Judgment :- 1. Rule. Heard finally with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioners herein take exception to the order dated 22-4-2014 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Nagpur Division Nagpur in proceedings under Section 145(1–A) of the Maharashtra Gram Panchayat Act, 1958 (in short the said Act). By said order, Gram Panchayat Kholmara has been dissolved as more than half of the total posts of member of the Gram Panchayat have become vacant. 3. In the General Elections for electing the members of the Gram Panchayat that were held on 21-10-2012, seven members were duly elected. Subsequently, the present petitioner No.1 was elected as the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat. The post of Sarpanch was reserved for woman belonging to the Scheduled Caste category. On 28-10-2013, five out of seven members tendered their resignation from the post of member and thereafter in the monthly meeting of the Gram Panchayat, the resignations were accepted on 22-11-2013. In view of provisions of Section 145(1A) of the said Act, the Block Development Officer submitted a report to the Dy. Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Bhandara stating therein that the five members who had resigned from their respective posts had not given any specific reason for such resignation and hence, necessary action in terms of aforesaid provision be taken. The Collector, Bhandara recommended dissolution of the Gram Panchayat on the ground that more than half of the total members had resigned. The Divisional Commissioner considered the entire matter and after hearing the petitioners as well as five members who had resigned passed the impugned order dissolving the Gram Panchayat in terms of Section 145(1A) of the said Act. This order is impugned in the present writ petition. 4. Shri A. Z. Jibhkate, learning Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the Divisional Commissioner erred in mechanically ordering dissolution of the Gram Panchayat. He submitted that provisions of Section 145(1A) of the said Act have been held to be directory in nature and the power of dissolution was required to be exercised after considering the Circular dated 15-6-1996 issued by the State Election Commission. According to him, all relevant factors were first required to be considered which included the object behind tendering resignations after which further action of dissolution could be taken. According to him, all relevant factors were first required to be considered which included the object behind tendering resignations after which further action of dissolution could be taken. He submitted that in the present case though some members who were opposed to the Sarpanch desired to move a motion of no-confidence against petitioner No.1, same could not be moved due to lack of necessary numbers. He submitted that petitioner No.1 had filed proceedings for disqualifying respondent No.6 as member of the Gram Panchayat and hence the other four members had joined hands and had resigned from their posts. It was further submitted that respondent Nos.4 to 8 were not desirous of permitting the petitioner No.1 to function as Sarpanch and hence, they had resigned with a view to enable dissolution of the Gram Panchayat. The learned Counsel placed reliance on the judgments of the Division Bench in Shivaji Maruti Shingate & ors. vs. State of Maharashtra and ors., 2007(5) Mh.L.J. 109 and Shri Jahangir Yusuf Qureshi & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2008 (3) Mh.L.J. 437 in support of his submissions. He, therefore, submitted that the impugned order deserves to be set aside. 5. Smt. B. P. Maldhure, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for respondent Nos.1 & 2 supported the impugned order. She submitted that after considering all relevant aspects including the Circular dated 15-6-1996, the Gram Panchayat had been dissolved. According to her, as it was found that the Gram Panchayat could not function due to resignation of five members, orders under Section Section 145(1A) of the said Act had been passed. Shri A. Y. Kapgate, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No.3 relied upon the report submitted by the Block Development Officer to urge that all relevant factors had been taken into consideration. According to him, dissolution of the Gram Panchayat was necessary with a view to enable smooth functioning of the Gram Panchayat. He submitted that this was a relevant consideration and in support of the same he placed reliance upon judgment of learned Single Judge in Omprakash vs. State of Maharashtra, 2009(5) Mh.L.J. 103 which was subsequently affirmed in appeal by the Division Bench in Omprakash and others vs. The State of Maharashtra and others, 2009(5) Mh.L.J. 322 . Shri S. Ali, learned Counsel appearing for respondent Nos.4 to 8 also supported the impugned order. 6. Shri S. Ali, learned Counsel appearing for respondent Nos.4 to 8 also supported the impugned order. 6. I have carefully considered the respective submissions and I have gone through the documents filed on record. The provisions of Section 145(1A) of the said Act have been held to be directory in nature conferring discretion in the State Government to take necessary decision in the matter of dissolution of a Gram Panchayat. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgment of the Division Bench in Jahangir Yusuf (supra). In Shivaji Maruti Shingate (supra), it has been held that the State Government must exercise discretion in a manner to make the Gram Panchayat workable and functionable. In Omprakash K. Desai (supra), the Division Bench of this Court observed that said provisions conferred a wide latitude on the State Government to take action in a variety of circumstances. Such power can be exercised even when smooth functioning is hampered and more than half of the total number of seats have become vacant. 