JUDGMENT : P.K. Lohra, J. Appellant, one of the plaintiffs, has laid this second appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 7th of April, 2014 passed by Additional District & Sessions Judge, Churu (for short, learned lower appellate Court), whereby learned lower appellate Court has dismissed appeal of the appellant and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 17th of September, 2007 passed by Civil Judge (Junior Division) Churu (for short, learned trial Court) in a suit jointly filed by appellant and proforma respondents No.4 and 5. 2. Succinctly stated, facts of the case are that respondents No.4 & 5 jointly filed a suit for declaration against Late Smt. Jadav Devi wherein State of Rajasthan through Collector, Churu and Municipal Board, Churu were also impleaded as defendants. In the suit, it is, inter alia, averred that an agricultural land measuring 10½ bighas of khasra No.1267/219 was set apart by District Collector, Churu for industrial purposes under Section 92 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (for short, 'Act of 1956') by its order dated 27th of May, 1965. After passing of set apart order, the land was allotted to Industries Department, which in turn allotted it to proforma respondent No.5 for construction of the quarters for mill's employees and possession was handed over. In the suit, it was specifically pleaded that Late Smt. Jadav Devi initiated execution proceedings pertaining to a part of said land measuring 8000 sq.ft. in respect of which a decree was passed in her favour and Sale Amin in execution of the said decree handed over possession of that land to her on 5th of May, 1987. It is also averred in the plaint that before handing over possession to Late Smt. Jadav Devi, no time was allowed to the plaintiffs to raise their objections. While referring to the checkered history of the suit, it is also pleaded that at the threshold the Court dismissed the suit but in appeal same was decreed. In order to seek cancellation of the decree, appellant and his co-plaintiffs have averred that in the suit filed by Late Smt. Jadav Devi only State of Rajasthan through Collector, Churu was impleaded as party-defendant and that they had no knowledge about passing of decree till the Sale Amin came at site for taking possession of the land measuring 8000 sq.ft. Assailing the decree passed in favour of Smt. Jadav Devi and seeking its cancellation, the appellant and other co-plaintiffs pleaded that the decree is nullity in want of non-joinder of necessary parties. While taking objection to the allotment of said land to Late Smt. Jadav Devi by Municipal Board, Churu, the plaintiffs categorically averred that when it was an agricultural land, set apart for industrial purposes, the Municipal Board had no authority to allot the same. A specific case is set out that the Municipal Board, Churu was not having any ownership or possession of the said land as such Patta issued by it in favour of Late Smt. Jadav Devi did not confer any title on her. In totality, appellant as well as other plaintiffs asserted with emphasis that the decree, passed in favour of Late Smt. Jadav Devi pertaining to the said land, is ineffective and inoperative qua them. In the alternative, even the Patta issued in the name of Late Smt. Jadav Devi was also assailed for the reason it was bereft of material particulars about neighbourhood and dimensions. A plea was also sought to be raised in the plaint that the entire proceeding were nothing but sham inasmuch as at the relevant point of time when patta was issued in the name of Late Smt. Jadav Devi, her husband was Chairman of the Municipal Board. The appellant also joined as plaintiff in the suit, which was earlier jointly filed by respondent No.4 and 5 by laying application during pendency of the suit. In the application, the appellant pleaded that he is a transferee pendente lite inasmuch as he purchased the suit property in question on 21st of June 2000, therefore, he may be impleaded as plaintiff. In totality, the appellant and other co-plaintiffs craved that the decree passed in favour of Late Smt. Jadav Devi be declared as null & void, cancelled and set aside. 3. Late Smt. Jadav Devi contested the suit for cancellation of decree and disputed all the averments contained in the plaint. It is averred in the written statement that State of Rajathan through Collector was party and the proforma respondent No.4 being an unit of State Government cannot be allowed to question the decree on the principle of res-judicata. 3. Late Smt. Jadav Devi contested the suit for cancellation of decree and disputed all the averments contained in the plaint. It is averred in the written statement that State of Rajathan through Collector was party and the proforma respondent No.4 being an unit of State Government cannot be allowed to question the decree on the principle of res-judicata. In totality, the defence of Smt. Jadav Devi was that handing over of possession of the land in question to her in execution of decree cannot furnish any cause of action to a unit of the State Government as it was bound by the decree passed against the State Government. During the pendency of suit, Smt. Jadav Devi expired and therefore, her legal representatives were brought on record. 