Judgment :- 1. This Second appeal is preferred against the Judgment and Order dt.22-08-2002 passed by the Additional District Judge, Khamgaon whereby the first Appellate Court had allowed the appeal, decreeing the suit for eviction and possession, damages and mesne profits. 2. The subject matter of the dispute is suit tenement on the ground floor of Plot no.99/2 situated in Nazul Sheet no. 33B at Khamgaon, District Buldana, which was let out to the defendant at a monthly rent of Rs.100/-. The plaintiff had filed an application to the Rent Controller, Khamgaon for permission to issue quit notice to the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement. The proceeding was opposed on the ground that the landlord was 'Benamidar' (not real owner)'. Plaintiff had filed Regular Civil Suit No. 122 of 1993 for eviction of the defendant in the Court of Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.), Khamgaon, District Buldana for relief of possession and recovery of damages. The defendant had denied title of the landlord–plaintiff. The defendant was served with notice dt.29-04-1993 (Exh. 44) on the ground that tenancy was forfeited and vacant possession and damages, mesne profits were claimed. The defendant had replied the notice (Exh.45). The trial Court had dismissed the suit. 3. The substantial question of law set out is as under: a) Whether as effect of the denial/disclaimer of the title of the landlord by the Tenant, the tenancy is liable to be forfeited? Whether there was waiver of notice of forfeiture issued by the landlord by accepting the rent from the Tenant after service of the notice of forfeiture? My answer is tenancy was liable to be forfeited and there was no waiver of notice of forfeiture merely by acceptance of rent in the facts and circumstances of the case for following reasons. 4. The defendant had pleaded in the proceedings before the Rent Controller that suit premises was purchased by one Inderkumar Sancheti in the name of the plaintiff. Thus, the title of the landlord was denied by the defendant-tenant by way of defence before the Rent Controller. 5. Mr. A.V. Bhide, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial Court had dismissed the suit on the ground that the bona fide requirement of the land lord was not established, but the first appellate Court erred to decree the suit. According to Mr. 5. Mr. A.V. Bhide, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial Court had dismissed the suit on the ground that the bona fide requirement of the land lord was not established, but the first appellate Court erred to decree the suit. According to Mr. Bhide merely because there was disclaimer of title of the land lord by the tenant, it would not enable the landlord to claim eviction of the tenant. 6. Mr. Bhide relied upon the ruling in Bapubhai Papabhai Vs. Khairunnisa Abdul Kadar reported in 1992 Mh.L.J. 521 to argue that when the trial Court had dismissed the suit, the appellate Court could not have decreed the suit on totally new ground and if so, it amounts to error of jurisdiction. I have seen the ruling. Facts of the case appear different. In that case, the tenant was inducted by the predecessor-in-title of the land lord. The tenant required the new landlord to prove her title. It did not follow that the tenant had denied the title prior to the filing of the suit. In fact, the defendants had never denied the title to the suit property. The appellate Court had decreed the suit on totally new ground not pleaded in the plaint. Thus, this Court held that the decree passed by the appellate Court was without jurisdiction. The ruling is, therefore, not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In this case in hand, the tenant denied title of the landlord during pendency of proceedings before the Rent Controller. Denial was conscious out of the tenant 7. Mr. Bhide placed reliance upon the ruling in Subhash Chandra vs. Mohommad Sharif & Others reported in (1990) 1 SCC 252. In this case, it is held that where the tenant was not inducted by the landlord and the title of the land lord is derivative such as Assignee, Donee, Vendee, Heir etc., the tenant can challenge the derivative title showing that the real owner is somebody else. But, at the same time, the ruling makes it clear that Section 116 of the Evidence Act does not permit the tenant to deny title of the landlord at the beginning of the tenancy. In the present case, we are not dealing with the case of the transferee of the landlord, but the landlord who inducted the defendant-tenant. 8. Mr. But, at the same time, the ruling makes it clear that Section 116 of the Evidence Act does not permit the tenant to deny title of the landlord at the beginning of the tenancy. In the present case, we are not dealing with the case of the transferee of the landlord, but the landlord who inducted the defendant-tenant. 