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2015 DIGILAW 1456 (RAJ)

Abdul Karim Sheikh v. State of Rajasthan

2015-08-04

AJAY RASTOGI, J.K.RANKA

body2015
JUDGMENT : Ajay Rastogi, J. Instant intra-court appeal is directed against order of the ld. Single Judge dt.02.03.2006. The brief facts of the case which are relevant for the present purpose can be summarized are that the educational institution (respondent No.6) named Azad Secondary School, Fatehpur, District Sikar was receiving 60% grant-in-aid from the State Government and the service conditions of the employees, at the relevant point of time, were governed by the Rajasthan Rules for Payment of Grant-in-Aid to Non-Government Educational & Cultural Institutions, 1963 (in short called as “the Rules of 1963”) which are non-statutory and mere executive instructions of the Government to the private educational aided institutions as a condition for implementation of pay scales and to govern the service conditions of the employees/Teachers working in the educational institutions receiving grant-in-aid. This fact can further be noticed from the scheme of Rules, 1963 that it is open to an institution to either accept those executive instructions or not to accept them. If it decides not to accept the executive instructions, it will naturally not get the grant-in-aid which is contingent on its accepting the conditions contained in the executive instructions and on the other hand, if the institution accepts the conditions contained in the executive instructions, it will receive the grant-in-aid. If, however, having accepted executive instructions containing the terms & conditions, the institution does not carry out the executive instructions, the Government will naturally have the right to withhold the grant-in-aid and that is clearly evident from the R.4(i) of the Rules, 1963. It is how a matter between the Government and the private aided institution being regulated under the scheme of Rules, 1963. These Rules of 1963 indeed have no statutory force and are mere executive instructions, introduced for the purpose of granting grant-in-aid to the private aided institutions. What grants the State Government should make to a private aided institution and for what terms, are matters for the State Government to decide. Conditions of these grants may be prescribed by the statutory rules, if any, and there is, however, no law preventing the State Government from prescribing the conditions of such grants by mere executive instructions which do not have the force of law. Conditions of these grants may be prescribed by the statutory rules, if any, and there is, however, no law preventing the State Government from prescribing the conditions of such grants by mere executive instructions which do not have the force of law. However, at a later point of time, the State Government came across with the situation that the grant-in-aid is not being properly utilized and the service conditions of the employee of the private aided institutions could not be properly safeguarded or there being an exploitation by the Management, keeping the object of Right to Education as a paramount consideration and to provide for better organization and development of education in the private aided institutions in the State of Rajasthan, the State Government enacted “the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Act, 1989” (in short called as “the Act of 1989”) which came into force after its publication in the gazette w.e.f. 01.01.1993 and after the statutory Act of 1989 came into force, it certainly regulated the service conditions of the employees and also the terms on which State holds statutory power to control the grant-in-aid sanctioned to the private aided institutions and to regulate the provisions of the Act, grant-in-aid and service conditions, etc., the State Government, in exercise of its powers conferred u/Sec.43 of the Act of 1989 and all other powers enabling it in this behalf, framed the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions (Recognition, Grant-in-Aid and Service Conditions etc.) Rules, 1993 which came into force on publication in gazette on 01.04.1993. Prior to the Act of 1989 coming into force w.e.f. 01.01.1993, on its publication in the gazette, the service conditions of the employees and grant-in-aid of all the private aided institutions which were receiving grant-in-aid were being regulated by executive instructions in the form of Rules, 1963 having no statutory force and are not enforceable in the court of law. In the instant case, the respondent-Society is running various educational institutions including the respondent No.6 named Azad Secondary School which later on has become a Senior Secondary School and receiving 60% grant-in-aid from the State Government. The appellant-petitioner joined as a Teacher on 01.11.1959 but because of a delinquency committed by him, he was placed under suspension vide order dt.18.02.1982. In the instant case, the respondent-Society is running various educational institutions including the respondent No.6 named Azad Secondary School which later on has become a Senior Secondary School and receiving 60% grant-in-aid from the State Government. The appellant-petitioner joined as a Teacher on 01.11.1959 but because of a delinquency committed by him, he was placed under suspension vide order dt.18.02.1982. For his alleged misbehaviour and ill-treatment with the students and parents, consistent complaints were received by the Management of the institution and he was once