. One of them, namely; A-1 suddenly tried to start his motorcycle and the other person swiftly walked towards village Sultanwind. In the circumstances, therefore, there was an urgency which required immediate raid. 37. So the challenge to the prosecution case based on violation of Section 42 of the Act, cannot be sustained. 38. It was next contended that the offer made by the DSP to appellants, is not in conformity with Section 50 of the Act. I do not think that the above contention is supported from the record. Before message was sent to the DSP, already an offer was made to appellants that they have right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate and that was a sufficient compliance of the provisions of Section 50 of the Act. For the second time when the contents of consent memos Ex. PC and PD were recorded in the presence of DSP, appellants were informed by the DSP that he is a gazetted officer, who has reached the spot and want appellants, their bags and motorbike to be searched and also about their legal right to be searched before any other gazetted officer or a Magistrate for which arrangement can be made. But there is nothing of the kind that the offer was made by the DSP for search either before him or before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate. It was further contended that the consent memo Ex. PC of A-1 recorded on arrival of the DSP does not bear the signatures of PW-1 SI Harwinderpal Singh, the investigating officer. 38. It was also contended that the consent memo Ex. It was further contended that the consent memo Ex. PC of A-1 recorded on arrival of the DSP does not bear the signatures of PW-1 SI Harwinderpal Singh, the investigating officer. 38. It was also contended that the consent memo Ex. PD of A-2 does not bear the signatures of Gurmukh Singh, the other independent witness and SI Dalbir Singh and this aspect is a contradiction in itself. I do not see this in any way an important contradiction in the evidence especially when cross-examination of PW-1 Harwinderpal Singh and PW-5 SI Dalbir Singh has not been adverted to this aspect. 39. Learned counsel for appellants further contended that recovery memos were not signed by the accused persons. That was not required at all as such a procedure would have amounted to confessional statements of accused and thus inadmissible. 40. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that PW-1 in cross-examination stated that the man who tried to start the motorcycle was Resham Singh (A-2) and the accused who tried to walk away was Paramjit Singh @ Pamma (A-1). PW-1 further stated that Paramjit Singh @ Pamma (A-1) walked for about 10 yards before he was apprehended. He further stated that Resham Singh was apprehended on the motorcycle itself. I do not think the above to be a material discrepancy because in the chief-examination PW- 1 had made the statement in consonance with the story that it was Paramjit Singh @ Pamma (A-1) who was riding on the motorcycle whereas Resham Singh (A-2) who was standing near the motorcycle tried to walk away. To take advantage of this contradiction, PW-1 should have been confronted with the statement made in chief examination for providing any benefit. 41. In fact PW-1 was cross-examined after about 2 years of recovery. The police officers have to conduct various similar kinds of investigations and they are not expected to testify on such matter with precision. PW-5 the other recovery witness, however, was categorical in his statement on this aspect that A-1 was riding on the motorcycle. 42. All the three witnesses to the recovery have been extensively cross-examined without being able to bring any other material contradiction in their testimony. They have synchronized on various time factors relating to the receipt of secret information, sending message to DSP, arrival of DSP and the period upto to which DSP remained present at the spot. 42. All the three witnesses to the recovery have been extensively cross-examined without being able to bring any other material contradiction in their testimony. They have synchronized on various time factors relating to the receipt of secret information, sending message to DSP, arrival of DSP and the period upto to which DSP remained present at the spot. Minor contradictions here and there would be quite insignificant. 43. The minor contradiction pointed out was that according to PW-1 and PW-5, the entire writing work was done while sitting in the official mini bus whereas PW-2 the DSP stated that some of the writing work was done inside the mini bus and some of it by sitting on the chairs outside the mini bus. PW-2 further stated that chairs were arranged from the spot. The above cannot be considered a material discrepancy. 44. The police party is not shown to have any ulterior motive to falsely implicate the appellants for such a huge quantity of heroin. The only suggestion put to PW-1 was that a false recovery has been planted to show on records the success of police department. A similar suggestion was put to PW-5. It was for the first time during their examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that the appellants took up a plea that they were falsely implicated because the police party nursed grievance against them. What was the nature of the grievance has not been highlighted nor even suggested to the recovery witnesses during their cross examination. 