JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar Mishra, J. Heard Sri Randhir Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Sunil Kumar Mishra, who has filed his appearance on behalf of respondents 3 and 4, through their power of attorney-holder, respondent no. 5. 2. A short counter affidavit of the power of attorney-holder of respondents 3 and 4 has been filed, as also supplementary affidavits of their counsel in the court below. 3. The writ petition is directed against an order dated 20.5.2015 passed in Suit No. 184 of 2005. By this order, an injunction granted by the trial court, directing the parties to maintain status quo, has been recalled on an application of respondents 3 to 5 herein. 4. The facts of the case are that the petitioner filed a suit in the court of the Civil Judge (SD), Allahabad, for a declaration that the plaintiff is the owner of the property in suit. A further relief for a permanent injunction, restraining the defendants from interfering in the plaintiffs' peaceful possession, was sought. It was also prayed that the defendants be restrained from damaging the property and from alienating the same. The suit was filed on 11.2.2015, along with an application for ad interim injunction. 5. It appears that notices were issued to the defendants in the suit. Thereafter, by order dated 5.5.2015 the application for interim injunction was allowed, with the direction that the parties maintain status quo as regards the property in question. This order was passed after hearing the plaintiff and defendant-respondent no. 2. This order further records that service of the notices upon defendants 3 and 4 was held to be sufficient, vide order dated 6.4.2014. However, none appeared on their behalf on the said date, that is, 5.5.2015. 6. It appears that on 18.5.2015, an application was filed on behalf of defendants 3 and 4, through the power of attorney-holder, seeking recall of the the interim injunction, on the ground that it was ex parte against them, i.e. the defendants 3 and 4 in the suit. This application appears to have been filed along with an application for fixing an early date in the matter. It further appears that on this application, dated 18.5.2015, the Court fixed the matter for 20.5.2015, with a further direction that notice of the application be served upon counsel for the plaintiff by a special messenger. This application appears to have been filed along with an application for fixing an early date in the matter. It further appears that on this application, dated 18.5.2015, the Court fixed the matter for 20.5.2015, with a further direction that notice of the application be served upon counsel for the plaintiff by a special messenger. The notice through the special messenger is alleged to have been served on the counsel for the plaintiff on 19.5.2015, at about 2: 15 pm. Counsel for the plaintiff had made an endorsement, while receiving the notice, that the next date fixed in the matter was 28.7.2015, and since he did not have the phone number of the plaintiff, there was not enough time to inform him of the date fixed and, therefore, it was prayed that notice be sent to the plaintiff. 7. The matter was thereafter taken up on 20.5.2015, and by an ex parte order the interim injunction granted on 5.5.2015 was vacated, and it was directed that the interim injunction application be considered on the next date fixed, namely 28.7.2015. 8. A perusal of this order indicates that it has been passed on the ground that although the Court, vide order dated 6.4.2015, had held the service of the notice upon defendants 3 and 4 to be sufficient, as the notices meant for them were accepted by their servant. It was alleged in the recall application of the defendant nos. 3 and 4 that no such service was effected and that no notice was served upon them. It has further been recorded that the recall application had been filed, stating that the defendants 3 and 4 would suffer irreparable injury in case the injunction order passed against them is not recalled. 9. There is nothing in the order to indicate as to what irreparable injury was being caused to the defendants by the order of status quo granted by the Court on 5.5.2015. 10. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner has submitted that the order of status quo was rightly granted on 5.5.2015, but the same has been recalled on the ground that it was passed ex parte against defendant nos. 3 and 4, and while passing the order on the recall application, another ex parte order has been passed. 11. 10. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner has submitted that the order of status quo was rightly granted on 5.5.2015, but the same has been recalled on the ground that it was passed ex parte against defendant nos. 3 and 4, and while passing the order on the recall application, another ex parte order has been passed. 11. It has further been contended that on account of the death of some advocates, the Bar Association had passed a resolution that no adverse orders be passed so as to enable the advocates to attend the funeral of the advocates, who had died in an accident the previous day. This was an additional ground why the order of status quo should not have been vacated ex parte. He further states that now the matter has been fixed for 28.7.2015, and, in the meantime, if the constructions existing on the disputed property are demolished, the suit itself might be rendered infructuous. 