removed from service vide order dt.23.12.1977 but subsequently the Management, on his mercy petition, reinstated him back in service but it is alleged by the respondents in reply that continuous complaints were received against him by the Management that he is always misbehaving not only with the students but also with their parents and one of the parents submitted a complaint to the Management on 28.01.1982 and it was complained that while he was working as Teacher, he took part in the local politics which resulted in polluting the atmosphere of institution with intra-party and group rivalry politics and he has also contested elections of the Municipal Board scheduled on 14.02.1992 from Ward No.7. The Management Committee in its meeting dt.03.02.1982 took up the matter and resolved to warn the appellant-petitioner and asked him not to contest such elections and informed him vide letter dt.03.02.1982 to withdraw his name from the Municipal Board Elections or else resign from service but since no change came forward in conduct of the petitioner-appellant, the matter was again taken up by the Management Committee in its meeting dt.15.02.1982 and it was resolved to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against him and accordingly, pending such proceedings, vide order dt.16.02.1982, the appellant-petitioner was placed under suspension and a chargesheet dt.18.02.1982 was served upon him. In response to the chargesheet, the appellant submitted his reply and he admitted that he has contested the Municipal Board Elections under the general relaxation granted in this behalf by the State Government. Furthermore vide letter dt.04.03.1982 supplementary chargesheet was issued to the appellant-petitioner with the allegations that he was regularly misbehaving with the students by abusing them and using filthy language and he was pressurizing the students to give him money and he was found creating communal disharmony between the students of two communities. Furthermore vide letter dt.04.03.1982 supplementary chargesheet was issued to the appellant-petitioner with the allegations that he was regularly misbehaving with the students by abusing them and using filthy language and he was pressurizing the students to give him money and he was found creating communal disharmony between the students of two communities. A joint complaint by 120 parents dt.07.03.1982 was received against the appellant that he had taken part in the procession led by hooligans and raising slogans against the Chairman of the Municipal Board and distributing pamphlets. The appellant-petitioner submitted reply to the supplementary chargesheet dt.11.03.1982 and thereafter the Management Committee appointed Mr. Mohd. Farooq Kureshi as Enquiry Officer on 12.03.1982 and after the matter was inquired upon, the appellant-petitioner was found guilty of charges, particularly the charge that he was taking part in the local politics and contested elections of Municipal Board despite orders from the Management not to do so and he was found guilty of abusing the students and misbehaving with them and their parents. Since the decision was to be taken on the Enquiry Report, furnished by the Enquiry Officer, the District Education Officer was accordingly informed vide letter dt.10.05.1982 to send his nominee to participate in the meeting. In compliance thereof, a letter was sent by the Office of District Education Officer, Sikar dt.14.05.1982 addressed to the Deputy District Education Officer, Fatehpur to participate in the meeting of Management Committee as his nominee and thereafter, the appellant-petitioner was served with a notice dt.17.05.1982 and the Management Committee in its meeting dt.17.05.1982, after taking into consideration all the documents placed before it, vide its Resolution No.14, resolved to remove the appellant-petitioner from service. The nominee of the District Education Officer also participated in the meeting of Management Committee and accordingly the services of appellant-petitioner were terminated and he was accordingly communicated vide letter dt.18.05.1982. Copy of the minutes of the meeting of the Management Committee were sent to office of the District Education Officer vide communication dt.31.05.1982 and that was challenged by the appellant-petitioner by filing of an appeal before the District Education Officer. Copy of memo of appeal was sent to the respondent-institution and at the same time the appellate authority appointed Enquiry Officer to inquire into the matter. However, the District Education Officer while setting aside the order of punishment dt.18.05.1982, ordered to reinstate the appellant-petitioner in service vide order dt.18.12.1985. Copy of memo of appeal was sent to the respondent-institution and at the same time the appellate authority appointed Enquiry Officer to inquire into the matter. However, the District Education Officer while setting aside the order of punishment dt.18.05.1982, ordered to reinstate the appellant-petitioner in service vide order dt.18.12.1985. Since according to the respondent-institution, the District Education Officer, Sikar acted in an arbitrary manner and had not provided adequate and reasonable opportunity to the respondent-institution, the respondent-institution approached the higher authority i.e. the Director, Primary & Secondary Education and after the matter being inquired upon by him, order passed by the District Education Officer, Sikar dt.18.12.1985 was cancelled and he was directed to re-examine the record of enquiry and pass