45. When the evidence of recovery is truthful and inspiring confidence, non-examination of independent witnesses will not make a dent in the prosecution story, especially as these witnesses were given up as having been won over by the appellants. It is not a case that some stock witnesses were associated by the raiding party and not later on examined. No record from any police station was relied upon by the defence for dubbing these witnesses as of shoddy character. 46. I am of the considered view that evidence of the official witnesses, cannot be disbelieved and distrusted, merely, on account of their official status. In the face of the evidence of the official witnesses, the court is only required to be put on guard, to scrutinize the same, carefully and cautiously. 46. I am of the considered view that evidence of the official witnesses, cannot be disbelieved and distrusted, merely, on account of their official status. In the face of the evidence of the official witnesses, the court is only required to be put on guard, to scrutinize the same, carefully and cautiously. After careful and cautious scrutiny, if the court comes to the conclusion, that the same does not suffer from inherent infirmities, it can be safely believed. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses, has been scrutinized carefully but nothing came to the fore, during the course of their cross- examination, which may go to discredit the same. They stood the test of touchstone of all probabilities, during the course of their cross-examination. 47. In Akmal Ahmed v. State of Delhi, 1999 (3) SCC 337 , it was held as well settled law that evidence of search or seizure, made by the police will not become vitiated, solely for the reason that the same was not supported by an independent witness. In State of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil, 2001 (1) SCC 652 , it was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court as under:- "It is an archaic notion that actions of the Police officer, should be approached with initial distrust. It is time now to start placing at least initial trust on the actions and the documents made by the Police. At any rate, the Court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law, the presumption should be the other way round. The official acts of the Police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognized even by the Legislature." 48. In Appabhai and another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 S.C. 696 , it was held that the prosecution story cannot be thrown out, on the ground, that an independent witness had not been examined, by the prosecution. It was further held, in the said authority, that the civilized people, are generally insensitive, when a crime is committed, even in their presence, and they withdraw from the victims' side, and from the side of the vigilant. They keep themselves away from the Courts, unless it is inevitable. Moreover, they think the crime like a civil dispute, between two individuals, and do not involve themselves, in it. They keep themselves away from the Courts, unless it is inevitable. Moreover, they think the crime like a civil dispute, between two individuals, and do not involve themselves, in it. The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid authorities, is fully applicable, to the facts of the present case. In these circumstances, mere non-examining of the independent witnesses, when the evidence led to prove recovery is cogent, convincing, creditworthy and reliable and there was no reason on the part of police party to falsely implicate the accused, no doubt is cast on the prosecution story. 49. It is also a well settled principle of law that the provisions of Sections 52, 55 and 57 are directory and not mandatory but in the present case there has not been only the substantial but meticulous compliance of these requirements. Sub-section (1) of Section 52 requires that the accused person is to be informed about the grounds of his arrest which has been done by the written documents. Sub-section (3) of Section 52 further says that every person arrested and article seized shall be forwarded without unnecessary delay to- (a) the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station, or (b) xx xx xx xx xx 50. Section 55 of the Act lays down that an officer-in-charge of a police station shall take charge of and keep in safe custody, pending the orders of the Magistrate, all articles seized under this Act within the local area of that police station. 51. PW-1 stated that on reaching Police Station 'B' Division, Amritsar he produced the case property alongwith accused before SHO Balkar Singh who after verifying the facts and inspecting the parcels sealed five bulk and five sample parcels with his seal 'BS' and also prepared the sample seal. He put the case property in the double lock under his possession. The handing over memo of case property to SHO is Ex. PP. 52. PW-4 Inspector Balkar Singh, who was then posted as SHO of Police Station 'B' Division supported the aforesaid version of PW-1. He even stated that he had put the aforesaid parcels, samples and sample seal in safe custody. PW-1 and PW-4 testified the version with regard to taking out the case property from the double lock on 09.11.2006 and production of the same before the Magistrate. He even stated that he had put the aforesaid parcels, samples and sample seal in safe custody. PW-1 and PW-4 testified the version with regard to taking out the case property from the double lock on 09.11.2006 and production of the same before the Magistrate. PW-4 even interrogated the accused and handed over the accused and the case property to PW-1 SI Harwinderpal Singh for further investigation. This would also vouchsafe the fact that the investigation was verified by SHO of the Police Station. PW-1 stated that he reached the Police Station at 12.15 a.m. (midnight) and the case property was produced before the SHO. It was suggested to PW-1 that there was no double lock system in the Police Station but this defence plea could not be supported despite extensive cross-examination of PW-4. There is minor discrepancy of time factor when the case property was produced as according to PW-4, the case property was produced before him at 01.25 a.m. which is a insignificant factor. Even according to PW-5, the other recovery witness, the case property was produced before SHO at 12.30 a.m. at night. 