JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. Heard finally with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties. 2. The issue of jurisdiction of the Industrial Court to entertain a complaint filed by the respondent No.1 challenging the action of the petitioner of seeking to superannuate the respondent No.1 from service on reaching the age of 58 years arises for consideration. According to the said employee, he was entitled to continue in service till the age of 60 years and issuance of such communication resulted in breach of the terms of the order of appointment. This led said employee to approach the Industrial Court through a recognized Union to file a complaint under Section 28 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short the said Act). The respondent No.1 invoked the provisions of Item 9 of Schedule IV and took the stand that the action on the part of the management was in breach of the certified standing orders. 3. The petitioner filed its written statement and raised a question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Court. According to the petitioner, by the impugned communication, the services of the employee were being superannuated and if he was aggrieved by the same, it was necessary for him to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under provisions of Item 1 of Schedule IV to the said Act. 4. The Industrial Court considered the respective cases of the parties after they had agreed not to lead any evidence before it. It was held that the complaint as filed was tenable before the Industrial Court and thereafter found that there was also a violation of the certified standing orders. Accordingly, by the impugned judgment dated 29-9-2014, the complaint was allowed and it was directed that the employee was entitled to continue in employment till he attained the age of 60 years. 5. Shri R. B. Puranik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint inasmuch as by issuing the impugned communication seeking to superannuate the employee, the same amounted to taking a step towards discharge of the employee. 5. Shri R. B. Puranik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint inasmuch as by issuing the impugned communication seeking to superannuate the employee, the same amounted to taking a step towards discharge of the employee. He submitted that in the impugned communication it was informed that the services of the employee would come to an end by 2-9-2014 and merely because the complaint was filed prior to said date, the same would not clothe the Industrial Court with jurisdiction. In support of his submissions, he relied upon judgments of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Lever Ltd. vs. Ashok Vishnu Kate and others, (1995) 6 Supreme Court Cases 326 and Pepsico India Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Noshir Elavia & Anr. 2002 1 CLR 953. According to him, the learned Member of the Industrial Court assumed jurisdiction merely on the ground that the employee had not been discharged from service by applying wrong tests in law. It was submitted that this approach was contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court. He also submitted that the finding regarding breach of certified standing orders while issuing the impugned communication was contrary to law. 6. Shri R. N. Sen, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 supported the impugned judgment. According to him, the services of the said employee had not come to an end on the date when the complaint was filed and hence, invocation of provisions of Item 9 of Schedule IV to the said Act was justified in the facts of the case. He submitted that issuance of the impugned communication by the petitioner was contrary to the certified standing orders and hence, there was a failure to implement the agreement in terms of Item 9 of Schedule IV to the said Act. In support of his submissions, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in S. G. Chemical and Dyes Trading vs. S. G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading (1986) 2 SCC 624 , Zim Laboratories Ltd., Nagpur vs. Nagpur General Labour Union, Kalmeshwar 2010(1) Mh.L.J. 173 , Shri C. R. Dhuri and Ors. vs. National Textile Corporation 2006(4) Bom.CR 170 and Ram Pyarelal Khicher vs. Municipal Council Ramtek and others, 2015(1) Mh.L.J. 698 . vs. National Textile Corporation 2006(4) Bom.CR 170 and Ram Pyarelal Khicher vs. Municipal Council Ramtek and others, 2015(1) Mh.L.J. 698 . He also submitted that the finding recorded as to breach of certified standing orders was in accordance with law. 7. I have heard respective submissions and have gone through the documents filed on record. The issuance of the communication by which the employee was given a notice that he would stand superannuated on 2-9-2014 after attaining the age of 58 years is not in dispute. The only question is as regards jurisdiction of the Industrial Court to entertain the complaint in question. According to the complainant, as there was a breach of certified standing orders, the invocation of Item 9 of Schedule IV to the said Act was appropriate. On the other hand, according to the management, the effect of issuance of said communication would result in discharge of the employee and if the employee was aggrieved, the same could be termed as said communication having been issued in colourable exercise of employer's right. It is, therefore, necessary to consider whether issuance of the notice dated 26-6-2014 calling upon the employee to superannuate on 2-9-2014 would amount to intended discharge of the employee. 