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2015 DIGILAW 1489 (RAJ)

Prabhat v. State of Rajasthan

2015-08-10

BELA M.TRIVEDI

body2015
JUDGMENT 1. The petitioners by way of these petitions have challenged the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the respondents under the provisions contained in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1894”). The petitioners initially had challenged the notification dated 21.09.2010 issued by the State Government under Section 4, the declaration dated 04.12.2012 under Section 6, and the notices issued to the petitioners under Section 9 of the Act of 1894. The Award dated 07.01.2015 having been passed in respect of the petitioners' lands in question during the pendency of the petition, the petitioners have challenged the same by amending their respective petitions. 2. According to the petitioners, the petitioner of the writ petition being No.12613/2014, is the khatedar of khasra Nos.68, 348, 349, 352 and 355 in Village Nangal Siras, Patwar Halka Khori bisal, Tehsil Amer, District Jaipur. The petitioner of the writ petition being No.12633/2014 is the khatedar of khasra Nos.80, 81 and has half share in khasra Nos.79/1 and 79/2; the petitioner of the writ petition being No.12845/2014 is the khatedar of khasra Nos.260, 261, 262 and has half share in khasra Nos.263/1 and 263/2; and the petitioner of the writ petition being No.12846/2014 is the khatedar of half share in khasra Nos.263/1, 263/2, 278/833/1, 278/833/2, 281/1 and 281/2 in the said village Nangal Siras. The petitioners of writ petition being No.12860/2014, claim ownership of one half share in khasra Nos.162 and 163 admeasuring 4.25 hectares in village Nangal Siras, Patwar Halka Khori bisal, Tehsil Amer, District Jaipur, on the basis of the sale deed dated 06.03.2009 allegedly executed by the original khatedar Lokesh Kumar. 3. For the sake of brevity, the facts of the writ petition being No.12613/2014 are narrated, as the facts of the other petitions are similar. 4. As per the case of the petitioner, the notification dated 21.09.2010 issued by the State Government under Section 4 of the Act of 1984 intending to acquire lands in question for approach road of Rajat-Vihar Residential Scheme, Jaipur, was published in the official gazette on 28.09.2010 (Annexure/1), and was published in the newspaper Dainik Bhaskar on 10.12.2010 (Annexure-2). The public notice thereof was issued on 12.12.2011 (Annexure-7). The public notice thereof was issued on 12.12.2011 (Annexure-7). According to the petitioner, the said notification under Section 4 was published only in one newspaper i.e. Dainik Bhaskar and not in any other newspaper, and the public notice of the said notification was also not pasted anywhere in the locality. It is further case of the petitioner that the declaration dated 04.12.2012 (Annexure/8) made under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, was published in the official gazette on 11.12.2012, and was published in two newspapers Dainik Navjyoti and Mahka Bharat on 08.12.2012. The said declaration was allegedly pasted in the locality on 09.01.2013 as per the notice dated 02.01.2013 (Annexure/9). However, some typographical corrections were sought to be made in the said declaration vide the corrigendum notification dated 04.01.2013 (Annexure/10). According to the petitioner, there was a gap of more than one year between the last mode of publication under Section 4 and the last mode of declaration under Section 6, and therefore the proceedings had vitiated being time barred. Subsequently, a public notice was issued under Section 9 (1) of the Act of 1894 on 02.01.2013 (Annexure/11), which according to the petitioner was allegedly pasted in the locality on 09.01.2013, calling upon the persons interested to appear and submit their respective claims for compensation. The petitioner had also received the notice dated 24.09.2014 (Annexure-12) under Section 9 (3) for appearance on 13.10.2014. Since during the pendency of the petition, the respondent No.3 Land Acquisition Officer had passed the award dated 07.01.2015 (Annexure-13), the said award has also been sought to be challenged by amending the petition, on the ground that the respondent No.3 could not have passed the award under the Act of 1894, the proceedings under the said act having stood lapsed, on the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency Land Acquisition/Rehabilitation and Settlement Act 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 2013) having come into force. The petitioner, therefore, has prayed to quash and set-aside the notification dated 21.09.2010 (Annexure-1) issued under Section 4, the declaration dated 04.12.2012 (Annexure-8) issued under Section 6, and the notices under Section 9 (Annexures/11 & 12). The petitioner has also sought declaration that the Award dated 07.01.2015 (Annexure/13) is a nullity. 5. The petitioner, therefore, has prayed to quash and set-aside the notification dated 21.09.2010 (Annexure-1) issued under Section 4, the declaration dated 04.12.2012 (Annexure-8) issued under Section 6, and the notices under Section 9 (Annexures/11 & 12). The petitioner has also sought declaration that the Award dated 07.01.2015 (Annexure/13) is a nullity. 