JUDGMENT : Hon’ble Alok Singh, J. (Oral) In both the writ petition identical questions of facts and law are involved, therefore, both the writ petitions are heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment with the consent of learned counsel of the parties. 2. To understand the controversy, facts of Writ Petition No. 463 of 2015 (M/S) are being taken. 3. Present Writ Petition No. 463 (M/S) of 2015 is filed assailing the order dated 31.12.2014, Annexure no. 1 to the writ petition issued by respondent no.3, whereby explosive license to install and run a petrol pump was declined to be renewed in favour of the respondent no.4. 4. Undisputedly, petitioner is selling agent of the respondent no.4 - petroleum company; a lease was executed between Pt. Prem Dutt Balutia S/o Moti Ram Balutia of Haldwani and Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited on annual rent on 01.05.1951 initially for the period of 30 years; Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, Oil Company came into existence somewhere in the year 1976, under Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertaking in India) Act, 1976. Prem Dutt Balutia S/o Moti Ram Balutia of Haldwani and Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited on annual rent on 01.05.1951 initially for the period of 30 years; Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, Oil Company came into existence somewhere in the year 1976, under Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertaking in India) Act, 1976. All the rights, properties and liabilities as stood in favour of the Burmah Shell Oil Company, after the appointed day stood vested in favour of B.P.C.L. respondent no.4; Petitioner was earlier appointed as selling agent by the then Burmah Shell Oil Company and, thereafter, was being permitted by the B.P.C.L. to run a petrol pump on behalf of the Oil Company over the site, in question; As per condition No. 7 of the lease deed, lease was granted for a period of 30 years w.e.f. 01.05.1951 with the stipulation that lessee, if so desire, may, by way of one month’s advance notice before the expiry of the term of lease, may show his desire for renewal of the lease for further term of 30 years, whereupon, lease may be renewed for further period of 30 years; initial period of lease stood expired on 31.12.1980; lease was not renewed between the lesser and the lessee i.e. Oil Company after the expiry of period of 30 years; Chetan Balutia claiming himself to be lesser/owner of the site has preferred Writ Petition (M/S) No. 2599 of 2013, before this Court seeking a writ of mandamus not to renew the license in view of the fact that lease was never extended and meanwhile, to place the license under suspension; during the pendency of Writ Petition (M/S) No. 2599 of 2013 renewal was declined, therefore, selling agent has preferred this writ petition. 5. I have heard Mr. Pankaj Purohit, learned counsel for the for the petitioner, Mr. P.S. Bisht, learned Standing Counsel appearing for Union of India/respondent no. 1 to 3 and Mr. S.S. Chauhan, learned counsel for the respondent no.4 and have carefully perused the record. 6. Mr. 5. I have heard Mr. Pankaj Purohit, learned counsel for the for the petitioner, Mr. P.S. Bisht, learned Standing Counsel appearing for Union of India/respondent no. 1 to 3 and Mr. S.S. Chauhan, learned counsel for the respondent no.4 and have carefully perused the record. 6. Mr. Pankaj Purohit, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/selling agent contends that although explosive license was declined to be renewed in favour of the petroleum company, however, petitioner is the selling agent of the petroleum company i.e. respondent no.4, therefore, petitioner has every right to challenge the order impugned by way of writ petition and he should not be denied to challenge the impugned order on the ground of locus, as the petitioner is the person, who is suffering because of the denial of the renewal of the license. 7. Mr. Pankaj Purohit, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has vehemently argued that in view of Clause-7 of the lease deed, the renewal of lease deed was not made by the parties in expressed terms or by executing the renewed lease deed, however, in view of Section 5 (2) and Section 7 of Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertaking in India) Act, 1976 same shall be deemed to have been renewed for further period of 30 years. 