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2015 DIGILAW 1515 (KER)

Chandra Prasad v. State of Kerala

2015-10-29

MARY JOSEPH

body2015
ORDER : Petitioners are accused Nos.1 to 7 and 9 in Crime No.118/2009 of Poojappura Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram District registered for the offences punishable under Ss.143, 147, 148, 149, 452, 427, 294(b), 324 and 308 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘I.P.C.’ in short) read with S.27 of the Arms Act. Eighth accused expired. On concluding the investigation, the S.I. Of Police, Poojappura Police Station submitted a final report against the petitioners for the offences. The First Additional Sessions Court took cognizance of the case and numbered it as S.C.No.941/2013. 2. The petitioners seek to quash Annexure A1, the final report and further proceedings pending against them in S.C. No.941/2013 on the files of the First Additional Sessions Court, Thiruvananthapuram on the ground that the issues involved in the case have been amicably settled out of court through mediators. 3. The petitioners are accused. The second respondent is the de facto complainant in the above case. The second respondent has sworn to an affidavit (Annexure A2) wherein it is stated that the dispute involved in the case has been amicably settled out of court by the management of the hotel and the petitioners. 4. Sri. P. Anoop (Mulavana), the counsel representing the petitioners/Sri. E.A. Bijumon, the counsel, who laid vakalath for the second respondent and the learned Public Prosecutor were heard. 5. It is contended by Sri. P. Anoop (Mulavana) that in view of the settlement of the issues involved in the case as evidenced from Annexure A2, this Court is empowered to record the same and to quash S.C. No. 941/2013 on its basis. 6. The ambit of the inherent powers of the High Court under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘the Cr.P.C.’) read with Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to quash criminal proceedings was dealt with by the Apex Court in B.S. Joshi & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr. ( (2003) 4 SCC 675 ). The scope and ambit of the power under S.482 of the Cr.P.C. has been examined by the court in a catena of decisions and in B.S. Joshi’s case (supra), that is considered in relation to matrimonial disputes. The High Court when approached for getting the case quashed took a negative stand in the matter placing reliance on State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. The High Court when approached for getting the case quashed took a negative stand in the matter placing reliance on State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. (1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335); Madhu Limayae v. The State of Maharashtra ((1997) 4 SCC 551); Surendra Nath Mohantv and another v. State of Orissa ( AIR 1999 SC 2181 ), that the offences involved being non-compoundable, inherent powers cannot be invoked to bypass S.320 of the Cr.P.C. 7. In Bhajan Lal’s case (Supra), the Apex Court has described seven categories of cases for illustrative purpose and not observed that those categories of cases are exhaustive. On the contrary, in Bhajan Lal’s case, it was said :- “......... In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of Cr.P.C. under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an illustrative list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.” 8. The Apex Court found it impracticable to lay down any straitjacket formula for observance as standards to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. According to the Court, natural justice principles would operate differently with reference to the factual matrix of each case. For illustrative purpose, seven categories of cases were listed in Bhajanlal’s case (supra) so as to bear in mind by the courts while extending the exercise of the inherent power under S.482 of Cr.P.C. to matters wherein parties have approached the court seeking to get their case quashed on the ground that an amicable settlement in redressal of their grievances has been arrived at. Specific reference is made by the Apex Court in Bhajanlal’s case (supra) that the illustrations given by them are not exhaustive. 9. Specific reference is made by the Apex Court in Bhajanlal’s case (supra) that the illustrations given by them are not exhaustive. 9. Therefore, the dictum in Bhajanlal’s case (supra) would make it clear that the inherent power is meant by the Apex Court to be exercised either to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice and the illustrations given therein are meant only to guide the courts when called upon to exercise the inherent jurisdiction in settled matters. 10. The Hon’ble Court observed further :- “It is thus, clear that Madhu Limaye’s case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or F.I.R. or complaint as vested in Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice. quashing of FIR becomes necessary. Section 320 would not be a bar to exercise of power of quashing. It is. however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, whether to exercise or not such a power." (underline supplied) 11. The High Court of Punjab (Haryana) in B.S. Joshi’s case (supra) mistook the dictum in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) and held that the parameters, principles and guidelines for quashing of complaints, first information report and criminal proceedings have been settled in terms thereof and concluded that the case under its consideration does not fall within any of the categories of cases illustrated therein. The High Court in the case lost sight of the observation in Bhajan Lal’s case(supra) which made it clear that the categories of cases enlisted therein are only illustrative in nature and not exhaustive. On the contrary, the High Court had erred in taking the view that the exercise of the inherent powers of the court is confined to the categories of cases illustrated therein. 