8. A somewhat similar question was considered by the Division Bench of this Court in Ashok Vishnu Kate vs. M. R. Bhope 1992(1) Mh.L.J. 473 wherein it was held thus: “7. The contention urged on behalf of the employees that the expression “engaged in or engaging in any unfair labour practice” in subsection (1) of section 28 is of wide ambit and would cover cases where an employer is engaging in practice which will lead to dismissal is of considerable merit. The Legislature very wisely did not use the expression “where any person has committed unfair labour practice” and the expression “engaged in or is engaging in” clearly indicates that once the employer engages in unfair labour practice, then the employee can approach the Labour Court and it is not that the cause of action for complaint under Item 1 of Schedule IV accrues only when the unfair labour practice of the employer ends with the order of discharge or dismissal. It cannot be overlooked that the expression used in Item 1 of Schedule IV is “to discharge or dismiss employees” and the word “to gives a clear indication that in case the employer indulges in unfair labour practice which leads to discharge or dismissal, then the employee can approach the Labour Court for redressal even before the order of discharge or dismissal is passed. The Legislature has used the word “to”, an infinitive instead of using the words “discharge or dismissal of employees” and that indicates that the Legislature never intended that the right of the employee to file complaint would arise only after the final order of dismissal or discharge is passed. Use of the word “to” in Item 1 of Schedule IV is an indicator that the Legislature was desirous that the employee can have a redress by approaching the Labour Court even when the employer proposes or intends to discharge or dismiss an employee by resort to unfair labour practice. The use of infinitive shows that the action of dismissal or discharge is not yet complete. In our judgment, the construction on Item No.1 of Schedule IV should be harmonious to achieve the object of th legislation and the construction suggested by the management would lead to drastic consequences for the employee. The employee would be left without employment and the source of earning in spite of the fact that the dismissal of discharge was clearly by resort to unfair labour practice. Such a construction would lead to defeat the object of the Act and could have never been intended by he Legislature. It is well settled rule of interpretation that Court should be extremely slow in holding that the jurisdiction of the Court is ousted. Any construction which ousts the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the complaint of unfair labour practice should be avoided. Once an employee establishes that the employer has indulged in unfair labour practice which would lad to the discharge or dismissal from the employment, then the Courts cannot close the doors and the interpretation that though there is wrong committed by the employer the remedy is not available till the wrong reaches its ultimate in the order of dismissal cannot be accepted. In no civilised set up and more so in industrial disputes the employee can be told that you must suffer at he hands of the employer and the remedy is available only when the wrong is completed. It is necessary to reasonably construe the provisions of the Act, so as to provide remedy and redress as soon as a wrong is practised by the employer. The unfair labour practice commences as soon as the employer starts proceedings against the employee and which proceedings fall within the mischief of Item No.1(a) to (f) of Schedule IV to the Act. It is then no answer for the employer to claim that wait till the mischief results into a drastic order of discharge or dismissal and the Labour Court is entitled to entertain the complaint and prevent the drastic consequences to the employee arising out of the resort to unfair labour practice by the employer. The Legislature enacted the provisions of the Act as it was found that the Industrial Disputes Act did not contain provisions to prevent unfair labour practices which would lead to drastic consequences and while construing the provisions of the Act, a construction should be employed which would prevent such drastic consequences. The Industrial Disputes Act has now introduced a Schedule which sets out unfair labour practices, but does not provide for grant of interim relief preventing the person from engaging in or cnt8inuing to engage in the unfair labour practice. The provisions of Section 30 of the Act enable the Court to direct person indulging in unfair labour practice to cease and desist from such practice and it is open for the Court under subsection (2) of Section 30 of the Act to pass interim order pending final decision. The Labour Court therefore is entitled not only to entertain the complaint for unfair labour practices on the part of the employer, and which will lead to order of discharge or dismissal, but is also entitled to direct the employer to cease the desist from such practice pending he decision of the complaint.” Accordingly, it was held that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint even before the actual order of dismissal or discharge termination was passed. 9. Aforesaid decision of the Division Bench was challenged before the Supreme Court in Hindustan Lever Ltd. (supra). 9. Aforesaid decision of the Division Bench was challenged before the Supreme Court in Hindustan Lever Ltd. (supra). After considering the entire scheme of the said Act, it was observed by the Supreme Court in para 19 of its judgment that the term “to discharge or dismiss” also indicates an attempted action towards such discharge or dismissal. In para 24 thereafter it was held that to discharge or dismiss an employee would include the final act of discharge or dismissal as well as any penultimate step taken towards that destination. Thereafter, in para 29, it has been observed thus: “29................................................................................. But the legislature has conferred jurisdiction on the Labour Court to entertain the complaints also on the additional ground that the employer is engaged in any unfair labour practice. This clearly indicates a present continuous action as it reflects a present continuous tense. That would include a complaint regarding the employer, who at present is engaging in the alleged unfair labour practice by way of victimisation. That would indicate actions which are contemplated and in pipeline but which are still not finally completed. If the learned counsel for the appellant is right that only the final act of discharge or dismissal can be covered by the sweep of Section 28(1), then the terminology used by