4. Learned trial Court on the basis of pleadings of rival parties framed nine issues for determination. The parties led their evidence and on conclusion of trial, the learned trial Court decided Issues No.1 to 6 against appellant and other co-plaintiffs and only Issues No.7 & 8 were decided in their favour. However, on the basis of findings on Issues No.1 to 6, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit. 5. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, the present appellant alone preferred appeal before the learned lower appellate Court. The learned lower appellate Court, after re-examining the matter on the touchstone of evidence and materials available on record, reversed the finding of learned trial Court on Issues No.1 and 6 but upheld the findings on other issues. Thus, upholding of the findings on Issues No.2 to 5 entailed dismissal of first appeal. In that backdrop, appellant is in second appeal. 6. Learned counsel, Mr. Sandeep Shah, has argued that when the agricultural land including the land measuring 8000 sq.ft. was set apart for industrial purposes under Section 92 of the Act of 1956, the Municipal Board had no authority to allot the same to Smt. Jadav Devi and that being so Patta issued in her name is of no consequence but this vital issue has been completely eschewed by both the Courts below. Mr. was set apart for industrial purposes under Section 92 of the Act of 1956, the Municipal Board had no authority to allot the same to Smt. Jadav Devi and that being so Patta issued in her name is of no consequence but this vital issue has been completely eschewed by both the Courts below. Mr. Shah submits that as a matter of fact, it was not a part of Abadi land, which vested in Municipal Board, therefore, the Municipal Board had no authority to issue Patta in the name of Jadav Devi, however, both the learned Courts below have not examined the lis involved in the matter in right perspective, therefore, substantial question of law is involved in the matter, which requires adjudication. Mr. Shah, while admitting that the Sale Amin in execution of decree handed over possession of the land to Late Smt. Jadav Devi taken from appellant's other co-plaintiffs (proforma respondents), submits that remedy was very much available to the appellant as well as other co-plaintiffs under Order 21, Rule 99 CPC, but mere availability of that remedy cannot be treated as an embargo for instituting a civil suit for cancellation of decree. Elaborating his submissions, Mr. Shah would contend that an aggrieved party, which was not a judgment-debtor, can avail both the remedies, i.e., either to submit objection/application under Order 22, Rule 99 CPC, or to lay a separate suit for redressal. Mr. Shah has also urged that finding on this particular aspect by the learned lower appellate Court is also favouring the cause of the appellant, and therefore, the appellant cannot be non-suited on that count. In support of his contentions, learned counsel has placed reliance on the following judgments:- V.K. Rama Setty v. A. Gopinath [ AIR 1998 Kar 186 ] Pavan Kumar & Anr. v. Gopalakrishna & Anr. [ AIR 1998 A.P. 24 ] 7. In V.K. Rama Setty (supra), Full Bench of Karnataka High Court held:- We are of the view that keeping in view the language employed in Order 21, Rule 99 it is optional for a person, who is other than judgment-debtor and has been dispossessed, to make an application to the Court complaining of such dispossession. Under Rule 99 the use of word "May" gives an option to a person to file application before the executing Court averring his grievance. Under Rule 99 the use of word "May" gives an option to a person to file application before the executing Court averring his grievance. But this rule does not make his remedy exhaustive thereby debarring him from preferring a suit for possession completely. It will be for him to choose either of the two forums. This explains the observation of the Division Bench. The Division Bench had not pronounced that even if an aggrieved person prefers an application under Rule 99, then still he will have a right to file a separate suit as well. We are clearly of the opinion that drawing of any such inference is a misreading of the judgment of the Division Bench since such an inference will be in the death of Rule 101 Order 21, C.P.C. and therefore the same cannot be held to be a good law, if at all it was intended to be so laid down. We do not find it necessary to record any detailed reasoning of our own on the said aspect since in our opinion, the issue is now finally concluded by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Noorduddin v. Dr. K.L. Anand, (1995) 1 SCC 242 : (1994 AIR SCW 5093). 8. In Pavan Kumar & Anr. (supra), Andhra Pradesh High Court held: The next limb of the argument based on Rule 99 to Rule 101 Order 21 CPC is that in a situation contemplated by Order 21, Rule 99 CPC, the procedure laid down therein has to be necessarily followed and it is not open to the person dispossessed to file a separate suit in view of the bar contained in Rule 101. In other words, it is contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that after the amendment of Order 21 Rule, 101 by the C.P.C. Amendment Act, 1976, the resort to suit is altogether barred and the application under Order 21, Rule 99 and the appeal under Rule 103 are the exclusive remedies available. We find it difficult to accept this contention. We agree with the learned single Judge that the bar against filing of a separate