53. Learned defence counsel vehemently contended further that there is violation of the order of learned area Magistrate before whom the case property was produced on the next day. The order passed by learned Magistrate is Ex. PR, which says that five bulk parcels and five samples sealed with seals bearing impressions 'BS', 'RS' and 'HS' and also describing the number of seals of aforesaid inscription on all the parcels, were produced before the learned Magistrate and it was recorded that the seals on samples were intact. The case property was ordered to be deposited in the Malkhana. However, as per prosecution version, the sample parcels were kept in police station instead of being deposited in Malkhana. PW-1 stated that as per record and under the orders of Magistrate he deposited all the five bulk parcels in the Judicial Malkhana and handed over the receipt alongwith five sample parcels and sample seals with seals intact to the SHO on the same day who kept the same in the custody in double lock. 54. It was submitted for the appellants that no specific order was obtained from the Magistrate for keeping the sample parcels in the police station. Reference thus was made to the copy of register No. 19, Ex. 54. It was submitted for the appellants that no specific order was obtained from the Magistrate for keeping the sample parcels in the police station. Reference thus was made to the copy of register No. 19, Ex. PS, that the case property was taken out on 09.11.2006 and after production of the case property five bulk parcels were deposited in the Judicial Malkhana with Tehal Chand, Malkhana Clerk and the sample parcels were redeposited with the SHO. I do not find any such violation of directions of the Court because the sample parcels were meant to be sent to the FSL. The sample parcels were handed over to Constable Kuldip Singh on 21.11.2006 as per entry in register No. 19, Ex. PS. 55. This fact is also testified by PW-3 C. Kuldip Singh to whom the sample parcels were entrusted by PW-4 SHO Balkar Singh and he deposited the same in the office of FSL, Punjab, Chandigarh. His affidavit is Ex. PX. In cross-examination PW-3 stated that SHO Balkar Singh himself handed over the aforesaid sample parcels to him. 56. The present is a case where the case property was not only sealed with seal of the investigating officer but also of the DSP and then of SHO of the police station whose responsibility was to keep the case property in safe custody specially the samples till these are sent to the FSL for analysis. 57. Learned counsel for appellants next contended that there is a gap in the link evidence inasmuch as form M-29 was not attached with the report of FSL. It was further contended that very purpose of putting seals of the DSP on the case property is frustrated as DSP did not hand over the seal after use to any independent witness but kept the same with himself. 58. I am not able to agree with the later contention because the case property was firstly sealed with seal of the investigating officer, who handed over the seal after use to Sanjeev Kumar, an independent witness and then with the seal of the DSP. Thereafter, the case property was deposited with SHO of the police station on the same night and PW-4 kept the same in the double lock. It is the responsibility of SHO to keep the case property in safe custody till the samples are deposited in the laboratory. Thereafter, the case property was deposited with SHO of the police station on the same night and PW-4 kept the same in the double lock. It is the responsibility of SHO to keep the case property in safe custody till the samples are deposited in the laboratory. After the case property is deposited in the police station in the double lock there is no scope of arguing without reference to any material on record that there was any possibility of tampering with the seals. 59. On the other contention, PW-2 stated in cross-examination that CFSL or form M-29 were not filled up at the spot. However, PW-1 in his chief-examination categorically stated that he prepared the sample of the seal used by him at the spot. PW-4 SHO of the police station in cross-examination stated that CFSL form is not on the judicial file. If that be the position, learned counsel for the appellants contended that the report of FSL, therefore, cannot be positively connected with the recovery allegedly made from the appellants. 