JUDGMENT : 1. Appellants-plaintiffs have filed this First Appeal to challenge the impugned Judgment and decree dated 8.11.2013 passed by Additional District Judge, Gulabpura, District-Bhilwara (for short, 'learned Trial Court'), whereby the learned Trial Court has dismissed suit of the appellants for specific performance of contract and cancellation of sale-deed as barred by limitation. 2. The bare necessary facts, for adjudication of lis involved in the present Appeal, are that appellants-plaintiffs filed a suit for specific performance of contract against first respondent Shriram and cancellation of sale-deed, executed by Shriram in favour of Respondents Nos. 3 and 4. In the plaint, it is inter alia, averred that respondent, Shriram, executed an agreement to sale dated 27.3.1978 in favour of appellant's father, Bhagu for a consideration amount of Rs. 4,500/- for one-forth of his agricultural land measuring 0.90 hectare jointly owned by him and his three brothers. It is also averred in the plaint that since Unkar Lal had no issue, he sold his one-forth share in favour of Respondent-Defendant No. 2-Uda through a registered sale-deed dated 24.12.1979 as such Bhagu and Uda became owners of the property. The appellant-plaintiffs have further averred in the plaint that their father expired 15 years ago and many a times they requested Shriram for registration of the sale-deed dated 27.3.1978 but he did not do so. It is also averred that after death of their father, Shriram sold one-third land to Respondent-Defendants No. 3 and 4 registered sale-deed dated 3.6.2008 although the plaintiffs are in possession of the land in question. 3. Respondent-Defendants No. 1 and 2 die not file their written statements. Respondent-Defendants No. 3 and 4 filed written statement and denied that respondent defendant No. 1 sold the land to Bhagu on 27.3.1978. They also denied possession of Bhagu over the land in question. It is also stated that Bhagu expired 15 years ago and since then the plaintiffs have not staked claim for the land in question. Respondents No. 3 and 4 also stated that they are the bona fide purchasers. They further claimed that the suit is barred by limitation and the plaintiffs have undervalued the suit and paid inadequate Court Fees. 4. On the basis of pleadings of rival parties, the learned Trial Court framed ten issues for determination. To support their case, plaintiffs examined three witnesses and the defendant in turn examined one witness. They further claimed that the suit is barred by limitation and the plaintiffs have undervalued the suit and paid inadequate Court Fees. 4. On the basis of pleadings of rival parties, the learned Trial Court framed ten issues for determination. To support their case, plaintiffs examined three witnesses and the defendant in turn examined one witness. After hearing the parties, the learned Trial Court decided all the issues in favour of appellants except Issue No. 9 regarding limitation. 5. I have bestowed by considerations to the arguments advanced by learned Counsel for the parties, perused impugned judgment and also scanned the record of the case. 6. A threadbare examination of factual gamut of the case in conjunction with the impugned judgment makes it amply clear that the learned Trial Court has found the suit of appellants barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, 'the Act') 7. Material question, which has cropped up for judicial scrutiny, is determination of question of limitation within the four corners of the Act. In that background, the point for determination in this Appeal under Order 41, Rule 33 C.P.C. is as follows:- "Whether in the facts and circumstances learned Trial Court has rightly non-suited the appellants on the ground of limitation while deciding Issue No. 9 against them?" 8. After giving my thoughtful consideration to this contentious question, on which the entire case hinges, 1 feel persuaded to scrutinise the pleadings of rival parties and analyse the evidence available on record. In order to throw light on this vital question, the basic document i.e., agreement to sale dated 27.3.1978 (Exhibit-19), executed by first respondent-Shriram, whose legal heirs are appellants in this Appeal needs threadbare examination. In order to throw light on this vital question, the basic document i.e., agreement to sale dated 27.3.1978 (Exhibit-19), executed by first respondent-Shriram, whose legal heirs are appellants in this Appeal needs threadbare examination. The agreement to sale contains following recitals:- ^ ^ fodz;&i= rknknh 4]500@& :i;s dk bZdjkjukek ^ ^ eSa fd Jhjke firk dhluk th xwtj tkfr dkaxl iS'kk dk'r fuokl&vklhn] rglhu&vklhn] ftyk&HkhykokM+k] jktLFkku dk gwaA tks fd ekS>k vklhn dh ljn dkyk ck<+ ukeh esa i0g0 vklhn esa vka0u0 1079 jdck 2@2 yxkuh 27&31 dh vkjkth ihiyh okyk uke ls iqdkjrs gSaA tks vkjkth esjs lkeykrh fgLls dh 1@2 ;kfu pkgk ua0 1068 jdck 52 ls ihoy 1@4 fgLlk lfgr esjs [kqn ds fgLls dh dk'r dh gSA ftl ij eSa dkfct o ekfyd gwaA ;g vkjkth fdlh ds jgu] cg] c{kh{k ugha gSA loZ izdkj ds okj rFkk Hkkj ls eqDr gSA ;g vkjkth reke gd gdwd e;s&pkgk fgLlk 1@4 lfgr vkt ehrh esjs :i;ksa dh vko';drk gksus ls fcy ,sot 4]500@& :i;s v{kjs pkj gtkj ikap lkS py.k ds uksVksa dh ,ot esa Jh Hkkxwth firk dhluk