suit would apply only if there was an application under Rule 99 but not otherwise. The third party aggrieved by dispossession in execution of a decree, may make an application to the Court complaining such dispossession. We find it difficult to accept this contention. We agree with the learned single Judge that the bar against filing of a separate suit would apply only if there was an application under Rule 99 but not otherwise. The third party aggrieved by dispossession in execution of a decree, may make an application to the Court complaining such dispossession. If he makes such an application, all questions including questions relating to right, title and possession in the properties shall be decided in that application as if it were a full-fledged suit for title and possession and no separate suit would lie for this purpose. However, an appeal lies under Rule 103 as if the order passed on such application is decree. We are unable to visualise the provisions of Rules 99 to 101 even after amendment as laying down an exhaustive Code on the remedies of the third parties dispossessed in execution of a decree for possession. The remedy under Order 21, Rule 99 CPC is no doubt one of the remedies available to the person dispossessed. But, we are unable to construe Order 21, Rule 99 as placing a bar on bringing an independent suit for possession, without filing an application under the said Rule. Such a bar, in our view, does not arise even by necessary implication. No doubt, there is a qualitative change in the scope of determination after the amendment of 1976 and it is no longer a summary proceeding to determine the question of possession but it embraces within its scope all questions relating to right, title and interest in the property. But, this change, by itself, does not deprive the aggrieved person of the resort to ordinary civil suit. Apart from the expression 'may' employed in Rule 99 which prima facie denotes that the remedy under Rule 99 is not compulsive, there is one relevant consideration which weighed with us in coming to the conclusion that the suit is not intended to be barred. The limitation prescribed for filing an application of the nature contemplated by Order 21, Rule 99 is as short as 30 days. It is not uncommon that the dispossession might often take place in the absence and without the knowledge of the person in possession. The person in possession may be residing at a distant place or in a different country. It is not uncommon that the dispossession might often take place in the absence and without the knowledge of the person in possession. The person in possession may be residing at a distant place or in a different country. In such a situation, it is hard to visualise that the legislative intent was to deny the remedy on the expiry, of 30 days. Whether 30 days' time has to be computed from the date of knowledge of dispossession and what is the date of knowledge would evoke controversies. All these considerations have impelled us to concur with the view expressed by the learned single Judge and to hold that the suit is not barred. 9-10. Per contra, Mr. O.P. Mehta, learned counsel for respondents, submits that grounds pleaded by appellant and his co-plaintiffs for cancellation of decree did not find favour of both the Courts below, is sufficient to non-suit the appellant in the second appeal, which is bereft of any substantial question of law. Mr. Metha has urged that the suit filed by Late Smt. Jadav Devi was against District Collector, Churu because by its order she was dispossessed and that emitted the cause of action. In that background, Mr. Mehta would contend that the argument of appellant, that appellant and his co-plaintiffs were necessary parties to the suit, is not tenable even on the principle of dominus litis, as such cannot be countenanced. Mr. Mehta submits that in all fairness Late Smt. Jadav Devi had impleaded Municipal Board also as a party, which has allotted and issued patta in her name, and therefore, the grounds set out in the plaint for cancellation of decree are not satisfying the requirements have rightly been turned down by both the Courts below. Mr. Mehta submits that strangely the appellant alone, who allegedly derived title from the Industries Department, has approached this Court and no endeavour was made by proforma respondents No.4 & 5 even to assail the verdict of learned trial Court so also the first appellate Court. In that background, Mr. Mehta submits that maintainability of appeal, at the behest of the appellant, is itself under serious cloud. Supporting the findings on Issue No.6, recorded by learned trial Court, which were reversed by the learned lower appellate Court, Mr. In that background, Mr. Mehta submits that maintainability of appeal, at the behest of the appellant, is itself under serious cloud. Supporting the findings on Issue No.6, recorded by learned trial Court, which were reversed by the learned lower appellate Court, Mr. Mehta submits that a third party, who was not a judgment-debtor and from whom possession was taken in execution of decree, cannot maintain a separate suit, and the only remedy available to that aggrieved third party is of submitting objection/application under Order 21, Rule 99 and 101 CPC. Mr. Mehta would contend that remedy to an aggrieved party in such a situation is provided under the aforesaid provisions, and if the