12. Sri Sunil Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the respondents, raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition itself is not maintainable. He submits that the order impugned has been passed on an application, which, for all practical purposes, was an application under section 151 Code of Civil Procedure Code (the Code). A revision ls maintainable against such an order, and not a writ petition. 13. Alternatively, he has submitted that the petitioner has an alternative remedy of filing a First Appeal from Order (FAFO) under Order XLIII, Rule 1(r) CPC. He submits that on either of the grounds, noted above, the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which has not been availed of, and, therefore, the writ petition must not be entertained. In support of this contention, he has relied upon the judgement of this Court, State of UP and others Vs. Smt. Pyari Rai, reported in 1997 (31) ALR 413, especially paragraph 8 of this judgement. 14. Paragraph 8 of the above-noted judgement, relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, reads as follows: "An order under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not a decree, hence no appeal against such order lies and only revision can be maintained...." 15. From a reading of the paragraph relied upon, it is clear that the controversy in that case was as to whether an appeal or a revision could be filed. From a reading of the paragraph relied upon, it is clear that the controversy in that case was as to whether an appeal or a revision could be filed. It was held that no appeal lay and, in fact, a revision was maintainable. This order was in the facts and circumstances of the case wherein it was passed. In my considered opinion, the facts in the instant case are different and, therefore, the observation that has been relied upon, does not help the respondents. 16. A revision lies under section 115 of the CPC. The relevant portion of the said section, as amended for its application in Uttar Pradesh, especially, sub-section (3) thereof, reads as follows: "115. Revision.-- (1) ... (3) The superior court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made except where, - (i) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding; or (ii) .... (iii) ..." 17. From the provision extracted above, it is clear that a revision will only lie where, interference with the order sought to be revised, would lead to closure of the proceedings themselves. 18. In the instant case, a restoration application has been allowed, and it stands finally disposed of by the order impugned. In case this order is set aside in revision, it will not finally dispose of the suit or the proceedings, but rather lead to re-opening of the restoration application itself. In such a view of the matter, in my considered opinion, the order impugned is not revisable and, therefore, the objection of the learned counsel for the defendant-respondents in this regard is repelled. 19. Coming to the alternative argument that an FAFO lies against the order impugned, it would be relevant to notice Rule 1(r) of Order XLIII of the CPC, which is reproduced below: "1. Appeal from orders.-- An appeal shall lie from the following orders under the provisions of section 104, namely: - ..... (r) an order under rule 1, rule 2 [rule 2A], rule 4 or rule 10 of Order XXXIX;" 20. Admittedly, in the instant case, the order impugned is not an order under Order XXXIX or any of the sub-rules specified in rule (r), quoted above. (r) an order under rule 1, rule 2 [rule 2A], rule 4 or rule 10 of Order XXXIX;" 20. Admittedly, in the instant case, the order impugned is not an order under Order XXXIX or any of the sub-rules specified in rule (r), quoted above. It is an order passed on a miscellaneous application for recall, which is, as submitted by the learned counsel for the defendant-respondents, for all practical purposes an application under section 151 CPC invoking the inherent powers of the court to recall an ex parte order. The alternative submissions of the learned counsel for the defendant-respondents, therefore, is also not acceptable. 21. Learned counsel for the defendant-respondents has thereafter relied upon various other judgements, as also the averments made in the short counter affidavit to canvass that several blocks of flats have been raised on the land in dispute. It has further been alleged therein that the basis of the suit is an unregistered gift-deed, and an unregistered gift-deed relating to immovable property cannot be recognized. It is, therefore, submitted that the suit itself is based on an bogus claim, and is liable to be dismissed. In support of his submissions on the merits of the suit, and on the merits of the writ petition itself, learned counsel has placed reliance on several judgements, namely: 1. AIR 2012 SC 437 : Makers Development Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M. Visvesraraya Industrial Research and Development Centre. 2. 1987 (2) AWC 989 All: Himachal Steel Rerollers and Fabricators Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and others. 3. AIR 2009 SC 2882 : Kishorsinh Ratansinh Jadeja Vs. Maruti Corp. and others. 22. Since the issue involved in the instant writ petition is only as to whether or not the trial court was justified in recalling a final order passed on the interim injunction application, I do not consider it fit to enter into the rival claims as regards the suit itself. The suit is pending and the same shall be decided on the basis of the evidence that may be led by the parties and on the basis of their submissions. The trial court has not yet undertaken this exercise, and any observation of this Court while deciding an entirely different issue may prejudice the case of the parties before the trial court. 