Judgment : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, Chief Justice (oral) By the medium of these appeals, the appellants have questioned the award, dated 6th March, 2009, passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-II, Solan, (for short, the Tribunal), in MAC Petition No.10-S/2 of 2008, titled Meena Devi vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation and others, whereby compensation to the tune of Rs.13,78,680/-, alongwith interest at the rate of 12% per annum, was awarded in favour of the claimant and the Himachal Road Transport Corporation (HRTC, for short), being the employer, was saddled with the liability. 2. Feeling aggrieved, the HRTC has questioned the impugned award by way of FAO No.364 of 2009, while the driver and the conductor (original respondents No.2 and 3, respectively), have filed the appeal being FAO No.346 of 2009. Thus, both the appeals are taken up together for final disposal. 3. Facts of the case, in brief, are that on 15th September, 2007, Meena Devi, the claimant-injured, boarded the bus belonging to HRTC. When she was alighting from the bus on reaching her destination, the driver of the bus suddenly put the bus into motion, as a result of which the claimant fell down and sustained multiple injuries. She was immediately taken to IGMC, Shimla, fromwhere was referred to PGI, Chandigarh, again from PGI she was taken to IGMC, Shimla, thereafter to Hospital at Arki. From Arki, the claimant-injured was taken to PGI, Chandigarh, and was operated upon there twice. It has been pleaded that the claimant-injured was still in coma. Thus, the injured filed the Claim Petition through her husband claiming compensation to the tune of Rs.20.00 lacs, as per the break-ups given in the Claim Petition. 4. The Claim Petition was resisted by the respondents. The Tribunal, on the pleadings of the parties, framed the following issues: “1. Whether the injuries were suffered by the petitioner on account of rash and negligent driving by the respondent No.2, as alleged? OPP 2. If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, whether the petitioner is entitled for compensation, if so the amount thereof and by whom? OPP 3. Relief.” 5. The claimant-injured, in order to prove her case, has examined as many as six witnesses, while the driver and the conductor (original respondents No.2 and 3) appeared in the witness box as RW-1 and RW-2, respectively. No other evidence was led by the respondents. 6. OPP 3. Relief.” 5. The claimant-injured, in order to prove her case, has examined as many as six witnesses, while the driver and the conductor (original respondents No.2 and 3) appeared in the witness box as RW-1 and RW-2, respectively. No other evidence was led by the respondents. 6. I have gone through the pleadings and the evidence led by the parties. The claimant-injured has proved by leading evidence that the driver of the offending bus had driven the bus rashly and negligently and had caused the accident in which the claimant-injured sustained injuries and became permanent disabled. The Tribunal has rightly made discussion in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the impugned award. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants in FAO No.346 of 2009 argued that the driver of the offending Bus was acquitted of the criminal case registered against him, by the Trial Magistrate. Thus, it was submitted that the Tribunal has wrongly held that the driver had driven the offending Bus rashly and negligently. 8. The argument, though attractive, is devoid of any force for the reason that in order to prove guilt against an accused in a criminal case, the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. In a claim petition, the claimants have to prove their case summarily and it cannot be dismissed on the ground that the driver of the offending vehicle has earned acquittal order. My this view is fortified by the judgment of the Apex Court in case titled as N.K.V. Bros. (P.) Ltd. vs. M. Karumai Ammal and others etc., reported in AIR 1980, SC 1354. 9. It is also beaten law of the land that, in claim petition, the negligence on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle has to be decided on the hallmark of preponderance of probabilities and not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Further also, the claimants claiming compensation in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act is not to be seen as an adversial litigation, but is to be determined while keeping in view the aim and object of granting compensation. My this view is fortified by the judgment of the Apex Court in Dulcina Fernandes and others vs. Joaquim Xavier Cruz and another, (2013) 10 SCC 646 . 10. My this view is fortified by the judgment of the Apex Court in Dulcina Fernandes and others vs. Joaquim Xavier Cruz and another, (2013) 10 SCC 646 . 10. On the other hand, from the pleadings and the evidence adduced, one comes to inescapable conclusion that the accident was the outcome of rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending bus. No doubt, the driver of the offending bus appeared in the witness box as RW-1, however, he was not in a position to dislodge the evidence of the claimant-injured that the accident was the outcome of rash and negligent driving of the driver. On the contrary, the driver of the bus, in his statement as RW-1, has admitted that he had driven the offending bus at therelevant point of time. Therefore, the findings returned by the Tribunal on issue No.1 are liable to be upheld and the same are upheld accordingly. 11. Now coming to issue No.2, the Tribunal, while assessing the compensation, has made detailed discussion in paragraphs 13 to 17 of the impugned award. It is the positive case of the claimant-injured that she was in coma, has become permanent disabled, which has shattered her physical frame, is dependent upon others. Because of the accident, life of the children and the husband of the injured has become miserable. It has also affected her matrimonial family and other spheres of life. 12. The Apex Court in case titled as R.D. Hattangadi versus M/s Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. & others, reported in AIR 1995 SC 755 , had discussed all aspects and laid down guidelines how a guess work is to be done and how compensation is to be awarded under various heads in the cases where permanent disability is suffered by the victim of a vehicular accident. It is apt to reproduce paras 9 to 14 of the judgment hereinbelow: “9. Broadly speaking while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary-damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which is capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which is capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include: (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters, i.e., on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e., on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life. 10. It cannot be disputed that because of the accident the appellant who was an active practising lawyer has become paraplegic on account of the injuries sustained by him. It is really difficult in this background to assess the exact amount of compensation for the pain and agony suffered by the appellant and for having become a life long handicapped. No amount of compensation can restore the physical frame of the appellant. That is why it has been said by courts that whenever any amount is determined as the compensation payable for any injury suffered during an accident, the object is to compensate such injury "so far as money can compensate" because it is impossible to equate the money with the human sufferings or personal deprivations. Money cannot renew a broken and shattered physical frame. 