objection/application is valid the executing Court can adjudicate on such objections by treating it as a suit, and therefore, the intention of the legislature is to discourage unnecessary litigation in the matter at the behest of either of the parties. Elaborating his submissions in this behalf, Mr. Mehta has completely repudiated the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that appellant had option either to lay objection/application before the executing Court or to lay a separate suit. Mr. Metha submits that a transferee pendente lite cannot be allowed to raise a plea that he was unaware about litigation when he purchased the property. Mr. Mehta, in support of his contentions, has placed reliance on following judgments: Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust and Anr. [ (1998) 3 SCC 723 ] N.S.S. Narayana Sarma & Ors. v. Goldstone Exports (P) Ltd. & Ors. [ (2002) 1 SCC 662 ] 11. In Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held: When a decree-holder complains of resistance to the execution of a decree it is incumbent on the execution court to adjudicate upon it. But while making adjudication, the court is obliged to determine only such question as may be arising between the parties to a proceeding on such complaint and that such questions must be relevant to the adjudication of the complaint. The words "all questions arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97" would envelop only such questions as would legally arise for determination between those parties. In other words, the court is not obliged to determine a question merely because the resister raised it. The words "all questions arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97" would envelop only such questions as would legally arise for determination between those parties. In other words, the court is not obliged to determine a question merely because the resister raised it. The questions which executing court is obliged to determine under rule 101, must possess two adjuncts. First is that such questions should have legally arisen between the parties, and the second is, such questions must be relevant for consideration and determination between the parties, e.g. if the obstructor admits that he is a transferee pendente lite it is not necessary to determine a question raised by him that he was unaware of the litigation when he purchased the property. Similarly, a third party, who questions the validity of a transfer made by a decree-holder to an assignee, cannot claim that the question regarding its validity should be decided during execution proceedings. Hence, it is necessary that the questions raised by the resister or the obstructor must legally arise between him and the decree-holder. In the adjudication process envisaged in Order 21, Rule 97 (2) of the Code, the execution court can decide whether the question raised by a resister or obstructor legally arises between the parties. An answer to the said question also would be the result of the adjudication contemplated in the sub-section. It is clear that executing court can decide whether the resister or obstructor is a person bound by the decree and he refuses to vacate the property. That question also squarely falls within the adjudicatory process contemplated in Order 21, Rule 97 (2) of the Code. The adjudication mentioned therein need not necessarily involve a detailed enquiry or collection of evidence. The court can make the adjudication on admitted facts or even on the averments made by the resister. Of course the Court can direct the parties to adduce evidence for such determination. If the Court deems it necessary. 12. In N.S.S. Narayana Sarma & Ors. (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with Section 47 and Order 21 Rules 97 to 103 and 35 CPC, emphasised in clear and unequivocal words that provisions made in CPC for delivery of possession and immovable property in execution of a decree and matters relating thereto shall be determined by the Courts dealing with application and not by separate suit. (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with Section 47 and Order 21 Rules 97 to 103 and 35 CPC, emphasised in clear and unequivocal words that provisions made in CPC for delivery of possession and immovable property in execution of a decree and matters relating thereto shall be determined by the Courts dealing with application and not by separate suit. In the verdict, the Court referred to the judgment of Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and held: Provision is made in the Civil Procedure Code for delivery of possession of immovable property in execution of a decree and matters relating thereto. In Order 21, Rule 35 provisions are made empowering the executing court to deliver possession of the property to the decree holder if necessary, by removing any person bound by the decree who refuses to vacate the property. In Rule 36 provision is made for delivery of formal or symbolical possession of the property in occupancy of a tenant or other person entitled to occupy the same and not bound by the decree to relinquish such occupancy. Rules 97 to 101 of Order 21 contain the provisions enabling the executing court to deal with a situation when a decree holder entitled to possession of the property encounters obstruction from "any person". From the provisions in these rules which have been quoted earlier the scheme