23. The trial court has not yet undertaken this exercise, and any observation of this Court while deciding an entirely different issue may prejudice the case of the parties before the trial court. 23. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the submissions on merits, as also the case-laws relied upon in support thereof are wholly irrelevant as regards the instant writ petition, and, therefore, the same are not being considered. 24. Insofar as the merits of the writ petition, as regards the order impugned are concerned, it has admittedly been passed ex parte. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in view of the resolution passed by the Bar Association, which was duly circulated, no adverse orders were to be passed on 20.5.2015 in the absence of the counsel for the parties. Despite such a resolution and circulation thereof, the order impugned has been passed ex parte. 25. In this connection, learned counsel for the respondents has filed two supplementary affidavits of the counsel, Sri B.M. Tripathi, who claims to be the counsel of defendants 3 and 4 in the suit. In these affidavits it has been alleged that the hearing of the recall application started at 10: 15 am, and was concluded within about 20 minutes. From the perusal of the averments made in this affidavit, it would be safe to conclude that the allegations made by the petitioner, that there was the resolution that no ex parte adverse order be passed, and this resolution was duly circulated, even then the impugned order was passed ex parte, have some substance. 26. In this connection the learned Standing Counsel has produced a copy of the instructions received by him in pursuance of directions issued by this Court. The perusal thereof indicates the District Judge had passed an order that judicial work would remain suspended after 3pm. 27. This very same fact has been reiterated in the second supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents. 28. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since neither the petitioner nor his counsel was present on the relevant date, it is not possible for them to comment as to the time of the day on which the order impugned was passed. 29. Admittedly, there was a resolution of the Bar Association, praying that no ex parte orders be passed on the relevant date. 29. Admittedly, there was a resolution of the Bar Association, praying that no ex parte orders be passed on the relevant date. It would, therefore, be safe to assume that it gave rise to a legitimate expectation that this resolution would be honoured. 30. Even otherwise, in my considered opinion, the order impugned has been passed with great haste. The recall application was filed on the 18th, and the same has been allowed ex parte on the 20th of May, the third day of the filing itself; more so, when the order recalled was an order which had been passed after due hearing. 31. The court while passing the impugned order has stated that the recall application states that the defendants are going to suffer irreparable injury due to the continuance of the order of status quo. However, there is no whisper in the order as to what was this irreparable injury which prompted the court to prepone the date by more than 2 months, and to pass an order on the recall application within 48 hours of the filing thereof. In such view of the matter, the controversy sought to be raised by the learned counsel for the respondents, in my considered opinion, is rendered insignificant. Nothing prevented the trial court from granting a few days' further time before considering the recall application. 32. In view of the discussion in the preceding paragraphs, I am of the view that in a suit for injunction, the Court should ensure that the strict status quo be maintained, as laid down in the judgement in the case of Ram Kalap Vs. IV Addl. District Judge, Gorakhpur and another, reported in AIR 1989 Alld 157. 33. In the result, I dispose of this writ petition with a direction that the injunction application filed by the petitioner be considered and disposed of on the next dated fixed, namely 28.7.2015, or within the next 3 days, after hearing all concerned, and in accordance with law. 34. Moreover, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case and in view of the fact that the civil court is closed for the summer vacations, I consider it fit to direct maintenance of status quo, as regards the nature and possession over the property in suit till the disposal of the interim injunction application, as directed above. 35. 34. Moreover, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case and in view of the fact that the civil court is closed for the summer vacations, I consider it fit to direct maintenance of status quo, as regards the nature and possession over the property in suit till the disposal of the interim injunction application, as directed above. 35. It is further provided that the trial court shall not grant any unnecessary adjournment to either of the parties and shall proceed to hear the application on a day-to-day basis so as to pass the order within the time-frame specified above. The parties are, therefore, directed to appear before the trial court on 28.7.2015, the date fixed before it, and to make their submissions. They may exchange their pleadings in this regard before the date fixed. Accordingly, and subject to the directions aforesaid, this writ petition is disposed of.