7. Another relevant aspect that is required to be borne in mind while examining the correctness of the exercise of dissolution is that the judicial enquiry should be confined to the aspect whether all relevant factors have been taken into consideration while passing the impugned order. The Court is not concerned with the correctness of such findings as long as said findings are reasonable and supported by evidence. Reference in this regard can be made to the following observations in the decision of the Supreme Court in Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Ltd. vs. Union of India (1990) 3 SCC 223 ). “49. Where a question of law is at issue, the court may determine the rightness of the impugned decision on its own independent judgment. If the decision of the authority does not agree with that which the court considers to be the right one, the finding of law by the authority is liable to be upset. Where it is a finding of fact, the court examines only the reasonableness of the finding. If the decision of the authority does not agree with that which the court considers to be the right one, the finding of law by the authority is liable to be upset. Where it is a finding of fact, the court examines only the reasonableness of the finding. When that finding is found to be rational and reasonably based on evidence, in the sense that all relevant material has been taken into account and no irrelevant material has influenced the decision, and the decision is one which any reasonably minded person, acting on such evidence, would have come to, then judicial review is exhausted even though the finding may not necessarily be what the court would have come to as a trier of fact.” It is in aforesaid background that the correctness of the impugned order will have to be examined. 8. The facts on record indicate that petitioner No.1 was elected as Sarpanch on 29-1-2013. She had filed proceedings for disqualification of respondent No.6 on 18-10-2013. On 31-10-2013, the petitioner No.1 had made a complaint against the Gram Sevak praying that necessary enquiry be held against him. She had also named the respondent No.4 who was the Up-Sarpanch in said complaint. The respondent Nos.4 to 8 resigned from their posts on 28-10-2013 and said resignations came to be duly accepted on 22-1-12013. In said meeting of the Gram Panchayat dated 22-11-2013, there was no discussion regarding the reasons that prompted the respondent Nos.4 to 8 to resign from the post of member. The report submitted by the Block Development Officer refers to this aspect and also takes into consideration the Circular dated 15-6-1996. The Collector in his communication dated 26-2-2014 considered the report submitted to the Chief Executive Officer and thereafter proposed dissolution of the Gram Panchayat. 9. The Divisional Commissioner in the impugned order has referred to acceptance of resignation by five members and has also referred to the aspect that there was some difficulty in smooth functioning of the Gram Panchayat on account of such vacancies. He has then considered the say of respondent Nos.4 to 8 who stated that the petitioner No.1 was not doing any development work nor was giving a proper say to the other members and was leaving the meetings midway. He has then considered the say of respondent Nos.4 to 8 who stated that the petitioner No.1 was not doing any development work nor was giving a proper say to the other members and was leaving the meetings midway. The impugned order then considers the response of the petitioners who had stated that a complaint had been made by petitioner No.1 to the Block Development Officer that the Up-Sarpanch and Gram Sevak had caused loss to the Gram Panchayat and further that it was not possible for the other members to move a motion of no confidence against the petitioner No.1. The Divisional Commissioner has thereafter considered the claims of both parties and has observed that in so far as the allegation regarding inability to move a motion of no confidence was concerned, there was no such material on record. Though there was an allegation by the petitioners that there was interference by respondent Nos.4 to 8 in the working of the Gram Panchayat, in fact the complaint had been made against the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat. It has then been observed that no reasons had been assigned by respondent Nos.4 to 8 for resigning from the posts of member and further there was nothing to indicate that they had resigned only because the post of Sarpanch was reserved for a member belonging to the Scheduled Caste. It is after considering these aspects along with the report of the Block Development Officer that the Divisional Commissioner found it fit to dissolve the Gram Panchayat. 10. The aforesaid, therefore, indicates that the entire material that was available before the Divisional Commissioner along with the respective contentions of the parties have been duly taken into account after which a satisfaction has been arrived at for dissolving the Gram Panchayat. A specific finding has been arrived at that there was no material on record to conclude that with a view to deprive petitioner No.1 from continuing as the Sarpanch, the respondent Nos.4 to 8 had resigned from the post of Sarpanch. It is also to be noted that the disqualification of respondent No.6 had been sought by filing proceedings on 18-10-2013 while respondent Nos.4 to 8 had resigned on 28-10-2013. The complaint made by petitioner No.1 against Gram Sevak with allegations against respondent No.4 is dated 31-10-2013 which is after the resignation of respondent Nos.4 to 8. It is also to be noted that the disqualification of respondent No.6 had been sought by filing proceedings on 18-10-2013 while respondent Nos.4 to 8 had resigned on 28-10-2013. The complaint made by petitioner No.1 against Gram Sevak with allegations against respondent No.4 is dated 31-10-2013 which is after the resignation of respondent Nos.4 to 8. Thus, except proceedings for disqualification against respondent No.6 having been filed only 10 days prior to the resignations, there is no other circumstance that is available on record to justify the stand of the petitioners. Moreover, the respondent Nos.4 to 6 in the meeting that was held for accepting their resignations also did not state that they were resigning from the post of member as they were dissatisfied with the working of the petitioner No.1 as Sarpanch. In this background, therefore, the grounds on which the petitioner No.1 sought to persuade the Divisional Commissioner not to dissolve the Gram Panchayat were not found satisfactory. Hence, it cannot be said that the Divisional Commissioner erred in directing dissolution of the Gram Panchayat under Section 145(1A) of the said Act after noting that due to the resignations of respondent Nos.4 to 8, it had become difficult for the Gram Panchayat to function. The discretion, therefore, has been exercised after considering all relevant aspects and after giving due opportunity to the petitioners as well as respondent Nos 4 to 8. This exercise of discretion cannot be said to be either arbitrary or illegal to warrant interference. It cannot be said that the respondent No.1 has exercised discretion in a manner contrary to law. There is no material on record to lead to such conclusion. 11. In the result, therefore, the order dated 22-4-2014 passed by respondent No.1 under provisions of Section 145(1A) of the said Act does not deserve to be interfered with. 12. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. Rule stands discharged with no order as to costs.