JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. This Regular Second Appeal has been instituted against judgment and decree dated 21.2.2005 rendered by learned Additional District Judge, Una, District Una, Himachal Pradesh in Civil Appeal No. 57/2003. 2. “Key facts" necessary for the adjudication of the present appeal are that respondent-plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as 'plaintiff' for convenience sake) filed a suit against the appellant-defendant (hereinafter referred to as 'defendant' for convenience sake) for recovery of Rs. 61,000/- with interest @ 12% per annum on the basis of an agreement dated 14.12.1997, Ext. PW-1/A. According to the plaintiff, he dealt in the business of sale and purchase of buffalos and cows. Defendant was employed in District Una. He was known to the plaintiff. Defendant approached the plaintiff on 14.12.1997. He intended to purchase 3 buffalos and one Jersey cow, price of which was settled at Rs. 65,000/-. Defendant paid Rs. 4,000/- to him towards earnest money. Remaining amount was to be paid by the defendant within a period of eight months without any interest. It was further stipulated that in case defendant fails to make payment within the time frame, plaintiff shall be entitled to charge interest @ 12%. An agreement was executed in the presence of witnesses. It was signed by the defendant. Defendant failed to make payment of amount within stipulated period. A notice was issued to the defendant. Defendant filed reply to the same. Suit was contested by the defendant. According to the defendant, plaintiff was a stranger to him. There was no occasion for the plaintiff to sell buffalo's or cows to him. He denied the signatures on the document relied by the plaintiff. Replication was filed by the plaintiff. Trial Court framed issues on 24.1.2002. Learned Sub Judge first class dismissed the suit on 31.5.2003. Plaintiff preferred an appeal against judgment and decree dated 31.5.2003 before the Additional District Judge, Una. He allowed the same on 21.2.2005. Hence this Regular Second Appeal. Plaintiff also filed Cross-objections bearing No. 632/2005 in the Regular Second Appeal seeking interest @ 12% per annum from the date of execution of the agreement, Ext. PW-1/A. 3. The Regular Second Appeal was admitted though no specific ground was formulated for admitting the appeal. Now, the same would be deemed to be admitted on substantial questions of law No. 1 and 3 framed at page-7 of the paper-book. Parties were put to notice. PW-1/A. 3. The Regular Second Appeal was admitted though no specific ground was formulated for admitting the appeal. Now, the same would be deemed to be admitted on substantial questions of law No. 1 and 3 framed at page-7 of the paper-book. Parties were put to notice. Since both the substantial questions of law are inter-linked as such same are taken up together along with cross-objection No. 632/2005. 4. Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate, has vehemently argued that the Courts below have not correctly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence. According to him, there was no offer on the part of seller or acceptance on the part of vendee and opinion of the Handwriting Expert was to be sought. 5. Mr. Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Advocate, has supported the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the record carefully. 7. Agreement Ext. PW-1/A is dated 14.12.1997. PW-1 Pritam Singh deposed that he was an agriculturist. He was also selling cattle. Defendant was working as an Inspector in the Cooperative Society at Una. Defendant has come to him on 14.12.1997 along with PW-3 Ram Lok. Vikram Singh also came to his house. He selected one cow and three buffalo's for a sum of Rs. 65,000/-. He paid earnest money of Rs. 4,000/-. Remaining amount of Rs. 61,000/- was to be paid within eight months. Agreement Ext. PW-1/A was scribed by Ramesh Chand. Same was signed by the defendant in the presence of the marginal witnesses. Defendant has not paid any amount as per agreement Ext. PW-1/A. He sent a legal notice through advocate which is Ext. PW-1/B. Receipt is Ext. PW-1/C. Reply of the defendant is Ext. PW-1/D. In his cross-examination, he denied that documents were purchased by the defendant. It was signed in the evening. 8. PW-2 Ramesh Chand scribed Ext. PW-1/A. He deposed that defendant has come to him. He got agreement scribed by him. He had purchased three buffalo's and one cow. Contents of the agreement were read over to the parties and, they, after admitting the same to be correct, have signed the document. He denied the suggestion that he did not sign Ext. PW-1/A in red circle. He further deposed that agreement was prepared in the month of December. Papers were purchased by the defendant. 9. Contents of the agreement were read over to the parties and, they, after admitting the same to be correct, have signed the document. He denied the suggestion that he did not sign Ext. PW-1/A in red circle. He further deposed that agreement was prepared in the month of December. Papers were purchased by the defendant. 9. PW-3 Ram Lok is a marginal witness to Ext. PW-1/A. Five years back he had gone to the Society. He along with Vikram went to the house of the plaintiff. He selected three buffalo's and one cow. A sum of Rs. 4,000/- was paid in advance. Agreement Ext. PW-1/A was written in his presence. He put his thumb impression on Ext. PW-1/A. 10. DW-1 Mangat Ram has led evidence by filing affidavit. He was cross-examined. He deposed in his cross-examination that he retired in August 1998. He did not know the plaintiff. He denied signatures on Ext. PW-1/A. He admitted signatures on Ext. PW-1/D. He admitted signatures on affidavit which he has filed in evidence. 