5. All the petitions have been resisted by the respondents by filing the replies in the respective petitions denying the allegations made in the petitions as regards the lapsing of proceedings under the Act of 1894. According to the respondents, the notification under Section 4 for the lands in question issued on 21.09.2010 was duly published in the official gazette on 28.09.2010, and in the two newspapers i.e. the Dainik Bhaskar and Samachar Jagat on 10.12.2010 and was pasted at the offices of the District Collector, Jaipur, Tehsildar Amer, Nagar Nigam, Jaipur, Land Acquisition Officer, Jaipur Development Authority and Panchayat Samiti, Amer on 13.12.2011, showing the names of the persons interested as appearing in the revenue record in the said notification. It is further contended that the declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was issued on 04.12.2012, which was published in the official gazette on 11.12.2012, published in two newspapers i.e. Dainik Navjyoti and Mahka Bharat on 08.12.2012 and was pasted at the various public places on 09.01.2013. It further stated that the corrigendum dated 04.01.2013 was issued only for the purpose of correcting the inadvertent minor typographical errors. Thereafter the notices under Section 9 were also duly pasted and served on the petitioners. Subsequently, considering the claims of the petitioners, the award was duly made by the respondent No.3 on 07.01.2015 (Annexure-13). According to the respondents, the award was made under the Act of 1894 clarifying that the said award would be subject to the compensation to be paid under the Act of 2013. 6. Learned counsel Mr. S.S. Hora for the petitioners taking the Court to the provisions contained in both the Acts, submitted that as per Section 114 of the Act of 2013, the Act of 1894 was repealed, without prejudice to the Section 6 of the General Clauses Act 1897, however Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would save the right accrued or liability incurred, and it would not create any new right, but merely would save an existing or crystallised rights. According to him, unless the possession was taken in accordance with Section 16 of the Act of 1894, the lands do not vest with the Government, and therefore all rights prior to the vesting are required to be treated as abstracts rights, which are not saved under the new Act of 2013. In this regard Mr. Hora has relied upon the decision of Apex Court in case of Vishwant Kumar Versus Madan Lal Sharma & Anr. (2004) 4 SCC 1 and in case of Isha Valimohamed and Anr. Vs. Haji Gulam Mohamad and Haji Dada Trust (1974) 2 SCC 484 . He further submitted that the bare reading of Section 24 (1) would show that the Act of 1894 is required to be treated as not repealed, only in the cases where award has been made under Section 11 of the 1894 Act, however where the award has not been made, then the proceedings under the Act of 1894 are required to be treated as lapsed. Relying upon the provisions contained in Section 24 (1) (a) of the Act of 2013, he submitted that the words “all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply”, would mean that the determination of compensation resulting in the award made under the Act of 2013 would apply, and accordingly the award was required to be made within 12 months from the date of publication of the declaration, as per Section 25 of the Act of 2013, otherwise entire proceedings would stand lapsed. 7. Challenging the legality and validity of the award dated 07.01.2015, Mr. Hora further submitted that the said award was bad in the eye of law, as it was not made as per the provisions of determining the compensation under the Act of 2013 and even otherwise the Land Acquisition Officer having become functus officio after making of the award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894, he could not have further determined the compensation as per the provisions contained in the Act of 2013. Hence, the said award was illegal as per Section 11 A of Act of 1894 as well as under Section 25 of the Act of 2013. 8. Mr. Hence, the said award was illegal as per Section 11 A of Act of 1894 as well as under Section 25 of the Act of 2013. 8. Mr. Hora also submitted that there was non-compliance of the mandatory provisions contained in Section 4 and 6 of the Act of 1894 as the publication of the notification under Section 4 in the second newspaper and the pasting at the convenient place of locality was not proved by the respondents. According to him, there being a big gap between the publication of declaration under Section 6 in the official gazette and the pasting of notice at the convenient place in the locality, the acquisition proceedings had failed to comply with the requirements of the said provisions. He has relied upon the decisions of Apex Court in cases of Kulsum R. Nadiadwala Versus State of Maharashtra, (2012) 6 SCC, 348, V.K.M. Kattha Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (2013) 9 SCC 338 , Deepak Pahwa & Ors. Versus Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors., (1984) 4 SCC 308 , Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad Urban Development Authority, Hyderabad, A.P. vs. Mohd. Amri Khan & Ors. (1986) 1 SCC 3 , in support of his submissions. As regards the petitioners of the writ petition No.12860/2014, Mr. Hora submitted that though the petitioners were the persons interested, they were not given due opportunity to make objections under Section 5 (A) of the Act of 1894, which lapse was required to be treated as fatal, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in case of Kamal Trading Private Limited (now known as Manav Investment and Trading Company Ltd.) Vs. State of West Bengal and Ors., (2012) 2 Supreme Court Cases 25 and in case of Usha Stud and Agricultural Farms Pvt. Ltd. And Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors., 2013 (4) Supreme Court Cases 210. 