12. In Pepsi Food Ltd and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors., ( (1998) 5 SCC 749 ), the Apex Court observed with reference to Bhajan Lai’s case that “the guidelines laid therein are not inflexible ones or laying down rigid formulae to be followed by court. 12. In Pepsi Food Ltd and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors., ( (1998) 5 SCC 749 ), the Apex Court observed with reference to Bhajan Lai’s case that “the guidelines laid therein are not inflexible ones or laying down rigid formulae to be followed by court. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.” 13. Madhu Limaye’s case (supra) has also been misread, misunderstood and misapplied by High Court of Punjab (Haryana) while arriving at a conclusion that the offences under Ss.498A and 4061.P.C. involved being non-compoundable, it would be impermissible to quash the F.I.R. on the sole ground that there has been a settlement between the parties. 14. The controversy came up for consideration of the Apex Court in Madhu Limaye’s case(supra) was, whether in view of the express bar under sub-s.(2) of S.397 of the Cr.P.C, invocation of the inherent power under S.482 of the Cr.P.C. would be fettered. 15. The Apex Court took the view that nothing in the Cr.P.C, inclusive of sub-s.(2) of S.397, “shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court.” The court said “if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers, but adopting a harmonious approach held that the bar provided in sub-section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional powers of the High Court meaning thereby that the High Court will be barred from exercising the power of revision in relation to interlocutory orders. It was further held that, the exercise of the inherent power will come into play, in the absence of any provision in O.P.C. for the redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party. 16. It was further held that, the exercise of the inherent power will come into play, in the absence of any provision in O.P.C. for the redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party. 16. The Apex Court also observed inter alia in Madhu Limaye's case (supra) "if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, interference of the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Courts 17. The Apex Court has referred an illustration wherein the court took cognizance of a case without jurisdiction and raised a query, whether the High Court is justified in not interfering with the matter in exercise of inherent jurisdiction, stating that in view of the specific bar under sub-section (2) of S.397 of the Cr.P.C, its hands are tied. Issuing process after taking cognizance in a case without jurisdiction is an illegality and if the proceedings were allowed to be pursued further, it would work out sheer injustice to the accused, as it would have the effect of directing him to face trial which is per se, illegal. Therefore, the Apex Court has expressed its view by way of the illustration that it would be unreasonable and improper to say in such circumstances of the nature that the High Court is without jurisdiction to exercise the inherent power to put a stop to the criminal proceedings at the earliest as no purpose would be served in giving green signal to the court which has erred in its action, to continue with the proceedings stating that its hands are tied up in view of the statutory bar under S.397(2) of Cr.P.C. Or in other words, it would be as if permitting someone, already in error to continue with committing errors and thus, to pass an illegal and unsustainable judgment. It is pertinent to note here that in cases of the nature, despite the fact that a full-fledged trial is held, the trial court cannot convict the accused solely on account of the illegality hangs upon the case from its inception. It is not as if the trial court is proceeding unknowingly of the illegality. The only option left for the trial court is to continue with the proceedings knowingly of the illegality unless and until the High Court interferes to quash the same. It is not as if the trial court is proceeding unknowingly of the illegality. The only option left for the trial court is to continue with the proceedings knowingly of the illegality unless and until the High Court interferes to quash the same. If the High Court is reluctant to interfere with the matter stating lack of jurisdiction, it would work out sheer injustice, in terms of prejudice to the accused, consumption of time by courts dealing with futile proceedings, expenditure to Exchequer etc. It is in such a circumstance, the Apex Court held that the bar under S.397(2) of Cr.P.C. would not operate when the task shouldered upon the court is to prevent abuse of the process of the court and/or to secure the ends of justice. Therefore, Madhu Limaye's case (supra) does not lay down any general proposition limiting the exercise of inherent power to quash criminal proceedings like F.I.R. or complaint as vested in S.482 of the Cr.P.C. or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 18. The proposition of law laid down in Surendra Nath Mohanthy's case (supra) was that offence declared to be non-compoundable cannot be compounded at ail even with the permission of the court. Or in other words, only cases, which are incorporated in Tables I and H of S.320 of the Cr.P.C., can be compounded and offences, which are not incorporated therein, cannot be compounded or permitted to be compounded. 