11. DW-2 Vikram Chand has also led evidence by way of affidavit. In his affidavit he has categorically deposed that his signatures were obtained by the plaintiff to submit an application at Shimla. In his cross-examination he admitted that cases are pending against him for mis-appropriation of funds of the Cooperative Society. Defendant has not signed Ext. PW-1/A in his presence. Other witnesses have also not signed in his presence and when he signed the paper, it was blank. He signed the document since there was some dispute between the parties. It is duly proved on the basis of the statements of the PW-1 Pritam Singh, PW-2 Ramesh Chand and PW-3 Ram Lok that the agreement was executed on 14.12.1997. Agreement was scribed by PW-2 Ramesh Chand. PW-3 Ram Lok has put his signatures on the same. Marginal witness DW-2 though has admitted in his cross-examination that the signatures were obtained on blank papers but he signed the same since plaintiff wanted to submit application at Shimla. He also categorically deposed that he has signed the document since there was some money dispute between the plaintiff and defendant. Defendant has visited the plaintiff to buy one cow and three buffalos. Offer was made by the seller to pay a sum of Rs. 65,000/- He has paid Rs. 4,000/- as advance. Remaining amount of Rs. He also categorically deposed that he has signed the document since there was some money dispute between the plaintiff and defendant. Defendant has visited the plaintiff to buy one cow and three buffalos. Offer was made by the seller to pay a sum of Rs. 65,000/- He has paid Rs. 4,000/- as advance. Remaining amount of Rs. 61,000/- was to be paid within eight weeks, failing which it was to be paid with interest @ 12% per annum. Learned first appellate Court has compared the signatures of the defendant on Ext.PW-1/A with his signatures on written statement, reply (Ext. PW-1/D) as well as Power of Attorney. He has found similarity in the signatures. Defendant has also taken a plea of fraud and deception but no averments were made to this effect in the written statement. Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate has also argued that it is disputed as to whether the agreement was signed in hotel or shop. This is a minor contradiction. Minor contradictions are bound to happen since agreement was executed on 14.12.1997 and witnesses have deposed in May 2002. 12. Learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Bhaggu v. Manni Prasad reported in AIR 1965 Allahabad 202, has held that the Court is not precluded from coming to its own conclusions in cases where it is fully familiar with the language and script of the document which is the subject matter of scrutiny before it and where it has the assistance in such scrutiny of the counsel of the parties. If on the face of it the court is able to come to a conclusion that a particular document contains alterations and interpolations it is not bound to seek the assistance of Handwriting Experts. It could not, therefore, be said that simply because a Handwriting Expert was not called to give evidence, the Court is not empowered to come to a conclusion whether the pro-note and the receipt in question have been subjected to alterations or interpolations. The learned Single Judge has held as under: “(7) It may be a rule of caution and prudence that where the Court considers that the opinion of a Handwriting Expert would be of assistance to it in coming to a decision it may call for the evidence of an expert. The learned Single Judge has held as under: “(7) It may be a rule of caution and prudence that where the Court considers that the opinion of a Handwriting Expert would be of assistance to it in coming to a decision it may call for the evidence of an expert. But there is no rule of law that the Court is precluded from coming to its own conclusions in cases where it is fully familiar with the language and script of the document which is the subject matter of scrutiny before it and where it has the assistance in such scrutiny of the counsel of the parties. If on the face of it the court is able to come to a conclusion that a particular document contains alterations and interpolations it is not bound to seek the assistance of Handwriting Experts. It could not, therefore, be said that simply because a Handwriting Expert was not called to give evidence, the Court is not empowered to come to a conclusion whether the pro-note and the receipt in question have been subjected to alterations or interpolations 13. Learned Single Judge of Orissa High Court in Iswar Chandra v. Ramnik Lal reported in AIR 1978 Orissa 156, has held that the comparison of signature on a disputed document with the proved signature by the Judge himself does not relegate him to the position of a witness. Where a Judge compares the signature on a document by way of corroboration to other evidence indicating that the defendant has taken loan from the plaintiff, it could not be said that the Court has committed any error in the procedure. Calling a handwriting expert may not always be possible or a desirable proposition. The learned single Judge has held as under: “8. Section 73 of the Evidence Act provides that- "73. Comparison of signature, writing or seal with others admitted or proved - In order to ascertain whether a signature, writing, or seal is that of the person by whom. Calling a handwriting expert may not always be possible or a desirable proposition. The learned single Judge has held as under: “8. Section 73 of the Evidence Act provides that- "73. Comparison of signature, writing or seal with others admitted or proved - In order to ascertain whether a signature, writing, or seal is that of the person by whom. It purports to have been written or made, any signature, writing, or seal admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written or made by that person may be compared with the one which is to be proved, although that signature, writing, or seal has not been produced or proved for any other purpose." (The 2nd and the third paragraphs of that section are not relevant.) So it cannot be said that by comparing such signatures the Judge relegates himself to the position of a witness. 