11. In the case Ward v. James, 1965 (1) All ER 563, it was said: "Although you cannot give a man so gravely injured much for his "lost years", you can, however, compensate him for his loss during his shortened span, that is, during his expected "years of survival". You can compensate him for his loss of earnings during that time, and for the cost of treatment, nursing and attendance. But how can you compensate him for being rendered a helpless invalid? You can compensate him for his loss of earnings during that time, and for the cost of treatment, nursing and attendance. But how can you compensate him for being rendered a helpless invalid? He may, owing to brain injury, be rendered unconscious for the rest of his days, or, owing to back injury, be unable to rise from his bed. He has lost everything that makes life worthwhile. Money is no good to him. Yet Judges and Juries have to do the best they can and give him what they think is fair. No wonder they find it well-nigh insoluble. They are being asked to calculate the incalculable. The figure is bound to be for the most part a conventional sum. The Judges have worked out a pattern, and they keep it in line with the changes in the value of money." 12. In its very nature whenever a Tribunal or a Court is required to fix the amount of compensation in cases of accident, it involves some guess work, some hypothetical consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of the disability caused. But all the aforesaid elements have to be viewed with objective standards. 13. This Court in the case of C.K. Subramonia Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair, AIR 1970 SC 376 , in connection with the Fatal Accidents Act has observed (at p. 380): "In assessing damages, the Court must exclude all considerations of matter which rest in speculation or fancy though conjecture to some extent is inevitable." 14. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 12 regarding non-pecuniary loss at page 446 it has been said :- "Non-pecuniary loss : the pattern. Damages awarded for pain and suffering and loss of amenity constitute a conventional sum which is taken to be the sum which society deems fair, fairness being interpreted by the courts in the light of previous decisions. Thus there has been evolved a set of conventional principles providing a provisional guide to the comparative severity of different injuries, and indicating a bracket of damages into which a particular injury will currently fall. The particular circumstances of the plaintiff, including his age and any unusual deprivation he may suffer, is reflected in the actual amount of the award. Thus there has been evolved a set of conventional principles providing a provisional guide to the comparative severity of different injuries, and indicating a bracket of damages into which a particular injury will currently fall. The particular circumstances of the plaintiff, including his age and any unusual deprivation he may suffer, is reflected in the actual amount of the award. The fall in the value of money leads to a continuing reassessment of these awards and to periodic reassessments of damages at certain key points in the pattern where the disability is readily identifiable and not subject to large variations in individual cases." 13. Following the law expounded by the Apex Court, this Court, in catena of judgments, has held that in an injury case, the courts are expected to pass an award which appears to be fair, just and proper, and keeping in mind the hardships, discomfort, loss of amenities of life, pain and sufferings undergone and has to undergo by the claimant-injured throughout his/her life. 14. The Tribunal, in the instant case, has taken the monthly income of the injured as Rs.3,000/-. Keeping in view the age of the injured i.e. 45 years at the time of accident, the Tribunal has applied the multiplier of 15 and, thus, awarded Rs.5,40,000/- under the head ‘loss of income’, in favour of the claimant-injured. Keeping in view the facts of the case, the amount awarded under this head appears to be on the lower side, however, since the claimant-injured has not questioned the impugned award, the same is reluctantly upheld. 15. The Tribunal, in paragraph 14 of the impugned award, has discussed in detail that the claimant-injured has become 100% disabled, is physically wreck, therefore, needed an attendant to look after her. Accordingly, the Tribunal assessed, and rightly so, the attendant charges as Rs.3,000/- per month and after applying the multiplier of 15, awarded Rs.5,40,000/- under the head ‘attendant charges’. 16. In addition to it, the Tribunal has also awarded Rs.1.00 lac and Rs.50,000/- under the heads ‘pain and suffering’ and ‘loss of amenities of life’, respectively, which, keeping in view the condition of the claimant-injured, appear to be on the lower side. However, as has been observed above, since the claimants have not assailed the impugned award, therefore, I have been left with no option but to reluctantly uphold the same. 17. However, as has been observed above, since the claimants have not assailed the impugned award, therefore, I have been left with no option but to reluctantly uphold the same. 17. In paragraph 16 of the impugned award, the Tribunal, keeping in view the material placed on record, has awarded Rs.48,680/- towards expenses on medicines. The Tribunal, in paragraph 17 of the impugned award, has awarded Rs.1.00 lac towards future medical treatment, which again appears to be on the lower side. However, since the claimant-injured has not questioned the impugned award, the same is liable to be upheld reluctantly. 18. Having said so, the impugned award merits to be upheld and the same is upheld. As a consequence, both the appeals are dismissed. The Registry is directed to release the entire amount of compensation, alongwith interest, in favour of the claimant-injured forthwith.