8. Hon’ble Apex Court in the Case of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. P. Kesavan and another, reported in 2004 Vol-9 SCC 772 has held as under: “The Parliament enacted the Act which came into force on or about 24.1.1976, in terms whereof the right, title and interest of Burmah Shell in relation to its undertakings in India stood transferred to and vested in the Central Government. The effect of such vesting is stated in Section 4 of the Act whereby and whereunder, inter alia, all assets, rights, powers, authorities and privileges and all property, movable and immovable vested in the Central Government. The effect of such vesting is stated in Section 4 of the Act whereby and whereunder, inter alia, all assets, rights, powers, authorities and privileges and all property, movable and immovable vested in the Central Government. By reason of sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Act where any property was held in India by Burmah Shell under any lease or under any right of tenancy, the Central Government became the lessee and tenant, as the case may be, in respect thereof as if the lease or tenancy in relation to such property had been granted to it and thereupon all the rights under such lease or tenancy was to be deemed to have been transferred to, and vested in the Central Government. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Act provides that on the expiry of the term of any lease or tenancy referred to in sub-section (1), such lease or tenancy was, if so desired by the Central Government, to be renewed on the same terms and condition on which the lease and tenancy was held by Burmah Shell immediately before the appointed day. ‘Appointed day’ has been defined to mean the date of commencement of the said Act which, as noticed hereinbefore, has been specified on 24.1.1976. Section 7 of the said Act provides for the Central Government to direct vesting of the undertakings of the Burmah Shell in a Government company. It is not in dispute that an appropriate notification in terms of sub- section (1) of Section 7 has been issued in favour of the appellant herein. Sub-section (3) of Section 7 provides that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 5 shall apply to a lease or tenancy which vests in a Government company as tenancy in the Central Government and reference therein to the Central Government shall be construed as the reference to the Government company. Section 11 of the Act provides for a non-obstante clause stating that the provisions thereof shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than the said Act. FINDINGS : The said Act is a special statute vis-a-vis the Transfer of Property Act which is a general statute. FINDINGS : The said Act is a special statute vis-a-vis the Transfer of Property Act which is a general statute. By reason of the provisions of the said Act, the right, title and interest of Burmah Shell vested in the Central Government and consequently upon the appellant Company. A lease of immovable property is also an asset and/or right in an immovable property. The lease-hold right, thus, held by Burmah Shell vested in the appellant. By reason of sub- section (2) of Section 5 of the Act, a right of renewal was created in the appellant in terms whereof in the event of exercise of its option, the existing lease was renewed for a further term on the same terms and conditions. As noticed hereinbefore, Section 11 of the Act provides for a non- obstante clause. As would appear from the preamble of the Transfer of Property Act, the same applies only to transfer by act of parties. A transfer by operation of law is not validated or invalidated by anything contained in the Act. A transfer which takes place by operation of law, therefore, need not meet the requirement of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act or Indian Registration Act. The said Act is a special statute. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 thereof mandates that in the event the appellant desires to renew the lease or tenancy, the same would be renewed on the same terms and conditions on which the lease or tenancy was held by Burmah Shell immediately prior to the appointed day. Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Act provides for a legal fiction in terms whereof the appellant herein became a lessee in respect of the leasehold. A legal fiction, as is well-known, must be given its full effect [See Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. And Others, (2003) 2 SCC 111 ]. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Act is imperative in character and must be construed as such. The maxim ‘generalia specialibus non derogant’ meaning thereby that general things do not derogate special things shall, thus, apply in the instant case and in that view of the matter as admittedly the appellant herein has expressed its desire to renew the lease, sub-section (2) of Section 5 read with sub-section (3) of Section 7 thereof shall be attracted. The maxim ‘generalia specialibus non derogant’ meaning thereby that general things do not derogate special things shall, thus, apply in the instant case and in that view of the matter as admittedly the appellant herein has expressed its desire to renew the lease, sub-section (2) of Section 5 read with sub-section (3) of Section 7 thereof shall be attracted. [See Indian Handicrafts Emporium and Others vs. Union of India and Others [ (2003) 7 SCC 589 ], D.R. Yadav and Another vs. R.K. Singh and Another [ (2003) 7 SCC 110 ], Union of India and Others vs. B.N. Jha [ (2003) 4 SCC 531 ], Ashok Leyland Ltd. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. [ 2004 (1) SCALE 224 ] and M.P. Vidyut Karamchari Sangh vs. M.P. Electricity Board (Civil Appeal No.2510 of 2002) disposed of on 18.3.2004. Furthermore, Section 11 of the Act provides for a non- obstante clause. An overriding effect, therefore, has been given thereby over all other laws for the time being in force. In Aswini Kumar Ghose and Another vs. Arabinda Bose and Another [ AIR 1952 SC 369 ], it was observed : “...The enacting part of a statute must, where it is clear, be taken to control the non obstante clause where both cannot be read harmoniously; for, even apart from such clause, a later law abrogates earlier laws clearly inconsistent with it. Posteriores leges priores contrarias abrogant (Broome’s Legal Maxims, Edn. 10 p. 347). Here, s. 2 entitles every Advocate of the Supreme Court as of right to practise in any High Court in India.” We, therefore, are of the opinion that the legislative scheme contained in the said Act leads to only one conclusion that if Government company expresses its desire to renew the lease, the same would stand renewed on the same terms and conditions. Section 5(2) and Section 7(3) of the Act are required to be given its purposive meaning, having regard to the object and purport the statute seeks to achieve. The Central Government by reason of the provisions of the said Act acquired running business undertakings dealing in distribution and marketing of petroleum products. Section 5(2) and Section 7(3) of the Act are required to be given its purposive meaning, having regard to the object and purport the statute seeks to achieve. The Central Government by reason of the provisions of the said Act acquired running business undertakings dealing in distribution and marketing of petroleum products. The leases or tenancy for outlets are, therefore, continued to be kept with the Central Government or the Government company, as the case may be, so that no let or hindrance is placed in the matter of distribution of the products from established retails outlets, unless alternate arrangements are made. Having regard to the object of the Act, as noticed hereinbefore, it is difficult to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents to the effect that the expression mere desire by the Central Government or the appellant was not enough and they were required to show something more, as for example existence of need for renewal of the lease. The central Government or the Government company is a state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. There are required to act fairly. It is not the case of the respondents herein that desire to get the lease renewed was actuated by any malice or ill-will or the same was otherwise unfair and unreasonable. In that view of the matter, it is difficult to construe Section 5(32) of the Act as not laying down a law not contemplating automatic renewal of the lease. The provisions of the Transfer of Property Act have no application in a case where a transfer of property takes place by operation of law.” 9. Undisputedly, initially, lease was commenced w.e.f. 01.01.1951, and the period of 30 years stood expired on 31.12.1980. There is nothing on record to show that B.P.C.L has ever issued any notice, as stipulated under Section 5 (2) read with Section 7 of the Act 1976 for the renewal of lease for further period of 30 years either in the year 1980 or 1981. Had there been any notice issued in the year 1980 or 1981, perhaps position would have been otherwise. Notice, allegedly issued on 28.05.2009 Annexure no. 4 to the Writ Petition (M/S) No. 2599 of 2013, in my considered opinion cannot fill up the gap arising w.e.f. 01.01.1981 to 2010. Had there been any notice issued in the year 1980 or 1981, perhaps position would have been otherwise. Notice, allegedly issued on 28.05.2009 Annexure no. 4 to the Writ Petition (M/S) No. 2599 of 2013, in my considered opinion cannot fill up the gap arising w.e.f. 01.01.1981 to 2010. Although, I am conscious about the fact that had notice been issued by the petroleum company for renewal of the lease in the year 1980-81, lease would have been renewed for further period of 30 years automatically in view of the Act, 1976, since that desire was never shown by the B.P.C.L. in the year 1980-81, therefore, lease cannot be deemed to have been renewed w.e.f. 01.01.1981 to 2010. 10. There is another aspect of the matter that as per condition no. 3 of the lease deed, lessee cannot transfer, underlet or part with the possession of the demised premises without previous consent in writing of the lesser. There is nothing on the record to show that Company ever sought and granted permission by the lesser that possession of the site, in question, can be delivered by the Company-lessee to its agent i.e. petitioner. Possession of the petitioner-selling agent of the respondent No. 4 thus cannot be said to be legal as same is in violation of Condition No. 3 of the lease deed. Respondent No. 4 is not in actual possession of the lease hold site in view of the fact petrol pump was being run by the selling agent i.e. the petitioner. Therefore, license cannot be renewed in favour of the respondent no. 4 who is not in actual, physical possession. 