is clear that the legislature has vested wide powers in the executing court to deal with "all issues" relating to such matters. It is a general impression prevailing amongst the litigant public that difficulties of a litigant are by no means over on his getting a decree for immovable property in his favour. Indeed, his difficulties in real and practical sense, arise after getting the decree. It is a general impression prevailing amongst the litigant public that difficulties of a litigant are by no means over on his getting a decree for immovable property in his favour. Indeed, his difficulties in real and practical sense, arise after getting the decree. Presumably, to tackle such a situation and to allay the apprehension in the minds of litigant public that it takes years and years for the decree holder to enjoy fruits of the decree, the legislature made drastic amendments in provisions in the aforementioned Rules, particularly, the provision in Rule 101 in which it is categorically declared that all questions including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions. On a fair reading of the rule it is manifest that the legislature has enacted the provision with a view to remove, as far as possible, technical objections to an application filed by the aggrieved party whether he is the decree holder or any other person in possession of the immovable property under execution and has vested the power in the executing court to deal with all questions arising in the matter irrespective of whether the Court otherwise has jurisdiction to entertain a dispute of the nature. This clear statutory mandate and the object and purpose of the provisions should not be lost sight of by the Courts seized of an execution proceeding. The Court cannot shirk its responsibility by skirting the relevant issues arising in the case. (emphasis supplied) 13. Lastly, Mr. Mehta submits that the respondent are well within their rights to challenge adverse finding of the lower appellate Court without filing any cross-objections by invoking Order 41, Rule 33 CPC. 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused impugned judgments of both the Courts below and thoroughly scanned entire record of the case. 15. In the instant appeal, there remains no quarrel that findings of both the Courts below are not concurrent in true sense. 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused impugned judgments of both the Courts below and thoroughly scanned entire record of the case. 15. In the instant appeal, there remains no quarrel that findings of both the Courts below are not concurrent in true sense. A bare perusal of judgment of learned lower appellate Court makes it amply clear that it has reversed the decision of the learned trial Court on Issues No.1 & 6. If the judgments of learned Courts below are harmoniously construed and properly explicated, then it would ipso facto reveal that the findings on crucial issues, i.e., Issues No.2 to 5, are concurrent favouring the cause of respondent. Issue No.2 which is the bone of contention has been decided against appellant by both the Courts below so also Issue No.5 in respect of which burden to prove rested on respondent. One more glaring fact is that appellant, who is transferee pendente lite, alone has preferred the first appeal Court before the learned lower appellate Court and this appeal too is laid solely by him whereas his other co-plaintiffs were neither appellants before the learned lower appellate Court, nor they are appellants in the instant appeal. It is an admitted fact that when possession of the disputed property was taken over in execution of decree passed in favour of Smt. Jadav Devi, his other co-plaintiffs were in possession and at their behest no resistance was put-forth. Furthermore, as they have not made any endeavour to lay appropriate application under Order 21, Rule 99 CPC for restoration of possession being transferee pendente lite, the appellant cannot be allowed to disown the proceedings undertaken against his alleged predecessor-in-title. The argument of learned counsel for the appellant that besides remedy under Order 21, Rule 99 CPC, appellant as well as other co-plaintiffs, i.e., proforma respondents No.4 & 5, were well within their rights to lay a suit for cancellation of the decree, appears to be quite alluring, but, in my opinion, not of any substance. The suit for cancellation of the decree was originally filed by proforma respondents No.4 & 5 in the year 1987 and the appellant made endeavour to join as plaintiff on 18th of December, 2001, i.e., almost one and half decade being a transferee pendent lite. The suit for cancellation of the decree was originally filed by proforma respondents No.4 & 5 in the year 1987 and the appellant made endeavour to join as plaintiff on 18th of December, 2001, i.e., almost one and half decade being a transferee pendent lite. It is also noteworthy that discloser about the fact that possession having been taken over by Smt. Jadav Devi in execution of decree was made in the sale-deed, which was executed in favour of appellant and he was even given liberty to join as co-plaintiff in terms of the recitals made in the instrument of sale, however, the appellant waited for almost one and half years before laying appropriate application in the suit to become a party as plaintiff. Therefore, virtually, he has made an attempt to question