9. Per contra, the learned counsel Mr. Anuroop Singhi for the respondent Nos.2 & 3, referring the documents produced by the petitioners themselves alongwith the petitions, submitted that there was due compliance of the mandatory provisions contained in Section 4 and 6 of the Act of 1894, so far as their respective petitions were concerned. According to him, it was proved from the Annexures-4, 5, 6 & 7, annexed to the petitions, that the notification under Section 4 was duly published in two newspapers. According to him, it was proved from the Annexures-4, 5, 6 & 7, annexed to the petitions, that the notification under Section 4 was duly published in two newspapers. He also submitted that both the notification and declaration were also duly pasted at the conspicuous places i.e. at the various Government Offices, and that the said acts of pasting of the notices, were the official acts done, in view of the presumption under Section 114 (e) of the Evidence Act. In this regard, he has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Ajay Krishan Shinghal, etc. vs. Union of India and Others, 1996 (10) SCC 721 . So far as the enquiry under Section 5(A) of the Act of 1894 is concerned, he submitted that the ground of not giving opportunity of hearing was taken only by the petitioners of the petition No.12860/2014 and not in other petitions, and in any case as transpiring from the award, the said petitioners had failed to produce any evidence before the Land Acquisition Officer to show that their names were mutated in the revenue records. Relying upon the decision of State of Haryana & Anr. Versus Raghubir Dayal, 1995 (1) SCC 133 , and in case of Deepak Pahwa & Ors. Versus Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors. 1984 (4) SCC 308 , he submitted that no acquisition proceedings would lapsed merely because there was some time gap between the publication in the official gazette and pasting of the notification under Section 4 and 6 of the Act of 1894, more particularly when the petitioners had failed to point out any prejudice having been caused to them on account of such time gap. He further submitted that the petitioners were estopped from raising the said issue as they had approached the Court in the year 2014, whereas the notification under Section 4 was published, as back as in the year 2010-11. 10. Mr. Singhi pressing into service the provisions of the Act of 2013, submitted that the legislature had very consciously restricted the scope and gamut of Section 24 (1) (a) of the Act of 2013, and had provided that when no award under Section 11 of the Act of 1984 has been made, then all provisions of Act of 2013 relating to the determination of compensation shall apply. In the instant case therefore, only the provisions relating to the determination of compensation and not the other provisions under the Act of 2013 would apply. He also submitted that despite the repeal of the Act of 1894 in view of Section 114 of the Act of 2013, the proceedings initiated under the Act of 1894 were saved as per Section 6 of the General Clause Act, and therefore the State Government had consciously approved the award dated 07.01.2015 stating that the said award was subject to the applicability of the provisions contained in the Act of 2013. Relying upon the unreported judgment of the High Court of Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, in case of Anitha Tholia & Ors. Versus State of Telangana & Ors., decided on 20.02.2015, he submitted that the award has to be passed under the Act of 1894, but the compensation was required to be determined as per the provisions of the Act of 2013. 11. Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsels in the light of the facts of the case, it appears that the petitioners have challenged the proceedings initiated under the Act of 1984 on various grounds. As such, there can not be any dispute with regard to the proposition of law reiterated by the Apex Court in case of Kulsum Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) and in case of V.K.M. Katha Industries vs. State of Haryana (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel Mr. Hora, that the requirements of publications of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 are mandatory in nature. It cannot be gainsaid that non publication of the said notification in the locality may affect the valuable right of the person interested in the lands in question to make his representation or objection in the enquiry under Section 5 A of the said Act. However, in the instant case, the challenge of the notification under Section 4 of the said Act of 1894 on the ground that it was not published in two newspapers and was not pasted at the conspicuous place in the locality does not find any merit, in view of the factual position narrated in the reply filed on behalf of the respondents. As stated in the reply filed on behalf of the respondent Nos.2 & 3,, the notification under Section 4 was issued on 21.09.2010, which was duly published in official gazette on 28.09.2010 and thereafter was published in two newspapers i.e. Dainik Bhaskar and Samachar Jagat on 10.12.2010, and it was also