19. In Mohanthy's case (supra), the appellants therein were convicted by the trial court for the offence under S.307 of the I.P.C. The High Court in appeal altered the finding of guilt of the accused under S.326 of the I.P.C. and punished him for the said offence, imposing sentence for six months. An application for compounding was filed before the High Court and it was dismissed by the said Court on the reason that the offence under S.326 of I.P.C. for which the accused was found guilty by the court is not incorporated in either of the Tables under S.320 of the Cr.P.C. The Apex Court in Mohanthy's case (supra) was pleased to reduce the sentence to a period of imprisonment already undergone by the appellants therein and ordered release of them on the reason that the parties had already settled their disputes outside the court. The Apex Court while discussing the matter in the ease on hand had also differentiated it from Mohanthy's case stating that the parties before the court have no prayer for getting the offences involved in the case compounded, but only for getting their case quashed. It is also apposite to quote State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and Others ( (1977) 2 SCC 699 ) wherein the Apex Court had occasion to consider the scope of the inherent power to quash under S.482 of the Cr.P.C., ".........while considering the true scope of Section 203 of the old Code that the Magistrate was not bound to accept the result of an enquiry or investigation and that he must apply his judicial mind to the material on which he had to form his judgment. These decisions show that for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against an accused the court possesses a comparatively wider discretion in the exercise of which it can determine the question whether the material on the record, if unrebutted, is such on the basis of which a conviction can be said reasonably to be possible. What is emerged from the aforesaid decisions was that the inherent power is very wide in its operation and exercise of the power cannot be restrained or restricted when the materials brought to the notice of the court for consideration involve abuse of the process of the court or liable to work out injustice. Or in other words, if the court feels on application of mind that ends of justice could not be secured by keeping aloof, and restraining itself from interference, it can act upon in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction. It is in such a circumstance that, the Apex Court laid down the dictum in B.S. Joshi's case (supra) that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary. Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of inherent jurisdiction for the purpose. Therefore, whether the inherent power should be exercised or not, is a matter that depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In Muniswami's case (supra), the Apex Court, held, "in the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that ends of justice so require.''' 20. Therefore, whether the inherent power should be exercised or not, is a matter that depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In Muniswami's case (supra), the Apex Court, held, "in the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that ends of justice so require.''' 20. The Full Bench of the Apex Court in Gian Singh's case (supra) had also reconsidered the dictums laid down by two Bench Judges in B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, Nikhil Merchant v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. ( 2008 (3) KLT 769 (SC)) and Manoj Sharma v. State & Ors. ( 2008 (4) KLT 417 (SC) when a reference is made to see whether S.320 creates a bar/limits inherent power of High Court under S.482. 21. B.S. Joshi's case (supra) has already been dealt with hereinabove and therefore, a reiteration of the facts involved and the dictum laid is uncalled for. 22. In Nikhil Merchant's case (supra), a company namely M/s.Neemuch Emballage Ltd., Mumbai, which obtained financial assistance in the form of loan from Andhra Bank defaulted repayment of loan which resulted in filing of a suit by the bank for recovery of the amount payable by the company to the bank. The Bank also initiated a criminal prosecution alleging commission of offences punishable under S.120B read with Ss.420, 467, 468 and 471 of I.P.C., read with Ss.5(2) and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and S.13(2) read with S.13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The suit was compromised. The Managing Director of the Company who was accused No.3 in the chargesheet filed by C.B.I. in the criminal case made application for getting discharged from the criminal complaint. The said application was rejected by Special Judge (C.B.I.), Bombay and the matter was taken in challenge before the Bombay High Court. The High Court rejected the application. The matter was taken to the Apex Court by special leave. The court relying upon B.S. Joshi's case (supra), set aside the order of the High Court and quashed the criminal proceedings holding that:- "30. The High Court rejected the application. The matter was taken to the Apex Court by special leave. The court relying upon B.S. Joshi's case (supra), set aside the order of the High Court and quashed the criminal proceedings holding that:- "30. In the instant case, the disputes between the Company and the Bank have been set at rest on the basis of the compromise arrived at by them whereunder the dues of the Bank have been cleared and the bank does not appear to have any further claim against the Company. What, however, remains is the fact that certain documents were alleged to have been created by the appellant herein in order to avail of credit facilities beyond the limit to which the Company was entitled. The dispute involved herein has overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal facets, The question which is required to be answered in this case is whether the power which independently lies with this Court to quash the criminal proceedings pursuant to the compromise arrived at, should at all be exercised? 