Order: This writ petition was originally filed by Onkar, since deceased, in the year 1999 challenging judgment dated 27.03.1996 passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Kota, and judgment dated 10.08.1998 passed by the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, Ajmer. Both the courts, while reversing judgment dated 15.03.1995 of the Sub Divisional Officer, Kota, have recorded concurrent finding. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that petitioner has agricultural land in joint account of one Chaturbhuj bearing khasra no.26 measuring 12 bigha situated in village Talab, Tehsil Pipalda. The said land, after construction of river in the area, was reduced to 6 bigha 14 biswa only and accordingly the Revenue Department/Land Settlement Department issued new khasra no.1218. Prior to catchment of agriculture land, the area of petitioner's land was 8 bigha and 14 biswa. Petitioner and said Shri Chaturbhuj needed some money, therefore, they mortgaged their land bearing khasra no.26 (new khasra no.1218) measuring 8 bigha 14 biswa with respondent no.5 Surjya for a sum of Rs.5000/-on 'Jeth Sudi 14, Samvat 2036'. Limitation of unregistered mortgaged deed came to end after five years of its execution i.e. on Jeth Sudi 14, Samvat 2041 (12th June, 1984), thereafter, he had no right to keep the land in his possession. When petitioner went to the land in question on 24.06.1984 for cultivation, respondent no.5 did not allow him to cultivate the land. Petitioner thereafter filed a suit before the Sub Divisional Officer, Kota, against respondent no.5 Surja and said Chaturbhuj. Sub Divisional Officer, by judgment dated 15.03.1995, decreed the revenue suit declaring that land measuring 6 bigha 14 biswa (8 bigha 14 biswa at the time of mortgage) comprising khasra no.1218 (old khasra no.26) situated in village Talab, Tehsil Pipalda, is the land of his possession and ownership. Further prayer that defendant-respondent Surjya be directed to handover possession of the land in question mortgaged with him, restraining him from interfering with possession of plaintiff-petitioner, was also granted. Respondent Surjya challenged the judgment and decree dated 15.03.1995 before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Kota, by filing appeal, who, after hearing both the parties, vide judgment and decree dated 27.03.1996, allowed the same and set aside the judgment and decree of learned Sub Divisional Officer, Kota. Dissatisfied therewith, petitioner approached the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, Ajmer, by filing second appeal. Learned Board of Revenue dismissed by same vide judgment and decree dated 10.08.1998. Dissatisfied therewith, petitioner approached the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, Ajmer, by filing second appeal. Learned Board of Revenue dismissed by same vide judgment and decree dated 10.08.1998. Hence this writ petition. Smt. Kamla Jain, learned counsel for petitioner has argued that learned Revenue Appellate Authority and learned Board of Revenue have failed to appreciate that when petitioner went on 24.06.1984 to his field to plough it, the respondent no.5 came there with his companions and did not allow him to plough the field and started quarrelling with him. Despite expiry of mortgage period, he did not handover possession of the land in question to petitioner. In these circumstances, petitioner filed an application under Section 183A of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. Learned Sub Divisional Officer has rightly allowed the said application by order dated 15.03.1995. Petitioner also impleaded Chaturbhuj as non-petitioner no.6 as party to the suit for the reason that he was joint khatedar of the land in question but petitioner did not seek any relief against him. The period of limitation of mortgage ended on 12.06.1984 and thereafter defendant-respondent no.5 Surjya had no right to continue in possession. The Revenue Appellate Authority as well as the Board of Revenue erred in law in not appreciating this aspect of the matter. They have recorded perverse and wrong finding while declining relief to petitioner for the reason that he deposed in his statement before the Sub Divisional Officer, Kota on 29.10.1985 that 8½ bigha of land of khatedari of his brother Chaturbhuj is situated in village Talab and that the said land was never mortgaged by him to Surjya at any point of time. Earlier, he filed a suit against Beera and Surjya and decision of that suit was also produced before the Sub Divisional Officer as Exhibit-1. Document, that was produced by respondent no.5 Surjya, is Exhibit-2. Reply to the plaint is Exhibit-3. The land was neither sold by him to Surjya nor it was mortgaged to Surjya. He had forcibly taken his land in his possession. The copy of jamabandi was produced as Exhibit-4. From the copy of jamabandi, it is clear that the land was never sold to Surjya at any point of time. In cross-examination, petitioner has made it specifically clear that he mortgaged the land about 10-15 years back with Heera and not Surjya. Chaturbhuj died about 4½ years back. The copy of jamabandi was produced as Exhibit-4. From the copy of jamabandi, it is clear that the land was never sold to Surjya at any point of time. In cross-examination, petitioner has made it specifically clear that he mortgaged the land about 10-15 years back with Heera and not Surjya. Chaturbhuj died about 4½ years back. He did not sell his land to Surjya for Rs.19,500/- and did not receive Rs.8500/-in advance. From his statement it is clear