the delivery of possession to Smt. Jadav Devi in execution of decree after a lapse of more than one and half decade. Any inaction on the part of predecessor-in-title and subsequently lethargy in pursuing the cause even after execution of sale-deed in his favour are some of the facts which are very much relevant having ramification on the cause espoused by the appellant. The legal position is no more res-integra that a transferee pendent lite can derive benefit, which accrued to his predecessor-in-title, but at the same time if he suffers some disadvantage or dis-comfort on account of the acts and omissions on the part of his predecessor, he cannot be allowed to disown the same, nor he can be allowed to eschew those omissions for staking his claim independently in ignorance of acts and omissions of his predecessor-in-title. 16. The legal precedents, on which learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance, cannot render any assistance to the cause of the appellant in view of the decision rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. (supra). Moreover, in N.S.S. Narayana Sarma & Ors. (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court has held in clear and unequivocal terms that all questions relating to right, title or interest in a property, arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Order 21, Rule 97 or Rule 99 CPC or their representatives and relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit. Therefore, in the considered opinion of the Court, maintainability of a separate suit at the behest of appellant and his co-plaintiffs is under serious cloud. It appears that intent of the legislature is not to deprive a decree-holder from reaping fruits of the decree and to face any litigation when his civil rights have already been crystallized by a competent Court. In that background, if the language employed under Order 21, Rule 101 CPC is properly construed, then it would ipso facto reveal that the language is clear and unequivocal. Rule 101 Order 21 CPC reads as under:- 101. Question to be determined. - All questions (including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property) arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under rule 97 or rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions. 17. Hon'ble Apex Court, in B. Gangadhar v. B.R. Rajalingam [ (1995) 5 SCC 238 ], has discussed the provisions contained under Order 21 Rules, 35, 98 and 101 CPC, and has held that executing Court by exercising powers under Section 151 CPC can direct demolition of construction raised pendente lite without relegating the plaintiff to tortuous remedy of separate suit seeking mandatory injunction or for possession, so as to avoid delay in execution or frustration and thereby defeat the decree. The Court held as under:- 6. . . .The right to ownership of a property carries with it the right to its enjoyment, right to its access and of other beneficial enjoyment incidental thereto. If any obstruction or hindrance is caused for its enjoyment or use, the owner, of necessity, has the remedy to have it removed. If any obstruction is raised by putting up a construction pendente lite or prevents the passage or right to access to the property pendente lite, the plaintiff has been given right and the decree-holder is empowered to have it removed in execution without tortuous remedy of separate suit seeking mandatory injunction or for possession so as to avoid delay in execution or frustration and thereby defeat the decree. The executing court, therefore, would be justified to order its removal of unlawful or illegal construction made pendente lite so that the decree for possession or eviction, as the case may be, effectually and completely executed and the delivery of possession is given to the decree-holder expeditiously. Admittedly, pending suit the petitioner had constructed shops and inducted tenants in possession without permission of the court. The only course would be to decide the dispute in the execution proceedings and not by a separate suit. 7. Order 21, Rule 35 (3) envisages that: "Where possession of any building or enclosure is to be delivered and the person in possession, being bound by the decree, does not afford free access, the Court, through its officers, may, after giving reasonable warning and facility to any woman not appearing in public according to the customs of the country to withdraw, remove or open any lock or bolt or break open any door or do any other act necessary for putting the decree-holder in possession." 8. Rule 35(3) of Order 21 itself manifests that when a decree for possession of immovable property was granted and delivery of possession was directed to be done, the court executing the decree is entitled to pass such orders incidental, ancillary or necessary orders for effective enforcement of the decree for possession. That power also includes the power to remove any obstruction or superstructure made pendente lite. The exercise of incidental, ancillary or inherent power is consequential to deliver possession of the property in execution of the decree. No doubt, the decree does not contain a mandatory injunction for demolition. But when the decree for possession had become final and the judgment-debtor or a person interested or claiming right through the judgment-debtor has taken law in his hands and made any constructions on the property pending suit, the decree-holder is not bound by any such construction. The relief of mandatory injunction, therefore, is consequential to or necessary for effectuation of the decree for possession. It is not necessary to file a separate suit when the construction was made pending suit without permission of the court. Otherwise, the decree becomes in-executable driving the plaintiff again for another round of litigation which the code expressly prohibits such multiplicity of proceedings. 