31. On an overall view of the facts as indicated hereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of this Court in B.S. Joshi's case and the compromise arrived at between the Company and the Bank as also Clause 11 of the consent terms filed in the suit filed by the Bank, we are satisfied that this is a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in our view, the continuance of the same after the compromise arrived at between the parties would be a futile exercise." (underline supplied) 23. In Manoj Sharma's case (supra), the concern of the court was on the question, whether an F.I.R. under Ss.420, 468, 471, 34, 120-B I.P.C. can be quashed under S.482 of the Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution when the accused and the complainant have compromised and settled the matter between themselves. The Apex Court observed as follows:- "..........., "The ultimate exercise of discretion under S.482 Cr.P.C. or under Art.226 of the Constitution is with the court which has to exercise such jurisdiction in the facts of each case. It has been explained that the said power is in no way limited by the provisions of S.320 Cr.P.C. We are unable to disagree with such statement of law. It has been explained that the said power is in no way limited by the provisions of S.320 Cr.P.C. We are unable to disagree with such statement of law. In any event, in this case, we are only required to consider whether the High Court had exercised its jurisdiction under S.482 Cr.P.C. legally and correctly." Then in paragraphs 8 and 9 (pg.5) of the Report, Altamas Kabir J., inter alia held as under: "8. ........ Once the complainant decided not to pursue the matter further, the High Court could have taken a more pragmatic view of the matter. We do not suggest that while exercising its power under Art.226 of the Constitution the High Court could not have refused to quash the first information report, but what we do say is that the matter could have been considered by the High Court with greater pragmatism in the facts of the case. 9..........In the facts of this case we are of the view that continuing with the criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility..... (underline supplied) 24. The reference was answered by the Full Bench of the Apex Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab ( 2012 (4) KLT 108 (SC)), in the following terms:- "57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under S.320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation, but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline ensrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offenders have settled the dispute. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offenders have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statues like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civilpartnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question (s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding." (underline supplied) 25. The case on hand is analysed in the backdrop of the decisions cited supra. It is evident that the de facto complainant and the petitioners had settled their differences on terms and the de facto complainant has filed an affidavit stating the factum. 26. The case on hand is analysed in the backdrop of the decisions cited supra. It is evident that the de facto complainant and the petitioners had settled their differences on terms and the de facto complainant has filed an affidavit stating the factum. 26. In the context, it is relevant to have a look at the allegations contained in Annexure A1 FIR based on which the prosecution case is built up, which is quoted hereunder:- "Other Language'' 27. It is seen therefrom that Sri. Adarsh/the de facto complainant is the Manager of the hotel named 'City Palace' within the premises of which the alleged incident was occurred. The non-bailable offences involved are those punishable under Ss.452 and 308 of the I.P.C. and S.27 of the Arms Act. Those offences are non-compoundable also. Apart from those offences, all other offences incorporated in Annexure Al are compoundable. On a mere look at the provisions defining the offences alleged, one cannot say that gravity is not involved. But, on an in-depth analysis of the 161 statements of witnesses to the prosecution including that of the de facto complainant/first informant would make it clear that though serious offence like S.308 is incorporated in the Final Report, whether the offence would be attracted from the allegations put forth in the case is doubtful. The offence under S.308 of I.P.C. was incorporated in the final report based on the allegation therein as extracted hereunder:- "Other Language" Going by the witness list and the evidence proposed to be let in by the prosecution through them, evidently there is no likelihood for the same to be culminated in conviction for those offences. To any stretch of imagination, the allegation, if proved would help the court to arrive at a conclusion regarding complicity of the accused in the offence alleged therein. The de facto complainant is the manager of the hotel named City Palace and at his instance that the law was set in motion. It is indicated therefrom that being the Manager of the hotel, he has every authority to represent the