JUDGMENT 1. Heard. 2. Admit. 3. Heard finally by consent. 4. By this application, the applicant has challenged legality and correctness of two orders passed by the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nagpur on 14/9/2012 and 15/01/2013. 5. The facts leading to presentation of the application may be stated in brief as under.: 5.1 The respondent initiated proceedings for dishonour of cheque issued to it by the applicant towards satisfaction of the applicant's liability on account of purchase of some goods by the applicant from the respondent on credit, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The affidavit in evidence was filed by the respondent on 06/01/2011 and he was also cross-examined by the applicant on 26/8/2011. 5.2 Few days later i.e. on 30/8/2011 the respondent moved an application vide Exh.46 seeking leave of the Court to examine partner of the respondent-firm, Satyanarayan Taori as its witness on the ground that the applicant had denied execution of power of attorney in favour of P.W.1 Krishna Shriramji Takalkhede and had denied the existence of the firm. This application was partly allowed by the trial Court on 09/12/2011. The trial Court allowed the respondent to examine its partner Satyanarayan Taori only for the purpose of proving of the power of attorney. The other purpose for which the partner was sought to be examined as witness of the respondent-firm, however, was not served by the said order. 5.3 Thereafter, the respondent-firm filed another application vide Exh.52 with almost a similar prayer. It was contended in this application that since the applicant had disputed delivery of goods and balance amount, it was necessary to prove the same by adducing proper evidence and, therefore, permission was sought for leading the evidence of the partner of respondent-firm fully in all respect. This application was rejected by the trial Court by an order passed on 28/3/2012. 5.4 The respondent, without getting tired of filing any more applications, filed yet another application (Exh. 55) on 06/8/2012 with a prayer which was, though expressed in different words, sought the same relief as in application vide Exh.52. It was contended in this application that since the applicant had disputed the delivery memo and bills, it was necessary to prove the same by examining Santosh Taori, another partner of respondent-firm and accordingly leave of the Court was sought for examining Santosh Taori as witness of the respondent-firm. It was contended in this application that since the applicant had disputed the delivery memo and bills, it was necessary to prove the same by examining Santosh Taori, another partner of respondent-firm and accordingly leave of the Court was sought for examining Santosh Taori as witness of the respondent-firm. This application was, however, allowed by the learned Magistrate by order passed on 14/9/2012. It appears that this order was not challenged by the applicant by filing any revision application or by resorting any other appropriate remedy. 5.5 After allowing of the application vide Exh.55, Santosh Taori, partner of the firm was examined as witness of the respondent-firm and was also cross-examined by the applicant. Thereafter, the evidence of the complainant was closed and the matter was fixed for arguments. 5.6 When the case was pending at the stage of arguments, on 11/01/2013, respondent-firm once again filed another application vide Exh.76 seeking permission of the Court to adduce additional evidence by invoking its power under Section 311 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This application, by the order passed on 15/01/2013, was allowed by the learned Magistrate on payment of costs of Rs.1,200/-. It was found by the learned Magistrate that grant of permission to the respondent-firm to examine its banker as its witness was necessary for reaching a just decision in the matter. 5.7 It was the order which was passed on 15/01/2013 granting permission to the respondent-firm to summon its banker as a witness under Section 311 Cr.P.C., which made the applicant file the present application under Section 482 Cr. P.C. In the process, the applicant has also challenged the order passed earlier on 14/9/2012 below application vide Exh.55. 6. Learned Counsel for the applicant submits that earlier order dated 14/9/2012 passed below application (Exh.55) amounted to nothing but review of own orders of the Court passed on 09/12/2011 below Exh.46 and 28/3/2012 passed below application Exh.52. He submits that the order dated 14/9/2012 is particularly a review order of the one passed on 28/3/2012 on the application Exh.52. According to him, by application (Exh.52) the respondent-firm had sought leave of the Court to examine its partner as a witness on the ground that existence of the partnership firm was denied and delivery of the goods and balance amount had also been disputed by the applicant. According to him, by application (Exh.52) the respondent-firm had sought leave of the Court to examine its partner as a witness on the ground that existence of the partnership firm was denied and delivery of the goods and balance amount had also been disputed by the applicant. This application was rejected in its entirety by the order passed on 28/3/2012 by the learned Magistrate and, therefore, another application seeking permission of the Court to examine Santosh Taori, one of the partners of the respondent-firm as witness to prove almost the same facts itself was not tenable as what it sought in effect was review of the order passed on 28/3/2012. He submits that there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code conferring any power upon the Court of J. M. F. C. to review its own order which has attained finality. He submits that the order summoning the person to lead additional evidence or refusing a person to be summoned as a witness attains finality by virtue of it being not challenged in any manner in the superior Court by resorting to appropriate remedy and, therefore, judicial propriety would require that it should not be reopened. In support, he places his reliance upon the case of Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. and another Vs. Gopal Krishna Sengupta and others reported in AIR 2003 SC 3536 . 