that respondent no.5 has taken the land illegally in his possession. Learned counsel for petitioner further argued that the courts below have committed grave illegality in not properly going through the reply filed by respondent no.5 Surjya. In the reply, on one hand, the respondent no.5 stated that the land was of his own possession and share but on the other hand, he stated that the plaintiff-petitioner sold the land to him. If the land was of the defendantrespondent no.5, then how could it be sold by plaintiff-petitioner to him and why the respondent no.5 would have purchased his own land from plaintiff-petitioner. Stand of defendant-respondent no.5 was thus contradictory. The respondent no.5 illegally took possession of the land, though the petitioner is the khatedar owner of the land in question. In fact, respondent no.5 stated before the Sub Divisional Officer, Kota, on 11.12.1989, that petitioner sold his land to him on 01.04.1984 and received an advance of Rs.8500/-from respondent no.5 and it was agreed that rest of the amount of Rs.11000/-, shall be paid to him at the time of execution of registered sale-deed of the land. Learned Board of Revenue has committed grave illegality in not appreciating that learned Sub Divisional Officer, Kota, after considering the submissions of the parties framed issues and rightly decreed the suit on that basis. Petitioner, in rejoinder to reply dated 07.08.1984 stated that respondent no.5 Surjya filed an application under Section 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and he has come entirely with wrong and false averments in application, which were denied by petitioner. Petitioner, in rejoinder to reply dated 07.08.1984 stated that respondent no.5 Surjya filed an application under Section 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and he has come entirely with wrong and false averments in application, which were denied by petitioner. Petitioner specifically stated in rejoinder that he sold the land to respondent no.5 Surjya but respondent no.5 wrongly stated before the court that he sown crop of maze on the land in question as there was no crop of respondent no.5 at the time of filing application under Section 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act nor it was never existed there on 31.07.1984. Learned counsel also argued that the courts below have failed to appreciate that maximum period of unregistered mortgage of an agricultural land is only five years and that expired on 12.06.1984. Thereafter, the mortgagor has no right to continue with possession of the land in dispute. Besides, the appellate courts did not take into account the jamabandi of Samvat 2026 to Samvat 2039, which indicated possession and khatedari of Chaturbhuj, who was real brother of petitioner. Defendant-respondent no.5 failed to prove the issues framed by learned Sub Divisional Officer by evidence. The Sub Divisional officer has rightly observed in judgment dated 15.03.1995 that statement of DW-2 Bihari Singh was doubtful and that there was no agreement to sell of the land between the plaintiff-petitioner and defendant-respondent no.5. Referring to Order 6 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, learned counsel for petitioner has argued that it is settled proposition of law that if there is variance between the pleadings and proof, the pleadings are reliable, and that if there is contradiction in statements, then also the pleadings are reliable, which rather supports the case of the plaintiff and thus the suit is liable to be decreed. Learned counsel for plaintiff-petitioner has relied on judgment of this Court in 1991 RLR 791 . He drew attention of the court towards statement of DW1 Surajmal, who stated that sale-deed was written in Tehsil and receipt of Rs.8500/-was not issued as generally such receipts are not issued in villages. From the statement of DW-2 Bihari Singh, who was deed writer in Tehsil, it is evident that sale-deed was written on instructions of petitioner Onkar but he is not in a position to state as to on what value of stamp paper it was written. From the statement of DW-2 Bihari Singh, who was deed writer in Tehsil, it is evident that sale-deed was written on instructions of petitioner Onkar but he is not in a position to state as to on what value of stamp paper it was written. Learned appellate courts have failed to appreciate that if the mortgage is not proved, then suit can be decreed even on the basis of title. Reliance in this connection is placed on judgments of this court in 1987 RRD 468 and 1988 RRD 88 and that of the Supreme Court in AIR 1974 SC 689 . Learned counsel argued that the appellate courts have failed to appreciate that the title of the land even today is of petitioner and possession of respondent no.5 on the said land was that of a trespasser. Suit under Section 183A of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act was not maintainable. Reliance in this connection is placed on judgment of this court in 1987 RRD 521. The appellate courts have failed to appreciate that miscarriage of justice should not occasion on technicalities of law. Merely because letter (A) was inserted after Section 183 by hand writing, it cannot be styled as an application because it was understood as suit by the parties and accordingly issues were framed and evidence was led, the documents were exhibited and the Sub Divisional Officer finally decreed the revenue suit. Even a court can grant relief provided under Section 209 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act on application or on its own