hotel and its staff and set the law in motion in exercise of the authority. Allegation in Annexure A1 is to the effect that the accused had assaulted some of the staff by kicking and pushing them down. It is indicated therefrom that being the Manager of the hotel, he has every authority to represent the hotel and its staff and set the law in motion in exercise of the authority. Allegation in Annexure A1 is to the effect that the accused had assaulted some of the staff by kicking and pushing them down. There is also allegation in Annexure A1 that the accused destroyed articles kept at the reception of the hotel. It is pertinent to note here that the allegations are not specific with respect to any injury sustained by the victims or the nature of the damages caused to the articles. With regard to the specific allegation incorporated in Annexure A1, offences at the most attracted are those punishable under Ss.324 and 427 and those are compoundable. As I have already observed, there is no likelihood for the allegations as those exist to attract the offence under S.308 I.P.C. and therefore, even if the accused is directed to face trial in respect of that offence, it is unlikely for the trial to be ended in conviction of the accused. Or in other words, the trial, if held contextually, would be a futile exercise and wastage of time. The gravity of the offence must be ascertained by the court not on the basis of the relevant provisions incorporated in the charge sheet but on the basis of the allegations contained therein. 28. The dictum of the Apex Court in Gian Singh's case (supra) being contextually relevant is extracted hereinbelow:- "In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime.'' (underline supplied) The factual matrix of the case on hand when dealt with in the light of the various dictums of the Apex Court (supra) direct me to take the view that, the case on hand is an apposite one inviting this Court to exercise the inherent jurisdiction under S.482 Cr.P.C. to quash Annexure Al Final Report without it being dragged to the stage of trial. A pragmatic approach on the factual matrix of the case and the evidence proposed to be let in by the prosecution through the witnesses listed in the final report when viewed in the backdrop of the facts now sworn to by the de facto complainant in the affidavit filed, it is unlikely for trial if pursued with, to be culminated in acquittal of the petitioners. 29. When the de facto complainant, allegedly an injured and at whose instance, the FIS was lodged to set the law in motion approaches the court in apprisal of the fact that his grievances against the petitioners are put to an end amicably and the factum of such resolution endorsed in the form of an affidavit is also placed forth, the court should apply its mind to be convinced of the scope of the allegation to attract the offences incorporated on its basis. If the allegations appear to it to be of such a gravity and there is scope for the interest of the society at large be affected by permitting the matter to be closed on the basis of an affidavit endorsing amicable settlement, it is expedient for the court in the interest of justice to abstain from exercising the inherent jurisdiction. But, in a case of the nature, there is absolutely no harm in exercising the inherent jurisdiction to give effect to the amicable settlement of issues arrived at among the parties. The de facto complainant may have his own reasons for withdrawing his cause against the accused. It is not for the trial court to venture into the reasons of the de facto complainant. As the criminal system remains as on date, the court is bound to decide on the basis of the evidence let in by the prosecution through its witnesses and documents. It is for the affected party to let in evidence to establish his grievance. If the affected party does not intend to let in evidence to substantiate his/her case, the trial court need not go after the reasons, but to pronounce a judgment of acquittal of the accused. Courts should borne in mind of such an eventuality while considering applications seeking to quash the proceedings based on amicable settlement of the disputes, in exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Courts should borne in mind of such an eventuality while considering applications seeking to quash the proceedings based on amicable settlement of the disputes, in exercise of inherent jurisdiction. It is pertinent to note from the allegations incorporated in the records of the case placed for perusal that only a scratch was inflicted on the cheek of the de facto complainant and that too while warding off a forcible blow aimed at the face with a knife. In a forcible blow, a scratch is unlikely to be inflicted. The learned Public Prosecutor has also not raised an allegation regarding frequent involvement of the petitioners in criminal activities. 30. In view of the discussion hereinabove made and on appreciation of the facts sworn to by the de facto complainant in the affidavit filed and other material aspects, this Court feels it only just and proper to quash Annexure A1 Final Report and all further proceedings pending against the petitioners pursuant to S.C.No.941/2013 before the First Additional Sessions Court, Thiruvananthapuram based on Crime No. 118/2009 of Poojappura Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram District. In the result, this Crl.M.C. is allowed. Annexure A1 Final Report and all further proceedings against the petitioners pursuant to SC 941/2013 pending on the files of the First Additional Sessions Court, Thiruvananthapuram originated from Crime No. 118/2009 of Poojappura Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram District stand quashed.