JUDGMENT 1. - Kashi Bai Chhagan Lal Zaveri Sr. Secondary School, Jaipur ('petitioner-employer', for short), is aggrieved of the judgement dated 4th March, 2002, passed by the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institution Tribunal, Jaipur (for short, 'the Tribunal') and therefore, has instituted the present writ petition, praying for the following relief(s) : "a) the impugned judgement dated 4th March, 2002 passed by the learned Non-Government Educational Institution Tribunal, Jaipur may kindly be quashed and set aside. b) the order passed by the petitioner dated 25.11.2000 may kindly be declared to be legally correct. c) Any other appropriate order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper any also kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner." 2. Shorn off unnecessary details, the indispensable skeletal material facts necessary for appreciation of the controversy are that the respondent-Teacher (Smt. Jaishree Dave), was initially appointed as 'Craft Teacher' on 15th July, 1993. Since she was not allowed the pay-scale of Teacher Grade-Ill, she instituted proceeding before the Tribunal. The Tribunal made an order in favour of the respondent-Teacher holding that she was in possession of the necessary educational qualifications. On a challenge to the order made by the petitioner-employer, by institution of SBCWP No. 5 5691/1994, a Coordinate Bench of this Court, on 12th October, 1995, dismissing the writ application, held the respondent-Teacher to be in possession of the required educational qualifications and confirmed the order of the Tribunal dismissing the writ application with a cost of Rs. 2,000/-. The petitioner- employer, vide order dated 25th November, 2000, again terminated the services of the respondent-Teacher, which became subject matter of appeal before the Tribunal, adjudicated upon vide impugned order dated 4th March, 2002, whereby the order of termination of the respondent- Teacher, was found vitiated for non-compliance of Section 18 of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institution Act, 1989 (for short, 'the Act of 1989'). 3. Learned Senior counsel, Mr. R.K. Mathur, assisted by Mr. Ajay Tantia, reiterating the pleaded facts and grounds of the writ application, has assailed the legality, validity and correctness of the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, for the Tribunal committed a gross error of law and fact, while recording a finding that mandate of Section 18 of the Act of 1989, was not complied with. 4. According to the learned counsel, the post of 'Craft Teacher' was abolished in the year, 1992. 4. According to the learned counsel, the post of 'Craft Teacher' was abolished in the year, 1992. The respondent-Teacher was not fit for appointment to any other post on account of efficient of educational qualifications, and therefore, the Managing Committee of the petitioner-institute was of unanimous opinion that services of the respondent-Teacher could not be continued without prejudice to the interest of the institution. Accordingly, permission was sought from the Director of Education, as contemplated under Section 18 of he Act of 1989, as would be evident from Annexure R/1/7, dated 30th September, 2000. The Director of Education, in turn, informed the petitioner-institute, vide communication dated 6th November, 2000, that powers under the Act of 1989, and the Rules made thereunder, have been deligated to the 'District Education Officer'. The petitioner-institute addressed a communication to the 'District Education is Officer (Secondary), Jaipur-I', Jaipur, for approval of termination of the employment of the respondent-teacher, vide communication, dated 7th November, 2000, as would be evident from Annexure-R-1/10). The approval was accorded by the 'District Education Officer', vide communication dated 16th November, 2000 (Annexure-R/1/11). 5. Assailing the finding recorded by the Tribunal for non-compliance of the mandate of Section 18 of the Act of 1989, learned counsel emphasised that a glance of Section 2(f) of the Act of 1989, which defines "Director of Education", would reveal that the term of 'Director of Education' includes 'any other officer' authorised by him to perform all or any of the functions of the 35 Director of Education' under this Act. Since the District Education Officer (Secondary), Jaipur, Jaipur, was an officer authorised, therefore, the approval accorded cannot be faulted. The petitioner-institute, after having received the approval of the 'District Education Officer', as contemplated under Section 18 of the Act of 1989, passed the order dated 25th November, 2000, terminating the employment of the respondent-teacher strictly in compliance of mandate of Section 18 of the Act of 1989. Six months salary, in lieu of notice, was also paid to the respondent-teacher as would be evident from the order of termination dated 25th November, 2000. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, deserves to be quashed and set aside. 6. Six months salary, in lieu of notice, was also paid to the respondent-teacher as would be evident from the order of termination dated 25th November, 2000. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, deserves to be quashed and set aside. 6. In response to the notice of the writ application, response has been filed on behalf of the respondent- teacher, reiterating the pleadings in the original proceedings before the Tribunal and supporting the impugned order dated 4th March, 2002. 7. Mr. C.P. Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-teacher, empathetically argued that the issue of abolition of post was a subject matter of earlier round of litigation between the parties, and therefore, the same is not open for adjudication afresh in view of the fact that the earlier proceedings initiated attained finality for the judgement and order dated 12th October, 1995, passed in SBCWP No. 5691/1994, wherein the respondent Teacher was held eligible and qualified for appointment to the post of 'Craft Teacher' and was granted relief accordingly. 8. According to the learned counsel, a bare perusal of communication dated 16th November 2000, would reveal that the 'District Education Officer', in fact, did not accord approval and only detailed out the facts, with an observation that in the instant case at hand, the petitioner-institute is at fault for employing a teacher, who was not in possession of the necessary educational qualifications. 9. Learned counsel further submits that Section 18(iii) of the Act of 1989, makes a clear distinction, with reference to termination of an employee where the managing committee is of unanimous opinion that the services of an employee cannot be continued without prejudice to the interest of the institution; and in such a case, termination of an employee can be effective only subject to compliance of the mandate of Section 18(iii), which contemplates six months notice or salary in lieu thereof and the consent of the 'Director of Education', is obtained in writing. 10. 10. The learned counsel emphasised that the alternative as contemplated under Section 18 under the first proviso restraining final order unless prior approval of the 'Director of Education' or 'officer authorised' by him on his behalf obtained but the phrase 'an Officer authorised' by him, is not obtaining under Clause (iii) of Section 18, which leads to the conclusion that in the case where the termination is to be effected under Section 18(iii) of the Act of 1989, the consent of the 'Director of Education', is mandatory and any approval even if accorded by the 'District Education Officer', would be in violation of mandate of Section 18 of the Act of 1989. Therefore, the Tribunal committed no error in recording a finding to that effect, while interfering with the impugned order of termination of employment of the respondent-Teacher, dated 25th November, 2000. 11. Learned counsel would further submit that even if the argument, as advanced on behalf of the petitioner- Institute referring to text of Section 2(f), was to be entertained, even then, the delegation or authorisation, as contemplated under Section 18 of the Act of 1989, was not made by the Director of Education', and therefore, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal called for no interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction on that count as well. 12. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the materials available on record as well as gave my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions at bar. 13. Indisputably, the respondent-Teacher, while claiming pay scale of Craft Teacher', instituted proceedings before the Tribunal successfully and the matter was finally adjudicated upon by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in S.B CWP No. 5691/1994 (Kashi Bai Chhagan Lal Jhaveri Vidhya Mandir Samiti, Jaipur v. Rajasthan Non - Government Educational institution Tribunal, Jaipur & Ors.) vide judgement and order dated 12th October, 1995 holding thus; "13. The argument of the learned counsel that respondent teacher was not qualified to be appointed as a Craft Teacher is also devoid of force. She has passed Senior School Examination in the year 1978 and also obtained diploma in tailoring from the Gujarat Education Board in the year 1977, besides she has also qualified in English typing examination from the State Board of Education Gujarat in the year 1977 and completed teacher training in the year 1989. She has passed Senior School Examination in the year 1978 and also obtained diploma in tailoring from the Gujarat Education Board in the year 1977, besides she has also qualified in English typing examination from the State Board of Education Gujarat in the year 1977 and completed teacher training in the year 1989. The order of the State Government dated, 15th April, 1978, recognising Tailoring and Cutting Certificate Examination of Gujarat State also makes it clear that the said order shall not apply to diploma holders up to the session 1978-79. The respondent has obtained diploma in Tailoring and Cutting from the Gujarat Education Board in the year 1977, as such, she was not affected by the order of the State Government. From the reply of the respondent teacher, it transpires that she has been teaching Craft subject from 3rd to 9th classes and this fact is also borne out from the documents Annexures R - 2/2, R - 2/3 and R - 2/4. 