pasted at the various government offices of District Collector, Jaipur, Tehsildar Amer, Nagar Nigam, Jaipur, Land Acquisition Officer, Jaipur Development Authority and Panchayat Samiti, Amer on 13.12.2011. The said statements made in the reply also find corroboration from the documents annexed to the petition, more particularly from the copy of notice dated 12.12.2011 (Annexure 7) and the award dated 07.01.2015 (Annexure-13). Even otherwise, it is needless to say that the official endorsements and acts done by the Government Employees, would be presumed to have been done properly unless proved otherwise, as per the provisions contained in Section 114 (e) of the Evidence Act. Beneficial reference of the decision of the Apex Court in case of Ajay Krishan Shinghal, etc. vs. Union of India and Others (supra) be made in this regard. The Apex Court has observed in the said decision that it is not the law and could not and would not be the law that publication of substance of Section 4 (1) of the notification in the locality should be established beyond shadow of doubt and benefit should be extended to the owner or interested person of the land. The presumption under Section 114 (e) of the Evidence Act could be raised that official acts have been properly done unless proved otherwise. In the instant case also, the Court is satisfied from the documents on record that the substance of notification under Section 4 was duly published in the locality and also in the two newspapers as well as in the official gazette, and hence the mandatory requirements of Section 4 of the Act of 1894 were duly complied by the Land Acquisition Officer. 12. It is very much pertinent to note that none of the petitioners except the petitioners of the writ petition No.12860/2014 have raised the grievance that their right to file objections in the enquiry under Section 5A was violated. On the contrary all the petitioners including the petitioners of writ petition No.12860/2014 were given opportunity to file their objections and their objections were duly considered by the Land Acquisition Officer. On the contrary all the petitioners including the petitioners of writ petition No.12860/2014 were given opportunity to file their objections and their objections were duly considered by the Land Acquisition Officer. In case of petitioners of writ petition No.12860/2014, from their own documents more particularly the order dated 02.07.2012 (Annexure/9 to the said petition), it clearly emerges that they were aware about the proceedings having been initiated in respect of Khasra No.162 and 163, and therefore had made a representation on 10.01.2011, however the said petitioners having failed to produce the sale deed or the Jamabandi showing their names in the revenue record, despite the notice dated 08.02.2012 having been given by the Land Acquisition Officer, their representation was rejected by the said order dated 02.07.2012. 13. The submission made by the learned counsel Mr. Hora for the petitioners that there was a time gap between the issuance of notification under Section 4, the publication thereof in the State gazette and the publication of the substance of notification in the locality, and therefore the acquisition proceedings had lapsed, does not have legs to stand, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in case of State of Haryana Versus Raghubir Dayal (supra). In the said decision it has been categorically held that such delay itself would not render the notification under Section 4 invalid. It is also held by the Apex Court in case of Deepak Pahwa & Ors. Versus Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors. (supra), that Section 4 (1) does not require that the publication and public notice must be simultaneous or immediately after one another. Acquisition would not be rendered void, whenever there was a gap of time between the publication in the gazette and the public notice in the locality. The fact that the petitioners had availed the opportunity to make their representations in the enquiry under Section 5 A, renders the time gap absolutely insignificant. 14. The argument made by the learned counsel Mr. Hora that the time gap between the last publication of Section 4 notification and the first publication of the declaration made under Section 6 had vitiated proceedings, is also misconceived. As per the provisions contained in the said Act of 1894 the declaration under Section 6 has to be made within one year from the date of last publication of notification under Section 4. As per the provisions contained in the said Act of 1894 the declaration under Section 6 has to be made within one year from the date of last publication of notification under Section 4. In the instant case, the notification under Section 4 was pasted in the locality on 13.12.2011 and the declaration under Section 6 was made on 04.12.2012, well within the prescribed time period, and therefore the proceedings could not be said to have vitiated. The issuance of subsequent corrigendum to the declaration under Section 6 with regard to the minor typographical error also does not take the case of the petitioner any further. The Apex Court in case of State of Haryana Versus Raghubir Dayal (supra) has held that the notification under Section 4 (1) should not be invalidated for non compliance of the notification under Section 6, as the purpose of publication of declaration is to give effect to the conclusiveness