9. The propriety of a Judge comparing disputed signatures by himself has been called in question. In a number of decisions, In the Division Bench decision reported in AIR 1925 Cal 485 (J.C. Glastaun v. Sonatan Pal) It has been observed that the practise of a judge declaring whether a disputed signature agrees with the other signatures of a certain person, without the assistance of any evidence but merely on his own inspection, has been disapproved by experienced judges in many cases. In para 30 of the Full Bench decision reported In AIR 1961 Cal 461 (Saurendra Mohan Basu v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar) it has been held as follows:- "Now while it is competent on the part of a judge or a Magistrate to compare the disputed signatures with the admitted signature for himself, vide Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, it is unsafe to rely entirely on such persona comparison. Reference may be made in this connection to the decisions 5 J.C. Glastaun v. Sonatan Pal, AIR 1925 Cal 485; Darshan Singh v. Prabhu Singh, A.I.R. 1946 All. 67 and Kessarbai v. Jethabhai, A.I.R. 1928 P. C. 277." (The underlines above are mine). Be it noted that in the above observations conclusion merely on comparison of signatures by Judges themselves without the assistance of any other evidence is disapproved. 67 and Kessarbai v. Jethabhai, A.I.R. 1928 P. C. 277." (The underlines above are mine). Be it noted that in the above observations conclusion merely on comparison of signatures by Judges themselves without the assistance of any other evidence is disapproved. In the case reported in A.I.R. 1946 All 67 (Darshan Singh v. Prabhu Singh) the comparison of the signatures was done by the Judge in his chambers and not in the court in the presence of the counsel appearing for both the parties. Their Lordships of that court and of the Calcutta High Court have deprecated such comparison. Justice P.B. Mukherjee in the case reported in A.I.R. 1961 Cal. 300 (Bisseswar Poddar v. Nabadwip Chandra Poddar), while agreeing with the judgment written by Justice Bose in that case, made certain observations on this aspect of the matter some of which I am tempted to quote herein below (at P. 306) :- "............I am unable to subscribe to the view of judicial blindness that a court is prevented by law to use its own eyes either in addition to handwriting expert's evidence on the point or even in the absence of such expert evidence on the point." In para 37 his Lordship stated that - "On the interpretation of the relevant sections of the Evidence Act and on a review and examination of the case law on the subject, I am satisfied that there is no legal bar to the Judge using his own eyes to compare disputed signature with admitted signatures even without the aid of any evidence of any handwriting expert. There are also other reasons to support this conclusion. What happens in those cases of disputed signatures where neither party calls any handwriting expert or where no handwriting expert may be available as in some of the courts in the districts ? Is the judge bound to call a handwriting expert as a court witness ? He can do so if he wants to. What happens in those cases of disputed signatures where neither party calls any handwriting expert or where no handwriting expert may be available as in some of the courts in the districts ? Is the judge bound to call a handwriting expert as a court witness ? He can do so if he wants to. But I do not think he can be forced to do so or that he is obliged to do so, if he feels that he can on the evidence of other witnesses on the point and by comparison of signatures come to his own conclusion on the point, so long as the court bears in mind the caution that such comparison is almost always by its nature inconclusive and hazardous." There are other passages in that judgment which may aptly by referred to on this topic. In the present case before me, the court below, on a fresh reassessment of the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 4, finds that the signature in Ext. It is that of the defendant. While considering then evidence the Judge has also compared the disputed signature in Ext I with the other admitted signatures of the defendant, and considering all that he has arrived at a firm conclusion that the signature in Ext. 1 is that of the defendant. His said conclusion therefore is not based entirely on his personal comparison of the signatures; that comparison was made, as it appears from the impugned judgment, for the purpose of receiving confirmation to his conclusion on that aspect on other evidence on record. Comparison of signature by Judges under such circumstances does not call for any comment. Calling a handwriting expert may not always be possible or a desirable proposition. Comparison of signatures by court is not and should not be dependent on the examination of a handwriting expert. 14. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.S. Satyanarayana v. V.R. Narayana Rao reported in AIR 1999 SC 2544 , have held as under: “7. A piquant situation had developed before the trial Court when the 1st defendant denied his signatures on the written statement and Vakalatnama in favour of his counsel. Trial Court should have immediately probed into the matter. A piquant situation had developed before the trial Court when the 1st defendant denied his signatures on the written statement and Vakalatnama in favour of his counsel. Trial Court should have immediately probed into the matter. It should have recorded statement of the counsel for the 1st defendant to find out if Vakalatnama in his favour and written statement were not signed by the 1st defendant whom he represented. It was apparent that the 1st defendant was trying to get out of the situation when confronted with his signatures on the Vakalatnama and the written statement and his having earlier denied his signatures on Exh. P.1 and Exh. P-2 in order to defeat the claim of the plaintiff. Falsehood of the claim of the 1st defendant was writ large on the face of it. Trial Court could have also compared the signatures of the 1st defendant as provided in Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 73 is reproduced as under:- "Comparison of signature, writing or seal with others admitted or proved. 