60. I find no substance in the aforesaid contention of learned counsel. PW-1 testified that he prepared the samples of his seal and separate sample seal was prepared by the DSP. In cross-examination PW-1 stated that CFSL and form M-29 were filled up at the spot in the presence of DSP and no question was put to him with regard to availability of CFSL or form M-29 with the FSL report. It was mainly PW-1 to whom such a question could be put for seeking exact information. PW-5 in cross-examination stated that CFSL/form M-29 was filled up at the spot by the investigating officer but he does not remember if the same was filled in the presence of DSP. 61. There is also categorical statement in the affidavit Ex. PX of PW-3 Constable Kuldip Singh that the sample parcels alongwith sample seals were entrusted to him by the SHO and he deposited the same in the FSL. There is no cross-examination conducted on PW-3 to challenge this part of his statement. It is also certified in the report Ex. PR that seals on the parcels were intact and tallied with the specimen seal impressions. There is no cross-examination conducted on PW-3 to challenge this part of his statement. It is also certified in the report Ex. PR that seals on the parcels were intact and tallied with the specimen seal impressions. There is also a letter of SSP, Amritsar addressed to the Director of FSL attached with report of FSL to the effect that the sample parcels are being sent for chemical examination through Constable Kuldip Singh enclosures of which are copy of FIR, copy of recovery memo and sample seals. 62. The entire case property was produced by the prosecution during examination of PW-1. Even the sample parcels which were sent in the office of FSL were produced in the Court after these were returned by the laboratory. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the bag recovered from A-2 was not produced but that is hardly of much significance as rest of the entire case property was produced. I, therefore, find no flaw in the link evidence. 63. The other interesting argument of learned appellants' counsel was that the complainant himself is the investigating officer which is not legally permissible. Learned counsel placed reliance among other upon Karam Singh @ Karma & another v. State of Punjab, SB of 2009, decided on 28.01.2015, State by Inspector of Police, Narcotic Intelligence Bureau, Madurai, Tamil Nadu v. Rajangam, 2010 (15) SCC 369 and Megha Singh v. State of Haryana, 1996 (11) SCC 709 , in support of this contention. 64. A similar contention was raised before Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. Jeevanantham v. The State through Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, 2004 (5) SCC 230 . That was a case where recovery of 2 kgs. of Hashish was made from possession of the accused person. The story of prosecution was that PW-7 the Sub Inspector received information which he recorded and sent the same to the superior officers, and alongwith PW-8 went to the place where the accused person was arrested and searched resulting into the recovery. Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the principle on the subject held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Megha Singh's case (supra) was later on referred by Hon'ble Supreme Court in State rep. Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the principle on the subject held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Megha Singh's case (supra) was later on referred by Hon'ble Supreme Court in State rep. by Inspector Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Tiruchirapalli, Tamil Nadu v. V. Jeyapaul, 2004 Cri.LJ 1819 wherein it was held as under:- "We find no principle or binding authority to hold that the moment the competent police officer, on the basis of information received, makes out an FIR incorporating his name as the informant, he forfeits his right to investigate. If at all, such investigation could only be assailed on the ground of bias or real likelihood of bias on the part of the investigating officer. The question of bias would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and it is not proper to lay down a broad and unqualified proposition, in the manner in which it has been done." 65. In S. Jeevanantham's case (supra) PW-8 who was accompanying PW-7 conducted the search and recovered the contraband article and had given information in his official capacity and registered a case as part of his official duty and later investigated the case and filed charge-sheet. He was not in any way personally interested in the case. Therefore, Hon'ble Supreme Court did not find any sort of bias in the process of investigation and conviction was upheld. Even in the present case, as already observed there was no ulterior motive with any of the police officials to falsely implicate the appellants for such a huge recovery of heroin. 66. It was then contended by learned counsel for the appellants that only one sample was drawn whereas the standing instructions mandate drawing of the two samples. Learned counsel relied upon Jaswinder Singh and another v. State of Punjab, 2013 (1) RCR (Criminal) 257, in support of his contention. 67. A Division Bench of this Court in Jarnail Singh's case (supra) held that the standing order No. 1/89 dated 13.06.1989 laying down the requirement of drawing two samples is not mandatory as the same was not passed by the Parliament under a statute. Under the Act there is no such mandate that two samples from each bag should be taken. A Division Bench of this Court in Jarnail Singh's case (supra) held that the standing order No. 1/89 dated 13.06.1989 laying down the requirement of drawing two samples is not mandatory as the same was not passed by the Parliament under a statute. Under the Act there is no such mandate that two samples from each bag should be taken. It was also found that no prejudice has been caused to the appellant with the drawl of one sample from each bag, as he has no right to get the second sample analyzed from the FSL. 68. In the present case each sample which was sent for analysis has been found to be containing 75% to 76% of diacetylmorphine (heroin). As observed earlier, even the sample parcels which were sent for analysis were returned by the laboratory and produced in the court during examination of PW-1 and no defect in the case property has been pointed out by directing cross-examination of PW-1 on this aspect. 