of the extent of the land needed for the public purpose under Section 6 (3) of the said Act. Since there is an opportunity already given to the owners of the lands, or the persons having interest in the land to raise their objections during the enquiry under Section 5 (A), unless they show grave prejudice caused to them in non-publication of substance of declaration under Section 6 (1), the omission to publish the substance of declaration under Section 6 (1) in the locality would not render the declaration of Section 6 invalid. In any case, as per the documents produced by the petitioners themselves, the notice dated 02.01.2013 regarding the substance of the declaration under Section 6 was already pasted in the locality on 09.01.2013 (Annexure/9). The award thereafter has also been filed within two years on 07.01.2015 (Anneuxre/13) and hence, it could not be said that the time limit prescribed under Section 11 A of the Act of 1894 was not adhered to. 15. It is true that before passing of the said Award, the new Act of 2013 had come into force on 01.01.2014, however the proceedings initiated under the said Act of 1894 did not lapse in the instant case in view of Section 24 (1) (a) of the Act of 2013. The relevant part of the said provision reads as under:- “24. The relevant part of the said provision reads as under:- “24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894),- (a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) where an award under said Section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.” 16. At this juncture, it is also beneficial to reproduce Section 114 of the said Act of 2013, which reads as under:- “114. Repeal and saving.-(1) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) is hereby repealed. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act the repeal under sub-section (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeals.” 17. The provisions contained in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is also reproduced as under:- “6. Effect of repeal – Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not- (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.” 18. From the bare reading of Section 24 (1) of the Act of 2013, it emerges that the said provision contemplates two situations, firstly, where no award has been made and secondly, where the award has been made under Section 11 of the Act of 1894, when the Act of 2013 came into force. In case of former, all provisions of the new Act of 2013 relating to the determination of compensation shall apply, whereas in the later case, all the proceedings under the Act of 1894 shall continue as if the said Act has not been repealed. None of these situations contemplates the lapsing of proceedings so far as Section 24 (1) is concerned. It is also pertinent to note that Section 24 (1) starts with the non abstante clause i.e. “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act.” Therefore the provision contained in Section 24(1) has an effect overriding the other provisions of the said Act of 2013. 19. In the instant case, as stated hereinabove, the award was not made on the date of coming into force of the Act of 2013, i.e. 01.01.2014, and was made on 07.01.2015, during the pendency of these petitions. Hence the case of petitioners would be governed by Section 24 (1) (a) of the Act of 2013. The land acquisition proceedings having been validly initiated under the Act of 1894, but the award having not been made on 01.01.2014, i.e. on the date when Act of 2013 came into force, the said proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Act of 1894, except that the provisions of Act of 2013 relating to the determination of compensation shall apply as per Section 24 (1) (a) of the Act of 2013. The submissions made by the learned counsel Mr. Hora to the effect that the proceedings initiated under the Act of 1894 would stand lapsed, if the award was not made on the date of coming into force of the Act of 2013, cannot be accepted in view of Section 24 (1) (a) of the Act of 2013, which does not speak about lapsing of proceedings but states that in such cases, the provisions relating to the determination of compensation would apply. 20. 20. Further, it has been specifically provided in Section 114 of the Act of 2013 that the repeal under sub-Section 1 of Section 114 shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act with regard to the effect of repeals. As per Section 6 (b) of the General Clauses Act such repeal would not affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder. It is also provided under Section 6 (c) of the General Clauses Act that such repeal shall also not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. Hence, the land acquisition proceedings already initiated under the Act of 1894 have been saved despite the repeal of the said Act, by virtue of Section 114 of the Act of 2013 read with Section 6 of General Clauses Act. It is significant to note that the legislature in its wisdom has not thought it proper to let the acquisition proceedings initiated under the Act of 1894 lapsed, merely because the award under Section 11 of the said Act was not made on the date of coming into force of the Act of 2013. It has been specifically provided in Section 24 (1) that notwithstanding anything contained in the said Act of 2013, the provisions of the Act of 2013 relating to the determination of compensation shall apply if the Award was not made under Section 11 of the Act of 1894. The Land Acquisition Officer, in the instant case, therefore has rightly passed the award on 07.01.2015 mentioning therein that the said award would be subject to the provisions of Act of 2013 for the purpose of determination of compensation. 