JUDGMENT : K.K. Trivedi, J. 1. Heard finally with consent of learned counsel for the parties. 2. This Misc. Appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(u) of the C.P.C. by the plaintiffs is against the judgment dated 4.1.2010 passed in Civil Appeal No. 77-A/09 by the IInd Addl. District Judge, Shahdol, by which while setting aside the judgment and decree granted by the trial Court the matter is remitted back for framing of issues, recording of evidence on the said issues, fixing the provisional rent and to pass the judgment and decree afresh after granting an opportunity of hearing to all concerned. 3. The facts leading to filing of this appeal in brief are that appellants-plaintiffs have filed a suit for eviction against the respondents-defendants under Section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short) on the grounds that respondent no.1 has sublet the premises to respondent no.2 unauthorizedly without the consent of the landlord-plaintiff and that the respondents- defendants were in arrears of rent of the said premises. Even after the demand of payment of rent, the said amount was not paid by the respondents, therefore, the suit was required to be filed. 4. The suit was contested by the respondents- defendants by filing written statement. However, the respondents never disputed that the rent of the demise premises was not Rs.250/- Per month. In fact, their case was that the defendants have informed the original landlord namely Late Shri Jokhilal Kahar and with his consent have partitioned the shop amongst themselves and started paying rent @ Rs. 250/- per month of each part to the original landlord. It was their case that they were ever-since willing to deposit the amount of rent. Even certain applications were made seeking permission of the Court for deposit of the rent amount and in part they deposited the rent amount in the Trial Court. 5. On the basis of pleadings raised by the parties, the trial Court framed the issues, recorded the evidence and came to the conclusion that there was a default on the part of the respondents-defendants to deposit the entire arrears of rent. It was also found that no consent for partition of the shop was given by the landlord and in fact, unauthorizedly a part of the shop was let-out to sub-tenant by the original tenant. It was also found that no consent for partition of the shop was given by the landlord and in fact, unauthorizedly a part of the shop was let-out to sub-tenant by the original tenant. Accordingly, the suit filed by the appellants-plaintiffs was decreed. An appeal was preferred against the said judgment and decree by the respondent no.2 herein, who was the defendant no.2 in the suit. No appeal was filed by defendant-respondent no.1. The said appeal was heard. A question was raised by respondent no.2 that the provisional rent was not fixed by the trial Court even when there was a dispute regarding the quantum of rent. The other ground raised in the appeal was that the defence of respondent no.1 was improperly struck off by the trial Court. It was contended that the opportunity to cross- examine the witnesses was not granted to the said appellant-defendant no.2 by the trial Court. 6. The appellate Court though recorded the fact that an application was made for deposit of the rent during pendency of the suit by the defendant-tenant, yet reached to the conclusion that it was necessary for the trial Court to decide the provisional rent. Relying on certain decisions rendered by this Court in some of the cases, it was held by the lower appellate Court that since the issue relating to the admitted rent was not framed, nor the provisional rent of the demise premises was fixed and the finding in that respect was not recorded by the trial Court, therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act was not sustainable. However, nothing was said about the passing of decree under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act by the lower Appellate Court. Only on that basis, after setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the lower appellate Court remitted back the suit to the trial Court to decide the same expeditiously within a period of eight months after framing of issue on the provisional rent and after granting an opportunity of hearing to the parties. However, the finding was again recorded by the lower appellate Court that the order striking off the defence of respondent no.1-defendant would not be treated to be set aside. Against the said order this appeal is filed by the plaintiffs-appellants. 7. However, the finding was again recorded by the lower appellate Court that the order striking off the defence of respondent no.1-defendant would not be treated to be set aside. Against the said order this appeal is filed by the plaintiffs-appellants. 7. It is contended by learned counsel appearing for the appellants that once the quantum of rent was admitted by defendant-tenant, which was not disputed by the appellants/plaintiffs and the said amount was deposited with the permission of the Court by the tenant, there was no question of framing any issue on the rent of the demise premises, nor any finding in that respect was required to be recorded. In view of the admission of the respondents-defendants regarding the quantum of rent, provisional rent was also not required to be fixed by the trial Court, as in fact the dispute with respect to the quantum of rent was not before the trial Court. If such a dispute was never raised rather admission was made in that respect in the trial Court by the tenant, in appeal such a ground was not available to the respondents to allege that without ascertaining the provisional rent, defence of the defendants could not be struck off. Even otherwise, the remand is not on that account as the order of striking off defence of the defendants is not interfered with by the lower appellate Court. In view of this, it is contended that the order of remand is liable to the set aside. 8. Per contra, it is contended by learned counsel for the respondents that in view of the law well settled, it was necessary for the trial Court to decide the provisional rent and then only to ask the tenant to deposit the rent and if any default was committed, then only to pass a decree under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. Since it was not done by the trial Court and erroneously the decree was passed under the aforesaid Section for eviction of tenant, the lower appellate Court has rightly remitted back the matter to the trial Court for deciding the said issue. It is also contended that the appeal was filed in the year 2010 before this Court which has remained pending for such a long time, whereas in terms of the remand order itself the trial Court would have decided the suit afresh within a period of eight months. It is also contended that the appeal was filed in the year 2010 before this Court which has remained pending for such a long time, whereas in terms of the remand order itself the trial Court would have decided the suit afresh within a period of eight months. It is thus contended that the appeal is bereft of any merit and deserves to be dismissed. 9. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at length and after going through the judgment passed by the lower appellate Court, it is clear that the order of remand was not justified. Trite it is that if the decree is under two provisions of the Act for eviction of the tenant, both the provisions are to be discussed in appeal by the appellate Court while hearing the appellants against a decree of eviction. If the decree of eviction is not justified on any one ground still it can be upheld for eviction of the tenant on other grounds if made out. As far as the decree under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act is concerned, on admission of the respondents-defendants that he was willing to deposit the amount of Rs.250/- per month as rent, if a default was found on the part of the said defendant in making deposit of the said amount, a decree under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act could have been passed by the trial Court and it was not necessary to fix the provisional rent after admission of the rent, since the question of fixing of the provisional rent does not arise. In none of the law referred to in the judgment of the lower appellate Court, this has been held to be necessary requirement of passing a decree for eviction under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. The finding of the lower appellate Court, therefore, cannot be sustained. 10. The other aspect is that there was no discussion with respect to grant of decree under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act for eviction of the respondents-defendants. This particular aspect was required to be discussed by the lower appellate Court on the basis of the material available on record. The finding of the lower appellate Court, therefore, cannot be sustained. 10. The other aspect is that there was no discussion with respect to grant of decree under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act for eviction of the respondents-defendants. This particular aspect was required to be discussed by the lower appellate Court on the basis of the material available on record. Not a single word is said about grant of decree under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act, therefore, as a whole the judgment and decree was not liable to be set aside, nor suit was liable to be remitted back to the trial Court for deciding the issue afresh. The decree of eviction under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act could have been affirmed by the lower appellate Court and the appeal of the respondents- defendants should have been dismissed on that account alone. However, since there is no discussion in that respect it is still required to be adjudicated by the lower appellate Court. 11. As a result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. The appeal of respondent before the lower appellate Court is restored on its original number. The lower appellate Court will not be influenced by the impugned judgment dated 4/1/2010, which is now being set aside by this Court and will decide the appeal of the respondent-defendant within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order passed today. 12. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. However, there shall be no orders as to costs.