order after hearing the parties in accordance with law vide order dt.18.02.1987 and thereafter the matter was again inquired upon and the District Education Officer was satisfied and confirmed the minutes of meeting of Management Committee removing the appellant-petitioner from service, vide order dt.11.06.1992 and that was subject matter of challenge by filing of a writ petition before the ld. Single Judge. The ld. Single Judge after examining record of the enqiury and so also the pleadings arrived to the conclusion that a fair and reasonable opportunity was afforded to the appellant-petitioner and no error has been committed in the decision making process which was in conformity and in compliance of the principles of natural justice which does not call for interference and accordingly dismissed the writ petition vide order dt.02.03.2006 which is under challenge in the instant proceedings. The main thrust of submission of counsel for the appellant is that once the appellate authority–District Education Officer, Sikar vide his order dt.18.12.1985 set aside the order of penalty dt.18.05.1982 and there is no such provision u/R.4 of the Rules of 1963 of further appeal which could be preferred and that being so the order passed by the Director, Primary & Secondary Education, may be higher in hierarchy, is not sustainable in law and the scheme of Rules, 1963 also does not contemplate the order passed by him setting aside the order passed by the District Education Officer as an appellate authority vide his order dt.18.02.1987 and that is without authority and competence and if his submission sustains, the later order passed by the District Education Officer dt.11.06.1992, after the matter being remitted back to him, in compliance of the order of the Director, Primary & Secondary Education dt.18.02.1987, confirming the order of penalty dt.18.05.1982, is not sustainable in law and the present appellant is entitled for reinstatement in service in compliance of the order of the District Education Officer, passed as an appellate authority, dt.18.12.1985 and the ld. Single Judge has committed serious error of law in dismissing the petition which requires interference of this court. On the last date of hearing when the matter came before us, while considering merits of the case, we directed counsel for appellant to address on the question as to if there is any violation of non-statutory Rules, 1963, can still mandamus be issued by this court to reinstate the employee in service or the mechanism provided under the scheme of Rules, 1963, R.4 – condition of service of the staff in particular, under the Rules of 1963 and R.4(i) envisages that in case the management fails to pay the amount, if any, specified in the order of appellate authority, the State Government or the Director may deduct it from the next grant-in-aid and from the subsequent grant-in-aid bills also and pay the person concerned on behalf of the management. The relevant extract of R.4, 1963, is quoted ad infra:- “Rule.4 Condition of Service of the staff- (a) XX XX XX (b) XX XX XX (c) XX XX XX (d) XX XX XX (e) No persons on the staff of the institution shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him provided that this clause shall not apply:- (i) Where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which led to his conviction on criminal charge; or (ii) Where it is not practicable to give that person an opportunity of showing cause and the Department's consent has been obtained before the action is taken. (f) XX XX XX (g) XX XX XX (h) The management shall implement the order passed by the appellate authority mentioned in (g) above within three months of the receipt of the copy thereof unless such implementation is stayed by the orders of any court or any higher authority. (i) In case the management fails without sufficient reason to pay the amount, if any, specified in the order of the appellate authority, the Director may deduct it from the next grant-in-aid and, if necessary, from subsequent grant-in-aid bills also and pay the person concerned on behalf of the management. This would be deemed to be a payment to the management of the institution itself. (j) XX XX XX (k) XX XX XX” Counsel for appellant further submits that in the light of judgment of the Full Bench of this court in Dr. Bajrang Lal Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan & Another reported in 1994 (1) RLR 1 Grant-in-Aid Rules, 1963 are enforceable in law and if action of the Institution is not in conformity with the scheme of Rules, 1963, he is certainly entitled for re-instatement in service. Counsel for respondent-institution, on the other hand, while supporting order of the ld. Bajrang Lal Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan & Another reported in 1994 (1) RLR 1 Grant-in-Aid Rules, 1963 are enforceable in law and if action of the Institution is not in conformity with the scheme of Rules, 1963, he is certainly entitled for re-instatement in service. Counsel for respondent-institution, on the other hand, while supporting order of the ld. Single Judge submits that there was sufficient material available on record that charge stands proved against the appellant of abusing the students and misbehaving with them and their parents and apart from it while in service he participated in the local politics, which is also admitted by him, and there is allegation of misconduct against him that he contested elections of Municipal Board in the year 1982, despite orders from the Management not to do so and this