th xwtj tkfr dkaxl fuokl&vklhn] ftyk&HkhyokM+k dks fodz; dj esjk dCtk gd gdwd fudkydj Jh Hkkxw firk dhluk th xwtj dks dCtk ns fn;kA cspku dk :i;k ,d eq'r izkIr fd;kA vc dksbZ ljhdnkj iSnk gksdj cspku dh gqbZ vkjkth reke gd&gdwd ds eqRyhd dksbZ Hkh okjhlku [kM+k gksdj mtj o n[ky djsxk rks dqy lg lae/kh gS [kpsZ dh ftEesnkjh esjh gksxhA vkjkth dk ikM+ksl fuEu izdkj gS%& 1- iwoZ&ikM+ksl%& Jh Hkksek] xksih xwtj dh vkjkthA 2- if'pe&ikM+ksl%& Jh blh ua0 dh vkjkth dk 1@2 fgLlk Jh Hkkxw xwtj dkA 3- mRrj&ikM+ksl%& Jh [ksek S/o Hkkxw xwtj dh vkjkth dkA 4- nf{k.k&ikM+ksl%& Jh ekauw czkgE.k ? nkxksfy;k ? dh vkjkthA mijksDr pkj gh ikM+kslk chpyh vkjkth reke gd&gdwd] ikyh /kksjk] Mksyh] :[k] o'{k] iku] ikiMh lesr cspku dj esjk dCtk gd&gdwd fudky dj dCtk vkidks ns fn;k] lks [kqn dk'r djs] ;k lhj fltkjs nsos] ;k esjh Hkkafr vkidks vf/kdkj nsrk gwa fd jgu cg c{kh{k iqU; HksaV oxSjg djus dk loZ&vf/kdkj vkidks gksxk vr% ;g fodz;&i= esjh jkth [kq'kh] vdy] gksf'k;kjh] fcxj u'ks&irs] gks'k&gok'k] nq:Lr gksdj :i;k udn izkIr dj LVkEi 560@1 dh 10@& :i;s ds ux 2 dqy ux 2 :i;s 20@& ij ;g cgsukek fy[kkA vafdr rkjh[k 27-3-1978 lk{kh 1 ukuw S/o eksVk [kVhd fuokl% xksfoaniqjk lk{kh 2 ---------------------- 9. As per pleadings, Bhaguji expired 15 years prior to the date of institution of the suit. The suit, as such, was instituted on 21.7.2008. It is averred in the plaint that Bhaguji during his lifetime persuaded and called upon Shriram to register sale-deed in his favour for the land in question but his requests were not paid any heed by Shriram. It is also averred that Bhaguji was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contact. However, if the averments made in Paras 3 and 4 are properly construed then it would ipso facto reveal that no date is mentioned as to when Bhaguji called upon Shriram for performing his part of the contract. Admittedly, after execution of agreement to sale, Bhaguji survived for one and half decade and as per version of the appellants, he must have died somewhere in 1993. During the interregnum period i.e., from the date of agreement to sale till he was alive, what transpired between Bhaguji and Shriram has not been disclosed in the plaint and the plaint is conspicuously silent about all these facts. If the statements of PW-1-Sugana and PW-2-Bherulal are examined then there remains no room of doubt that in their evidence, they have not made any endeavour to explain the events for interregnum period, i.e., from the date of execution of agreement to sale uptill death of Bhaguji. Therefore, admittedly, when Shriram declined to perform his part of the contract, during the lifetime of Bhaguji, what prevented Bhaguji from initiating appropriate legal proceedings, is not at all clear. The appellants after death of Bhaguji have waited for almost 15 years for launching the legal proceedings and for this inordinate delay there is no explanation much less plausible explanation in the plaint. Moreover, there is no semblance of proof that after death of Bhaguji, Shriram reiterated the terms of the contract, or assured them to perform his part of the contact. In totality, the appellants have not whispered anything in the plaint as to when Shriram was called upon to perform his part of the contract. In this view of the matter, the suit, as such, was filed after three decades from the date of execution of agreement to sale. 10. Now, I propose to deal with the relevant law governing the province of limitation, insofar as suit, for specific performance of contract is concerned. In this view of the matter, the suit, as such, was filed after three decades from the date of execution of agreement to sale. 10. Now, I propose to deal with the relevant law governing the province of limitation, insofar as suit, for specific performance of contract is concerned. Article 54 of the Act deals with the period of limitation, which reads as under: Description of Suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run For Specific performance of a contract Three years The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. 11. Well it is true that in the agreement to sale (Ex. 19) no date is fixed for performance but then in such an eventually, period of three years is to reckon from the date, the plaintiff noticed that performance is refused. If this provision is construed in light of the averments contained in Paras 3 and 4 of the plaint, then it can very well be inferred that performance was refused by Shriram during the lifetime of Bhaguji. 12. True it is that no date is mentioned but even if this date is to be construed as any day anterior to the death of Bhaguji, the limitation has reckoned from that date and it came to an end within three years from that date. In that event, according to appellant-plaintiffs also the limitation had come to an end in the year 1996 and as such the suit, which was instituted in the year 2008, is hopelessly barred by limitation. Therefore, the learned Court below although decided all the issues in favour of appellant-plaintiffs has rightly decided the crucial issue of limitation against them. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy. It seeks to bury all acts of the past, which have not been agitated unexplainably and by lapse of time have become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28 P. 266 : "605. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy. It seeks to bury all acts of the past, which have not been agitated unexplainably and by lapse of time have become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28 P. 266 : "605. Policy of the Limitation Acts - The Courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, - (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost of evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence." 14. In Popat and Kotecha Property (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court has thoroughly discussed the law of limitation and its objects by observing that: Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their 35 remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts. So, a life-span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest res publicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for legislatively fixed period of time. [See : N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishana Murthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 ] 15. One more point, which has cropped, up in the matter, is that the suit is instituted by Legal Representatives of Bhaguji, in whose favour agreement to sale was executed by Shriram. In that background, even assisting that during lifetime of Bhaguji, Shriram repeatedly assured Bhaguji to perform part of the contract, and after his death appellants, who are his Legal Representatives, were required to file suit within three years from the date of his death. 16. In that background, even assisting that during lifetime of Bhaguji, Shriram repeatedly assured Bhaguji to perform part of the contract, and after his death appellants, who are his Legal Representatives, were required to file suit within three years from the date of his death. 16. The right to sue which was available to Bhaguji, could have been availed by his Legal Representatives within three years from the date of his death in terms of sub-Section (1) of Section 16 of the Act. Complete text of Section 16 of the Act reads as under: 16. Effect of death on or before the accrual of the right to sue. - (1) Where a person who would, if he were living, have a right to institute a suit or make an application dies before the right accrues, or where a right to institute a suit or make an application accrues only on the death of a person, the period of limitation shall be computed from the time when there is a Legal Representative of the deceased capable of instituting such suit or making such application. (2) Where a person against whom, if he were living, a right to institute a suit or make an application would have accrued dies before the right accrues, or where a right to institute a suit or make an application against any person accrues on the death of such person, the period of limitation shall be computed from the time when there is a Legal Representative of the deceased against whom the plaintiff may institute such suit or make such application. (3) Nothing in sub-Section (1) or sub-Section (2) applies to suits to enforce rights of preemption or to suit for the possession of immovable property or of a hereditary office. 17. If Section 16(1) of the Act is examined in the light of Article 54 of the Act then too suit instituted by the appellants after 15 years from the date of death of Bhaguji is barred by limitation. 18. It goes with saying that Section 3 of the Act provides that bar of limitation is required to be examined by Court in relation to every suit, Appeal or application even if limitation as such has not been set up as a defence. 19. 18. It goes with saying that Section 3 of the Act provides that bar of limitation is required to be examined by Court in relation to every suit, Appeal or application even if limitation as such has not been set up as a defence. 19. While considering the plea of limitation raised by respondents, learned Trial Court has framed the issue and thoroughly examined the same while answering the same against the appellants and in favour of respondents. In my opinion, the learned Trial Court while dilating on Issue No. 9 has considered the relevant provisions of the Act namely Sections 54 and 16 of the Act and has further considered the wrigger of Section 3 of the Act for non-suiting the appellant-plaintiffs. 20. In the backdrop of the facts and circumstances of the instant case, I have no hesitation to hold that the suit filed by the appellant-plaintiffs was hopelessly barred by limitation and the same has been rightly rejected by the learned Trial Court on the ground of limitation . Therefore, in totality, the point for determination deserves answer against the appellants and in favour of respondents and the decision rendered by learned Trial Court on the said issue cannot be faulted. 21. The analysis of the evidence in conjunction with the pleadings for arriving at its conclusion on Issue No. 9 is a just decision which cannot be categorised as infirm or perverse from any stretch of imagination warranting interference of this Court in this Appeal. 22. The upshot of above discussion is that this Appeal fails and the same is, hereby dismissed.Costs are made easy.Appeal dismissed.