7. Learned Counsel Shri Dani for the respondent submitted that in the first place the order passed on 14/9/2012 did not amount to review of any of the earlier orders passed by the trial Court much less review of the order passed on 28/3/2012 for the reason that the application below Exh.55 on which order dated 14/9/2012 was passed was moved on altogether different grounds. He submits that in the earlier application vide Exh.52, which was rejected by the order dated 28/3/2012 so also the application vide Exh.46, which was rejected by the order passed on 9/12/2011, name of the partner, Santosh Taori was not mentioned and no prayer was made for examining Santosh Taori as witness of the respondent-firm. He further submits that, even otherwise, it would be proper for this Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P. C. to not interfere with the order passed on 14/9/2012, which has already attained its finality, it having not been challenged in any manner by the applicant previously. He further submits that, even otherwise, it would be proper for this Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P. C. to not interfere with the order passed on 14/9/2012, which has already attained its finality, it having not been challenged in any manner by the applicant previously. He further submits that in fact the order passed on 14/9/2012 had been acted upon by the parties as the applicant by cross-examining Santosh Taori had participated in the proceedings before the trial Court and thus he can be said to have waived whatever rights he may had in law in this regard. He also submits that it is not the case of the applicant that by the order passed on 14/9/2012, any prejudice has been caused to the rights of the applicant in the sense that the defence taken by the applicant has been washed away. Therefore, this is not a fit case for making any interference in the order passed on 14/9/2012, so submits the learned Counsel for the respondent. 8. Upon considering all the orders passed by the trial Court, which orders are of the date 09/12/2011 passed below application vide Exh.46, 28/3/2012 passed below application vide Exh.52 and 14/9/2012 passed below application vide Exh.55, I find that the order lastly passed on 14/9/2012 can be considered to be an order which effectively reviewed the order passed by the trial Court on 28/3/2012 below application (Exh.52). The order passed on 28/3/2012 was on an application which prayed for grant of leave to examine any of the partners of the respondent-firm as its witness and this application was rejected in its entirety by the order passed on 28/3/2012. By the subsequent application vide Exh.55, although the respondent did not pray in so many words that any of its partners should be allowed to be examined as its witness, the respondent sought permission of the Court to lead evidence of Santosh Taori, one of the partners of the respondent-firm to prove some of the facts which were disputed by the applicant. This application was expressed in different words but it carried the same purport and meaning as previous application vide Exh.52. Therefore, learned Magistrate ought to have considered the aspect as to whether allowing of the said application would amount to review of his own order passed earlier on similar application or not. This application was expressed in different words but it carried the same purport and meaning as previous application vide Exh.52. Therefore, learned Magistrate ought to have considered the aspect as to whether allowing of the said application would amount to review of his own order passed earlier on similar application or not. It appears that learned Magistrate has not given any thoughtful consideration to this aspect. This order not being in accordance with law has to be held as incorrectly passed. 9. The question, however, remains as to whether or not any exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to interfere with the order passed on 14/9/2012 would be warranted. The answer to this question could have been in the affirmative had it been the case that the order passed on 14/9/2012 had not attained any finality and had been subjected to challenge by the applicant by resorting to appropriate remedy before it was acted upon not only by the respondent but also by the applicant. That is unfortunately not the case here. The applicant has allowed the order to become final by not challenging it by filing any revision application or appropriate proceedings. Rather, the applicant allowed the respondent to lead evidence of Santosh Taori and also participated in the proceedings before the trial Court by cross-examining Santosh Taori. In such a situation, judicial propriety requires that the matter is not allowed to be reopened. 