JUDGMENT : Z.A. HAQ, J. 1. The appellant has filed this appeal challenging the judgment passed by the Sessions Court, convicting him for the offence punishable under Section 302 Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/and in default of payment of fine, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month. 2. The case of the prosecution is : Balu @ Raju Rustam Suradkar (appellant) and Sunita @ Bali were married eleven years prior to the incident and had two sons aged about 8 and 6 years. The appellant used to beat his wife under the influence of alcohol. On 26-03-2010 around 700 p.m. the appellant came to house under the influence of alcohol, picked up quarrel with his wife, had beaten her and abused her and poured kerosene on her person and set her ablaze by throwing match stick on her. Mahadeo Paighanhusband of sister of deceased Sunita, took Sunita to Reynolds Hospital, Washim. Shri Satish Patil, Medical Officer working at Reynolds Hospital informed the police station by communication (Exhibit 35) in response to which the concerned Police Officer requested the Judicial Magistrate First Class Shri Gujrate to record the statement of Sunita. Shri Gujrate went to the hospital and recorded the statement of Sunita (Exhibit 36). Crime No.101/2010 came to be registered against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 307 Indian Penal Code. Shri Gorakhnath-Assistant Sub-Inspector visited the spot, prepared panchanama and seized some articles under seizure panchanama (Exhibits 22 and 23). Shri Gorakhnath-Assistant Sub-Inspector recorded the statement of Sunita (Exhibit 49). Sunita died on 30-03-2010. Investigation was then entrusted to Shri Hemant Patil-Assistant Police Inspector. The inquest panchanama (Exhibit 50) was prepared, the dead body of Sunita was sent for postmortem. The postmortem report (Exhibit 26) came to be placed on the record and the seized articles were sent for Chemical Analysis. The offence in Crime No.101/2010 came to be converted into one under Section 302 Indian Penal Code. The appellant was arrested on 01-04-2010 vide arrest panchanama (Exhibit 51). After the completion of investigation, the charge-sheet came to be filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, who committed the trial to the Sessions Court. The charge was framed against the appellant and was read over and explained to the appellant in vernacular. The appellant did not accept his guilt and claimed to be tried. After the completion of investigation, the charge-sheet came to be filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, who committed the trial to the Sessions Court. The charge was framed against the appellant and was read over and explained to the appellant in vernacular. The appellant did not accept his guilt and claimed to be tried. The learned Additional Sessions Judge completed the trial and by the impugned judgment convicted the appellant. 3. The case of the prosecution is substantially based on three dying declarations : i) dying declaration recorded by Shri Gorakhnath, Assistant Sub-Inspector. ii) dying declaration recorded by Shri Gujrate-Judicial Magistrate First Class. iii) oral dying declaration given to Mahadeo Paighan-husband of sister of deceased. As far as the dying declaration recorded by Shri Gorakhnath Pawar is concerned, it has not been relied upon by the trial Court as Shri Gorakhnath Pawar died during the pendency of the trial and was not available for examination by the prosecution. As far as the dying declaration recorded by Shri Gujrate-Judicial Magistrate First Class is concerned, it suffers from a serious infirmity. There is no endorsement on this dying declaration showing that the contents were read over to the deceased and she admitted them to be true and correct. The Division Bench of this Court in the judgment given in the case of Abdul Riyaz Abdul Bashir vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2012 ALL MR (Cri) 2188, has laid down that the dying declaration which was not read over to deceased and on which there is no endorsement to that effect, cannot be relied upon for recording the conviction. Paragraph 8 of the above referred judgment is relevant and it is reproduced as follows : “8. On perusal of Exh.63, it appears that in column no. 2 the deponent had given the detailed narration of the incident and has stated that her mother-in-law had exhorted her husband to eliminate Nargis. Nargis got enraged and doused herself with kerosene and when she was changing her clothes, her husband ignited the matchstick and because the neighbours had raised the cries, her husband attempted to extinguish the fire. In column no.5, it is stated that she had sustained burn injuries to her face, both hands, chest and back. The reply to column no.7 is also stated. In column no.5, it is stated that she had sustained burn injuries to her face, both hands, chest and back. The reply to column no.7 is also stated. However, column no.8 pertains to the fact that the statement as recorded was read over to the deponent and proved to be correct as per the say of the deponent. The said column is left blank. To rule out any remote infirmity, it is necessary that there has to be an endorsement that the contents were read over and admitted to be true and correct. The said column cannot be treated as an empty formality since the deponent is not available for cross-examination. Hence it is a material inherent infirmity in the dying declaration and, therefore, cannot inspire confidence of the Court. It, therefore, appears that the statement was never read over to the deceased and there is no endorsement to that effect. When the declaration was not read over to the deponent and hence not admitted by the deponent to be correct and recorded according to her say, then such a dying declaration cannot be a foundation for sustaining the conviction. Merely because it is mentioned in the printed proforma that the statement is read over to the deponent, it cannot be presumed that the actual exercise of reading over the statement and getting it endorsed to be correct, was actually followed. In fact the said column is blank and, therefore, the said fact cannot be assumed. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in (2008) 1 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 679 Shaikh Bakshu and others vs. State of Maharashtra wherein it is held by the Apex Court that “there was no mention in the dying declaration that it was read over and explained to the deceased. The trial Court and the High Court concluded that even though it is not so stated, it has to be presumed that it was read over and explained”. The Apex Court has held that the said view is unacceptable. The trial Court and the High Court concluded that even though it is not so stated, it has to be presumed that it was read over and explained”. The Apex Court has held that the said view is unacceptable. The learned counsel for the appellant has also relied upon the judgment reported in 2004 ALL MR (Cri) 3220 in the case of Shivaji Tukaram Potdukhe .vs. State of Maharashtra wherein it is held that “when the declaration was not read over to Durgabai and she had not admitted the contents thereof to be correct, according to us, the dying declaration cannot be made foundation for sustaining the conviction”. We have observed that it is doubtful whether the signature on Exh.63 is that of deceased Nargis since the accused by taking recourse to Section 155 of the Indian Evidence Act has examined an independent witness who has deposed that the signature on the Nikahnama was made by Nargis in his presence and, therefore, in the present case we find that the written dying declaration at Exh.63 cannot be made the sole basis for recording the conviction. Notwithstanding the fact that it was recorded by the Magistrate, the discrepancies in the written dying declaration are such that they would not inspire the confidence of the Court.” The dying declaration recorded by Shri Gujrate-Judicial Magistrate First Class does not show the endorsement that the contents of the dying declaration were read over to deceased Sunita. As per the proposition laid down in the above referred judgment, the dying declaration recorded by Shri Gujrate cannot be considered for recording conviction. 4. The third oral dying declaration has been brought on record by Shri Mahadev Paighan, who has stated that he had taken deceased Sunita to Reynolds Hospital in an autorickshaw and after she was admitted in the hospital, he enquired from her about the incident and deceased Sunita told him that the appellant had poured kerosene on her person and had set her ablaze. The oral dying declaration is primarily a weak piece of evidence. In our view, the alleged oral dying declaration brought on record in testimony of Shri Mahadev Paighan cannot be the foundation for convicting the appellant and it can have only corroborative value. The oral dying declaration is primarily a weak piece of evidence. In our view, the alleged oral dying declaration brought on record in testimony of Shri Mahadev Paighan cannot be the foundation for convicting the appellant and it can have only corroborative value. The prosecution has not brought on the record any other evidence to corroborate the dying declaration and on the basis of which it can be held that the charges leveled against the appellant are proved. 5. Rukhmabai-mother of deceased Sunita has not supported the case of prosecution. Rukhmabai has stated that deceased Sunita was taken to the hospital by the appellant. Rukhmabai has further stated that when she enquired about the incident, deceased Sunita told her that she could not realise as to how the incident had occurred. We find that the alleged oral dying declaration which is brought on the record in the testimony of Mahadev Paighan is not supported by any other evidence and on the contrary, the evidence of Rukhmabai-mother of deceased Sunita does not support the case of the prosecution. In our view, the prosecution has failed to prove the charge against the appellant beyond doubt and therefore, the appellant is entitled to be acquitted. Hence, the following order is passed : i) The Criminal Appeal is allowed. ii) The conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant/accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code vide judgment and order dated 05-01-2013 Passed by Adhoc District JudgeII & Additional Sessions Judge, Washim in Sessions Trial No.56/10 are quashed and set aside and the appellant/accused is acquitted of the offence. iii) The fine amount, if paid, be refunded to the accused. iv) The order passed by the learned trial Judge in so far as disposal of property is concerned, is maintained. The accused is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case.