8. Mr. Bhide refers to Section 15 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act which provides RELIEF AGAINST FORFEITURE of tenancy in following terms: 15. No ejectment ordinarily to he made if tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay standard rent and permitted increases. (1) A landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay, the amount of the, standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and observes and performs the other, conditions of the tenancy, in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of this Act. (2) No suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord against the tenant on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent or permitted increases due, until the expiration of ninety days next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. (3) …........................ 9. According to Mr. Bhide, landlord was not entitled to possession. Mr. Bhide then refers to the ruling in M/s Bharat Earth Movers Ltd vs Puranlal Kedia reported in AIR 2009 (NOC) 585 (CAL). The right to evict the tenant must be exercised by notice determining the tenancy. In the case in hand the landlord had already approached the Rent controller to initiate the eviction proceedings in which the tenant challenged the title of the landlord as 'Benamidar' despite the fact that the same land lord had inducted him. 10. Section 116 of the Evidence Act reads thus: 116. In the case in hand the landlord had already approached the Rent controller to initiate the eviction proceedings in which the tenant challenged the title of the landlord as 'Benamidar' despite the fact that the same land lord had inducted him. 10. Section 116 of the Evidence Act reads thus: 116. Estoppel of tenant and of license of person in possession - No tenant of immovable property or person claiming through such tenant shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and not person who came upon any immovable property by the license of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person has a title to such possession at the time when such license was given. Tenant is, thus prevented by law from disputing title of the landlord as on beginning of tenancy. 11. Shri Khajanchi, learned Counsel for the respondent/landlord submitted that the suit was wrongly dismissed by the trial Court. However, the first appellate Court had rightly arrived at the conclusions which were wholly consistent with the legal position as to law of waiver of quit notice issued by the landlord claiming decree for eviction of the tenant. Learned Counsel relied upon the ruling in Hashmatrai Vs. Tarachand Laxmichand reported in 1978 Mh.L.J. 750 to argue that the question of waiver has to be decided depending upon the facts of each case. The question is of the intention of the parties once a suit for ejectment is filed it cannot be possibly said that the landlord had the intention to treat the tenancy as subsisting unless he withdraws the suit. The lessor cannot be said to have waived the notice by accepting rent during the continuance of the suit. In the ruling in Ramjilal Banwarisahay Vs Gulabrao Balaji Deshmukh 1978 Mh.L.J. 850, it is observed that the intention on the part of the landlord to treat the tenancy as subsisting is necessary to constitute the waiver. Mere acceptance of the rent in the pending suit would not amount to the waiver unless the landlord thereafter abandon the suit. Mr. Khajanchi argued that the tenant was not entitled to dispute or deny the title of the landlord in proceedings before the Rent Controller. Mere acceptance of the rent in the pending suit would not amount to the waiver unless the landlord thereafter abandon the suit. Mr. Khajanchi argued that the tenant was not entitled to dispute or deny the title of the landlord in proceedings before the Rent Controller. The tenant by the act of disclaimer of title of the landlord invited the forfeiture of the tenancy by notice to quit issued from the landlord. Learned Counsel emphasized that the acceptance of the rent by the landlord must be with clear intention to treat the lease as subsisting despite determination of the tenancy in other words it must be proved by the tenant that the landlord's must have elected to treat the lease as subsisting. In Ramchandra Jamnadas Katariya vs. Nuruddinbhai reported in 2004 (4) Mh.L.J. 178, it is observed that the intention of the landlord is of paramount importance to determine the act of waiver of the notice to quit. Mere acceptance of rent, therefore, would not amount to waiver. This Court in Haribhau Sadashiv vs. Raju Daulatrao reported in 2004 (4) Mh.L.J 350 held that during pendency of the suit appropriation by the landlord towards arrears of rent would not constitute waiver of notice to treat the tenancy as subsisting. After service of notice to quit, the waiver cannot be presumed, determinative by mere fact of rent tendered and accepted. To support the submission, reference is made to