11. There is yet another aspect of the matter that license was declined to be renewed in favour of the respondent no. 4, however, respondent no. 4 is not filing any petition challenging the impugned order and same is being challenged by the petitioner/selling agent, who has absolutely no locus to challenge the order which was not passed against him and was, in fact, passed against the respondent no. 4. 12. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of C. Albert Morris Vs. K. Chandrashekhran and others (2006) 1 S.C.C. 228 in Para No. 43 has held as under:- “In our opinion, any right which the dealer has over his site was the right which he had acquired in terms of the lease. 4. 12. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of C. Albert Morris Vs. K. Chandrashekhran and others (2006) 1 S.C.C. 228 in Para No. 43 has held as under:- “In our opinion, any right which the dealer has over his site was the right which he had acquired in terms of the lease. When that lease expired and when the landlord declined to renew the same and also called upon the erstwhile tenant to surrender possession, the erstwhile lessee could no longer assert that he had any right to the site. His continued occupation of something which he had no right to occupy cannot be regarded as source of a right to the land of which he himself was not in lawful possession. As observed by this Court in the case of M.C. Chockalingam Vs. V. Manickavasagam litigious possession cannot be regarded as lawful possession. As rightly pointed out by the Division Bench of the High Court the right referred to in this Rule has necessarily to be regarded as right which is in accordance with law and the right to the site must be one which is capable of being regarded as lawful. We have already referred to Bhawanji Lakhamshi Vs. Himatlal Jamnadas Dani wherein this Court held that the act of holding over after the expiration of the term does not create a tenancy of any kind. A new tenancy is created only when the landlord assents to the continuance of the erstwhile tenant or the landlord agrees to accept rent for the continued possession of the land by the erstwhile tenant. The contention of Mr. L.N. Rao that the landlord’s assent should be inferred from the conduct of the landlord who had filed the suit for ejectment, but did not pursue the same, has no force. This suit was withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action, liberty which the Court has granted. The possession of this site by the erstwhile lessee does not ripen into a lawful possession merely because the landlord did not proceed with the suit for ejectment at that time, but reserved the right to bring such a suit at a later point of time. That cannot amount to an assent on his part to the continued occupation of the landlord under cover of a right asserted by the erstwhile lessee. That cannot amount to an assent on his part to the continued occupation of the landlord under cover of a right asserted by the erstwhile lessee. The words “right to the site” in Rule 153(1) (i) must, therefore, in our opinion, be given their full meaning and the effect that unless the person seeking a licence is in a position to establish a right to the site, he would not be entitled to hold or have his licence renewed. We have already rejected the contention of Mr. L.N. Rao that the appellant-tenant is a statutory tenant for the reasons recorded earlier. The lease deed is very clear as to what was leased. The lease was of vacant land. That is evident from the recitals in the plaint, legal notice, lease deed etc. It is, therefore, not in dispute that the lease of land is not covered by the statute, the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1969 in force extending protection to tenants”. 13. As per the dictum of Hon’ble Apex Court petroleum license cannot be granted or renewed in favour of the lessee, after expiry of the period of the lease deed irrespective of the fact that the lesser has taken any action for eviction of the lessee after the expiry of lease period or not. Since there is absolutely no material on record to show that lease was desired to be renewed in the year 1980 or 1981 by issuing notices as contemplated in Section 5 and 7 of the 1976 Act, therefore, lease cannot be said to have been renewed, after 1980 and subsequent notice issued in 2009 cannot be treated with retrospective effect and shall not amounts to renewal of lease after 1980, therefore, B.P.C.L. is not a lessee after 31.12.1980, therefore, license cannot be renewed in favour of the respondent no. 4 in view of the dictum of the Apex Court in the case of C. Albert Morris (Supra) 14. For the reasons stated hereinbefore, Writ Petition fails and is hereby dismissed. 15. CLMA No. 1835 of 2015 and 2178 of 2015 also stand disposed of accordingly. 16. Writ Petition (M/S) No. 2599 of 2013 also stands disposed of accordingly.