JUDGMENT Hon’ble Mrs. Vijay Lakshmi, J.—This intra Court appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 5.11.2014 whereby the writ petition filed by the petitioner/appellant has been dismissed. 2. The brief facts giving rise to this appeal are that the appellant was appointed as a driver with respondent-corporation U.P.S.E.B. by the order dated 23.3.1977 of the then Executive Engineer. However, his service alongwith services of some other employees were subsequently terminated on 17.11.1979. Aggrieved by the order of termination the Bijli Karmchari Sangh including the appellant filed writ petition No. 1642 of 1979 which was allowed by the Division Bench of this Court on 27.9.1989 and the following order was passed : “In view of the above these writ petitions are allowed and the impugned orders passed by the opposite parties terminating the service of the petitioners are quashed. The petitioners would be treated in the service with effect from the date when their services were terminated illegally and they are also entitled to the consequential benefits. No order as to costs.” 3. According to the petitioner/appellant the aforesaid order was not complied with by the concerned authorities. The petitioner filed Contempt Petition No. 79 of 1992 which was dismissed on ground of delay. In pursuance of the order of this Court the appellant was reinstated in service in the year 1992 but he was reinstated on the post of a Coolie and not as a driver. However, on 2.1.1997 he was promoted to the post of driver where he is still working. 4. Being aggrieved the appellant filed another Writ Petition No. 71770 of 2005 claiming his back-wages for the period falling between 17.11.1979 till the date of his promotion to the post of driver i.e. 2.1.1997. The aforesaid writ petition was disposed of by this Court directing the respondent-corporation that in case the petitioner files a fresh comprehensive representation before the General Manager, U.P. Power Corporation Ltd, the same shall be decided by the said respondent expeditiously preferably within a period of 3 months. 5. The aforesaid writ petition was disposed of by this Court directing the respondent-corporation that in case the petitioner files a fresh comprehensive representation before the General Manager, U.P. Power Corporation Ltd, the same shall be decided by the said respondent expeditiously preferably within a period of 3 months. 5. The petitioner moved a fresh representation which was decided by the order dated 7.3.2006 (impugned in the writ petition) whereby the claim of appellant for back wages and regulation of his service on the post of driver since the date of his initial appointment was rejected by the Corporation on the grounds that as the petitioner himself alongwith U.P. Bijli Karmchari Sangh had agreed for giving up his claim for back wages in pursuance of a compromise filed before the then Labour Commissioner, Allahabad and had agreed to the terms and condition thereof, so now he cannot re-agitate the dispute after about 23 years of entering into the said compromise. 6. Against the aforesaid order dated 7.3.2006, the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 18446 of 2010, which was dismissed by the order dated 5.11.2014, impugned in the present special appeal. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, it appears that the appellant in his representation dated 9.6.2005 (annexure-4 to the writ petition) has himself admitted the fact that he was initially appointed on the post of a labour. The para 2 of his representation is quoted below : ^^izkFkhZ dh fu;qfDr fnukad 23&3&77 dks prqFkZ Js.kh deZpkjh dh Jfed ds :i esa fo|qr foHkkx esa dh x;h FkhA^^ 8. Thus, it is clear by the admission of appellant himself that initially he was appointed as a labour. It does not make any difference that he was assigned the work of motor driving by his employers. Being appointed as a labour he was supposed to do any work, he was assigned to do. It is also evident that when the service of appellant was directed to be reinstated by the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 27.9.1989, that order was complied with by the Corporation and the appellant’s services were regularised. In view of the above, the grievance of the petitioner is that he was regularised on 17.12.1992 as a coolie whereas his services should have been regularised as a driver appear to have no force. 9. In view of the above, the grievance of the petitioner is that he was regularised on 17.12.1992 as a coolie whereas his services should have been regularised as a driver appear to have no force. 9. Moreover, a perusal of order dated 7.3.2006 of the General Manager (D) which has been impugned in the writ petition clearly shows that some compromise was entered into between the parties in pursuance of which the appellant was reappointed on the post of coolie. In such compromise the appellant had agreed for giving up his right to back wages. The General Manager of the Corporation rejected the claim of back wages on the ground that petitioner is raising a plea after entering into a compromise way back in the year 1992. The office memorandum dated 17.12.1992 as well as the consequential promotion order passed in 1997, was enjoyed by the petitioner throughout his career and was not challenged. Further, this fact was not disclosed by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 41770 of 2005 and Contempt Petition No. 1121 of 1992. Thus from the facts of the case it is evident that the petitioner/appellant has raised his grievance before the Corporation with regard to the alleged non compliance of the order dated 27.9.1989 passed in his first writ petition, after a lapse of 27 years. Admittedly in 1997 the appellant was promoted to the post of driver and since then he is regularly serving as a motor driver. 10. The law cannot come forward to help a person who has slept over his rights for such a long period. 11. The learned writ Court has rejected the claim of the petitioner/appellant with the following observations : “The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted after a lapse of 27 years and the Court cannot sit in appeal over the judgment and order dated 27.9.1989 nor execute it, more so, as a specific stand has been taken by the respondents, in the counter-affidavit, that the petitioner was engaged as a Coolie, the petitioner was reinstated on the terms of agreement entered between the workman/Union and the respondents which was duly filed before the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Allahabad. For the facts and reasons stated hereinabove, this Court declines to exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.” 12. For the facts and reasons stated hereinabove, this Court declines to exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.” 12. Although learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that no compromise was ever entered into by the appellant at any point of time and the theory of so called compromise is absolutely false and baseless, yet, on a perusal of the order dated 7.3.2006 this fact becomes clearly evident that the said compromise had been filed before the then Deputy Labour Commissioner, Allahabad and also alongwith the affidavit of Ex. Engineer filed in Contempt Petition No. 1121 of 1992. The said contempt petition was dismissed due to latches on the part of petitioner/appellant. 13. The Corporation has taken a specific stand and has based its reasons about the existence of such compromise and settlement of dispute in accordance with such compromise on the basis of records of Labour Court and this Court, but the contention of petitioner/appellant that no such compromise ever took place has no legs to stand and his contention cannot be accepted after a lapse of so many years and the writ Court has rightly rejected it. 14. The petitioner/appellant has not even annexed the copies of counter-affidavit and rejoinder-affidavit filed in writ petition with the special appeal, which also shows that he has tried to conceal all these facts from this Court. 15. In view of the above discussion, the appeal appears to be devoid of merits. It is liable to be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly. ——————