the case of Sarup Singh Gupta vs. S.Jagdish Singh, (2006) 4 SCC 205 and ruling in Savitribai vs Faruk, 2010 (5) Mh.L.J. 357 . Mere acceptance of the rent without further evidence to prove the waiver on the part of the landlord to treat the tenancy as subsisting can not assist the defendant to defeat the claim for eviction under Section 113 of the Transfer of Property Act. Division Bench of this Court in Ratanlal Manikchand Shah Vs Chanbasappa, AIR 1978 Bom. 216 (1) held that relationship of the tenant and landlord must exist between the parties to attract provisions of the Rent Act. Disclaimer by the tenant of the title of the landlord would not, therefore, bar the Civil Court to order eviction as in such case, in the absence of relationship as landlord and tenant between the parties to the suit, owner of the property can recover possession of the premises de hors the provisions of the Rent Act. Disclaimer by the tenant of the title of the landlord would not, therefore, bar the Civil Court to order eviction as in such case, in the absence of relationship as landlord and tenant between the parties to the suit, owner of the property can recover possession of the premises de hors the provisions of the Rent Act. Denial of the land lord's title or disclaimer, thus, exposes the tenant to the risk of forfeiture of the lease and the lessor is given the right to determine the lease by notice to the lessee and to sue defendant on the basis of title as owner of the suit property. 12. It appears in the facts of the present case that the tenant had denied the title of the landlord in the judicial proceeding before the Rent Controller and in the result the landlord had issued the notice of forfeiture of tenancy and terminated his tenancy. The act of repudiation of the title of the landlord by the tenant in judicial proceeding was a deliberate or conscious act, which resulted in the end of relationship as landlord-tenant. Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act estops the tenant from denying the title of the landlord. It is settled legal position that the tenant can not deny title of the land lord. Denial or repudiation of the landlord-tenant relationship entails forfeiture of the lease enabling landlord to recover possession as owner of the suit property. The claim that the landlord was mere “Benamidar” and owner is someone else amounts to disclaimer of the relationship of the landlord and tenant by setting up title in third person. The denial was clear and unambiguous in the Rent Control proceedings, tenant trying to set up title in third person one Inderchand Sancheti. Tenant had no such statutory right to disclaim the landlord's title. The tenant, thus, incurred forfeiture of the tenancy as the landlord issued notice to quit the tenancy under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. The tenancy stood terminated by the defence of the tenant to repudiate his relationship as tenant with the landlord and setting up title in another. When relation between landlord and tenant itself stands repudiated by conduct of tenant by disclaimer, the landlord becomes entitled to recover possession by resorting to ordinary law of the land. 13. The tenancy stood terminated by the defence of the tenant to repudiate his relationship as tenant with the landlord and setting up title in another. When relation between landlord and tenant itself stands repudiated by conduct of tenant by disclaimer, the landlord becomes entitled to recover possession by resorting to ordinary law of the land. 13. The next question is as to whether there is waiver of termination of tenancy by acceptance of the rent. The waiver can occur only when the lessor has treated the tenancy as subsisting. Mere acceptance of arrears of rent can not imply that the lessor treated the tenancy as subsisting unless it can be established as conscious and deliberate act. There has to be consensus ad idem of the parties to treat the lease as subsisting or reestablish the relationship of the landlord and tenant. Mere acceptance of rent, therefore, without the intention to treat the lease as subsisting would not amount to waiver. The acceptance of rent may be without prejudice to the rights and contentions in the notice, it does not amount to waiver. Waiver has to be a deliberate and conscious act on the part of the landlord to treat the contractual tenancy-lease as subsisting. If the eviction suit is continuing even after acceptance of the rent it indicates that the landlord has no intention to waive the quit notice because landlord has elected to continue with the eviction proceedings in order to recover possession from the lessee. 14. The first appellate Court has recorded findings consistent with this legal position stated and therefore, no acceptable ground is made out for to warrant interference with the impugned Judgment and Order. The appeal, therefore, has no merits. It is dismissed with costs.