being an admitted misconduct which he has committed, there is no requirement of further enquiry and in these facts & circumstances, the decision of termination from service, passed by the management committee in its meeting dt.17.05.1982 and furtherance thereto order passed by the management committee dt.18.05.1982 removing the petitioner from service, certainly does not require interference of this court and further submits that after coming into force of the Rajasthan Voluntary Rural Education Service Rules, 2010, all the employees working in the aided institutions have been absorbed in the State Government and no grant-in-aid is being sanctioned by the State Government after the Rules of 2010 have come into force and even under the changed circumstances, the appellant petitioner could not be inducted into service in the respondent-institution since grant-in-aid is no more sanctioned by the State Government to the respondent-institution thereafter. We have heard counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the material available on record. It is not disputed that the Rules of 1963 are non-statutory and not enforceable in law and the service of appellant-petitioner would be governed by contract of personal service, executed by the parties under the Rules of 1963. There is a well marked distinction between a body which is created by the statute and a body which after having come into existence is governed in accordance with the provisions of the statute. There is a well marked distinction between a body which is created by the statute and a body which after having come into existence is governed in accordance with the provisions of the statute. In other words, the position seems to be that the institution must owe its very existence to a statute which would be fountain head of its power and if there is no statute what will be the legal existence of the institution and it is settled principles of law that under the common law the court will not ordinarily force an employer to retain the service of an employee whom he no longer wishes to employ but this Rule is subject to certain well recognized exceptions and it is open for the courts in an appropriate case to decide that a public servant who is dismissed from service in contravention of Art.311 of the Constitution continues to remain in service, even though by so doing the State Government is in fact forced to continue to employ the servant whom it does not want to employ. Similarly, under the Industrial Law, jurisdiction of the Labour and Industrial Tribunals to compel the employer to employ a worker, whom he does not desire to employ, is recognized. The courts are also vested with the powers to declare invalid the act of a statutory body and if by doing the act, the body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by statute, even if by making the declaration, the body is compelled to do something which it does not desire to do. This can be fortified by the view expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Executive Committee, U.P. Warehousing Corporation Vs. Chandra Kiran Tyagi reported in 1969 (2) SCC 838 , where it was observed ad infra:- “23. From the two decisions of this court, referred to above, the position in law is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be normally granted. But there are certain well-recognized exceptions to this rule and they are : To grant such a declaration in appropriate cases regarding (1) a public servant, who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311; (2) reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial Law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals. But there are certain well-recognized exceptions to this rule and they are : To grant such a declaration in appropriate cases regarding (1) a public servant, who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311; (2) reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial Law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals. (3) a statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed by statute.” It has been further fortified by the Apex Court in Indian Airlines Corporation Vs. Sukhdeo Rai reported in 1971 (2) SCC 192 , where it was observed ad infra:- “It is a well settled principle that when there is a purported termination of a contract of service, a declaration, that the contract of service still subsisted, would not be made in the absence of special circumstances because of the principle that courts do not ordinarily grant specific performance of service. This is so even in cases where the authority appointing an employee was acting in exercise of statutory authority. The relationship between the person appointed and the employer would in such cases be contractual, i.e., as between a master and servant and the termination of that relationship would not entitle the servant to a declaration that his employment had not been validly determined.” To the same effect is the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bank of Baroda Ltd. Vs. Jewan Lal Mehrotra reported in 1971 (3) SCC 677, where it was observed ad infra:- “3...The law as settled by this Court is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be normally granted. The well recognized exceptions to this rule are (1) where a public servant has been dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311, (2) where re-instatement is sought of a dismissed worker under the industrial law by labour or industrial tribunals, (3) where a statutory body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by statute...” The matter was exhaustively reviewed by the Apex Court in Sirsi Municipality by its President Sirsi Vs. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis reported in (1973) 1 SCC 409 , where it was observed ad infra:- “15. The cases of dismissal of a servant fall under three broad heads. The first head relates to relationship of master and servant governed purely by contract of employment. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis reported in (1973) 1 SCC 409 , where it was observed ad infra:- “15. The cases of dismissal of a servant fall under three broad heads. The first head relates to relationship of master and servant governed purely by contract of employment. Any breach of contract in such a case is enforced by a suit for wrongful dismissal and damages. Just as a contract of employment is not capable of specific performance similarly breach of contract of employment is not capable of finding a declaratory judgment of subsistence of employment. A declaration of unlawful termination and restoration to service in such a case of contract of employment would be indirectly an instance of specific performance of contract for personal services. Such a declaration is not permissible under the Law of Specific Relief Act. 16. The second type of cases of master and servant arises under Industrial law. Under that branch of law a servant who is wrongfully dismissed may be reinstated. This is a special provision under Industrial law. This relief is a departure from the reliefs available under the Indian Contract Act and the Specific Relief Act which do not provide for reinstatement of a servant. 17. The third category of cases of master and servant arises in regard to the servant in the employment of the State or of other public or local authorities or bodies created under statute.” After a detailed consideration of the authorities mentioned above, it is considered by the Apex Court again in the case of Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and Ors. Vs. Lakshmi Narain & Ors. reported in (1976) 2 SCC 58 , where it is observed by the Apex Court ad infra:- “18. On a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, it is, therefore, clear that a contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a court normally would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee, even after having been removed from service can be deemed to be in service against the will and consent of the employer. This rule, however, is subject to three well recognized exceptions- (i) where a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India; (ii) where a worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the Industrial Law; and (iii) where a statutory body acts in breach or violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute.” The matter was again examined by the Apex Court in Dipak Kumar Biswas Vs. Director of Public Instruction & Others reported in (1987) 2 SCC 252 , where the Apex Court observed ad infra:- “10. The legal status of an employee in a privately managed college and whether a contract for personal service can be specifically enforced came up for consideration before this Court in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain. The facts in that case were as follows. Vaish Degree College which was registered under the Registration of Cooperative Societies Act was initial affiliated to the Agra University and later to the Meerut University. A Principal of the college who was appointed after obtaining formal approval of the Vice-Chancellor was terminated from service about two years later. The Principal challenged the order of termination in a suit filed by him on various grounds and he sought for a declaration regarding his continuous in service. The trial court dismissed the suit but the Appellate Court decreed the same. In the second appeal there was a reference to a Full Bench regarding the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit and eventually the second appeal filed by the management was dismissed and the management came up in appeal to this Court by special leave. This Court held that the Executive Committee of the college was not a statutory body because it had not been created by or under the statute and did not owe its existence to a statute. But on the contrary it was a body which came into existence on its own and was only governed by certain statutory provisions for the proper maintenance and administration of the institution. But on the contrary it was a body which came into existence on its own and was only governed by certain statutory provisions for the proper maintenance and administration of the institution. The Court summed up the law in the following words:- “It is, therefore, clear that there is a well marked distinction between a body which is created by the statute and a body which after having come into existence is governed in accordance with the provisions of the statute. In other words the position seems to be that the institution concerned must owe its very existence to a statute which would be the fountainhead of its powers. The question in such cases to be asked is, if there is no statute would the institution have any legal existence. If the answer is in the negative, then undoubtedly it is a statutory body, but if the institution has a separate existence of its own without any reference to the statute concerned but is merely governed by the statutory provisions it cannot be said to be a statutory body. The High Court, in our opinion, was in error in holding that merely because the Executive Committee followed certain statutory provisions of the University Act or the statutes made thereunder it must be deemed to be a statutory body.” The Court then proceeded to consider the next question regarding a contract of personal service being specifically enforceable. After referring to the decisions in S.R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra and Anr., Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation Ltd. v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, Bank of Baroda v. Jewan Lal Mehrotra and Sirsi Municipality v. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis, the Court held as follows:- “On a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, it is, therefore, clear that a contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a Court normally would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee, even after having been removed from service can be deemed to be in service against the will and consent of the employer. This rule, however, is subject to three well recognised exceptions-(i) where a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India; (ii) where a worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the Industrial Law; and (iii) where a statutory body acts in breach of violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute.” 11. The matter again came to be considered in the case of J. Tewari v. Jwala Devi Vidya Mandir. In that case the appellant, Smt. J. Tewari was appointed as the Headmistress of the Jwala Devi Vidya Mandir, Kanpur which was a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Smt. J. Tewari who later became the Principal of the institution challenged her order of suspension in an earlier suit and her order of termination from service in a later suit. The second suit was partly decreed by the trial judge and he upheld that the termination of service of Smt. J. Tewari was not legal and awarded her a sum of Rs.15,250 as arrears of pay for a period of 3 years together with interest and provident fund contribution. The High Court confirmed the decree but held that the sum awarded to her should be by way of damages and not towards arrears of salary since Smt. J. Tewari will not be entitled to a declaration that she continued to be in the service of the institution and to a consequent order of reinstatement. In further appeal to this Court by certificate it was contended that the institution was a statutory body and that Smt. J. Tewari was entitled to a declaration regarding her continuance in service. This Court repelled the contention and held that the Vidya Mandir, in spite of being governed by the University regulations and the provisions of the Education Code framed by the State Government and also being aided by educational grants, still constituted only a private institution and as such Smt. J. Tewari would only be entitled to a decree for damages, if her dismissal was wrongful and not to an order of reinstatement or a declaration that notwithstanding the termination of her services she continued to be in service. 12. The law enunciated in these decisions stand fully attracted to this case also. 12. The law enunciated in these decisions stand fully attracted to this case also. Even though the Lady Keane Girls College may be governed by the statutes of the University and the Education Code framed by the Government of Meghalaya and even though the college may be receiving financial aid from the Government it would not be a statutory body because it has not been created by any statute and its existence is not dependent upon any statutory provision.” In the light of the judgments of the Apex Court, referred to supra, it remains settled that a contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and courts normally would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee, even after removed from service, can be reinstated and considered for employment obviously subject to three well recognized exceptions to this Rule and they are–(1) a public servant, who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311; (2) reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial Law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals. (3) a statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed by statute. From the Full Bench judgment of this court in the case of Dr. Bajrang Lal reported in 1994 (1) RLR 1, on which counsel for appellant has placed reliance, we find that while the controversy came up for consideration at that point of time the Rules of 1963 were replaced by the Act of 1989 which came into force on its publication in gazette on 01.01.1993 and the Rules of 1993 framed by the State Government, in exercise of its powers conferred u/Sec.43 of the Act, 1989 came into force on its publication in gazette on 01.04.1993 and this court while examining the Rules, 1963 with collective impact of the Act, 1989 and of Rules, 1993 arrived to a conclusion that after the enforcement of the Act, 1989, the service conditions of the employees of the recognized institutions are governed by the statute and non-compliance or violation of any service conditions which are in contravention of the provisions of the Act, 1989 or of Rules, 1993 are certainly enforceable by law. The another judgment, on which counsel has placed reliance, of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manmohan Singh Jaitla Vs. The another judgment, on which counsel has placed