69. Similarly, the Division Bench of this Court in Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab, 2003 (2) RCR (Criminal) 256 observed that there is no doubt that the instructions are there but contravention of the said instructions would not necessarily vitiate the conviction. There is no doubt that although these instructions are to be followed as guide by the investigator yet they are having no force of law. The check is to ensure only that the case property is not tampered with at any stage. Even in the present case also there was so much of precaution taken for putting seals of so many officials including SHO and DSP that the aforesaid contention of the appellants cannot bring any support to the appellant's case. 70. The other contention of learned appellant's counsel was that there is delay of 13 days in sending the sample to the laboratory and that would create doubt in the analysis report. 71. In Mohan Lal's case (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court did not find 40 days of delay in sending sample to be fatal. 72. 70. The other contention of learned appellant's counsel was that there is delay of 13 days in sending the sample to the laboratory and that would create doubt in the analysis report. 71. In Mohan Lal's case (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court did not find 40 days of delay in sending sample to be fatal. 72. In Hardip Singh v. State of Punjab, 2008 (8) SCC 557 , Hon'ble Supreme Court found delay in sending samples to be no consequence, from the fact of the recovery of the said sample from the possession of appellant had been proven and established by cogent and reliable evidence and that apart it had also come in evidence that till the date of parcels of samples were received by the Chemical Examiner, the seal put on that sample was intact. 73. I thus hold that the prosecution established the charge against both the appellants beyond suspicion and there is no scope of interference in the finding of conviction. The appeal thus deserves to be dismissed on merits. 74. Learned trial Court, however, has not held categorically that the offence proved against appellants is Section 21 of the Act for which there was specific charge against them. So far as charge for criminal conspiracy under Section 29 of the Act is concerned that was relating to association of Kulwant Singh who has since been acquitted. Separate recoveries were made from both the appellants. From A-1 it was 4 kgs. of heroin and from A-2 it was 1 kg. 75. In Durgo Bai's case (supra) heroin was recovered from possession of appellants but conviction was recorded under Section 22 of the Act. Hon'ble Supreme Court held that seized substance, which was heroin, answers the definition of 'manufactured drug' being an opium derivative containing 'di-acetyl morphine' and therefore the appropriate Section providing for punishment is Section 21. Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that punishments prescribed under Sections 21 and 22 are the same. It was also held that by reason of citation of wrong section in the charge, we do not think that the appellants were handicapped from meeting the case against them or otherwise suffered any prejudice. 76. Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that punishments prescribed under Sections 21 and 22 are the same. It was also held that by reason of citation of wrong section in the charge, we do not think that the appellants were handicapped from meeting the case against them or otherwise suffered any prejudice. 76. In the present case there was, however, the specific charge against both the appellants of being found in possession of heroin of certain quantity for offence under Section 21 of the Act for which appellants were liable to be convicted instead of Section 29 of the Act. The conviction as finally observed by learned trial Court, though not specifically dealt with in the judgment, is altered to one under Section 21 of the Act. 77. As per custody certificate dated 04.09.2014, A-1 has undergone 8 years of imprisonment out of 10 years of rigorous imprisonment awarded to him. As per the details mentioned in the custody certificate, A-1 has also been sentenced to undergo 12 years of rigorous imprisonment apart from fine in Sessions Case No. 55 of 2005/2008, 15 years of rigorous imprisonment and fine in a complaint case under the NDPS Act and therefore, total period of imprisonment by counting the imprisonment already undergone in this case would run into more than 30 years. Therefore, the prayer is also made that the period of sentence awarded to A-1 may be directed to run concurrently with the substantive sentences awarded in the aforesaid cases. 78. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants and the State counsel on this contention also, though there was no specific application made by the accused in that regard in the present case. 79. A Full Bench of this Court in Jang Singh v. State of Punjab, 2008 (1) RCR (Criminal) 323, observed as under:- "15. It may, thus, emerge that discretion to make the sentences to run consecutively or concurrently would be governed by different consideration, like facts of each case, nature and character of the offences, criminal history sheet and record of the offender, his age, sex. It may, thus, emerge that discretion to make the sentences to run consecutively or concurrently would be governed by different consideration, like facts of each case, nature and character of the offences, criminal history sheet and record of the offender, his age, sex. In our view, these considerations would appear relevant for the exercise of discretion by the courts under Section 427 (1) Cr.P.C. It is not possible to exhaustively lay down all the factors that may be relevant to be taken into consideration and basically it would depend upon facts of each case to be so noted by the Court while exercising its discretion in this regard. It may, however, need to be noted that normal rule under Section 427 Cr.P.C. appears to be consecutive sentences. It is thereafter discretion is given to the sentencing Court to direct concurrency. It may also have to be kept in view that if principle of concurrency is applied in case where the offender is habitual, it may repel the very basic and the normal rules as laid down in Section 427 Cr.P.C. If such principles are universally applied unmindful to such consideration of the offender being habitual, then it may lead to hostile discrimination negatively because then it would amount to giving similar treatment to a normal as well as a habitual offender. Accordingly, segregation of the habitual offender by making them to undergo sentences consecutively can also be accepted as principle." It was further held as under:- "18. .........What principle and consideration will govern the exercise of this discretion, as already noted above, can not be exhaustively enumerated. Certain relevant factors, as can be culled out from different judgments referred to above, may give an indication where such discretion may be exercised. These factors generally would be the nature or character of the offences committed, the prior criminal record of the offender, character, his age and sex etc. ghastly nature of the crime. The offender being habitual would also be the factor, which can be relevantly taken into consideration. It may be stated at the cost of repetition that these are not the only reasons for which the Court can exercise this discretion. ghastly nature of the crime. The offender being habitual would also be the factor, which can be relevantly taken into consideration. It may be stated at the cost of repetition that these are not the only reasons for which the Court can exercise this discretion. Discretion always is open to be exercised by any Court dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case on any relevant or valid consideration as may be considered so by the Court while holding the trial or deciding the case at the stage of appeal or revision. It may require a notice that Section 427 Cr.P.C., as observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court, is aimed at amelioration and this aspect may also require to be kept in view while exercising the discretion." 80. In V.K. Bansal v. State of Haryana and others, 2013 (7) SCC 211 arising out of sentences awarded in different cases under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- "Applying the principle of single transaction referred to above to the above fact situations we are of the view that each one of the loan transactions/financial arrangements was a separate and distinct transaction between the complainant on the one hand and the borrowing company/Appellant on the other. If different cheques which are subsequently dishonoured on presentation, are issued by the borrowing company acting through the Appellant, the same could be said to be arising out of a single loan transaction so as to justify a direction for concurrent running of the sentences awarded in relation to dishonour of cheques relevant to each such transaction. That being so, the substantive sentence awarded to the Appellant in each case relevant to the transactions with each company referred to above ought to run concurrently. We, however, see no reason to extend that concession to transactions in which the borrowing company is different no matter the Appellant before us is the promoter/Director of the said other companies also. Similarly we see no reason to direct running of the sentence concurrently in the case filed by the State Bank of Patiala against M/s. Sabhyata Plastics and M/s. Rahul Plastics which transaction is also independent of any loan or financial assistance between the State Financial Corporation and the borrowing companies........" 81. Similarly we see no reason to direct running of the sentence concurrently in the case filed by the State Bank of Patiala against M/s. Sabhyata Plastics and M/s. Rahul Plastics which transaction is also independent of any loan or financial assistance between the State Financial Corporation and the borrowing companies........" 81. The present case involves a huge quantity of contraband and a stringent punishment for violation of the provisions of the Act is provided. The appellant had been consistently indulging in the same. The instant FIR is of the year 2006 and as per custody certificate, in other two cases, sentences of A-1 are yet to start as he was convicted in those cases on 05.11.2009 and 13.09.2011, respectively for the offences under the Act. It seems that despite the appellant facing trial in the present case he indulged in the similar crime consistently and was apprehended. Some benevolence could be shown in his favour if recovery in the instant case was quite small or may be little above the commercial quantity but this again is a huge recovery of heroin. The persons like A-1 are a menace to the society and deserve no discretion for concurrent running of the sentences. 82. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I find no merit in the instant appeal and the same is dismissed.