motion. The finding of the court that the order was passed in summary proceeding and not in a regular suit and therefore the petitioner could recover the possession only by filing a regular suit, is wholly perverse. On the contrary, Shri Suresh Sahni, learned counsel for respondent no.5 Surjya opposed the writ petition and submitted that there was variance in the pleadings and proof on the part of the plaintiff-petitioner. Learned counsel, in this connection, referred to statement of plaintiff-petitioner Onkar and argued that this witness, in his statement, has stated that land was mortgaged with Heera and not with Surjya. His statement is thus contrary to the pleadings, which is evident from averments in para 3, where the plaintiff has stated that the disputed land was mortgaged with defendant no.1 Surjya for a sum of Rs.5000/-. His statement is thus contrary to the pleadings, which is evident from averments in para 3, where the plaintiff has stated that the disputed land was mortgaged with defendant no.1 Surjya for a sum of Rs.5000/-. In these circumstances, the case of the plaintiff cannot be taken to have been proved. Learned appellate courts have rightly reversed the judgment passed by the Sub Divisional Officer. If the period limitation for written mortgage had expired, the only remedy with the plaintiff is to file regular suit under Section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act for recovery of possession, which was not filed. It was a simple application under Section 183A of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, which has wrongly been styled as a suit. The Revenue Appellate Authority was perfectly justified in reversing the judgment passed by the Sub Divisional Officer. It has taken note of the contradictions in the statement of plaintiff Onkar and his witnesses. It has also considered earlier judgment passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority and the Board of Revenue, wherein it was held that the mortgage was unregistered and that plaintiff himself has denied the instrument of mortgage and has given a contradictory statement than what is pleaded in para 3 of the plaint. His case was thus not found proved. The plaintiff would in any case be at liberty to file independent suit under Section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The application under Section 183A of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act was thus not maintainable. The Revenue Court could not convert an application under Section 183A into a regular suit under Section 183. However, the Sub Divisional Officer granted liberty to plaintiff to file a fresh suit. The Board of Revenue has rightly maintained the aforesaid order of the Revenue Appellate Authority. Smt. Kamla Jain, learned counsel for petitioner, rejoined and submitted that there was variance between the pleadings and proof produced even by the defendant. The defendant in para 3 of written statement has admitted the pleading of para 3 of the plaint, therefore the fact which is admitted was not required to be proved by plaintiff. Even then, it is submitted, plaintiff is khatedar tenant of disputed land. Defendant came to acquire possession of the disputed land by way of mortgaged is not disputed. Plaintiff would therefore be entitled to recover possession of the land of his khatedari. The writ petition be therefore allowed. Even then, it is submitted, plaintiff is khatedar tenant of disputed land. Defendant came to acquire possession of the disputed land by way of mortgaged is not disputed. Plaintiff would therefore be entitled to recover possession of the land of his khatedari. The writ petition be therefore allowed. I have given my anxious consideration to rival submissions and perused the material on record. It is indeed very strange that both – plaintiff and defendant, have in their statements contradicted what they pleaded in their plaint and written statement. There is variance between the pleading and proof submitted by both the parties. Plaintiff-petitioner Onkar, in para 3 of the plaint, has stated that the land measuring 8 bigha and 14 biswa comprising of khasra no.26, was mortgaged with defendant Surjya for Rs.5000/-and he was in possession. Defendant in written statement to aforesaid para 3, has admitted the averments of para 3 of the plaint and set up a case that after the plaintiff mortgaged the land in dispute with defendant, he on 01.04.1984 sold the aforesaid land to defendant for sale consideration of rs.19,500/-and issued receipt of Rs.8,500/-. It is for that reason that defendant was retaining the possession of the land in dispute. The disputed land was of the share of the plaintiff and therefore he could have legally sold the same to defendant. If statement of defendant is analyzed, the defendant has failed to prove his this case even from his statement, although he sought to support the case of sale. He has produced Bihari Singh as DW-2, who was deed-writer and scribed the sale-deed. He has stated that he scribed the sale-deed but in cross-examination, he stated that he was deed-writer for 15 years. Both the parties came to his house at 5'O clock in the evening but the witnesses did not sign the document (Exhibit-D1) in his presence. He has rather stated that plaintiff Onkar did not sign the sale-deed (Exhibit-D1) in his presence. Tehsil office was situated about 200-250 yard from his house and later he stated that this distance was 300-350 yards. He has also stated that Onkar did not even admit that he has received Rs.8500/-from defendant Surjya. It is in this