10. There is also another angle from which this matter needs to be examined. It is of causing of prejudice to the defence of the applicant by the order passed on 14/9/2012. I do not find that any such prejudice has been caused to the defence of the applicant by the order passed on 14/9/2012. The order has also not led to any miscarriage of justice, rather the order has only subserved the purpose of justice by allowing the parties to lead best possible evidence and enable the Court to arrive at just decision in the dispute between the parties. From this view point as well, I do not think that it would be appropriate for this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P. C. by interfering with the order passed on 14/9/2012. It must be remembered that jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr. From this view point as well, I do not think that it would be appropriate for this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P. C. by interfering with the order passed on 14/9/2012. It must be remembered that jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C. is extraordinary in nature and it calls for extraordinary situation for its appropriate exercise. As said earlier, there being no prejudice caused to the defence of the applicant and no miscarriage of justice resulting from the order dated 14/9/2012, I am of the view that no exceptional situation prevails to impel this Court to interfere with the order dated 14/9/2012 by invoking its power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 11. It is also well settled law that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr. P. C. is discretionary in nature and it is not that in every case it must be exercised only because some illegality is noticed. The noticed illegality should also be transforming itself into a situation where there is a failure of justice or gross abuse of power or deprivation of substantial rights of the parties and if that does not occur, there would be no reason for the High Court to invoke its power under Section 482 Cr. P. C. Accordingly, I find that the order dated 14/9/2012 passed below application vide Exh. 55 by the trial Court cannot be inferred with in this application and the objection taken in this regard deserves rejection. 12. As regards the second objection of the applicant about illegality of the order passed on 15/01/2013 allowing banker of the respondent to be examined as a Court witness under Section 311 Cr. P. C., I must say that the order as passed by the learned Magistrate is neither perverse nor incorrect nor improper nor in violation of any settled principles of law. 13. The learned Counsel for the applicant has invited my attention to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohanlal Shamji Soni Vs. Union of India and another reported in 1991 CRI. L. J. 1521 in order to support his contention that the said order only enables the respondent-firm to fill up the lacunae in this case, which is not a permissible ground for allowing the application filed under Section 311 Cr. Union of India and another reported in 1991 CRI. L. J. 1521 in order to support his contention that the said order only enables the respondent-firm to fill up the lacunae in this case, which is not a permissible ground for allowing the application filed under Section 311 Cr. P. C. No doubt, the law as laid down in the case of Mohanlal Shamji Soni is well settled law and it propounds the principle that even though power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. is very wide and without any restriction, it must be exercised with due care and the Court should not be oblivious of the fact that the power is circumscribed by the principle that evidence to be obtained must appear to the Court essential for reaching a just decision of the case by getting at the truth by all lawful means and as such the exercise of the power should not be capricious or arbitrary. The impugned order shows that this very principle of law has been followed by the learned Magistrate in its letter and spirit. He has found that Santosh Taori always claimed to be partner of the complainant-firm, which claim was disputed by the applicant and, therefore, if any additional evidence was sought to be led by the respondent for substantiating the assertion that Santosh Taori was partner of the complainant-firm, it would not amount to any attempt to filling up the lacuna, and rightly so. No illegality or infirmity or judicial impropriety can be seen in these findings which stand at the base of the grounds on which application vide Exh.76 has been allowed by the learned Magistrate by the order passed on 15/01/2013. It is also seen that the learned Magistrate has drawn support from the case of Milind Shripad Chandurkar Vs. Kalim M. Khan & another reported in 2011 AIR SC 1588, wherein the fact situation was almost similar in the sense that identity of the complainant as a sole proprietor of the concern to whom a dishonoured cheque was issued was in question and since it was not established appropriately by the complainant, although he had an opportunity to adduce evidence in that regard at the early stage or the belated stage, the Hon'ble Apex Court acquitted the accused in that case. Drawing of support from this case by the trial Court cannot be considered to be inappropriate in view of the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court that efforts ought to have been taken by the complainant in the said case of Milind Shripad Chandurkar for leading additional evidence either before the trial Court or at appellate stage. Therefore, I do not see any illegality or impropriety in the order passed on 15/01/2013. This order, I must say, appears to be necessary for reaching a just decision in the case and as such calls for no interference with it. 14. Before passing the final order, I must record a word of caution for the respondent-firm. The proceedings in the complaint filed by the respondent against the applicant are being delayed apparently and probably for the reason that the respondent-firm has been filing one application after another showing wavering of it's mind. The respondent-firm shall now do well to take one firm stand and allow the law to do the rest. In fact, the respondent has now already adhered to one stand and, therefore, it would be advisable that it completes whatever evidence it has been permitted to lead in the matter in shortest possible time and extends it's full cooperation with the Court in expeditious disposal of the complaint. 15. In the result, there is no merit in the application and it deserves to be rejected. The application stands rejected.