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2015 DIGILAW 1471 (RAJ)

Surendra Singh Choudhary v. State of Rajasthan

2015-08-06

ANUPINDER SINGH GREWAL

body2015
JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner, who is a member of Rajasthan Administrative Service, was posted as Development Officer at Panchayat Samiti, Laxmangarh, District Alwar from 02.11.1989 till 11.05.1990. He was charge-sheeted on 26.02.1997 (Annx.3). The charges included that he did not convene eye-camp even though Rs. 10,000/- had been sanctioned for that purpose, he did not participate in most of Cattle camps, he did not forward proposals for providing residential accommodation to people of Bikhri tribe, did not send requisition for training tool kits under Trisem project and for training of youth under Trisem project from year 1985-86 to 1988-89, he did not participate in the monthly meetings and he had relieved a Junior Engineer, posted at the Panchayat Samiti for posting at another station without assigning any reason. 2. After considering his reply and following the procedure laid down in the Rules, the petitioner was imposed a punishment of withholding 3 increments without cumulative effect vide order dated 02nd June 1998 (Annx.2) which is impugned in the instant petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that even though the incidents for which the petitioner was charged pertain to period from 02.11.1989 to 11.05.1990, the charge-sheet was issued only in the year 1997. Therefore, the delay of over 6 years has seriously prejudiced the petitioner and the entire disciplinary proceedings are liable to be quashed. He further submitted that even these charges are not of serious nature and there is no charge which pertains to either corruption or misappropriation of any Government money and hence, the punitive order could not have been passed. In support of his submissions he has cited judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and another- AIR 1990 SC 1308 , State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan - (1998) 4 SCC 154 , P.V. Mahadevan v. M.D., Tamil Nadu Housing Board- 2005 (5) Supreme 611 and M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India & others (2006) 5 SCC 88 . 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has contended that the charge-sheet was issued in the year 1997 after the matter was brought to notice of the Government and the petitioner had been given full opportunity to defend the charges and merely on account of delay, the disciplinary action cannot be held to be illegal. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has contended that the charge-sheet was issued in the year 1997 after the matter was brought to notice of the Government and the petitioner had been given full opportunity to defend the charges and merely on account of delay, the disciplinary action cannot be held to be illegal. The counsel for the State has relied upon judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the cases of Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society & ors., (2013) 6 SCC 515 and Chairman, LIC of India & others v. A. Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530 . 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the material on record. 6. The primary contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the charge-sheet is vitiated on account of delay of 6 years in its issuance after the incidents of misconduct. This argument though appears to be attractive on the face of it but a deeper scrutiny reveals its hollowness. There is no doubt that the charge-sheet was issued after a period of 6 years. But the petitioner has nowhere pleaded in this petition that he was in any manner prejudiced in his defence because of this delay. Although in the reply filed by the petitioner in response to the charge sheet he has mentioned that the relevant record is not available and it is difficult for him to submit elaborate response. However, from perusal of impugned order it is amply clear that no prejudice was caused to the petitioner for this delay. The petitioner did not file any application whatsoever for the inspection of record which may have been necessary for him to defend the charge. 7. It is also borne out from the impugned order that the petitioner had, in fact, been specifically asked in the disciplinary proceedings that if he wants to inspect any record or document he was free to do so. Instead, the petitioner chose neither to inspect the documents nor even submit any application for supply of any document. It is also evident that the impugned order wherein penalty of withholding 3 increments without cumulative effect had been imposed, is based on evidence of witnesses which was recorded during the course of inquiry and the material available on record. 8. Instead, the petitioner chose neither to inspect the documents nor even submit any application for supply of any document. It is also evident that the impugned order wherein penalty of withholding 3 increments without cumulative effect had been imposed, is based on evidence of witnesses which was recorded during the course of inquiry and the material available on record. 8. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner are distinguishable on facts and not applicable to the instant case. In the case of State of M.P. v. Bani Singh (supra) there was a delay of over 12 years in initiating the proceedings and there was no explanation whatsoever for the delay in issuing charge-sheet. In the case of P.V. Mahadevan (supra) there was a delay of over 10 years in issuing the charge-sheet and the explanation offered in the counter-affidavit filed therein that the irregularities came to light in audit report subsequently was not accepted. In the case of State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan (supra) there was also a delay in concluding the departmental proceedings even though charge-sheet pertained to the year 1987 and without conclusion of these proceedings another charge sheet was issued in 1995 on the ground that new Rules had come into effect. In the case of M.V. Bijlani (supra) there was delay of 6 years in initiating the proceedings which continued for another period of 7 years. 9. In all these cases it was specifically pleaded that the delay in disciplinary action had seriously prejudiced the defence of the delinquents therein. These judgments can not be applied to the facts of the instant case. As already mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, there is no plea of prejudice which has been raised by the petitioner. Leave alone any plea there is not even a whisper in the entire petition about prejudice which may have been caused to the petitioner due to delay in issuance of charge sheet. 10. Further, none of these judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court lay down an absolute proposition of law that delay in every case would vitiate the disciplinary proceedings. Unless and until there is a prejudice which has been caused to the delinquent officer, the delay by itself can not be held to be fatal to the departmental proceedings. 10. Further, none of these judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court lay down an absolute proposition of law that delay in every case would vitiate the disciplinary proceedings. Unless and until there is a prejudice which has been caused to the delinquent officer, the delay by itself can not be held to be fatal to the departmental proceedings. The Court has to balance equities and in case there is an unexplained and unreasonable delay which has prejudiced the defence of the petitioner or he has been put to undue harassment then, of course, such a delay would render the disciplinary action illegal. I draw support from judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of LIC & ors v. A. Masilamani (supra) wherein it was held that the delay alone can not be basis to deny the employer opportunity to complete the inquiry which had been held to be vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice. It was also held that the Court should not normally quash the charges only on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings. 11. It is also noteworthy that the petitioner has been imposed only a minor punishment of withholding of 3 increments without cumulative effect. His negligence in not holding the eye-camp and also not furnishing requisite proposals for training of unemployed tribal youth can not be held to be minor lapses which would enable the petitioner to be let off without any punishment whatsoever. This minor punishment imposed upon the petitioner appears to be fully justified in the light of misconduct which has been proved in the departmental inquiry. 12. I cannot also lose sight of the fact that the scope of interference in departmental inquiries is extremely limited and confined to cases in which there is violation of principles of natural justice or the action of the disciplinary authority is contrary to the Rules. This Court can not reexamine and re-appreciate the evidence led before the Enquiry Officer as it does not exercise appellate jurisdiction over findings of the departmental authority. 13. In view of the above, the petitioner has not been able to make out any case for interference with the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority which is fully justified under the facts and circumstances of the case. 14. In the result, the petition is dismissed. 13. In view of the above, the petitioner has not been able to make out any case for interference with the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority which is fully justified under the facts and circumstances of the case. 14. In the result, the petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.Writ Petition dismissed. *******