scenario that statement of plaintiff, where he has mentioned that he has mortgaged the disputed land to Heera and not Surjya is to be analyzed. He has also stated that Onkar did not even admit that he has received Rs.8500/-from defendant Surjya. It is in this scenario that statement of plaintiff, where he has mentioned that he has mortgaged the disputed land to Heera and not Surjya is to be analyzed. This has so happened largely owing to the fact that both the parties are illiterate and did not have the proper legal advice. In any case, the factum of mortgage having not been denied by the defendant, the nature of possession is fully explained, which is that he came to acquire the possession of the disputed land owing to the mortgage-deed aforesaid. It is also fully proved that the khatedari of the aforesaid land was with plaintiff Onkar. Now coming to contention that suit could not be decreed as it was styled as a suit under Section 183A and not a regular suit for recovery of possession under Section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and that the Revenue Appellate Authority and the Board of Revenue have set the plaintiff-petitioner at liberty to file independent suit for recovery of possession by accepting the fact of his being khatedar tenant, possession of the land was given to defendant by virtue of mortgage. Section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, provides for ejectment of certain trespassers, whereas Section 183A provides for summary eviction of mortgagee on non-delivery of possession of land after the expiry of the period of mortgage. Although, it may be true that proceedings under Section 183A are summary in nature whereas the proceedings under Section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act are regular proceedings, wherein issues have to be framed and parties have to be given opportunity to adduce their evidence for or against such issues, both oral and documentary. Perusal of the impugned orders clearly indicate that the parties in the case have all throughout understood it to be a regular suit under Section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act for recovery of possession. The prayer clause of the plaint also indicates that the plaintiff had prayed for recovery of possession and further injunction against defendants that they be restrained from interfering with the use and possession of the land in dispute. The prayer clause of the plaint also indicates that the plaintiff had prayed for recovery of possession and further injunction against defendants that they be restrained from interfering with the use and possession of the land in dispute. It is settled proposition of law that mere non-mention of correct provision or mention of incorrect provision does not, in any manner, affect the power of the authority or the court, if it is otherwise shown that source of such power emanate correct provision. Prayer was was also made for award of special damages of Rs.1000/-. The defendant had understood the aforesaid case as a regular suit, which is evident from written statement filed by him, copy of which is on record as Annexure-6. It was not filed as an application but as a revenue suit. The plaint as well as written statement also described it to be a suit. Learned Sub Divisional Officer has also understood this to be a suit, which is evident from the fact that it has framed issues and allowed the plaintiff and defendant to lead evidence on those issues. While the plaintiff examined himself as witness, the defendant, apart from himself, produced one more witness Bihari Singh. Documentary evidence was also produced by both the parties in support of their respective case. Learned Sub Divisional Officer has decreed the suit and also prepared a decree, which is on record with the judgment dated 15.03.1995. In these circumstances, requiring the plaintiff-petitioner to again repeat the same process of filing the suit and going through and taking them to again undergo the same ordeal, would be highly unjust and inequitable. It would be travesty of justice if petitioner is compelled to again go through agony of protracted litigation after three decades when first round of litigation which started in the year 1989 has now ended by this judgment. This is also because the writ petition having been filed in 1999, is being now decided after 16 years. The revenue suit filed by plaintiff-petitioner in 1984 has taken as long as 31 years to culminate into passing of present judgment. In view of aforesaid discussion, judgment dated 27.03.1996 passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Kota, and judgment dated 10.08.1998 passed by the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, cannot be allowed to stand and are liable to be set aside. In the result, writ petition is allowed. In view of aforesaid discussion, judgment dated 27.03.1996 passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Kota, and judgment dated 10.08.1998 passed by the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, cannot be allowed to stand and are liable to be set aside. In the result, writ petition is allowed. Judgment dated 27.03.1996 passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Kota, and judgment dated 10.08.1998 passed by the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, are set aside. Judgment dated 15.03.1995 passed by the Sub Divisional Officer (Up-Zila Collector), Kota, in Case No.86/89 is restored. Plaintiff-petitioner would be entitled to recovery of possession forthwith. Parties are left to bear their own costs.