reliance, of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manmohan Singh Jaitla Vs. Commissioner, Union Territory of Chandigarh & Others reported in 1984 (Supp) SCC 540 was a case where the service conditions of an employee of aided institution were governed by the provisions of a statutory Act namely the Punjab Aided Schools (Security of Service) Act, 1969 and indisputably his services being governed by a statute any violation thereof is always enforceable by law but as we are dealing with the situation prior to coming into force of the Act of 1989, when the service conditions of the employees of aided institutions were governed by the Rules, 1963 which, as we have already noticed above, are executive instructions given by the Government having no statutory force, were not enforceable by law and if any institution fails to comply with the orders or directions of the State Government, the only remedial measure available with the State Government was to withhold its grant-in-aid to the extent, as contemplated u/R.4(i) of the Rules, 1963 but the orders of the State Government were not enforceable by law, being the executive instructions. Apart from legal position which we have expressed in the instant matter, we find that even on merits there were serious allegations against the appellant of abusing the students by using filthy language and misbehaving not only with the students but also with their parents and there were good number of complaints which have been placed on record in support thereof and apart from it, he has participated and contested the Municipal Board Elections, which was his own admission, and there was a serious allegation against him of taking part in the procession led by hooligans and raising slogans against the Chairman of the Municipal Board and distributing pamphlets and it was inquired upon by the Enquiry Officer, appointed by the Management Committee of the Institution who found the charges proved and the nominee of the District Education Officer, appellate authority, had also participated in the meeting of the Management Committee dt.17.05.1982 in which decision was taken for passing the order terminating services of the appellant and pursuant thereto services of the appellant were terminated vide order dt.18.05.1982 and we find that the material available on record was not looked into by the District Education Officer as an appellate authority and even under the scheme of Rules of 1963, R.4(e) envisages that while passing the order of punishment like dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, a reasonable opportunity has to be afforded to the employee but no procedure has been prescribed and indisputably an opportunity of hearing was afforded to the employee, during the course of enquiry conducted by the Management Committee of the respondent-institution through Enquiry Officer and in our considered view the order passed by the District Education Officer cancelling the order of termination as an appellate authority dt.18.12.1985 was not legally sustainable in law and when the complaint was made by the Management Committee of the respondent-institution to the higher authority i.e. the Director, Primary & Secondary Education, he just remitted the matter back to the District Education Officer to re-examine the material of enquiry and pass orders obviously in accordance with law and thereafter when the matter was re-enquired, pursuant thereto, the very appellate authority found the order of termination dt.18.05.1982 to be valid and in compliance of scheme of Rules, 1963, we find from the record, that the decision which was taken by the authority in finally confirming the decision of the Management Committee in terminating the services of the appellant dt.17.05.1982 and passing of the order dt.18.05.1982 in furtherance thereto terminating his services, was not in contravention of the scheme of Rules of 1963. The submission of counsel for appellant that fair opportunity of hearing was not afforded and after the order passed by the appellate authority cancelling the order of termination dt.18.05.1982, the Director, Primary & Secondary Education, may be the higher authority in hierarchy, was not holding competence, in our considered view, does not have any substance as R.4(h) of the Rules, 1963 clearly envisages that the order of appellate authority is to be complied with within three months of receipt of the copy thereof unless such implementation is stayed by the orders of any court or any higher authority and the Director, Primary & Secondary Education, indisputably being higher authority to the appellate authority, if has come across of any error being committed in the decision making process, conferred upon the appellate authority, is always competent to interfere and we do not find any error being committed by the Director, Primary & Secondary Education, as higher authority in passing of the order dt.18.02.1987 setting aside the order of appellate authority and remitting the matter back to the appellate authority to re-examine and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law and in compliance thereof the District Education Officer (Appellate Authority) has given a re-look to the matter and confirmed the order of punishment vide his order dt.11.06.1992 and we do not find any error being committed by the District Education Officer in passing the order dt.11.06.1992 or there being any contravention of the scheme of Rules, 1963. The upshot of the matter is that the appeal is devoid of merit, having no substance and accordingly dismissed.