73. In order to ascertain whether a signature, writing, or seal is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written or made, any signature, writing, or seal admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written or made by that person may be compared with the one which is to be proved, although that signature, writing, or seal has not been produced or proved for any other purpose. The Court may direct any person present in Court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare the words or figures so written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person. This section applies also, with any necessary modifications, to finger impressions. " 8. It was a case where instead of going into a protracted trial, trial Court could have decreed the suit of the plaintiff against the 1st defendant as well at the stage of Order 10 (Examination of Parties by the Court) of the Code of Civil Procedure. After the 1st defendant admitted having received rupees one lakh from the plaintiff he could not retain that money on the spacious plea that there was no privity of contract between him and the plaintiff. After the 1st defendant admitted having received rupees one lakh from the plaintiff he could not retain that money on the spacious plea that there was no privity of contract between him and the plaintiff. Amount of rupees one lakh had been given to him by the plaintiff as he wanted to purchase ground floor of his property. The agreement to sell for the purpose was entered into through the 2nd defendant whom the 1st defendant had authorised to enter into any such agreement on his behalf. The plaintiff could not have paid to the 1st defendant rupees one lakh but for the agreement to sell in respect of ground floor of his property. It is only on the basis of this agreement (Exh. P-2) which is entered into by the 2nd defendant on the strength of Exh. P-1 that the plaintiff paid rupees one lakh each to the 1st and 2nd defendants. If we accept the pleadings of the 1st defendant then the amount of rupees one lakh had been given by the plaintiff under some mistake. In any case, it was not a payment gratuitously made. Doctrine of undue enrichment would squarely apply in the present case and the plaintiff would be entitled to restitution. In this connection Sections 70 and 72 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 may be referred to, which are as under:- "70. Obligation of person enjoying benefit of non gratuitous act - Where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered. 72. Liability of person to whom money is paid, or thing delivered, by mistake or under coercion. A person to whom money has been paid, or any thing delivered, by mistake or under coercion, must repay or return it.” 15. A Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Nepal Singh v. Om Pal Singh reported in AIR 2005 Delhi 330, have held that not only the trial Court but also the appellate Court shall have the power under Section 73 of the Evidence Act to apply the test of comparison of writing in an appropriate case with sufficient care and caution. As a matter of prudence, Court may not base its findings solely on comparison made by the Court. But there could be no bar for the Court to take resort to the said power and compare the signatures and give its findings thereon which could be considered with the findings on other evidence on record. The Division Bench has held as under: “10. In the light of the aforesaid ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court, we are of the considered opinion that not only the trial court but also the appellate court shall have the power under Section 73 of the Evidence Act to apply the test of comparison of writing in an appropriate case with sufficient care and caution. As a matter of prudence, court may not base its findings solely on comparison made by the court. But there could be no bar for the court to take resort to the said power and compare the signatures and give its findings thereon which could be considered with the findings on other evidence on record. In the present case, the aforesaid findings on the signatures of the appellant on the disputed document are based not only on the test of comparison of the signatures but also on the basis of other evidence on record. Comparison of the signatures and the conclusion that the same are of the same person supports and corroborates the conclusions that have been arrived at by this court that the oral evidence adduced by the witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiff clearly prove and establish the transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant and also execution of the said document. We, therefore, hold that the said pronote and receipt (Ex. P-1) is a legal and valid document and the same was executed by the defendant by putting his signatures thereto in presence of witnesses. 16. Learned first appellate Court has rightly awarded the interest from the date of filing of suit till its realization. Plaintiff was not entitled to the interest from the date of execution of agreement i.e. 14.12.1997. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 17. Consequently, there is no merit in the appeal as well as Cross-objections and the same are dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. No costs. Appeal dismissed.