the Legislation “or is engaging in any unfair labour practice” would be rendered totally redundant and otiose, as such a completed action would already stand covered by the earlier phrase “has engaged in any unfair labour practice”. Similar words are found in Section 30(1) which deals with powers of the courts and provides that where the court decides that anyperson named in the complaint has engaged in, or is engaging in, any unfair labour practice, it may by its order give relief as mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that subsection. Similar words are found in Section 30(1) which deals with powers of the courts and provides that where the court decides that anyperson named in the complaint has engaged in, or is engaging in, any unfair labour practice, it may by its order give relief as mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that subsection. A conjoint reading of Section 28(1) and Section 30(1) clearly shows that complaint can be filed for the alleged unfair labour practice as contemplated in Item 1 of Schedule IV on any of the grounds mentioned therein, both at the stage where such final orders of discharge or dismissal are passed on the alleged grounds concerned and also at the stages prior to such final orders, once the employer is shown to have taken a firm step in that direction by initiating departmental enquiries with a view to ultimately discharge or dismiss the employee on any of the alleged grounds and such enquiries are presently in progress or are presently in the offing. Then the employer can be said to be presently engaging in any such unfair labour practice. It becomes obvious that the twin phrases 'has engaged' and 'is engaging in' indicate not only the finished, complete or continuous action but also an incomplete continuous action.” It was thereafter concluded that if an employer is alleged to be engaged in discharging any employee even before the actual order of discharge is passed he can be said to be engaged in such discharge if it is shown that an attempt is made with an intention to ultimately discharge the employee. 10. If the facts of the present case are examined in the light of aforesaid law, it is obvious that by communication dated 30-6-2014, the petitioner has taken penultimate step with a view to discharge the employee from service on 2-9-2014. Hence, in the light of aforesaid law, it can clearly be said that a step had been taken by the petitioner to discharge from service of an employee. It is also to be noted that the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision also recognized the powers of Labour Court to issue interim orders with a view to prevent an alleged unfair practice from getting fructified. 11. It is also to be noted that the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision also recognized the powers of Labour Court to issue interim orders with a view to prevent an alleged unfair practice from getting fructified. 11. The contention that there was failure to implement the settlement or agreement due to which provisions of Item 9 were being invoked is urged on the basis of the decision in S. G. Chemicals (supra). Said case considers violation of provisions of Section 25O of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. However, considering the facts of the present case, the result being one of intended discharge, the jurisdiction in that regard was available under Item 1 of Schedule IV. Item 1(b) would cover a case of colourable exercise by the employer of his right which is not in good faith. Similar submission was considered in Pepsico India Holdings (supra) and it was held that appropriate relief could be claimed before the Labour Court. In Zim Laboratories Ltd. (supra), it was found that no steps for terminating the services of the employees were taken. The only direction sought was to provide them wages. It was in that background that this Court found that as there was existence of relationship of employer and employee between the parties, the same was sufficient to attract Item 9 of Schedule IV. As regards judgment of the learned Single Judge in C. R. Dhuri (supra), it was pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the same has been subsequently set aside in Appeal No.432/2006 Managing Director Vs. C. R. Dhuri by the Division Bench vide judgment dated 19-7-2006. Similarly, the facts in the case of Ram Khicher (supra) are clearly distinguishable from the case in hand. 12. In the light of aforesaid discussion, the finding recorded by the Industrial Court on the question of jurisdiction is, therefore, found to be not sustainable in law. During pendency of the proceedings before the Industrial Court, the services of the employee were continued in view of arrangement between the parties. Hence, it is open for the respondent No.1 to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court for seeking appropriate relief. 13. Hence, the following order is passed: ORDER (1) The judgment dated 29-9-2014 passed by the learned Member, Industrial Court, Nagpur in Complaint (ULP) No.37 of 2014 is set aside on the question of jurisdiction. Hence, it is open for the respondent No.1 to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court for seeking appropriate relief. 13. Hence, the following order is passed: ORDER (1) The judgment dated 29-9-2014 passed by the learned Member, Industrial Court, Nagpur in Complaint (ULP) No.37 of 2014 is set aside on the question of jurisdiction. (2) The proceedings in Complaint (ULP) No.37/2014 stand transferred to the Labour Court, Bhandara. The parties are at liberty to amend their pleadings. (3) As the employee in question is continuing in service pursuant to the arrangement between the parties, the said arrangement shall continue for the period of eight weeks from today. The respondent No.1 is at liberty to seek appropriate interim orders under provisions of Section 30(2) of the said Act before the Labour Court. (4) It is made clear that this Court has not examined the rival submissions on merits of the dispute. If any application for interim relief is moved, the same shall be considered on its own merits. (5) Rule is made absolute in aforesaid terms. No costs.