14. The net result of the above discussion is that the respondent teacher is entitled to get pay scale of a Craft Teacher and, in fact, she was given regular pay scale very late in the year 1992 by Management, apparently it was an act of exploitation on its part. The order of the Tribunal, therefore, does not suffer from any infirmity. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed with costs, which is quantified as Rs. 2,000/- to be paid to the respondent-teacher within three months from today by the petitioner. 14. In view of the above, it can safely be concluded that so far as the eligibility of the respondent-teacher, with reference to her qualifications for the post of 'Craft Teacher', is concerned, cannot be a subject matter for consideration afresh. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent-teacher in support of his submissions has placed reliance on the opinions in the case of managing Committee, Mayo College v. Kailash Singh (Raj.); 2002 (8) SLR 317 , Central Academy Society v. Raj. Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal, Jaipur & Ors.; 2010(3) WLC (Raj.) 21, In the case of Janta Balika Senior Secondary School and ors. v. Smt. Manju Sharma & ors; 2010(3) WLC 21, in the case of Janta Balika Senior Secondary School and ors. v. Smt. Manju Sharma & ors; 2012 WLC (Raj.) UC 696 and Managing Committee, Shri Digamber Jain School Society, Sikar & Anr. v. Smt. Manju Sharma & ors; 2010(3) WLC 21, in the case of Janta Balika Senior Secondary School and ors. v. Smt. Manju Sharma & ors; 2012 WLC (Raj.) UC 696 and Managing Committee, Shri Digamber Jain School Society, Sikar & Anr. v. Smt. Usha Saxena & Ors.; 2013(2) WLC (Raj.) 275. 16. In the backdrop of the fact that the post of 'Craft Teacher', was abolished and the respondent-teacher was not in possession of educational qualifications for appointment to any other post; the Managing Committee of the petitioner-institute, in exercise of powers under Section 18 (iii), unanimously opined that services of the respondent-Teacher cannot be continued without prejudice to the interest of the Institution. According, a communication was addressed to the 'Director of Education', Jaipur, seeking approval for termination of the employment, as contemplated under Section 18 of the Act of 1989, and in turn, the petitioner-institute was informed that the 'District Education Officer', is the 'Authorised Officer', for the purpose of approval under the Act of 1989 and the Rules made there under, while making a reference to Rule 39 of the Rules of 1993, framed under the Act of 1989. 17. The 'District Education Officer' accorded approval for termination of the employment of the respondent-teacher vide communication dated 16th November, 2000, was made by the petitioner-institute by payment of salary of six months in lieu of notice. 18. In the case of Managing Committee, Mayo College (supra), the issue was examined by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the backdrop of the fact that whether a subsequent clarification issued by the State Government with reference to the power of consent as contemplated under proviso could be exercised by the District Education Officer, which was not acceptable in the face of the text of Section 18 of the Act of 1989 and it was so ruled. Thus, the facts, in the instant case at hand, are entirely different and distinct from that of the case which has been referred to and relied upon and the opinion is of no help to the respondent-teacher. 19. In the case of Managing Committee, Shri Digamber Jain School Society, Sikar & Anr. Thus, the facts, in the instant case at hand, are entirely different and distinct from that of the case which has been referred to and relied upon and the opinion is of no help to the respondent-teacher. 19. In the case of Managing Committee, Shri Digamber Jain School Society, Sikar & Anr. (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court Interpreted the 'consent' or 'approval' as contemplated under Section 18(iii) of the Act of 1989, in the backdrop of the term 'after' holding that the 'approval' or 'consent' as contemplated under Section 18(iii) of the Act of 1989 has to precede the order of termination and such an approval or consent cannot be sought after the termination was effected. Again the facts of the instant case and the case which has been referred to and relied upon, are entirely different and distinct and the opinion has no application to the facts of the present case. 20. In the case of Janta Balika Senior Secondary School and ors. v. Smt. Manju Sharma & ors. (supra), again a Division Bench of this Court examined the controversy in the backdrop of the word 'after' while following the view of the Full Bench and held that the consent/approval has to precede, the order of termination of services of an employee. Thus, the opinions referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent-teacher have no application to the facts of the instant case at hand wherein the approval/consent, as contemplated under Section 18(iii) of the Act of 1989, did precede the order of termination dated 25th November, 2000. 