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2015 DIGILAW 1479 (JHR)

Ram Singasan Chaubey v. State of Jharkhand

2015-11-27

PRAMATH PATNAIK

body2015
JUDGMENT : Pramath Patnaik, J. I.A. No. 6525 of 2015 The instant Interlocutory application has been filed for addition of a prayer, as mentioned in para 3 of this application, in prayer portion of the writ petition, in view of the dismissal of departmental during pendency of this writ application. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that during pendency of this writ application, the departmental appeal preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed vide memo no. 44 dated 20.01.2010, which is necessary to be brought on record for just adjudication of the writ petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the proposed amendment will not change the nature and character of the case and the same is formal in nature. 3. Learned counsel for the State raised serious objection to the prayer made by learned counsel for the petitioner. 4. In view of the fact that the amendment sought for is formal in nature and is necessary for proper adjudication of the matter, the interlocutory application seeking amendment, by way of addition in prayer portion, is allowed. 5. I.A. No. 6525 of 2015 is allowed. W.P. (S) No. 2995 of 2009 In the accompanied writ application, the petitioner has inter alia, prayed for quashing of memo dated 04.10.2005 issued by the Superintendent of Police, Palamau pertaining to infliction of punishment of withholding of one annual increment, equivalent to two black marks, without cumulative effect as well as restrictions of payment of only subsistence allowance during the suspension period and for quashing of appellate order dated 20.01.2010 passed by the D.I.G of Police, Palamau and further for payment of arrears of salary as well as other consequential benefits. 2. The factual matrix, as disclosed in the writ application, in brief, is that the petitioner while continuing his services as A.S.I. of Police in Town P.S., Daltonganj, Palamau, one Sunil Kumar Gupta made a complaint alleging that when he was carrying two tins of Ghee for retail selling to Daltonganj on Chhamuhan Chowk, a driver sitting in white colour Police Jeep stopped him a put a demand of Rs. 5000/- and later on, he put a demand of Rs. 1500/- and taken the said Ghee in his custody and as such the complainant made a request to the officer-in-charge of Town Police Station for return of his Ghee. 5000/- and later on, he put a demand of Rs. 1500/- and taken the said Ghee in his custody and as such the complainant made a request to the officer-in-charge of Town Police Station for return of his Ghee. In pursuance to the said complaint, the petitioner was put under suspension and departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner. After receipt of memo of charge, the petitioner submitted his reply requesting to revoke his suspension and for exonerating the petitioner from the charges levelled against him. Thereafter, the matter was enquired into by the enquiry officer, who submitted his report exonerating the petitioner from the charges levelled against him, but the disciplinary authority disagreeing with the enquiry report imposed the impugned punishment vide memo dated 04.10.2005. Being aggrieved, the petitioner preferred appeal, which was dismissed vide order dated 20.01.2010 by the appellate authority-D.I.G of Police, Palamau. 3. Being aggrieved by the impugned order of punishment dated 04.10.2005 and order passed by appellate authority dated 20.01.2010, the petitioner left with no alternative, efficacious and speedy remedy, has approached this Court invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for redressal of his grievances. 4. Per contra, supplementary counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent nos. 3 to 5 wherein it has been stated that the D.I.G. Of Police, Palamau Range, Daltonganj upheld the order of punishment vide memo dated 20.01.2010, though, inadvertently, name of one Satyam Kumar in place of present petitioner-Ram Singasan Chaubey, was mentioned in the operative portion of the impugned order dated 20.01.2010, which got amended vide memo dated 29.10.2015. 5. Heard Mr. Anjani Kumar Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Anshuman Kumar, J.C. to learned A.G. for the respondents-State. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged that Annexure-1, the complaint, contains allegation against the driver only. There is no whisper of allegation against the petitioner, who at the relevant point of time was A.S.I of Police. However, charges were framed against him, but, in the enquiry, the petitioner was exonerated from the said charges. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority, contrary to the enquiry report, inflicted the impugned punishment, which is a major punishment as per Rule 835 of the Police Manual. However, charges were framed against him, but, in the enquiry, the petitioner was exonerated from the said charges. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority, contrary to the enquiry report, inflicted the impugned punishment, which is a major punishment as per Rule 835 of the Police Manual. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order of punishment is not legally sustainable since no reason has been assigned by the disciplinary authority for differing with the findings of the enquiry officer. 7. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the decision rendered in the case of Punjab National Bank & Ors vs. Kunj Behari Misra as reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 , in particular paragraph 19, which is quoted herein below:- “19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer.” 8. On the contrary, learned counsel for the State has assiduously countered the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner by advancing his argument that in the instant case, the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority has been affirmed by the appellate authority and under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has very limited scope to re-apprise or re-appreciate the evidence and nor can it go into the findings of the two consecutive authorities. Moreover, driver of police Jeep at the behest and tacit approval of the petitioner, demanded two tins of Ghee and Rs. 5000/-. So the petitioner was the privy to the alleged charges. Moreover, driver of police Jeep at the behest and tacit approval of the petitioner, demanded two tins of Ghee and Rs. 5000/-. So the petitioner was the privy to the alleged charges. Hence, the petitioner has rightly been inflicted with the impugned punishment, which is affirmed by the appellate authority. 9. After hearing learned counsels for the parties at length and on perusal of the record, I am of the considered view that the impugned order of punishment is not legally sustainable due to following facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements:- (i). Admittedly, in the case in hand, on the basis of a complaint purportedly made against the driver of the police Jeep, the petitioner was placed under suspension and a departmental proceeding was initiated by serving memo of charge upon him. Subsequently, the matter was enquired into by the enquiry officer, who has not found the petitioner guilty of the charges rather he has been exonerated from the said charges but the disciplinary authority for the reasons best know to him, has imposed the impugned order of punishment, which appears to be bald, non-speaking and cryptic, bereft of reasons being in disagreement with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, which is contrary to the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court as referred to above. On that score the impugned order of punishment being not legally sustainable is liable to quashed. (ii). It has been submitted at the Bar that the petitioner has now retired on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.01.2013. Since the impugned order of punishment pertains to grant of increment, no useful purpose would be served in remitting the matter to the disciplinary authority for passing appropriate order. Therefore, it would be in the fitness of things to quash the impugned order of punishment and the order passed by the appellate authority, which would serve the ends of justice. 10. Therefore, it would be in the fitness of things to quash the impugned order of punishment and the order passed by the appellate authority, which would serve the ends of justice. 10. On cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, the impugned order punishment dated 4.10.2005 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Palamau and appellate order dated 20.01.2010 passed by the appellate authority-the D.I.G. Of Police, Palamau Range are hereby quashed and since the petitioner has already retired on 31.01.2013 on attaining the age of superannuation, the respondents are directed to pay all consequential benefits, as due and admissible, to the petitioner within a period of four months from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. 11. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ petition stands disposed of.