21. There is no merit in the submission made by Mr. Hora that the Land Acquisition Officer could not have taken any action under the Act of 1894 and had become functus officio on the Act of 2013 having come into force. As stated hereinabove, the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Act of 1894 having not been treated as lapsed in view of the provision contained in Section 24 (1) (a), the Land Acquisition Officer is required to determine the compensation as per the Act of 2013. As stated hereinabove, the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Act of 1894 having not been treated as lapsed in view of the provision contained in Section 24 (1) (a), the Land Acquisition Officer is required to determine the compensation as per the Act of 2013. The provisions of Act of 1894 would still continue to apply so far as the other provisions pertaining to taking over possession of lands, vesting of lands etc. are concerned. Under the circumstances, the question of LAO becoming functus officio does not arise. Such award could not be said to be bad under Section 25 also, as Section 25 would apply only to the cases where the declaration under Section 19 is made and the award is not made under the Act of 2013 within a period of twelve months from the date of publication of such declaration. 22. The submission of learned counsel Mr. Hora for the petitioners that the provisions relating to determination of compensation would also include the provisions of Rehabilitation and Resettlement as contemplated in the Act of 2013, cannot be accepted. In this regard, it is significant to note certain provisions of the Act of 2013, more particularly Section 2, which deals with application of the Act. As transpiring from the said Section 2, the provisions of the Act relating to land acquisition, compensation and Rehabilitation and Resettlement shall apply in terms of the said section. The very fact that the provisions relating to compensation and the Rehabilitation and Resettlement have been separately dealt with, it means that the provisions relating to Rehabilitation and Resettlement can not be read as the provisions relating to compensation. When it is specifically provided in Section 24 (1) (a) that the provisions of the said Act of 2013 relating to the determination of compensation shall apply, it would mean that the provisions contained in Section 27 to Section 30 and other provisions relevant for the purpose of determining compensation to be paid to the affected persons would apply. For the cases falling under Section 24 (1) (a), the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer is not expected to consider the other provisions pertaining to the Rehabilitation and Resettlement which otherwise also, are contained in separate Chapter V of the Act of 2013. For the cases falling under Section 24 (1) (a), the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer is not expected to consider the other provisions pertaining to the Rehabilitation and Resettlement which otherwise also, are contained in separate Chapter V of the Act of 2013. The said Chapter V would apply when the land is sought to be acquired under the Act of 2013, and not to the land acquisition proceedings validly initiated and continued under the Act of 1894. The said Chapter deals with the provisions of making Rehabilitation and Resettlement Awards, which could not mean provisions relating to determination of compensation as contemplated in Section 24 (1) (a). The legislature appears to have deliberately omitted the said provisions relating to the making of Rehabilitation and Resettlement Awards, from the purview of Section 24 (1) (a). 23. Having regard to the scheme of the Act of 2013 also, it clearly emerges that the Collector could pass the Rehabilitation and Resettlement awards for the affected families in terms of their entitlements provided in the second schedule of the said Act, only when the land is sought to be acquired under the said Act of 2013, after determining the social impact and the public purpose, and after framing the Rehabilitation and Resettlement scheme. No such provision having been contained in the earlier Act of 1894, the provisions contained in Chapter V of the said Act of 2013, which do not deal with the determination of compensation could not be made applicable to such land acquisition proceedings, initiated under the Act of 1894. Had it been the intention of legislature to make all the provisions relating to Rehabilitation and Resettlement applicable, it would have stated so in Section 24 (1) (a) itself. That having not been done, the only interpretation which is plausible and reasonable, is that the provisions of Act of 2013 relating to the determination of compensation alone and not the other provisions relating to Rehabilitation and Resettlement would apply to the cases falling under Section 24 (1) (a) of the said Act. 24. In that view of the matter, the Court does not find any substance in any of the petitions. The petitions being devoid of merits are dismissed. By this order, the stay applications also stand dismissed. A copy of this order be placed in each connected petition.