21. Thus, the opinions referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent-teacher have no application to the facts of the instant case at hand wherein the approval/consent, as contemplated under Section 18(iii) of the Act of 1989, did precede the order of termination dated 25th November, 2000. 21. The finding recorded by the Tribunal as to non-compliance of mandate of Section 18(iii) of the Act of 1989 for the approval was accorded by the 'District Education Officer' and not by the 'Director of Education', cannot be sustained in the face of text as contained under Section 2(f) of the Act of 1989, which defines "Director of Education", which reads thus : 2(f) "Director of Education" means- (i) in relation to degree and post-graduate college and educational institution of equal or higher studies other than institutions of Sanskrit and technical education, the Director of College Education, Rajasthan; (ii) in relation to the institutions of Sanskrit education, the Director of Sanskrit Education, Rajasthan; (iii) in relation to the institutions of technical education, the Director of Technical Education, Rajasthan; (iv) in relation to schools and institutions other than those referred to in sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) the Director of Primary and Secondary Education, Rajasthan; Explanation-The Director of Education shall include any other officer authorised by him to perform or any of the functions of the Director of Education under this Act; 22. Section 18 of the Act of 1989 contemplates that services of an employee, where the managing committee is of unanimous opinion that the services of an employee cannot be continued without prejudice to the interest of the institution, may be terminated, subject to twin conditions mentioned here in. Firstly, after giving him six months notice or salary in lieu thereof and secondly, the consent of the 'Director of Education, is obtained in writing, Section 18 of the Act of 1989, reads thus: "Section 18 - Removal, dismissal or reduction in rank of employees. Firstly, after giving him six months notice or salary in lieu thereof and secondly, the consent of the 'Director of Education, is obtained in writing, Section 18 of the Act of 1989, reads thus: "Section 18 - Removal, dismissal or reduction in rank of employees. - Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, no employee of a recognised institution shall removed, dismissed or reduced in rank unless he has been given by the management a reasonable opportunity being heard against the action proposed to be taken: Provided that no final order in this regard shall be passed unless prior approval of the Director of Education or an Officer authorised by him in this behalf has been obtained: Provided further that this section shall not apply,- (1) to a person who is dismissed or removed on the ground of conduct which led to his conviction on a criminal charge, or (2) where it is not practicable or expedient to give that employee an opportunity or showing cause, the consent of Director of Education has been obtained in writing before the action is taken, or (3) Where the managing committee is of unanimous opinion that the services of an employee can not be continued without prejudice to the interest of the institution the services of such employee are terminated after giving him six months notice or salary in lieu thereof and the consent of the Director of Education is obtained in writing" 23. A conjoint reading of Section 2(f) and Section 18(iii) of the Act of 1989, would lead to irresistible conclusion that the approval, as contemplated under Section 18(iii) of the Act of 1989, no doubt has to be accorded by the 'Director of Education', but the 'Director of Education', as defined under the definition Clause 2(f) of the Act of 1989, includes 'any other officer authorised by him to perform all or any of the functions of the 'Director of Education' under this Act. 24. For the reasons and discussions herein above, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, cannot be sustained and calls for interference in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. 25. In the result, the writ application succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 4th March, 2002, passed by the Tribunal is hereby quashed and set aside. 26. 24. For the reasons and discussions herein above, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, cannot be sustained and calls for interference in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. 25. In the result, the writ application succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 4th March, 2002, passed by the Tribunal is hereby quashed and set aside. 26. In view of the final adjudication on the writ application, the stay application stands closed. 27. No costsWrit Petition Allowed. *******