18. In Bramhdeo Chaudhary v. Rihikesh Prasad Jaiswal & Anr. [ (1997) 3 SCC 694 ], the Court held: 8. Otherwise, the decree becomes in-executable driving the plaintiff again for another round of litigation which the code expressly prohibits such multiplicity of proceedings. 18. In Bramhdeo Chaudhary v. Rihikesh Prasad Jaiswal & Anr. [ (1997) 3 SCC 694 ], the Court held: 8. A conjoint reading of Order 21, Rules 97, 98, 99 and 101 projects the following picture: (1) If a decree-holder is resisted or obstructed in execution of the decree for possession with the result that the decree for possession could not be executed in the normal manner by obtaining warrant for possession under Order 21, Rule 35 then the decree-holder has to move an application under Order 21, Rule 97 for removal of such obstruction and after hearing the decree-holder and the obstructionist the court can pass appropriate orders after adjudicating upon the controversy between the parties as enjoined by Order 21, Rule 97, sub-rule (2) read with Order 21, Rule 98 . It is obvious that after such adjudication if it is found that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without a just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on his behalf then such obstruction or resistance would be removed as per Order 21, Rule 98, sub-rule (2) and the decree-holder would be permitted to be put in possession. Even in such an eventuality the order passed would be treated as a decree under Order 21, Rule 101 and no separate suit would lie against such order meaning thereby the only remedy would be to prefer an appeal before the appropriate appellate court against such deemed decree. (2) If for any reason a stranger to the decree is already dispossessed of the suit property relating to which he claims any right, title or interest before his getting any opportunity to resist or offer obstruction on the spot on account of his absence from the place or for any other valid reason then his remedy would lie in filing an application under Order 21, Rule 99 CPC claiming that his dispossession was illegal and that possession deserves to be restored to him. If such an application is allowed after adjudication then as enjoined by Order 21, Rule 98, sub-rule (1) CPC the executing court can direct the stranger applicant under Order 21, Rule 99 to be put in possession of the property or if his application is found to be sub-stanceless, it has to be dismissed. Such an order passed by the executing court disposing of the application one way or the other under Order 21, Rule 98 , sub-rule (1) would be deemed to be a decree as laid down by Order 21, Rule 103 and would be appealable before appropriate appellate forum. But no separate suit would lie against such orders as clearly enjoined by Order 21, Rule 101. 19. Therefore, in view of authoritative pronouncements of Hon'ble Apex Court, the appellant, who is a transferee pendente lite, and had instituted the suit for cancellation of decree in clear negation of Order 21 Rules 99 and 101 CPC, is not entitled to maintain the suit. 20. True it is that the learned lower appellate Court has recorded an affirmative finding favouring the cause of appellant but the said finding is contrary to the mandate of Hon'ble Apex Court, therefore, the said finding cannot be sustained even in absence of any cross-appeal or cross-objection laid by respondent by virtue of Order 41, Rule 33 CPC. 21. In overall scenario, taking into account the concurrent findings of both the Courts below on Issues No.2 to 5, even on merits, I am not persuaded to interfere with the impugned judgment of the learned lower appellate Court. 22. It is trite that this Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, is not obliged to investigate the grounds, on which findings were arrived at by the last court of fact, being the first appellate Court. In a case, in the given set of circumstances, if two inferences of facts are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate Court will not be interfered by this Court in second appeal. It is just not permissible to adopt any other approach in such matters. In a case, in the given set of circumstances, if two inferences of facts are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate Court will not be interfered by this Court in second appeal. It is just not permissible to adopt any other approach in such matters. Interference of this Court is permissible only when it is noticed by the Court that conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court are erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at by ignoring material evidence. No such situation is available in the instant case. On the contrary, the maintainability of the suit itself is seriously questionable. 23. As observed hereinabove, the appellant is pitted against concurrent finding of fact on crucial issues. I am afraid, his endeavour to challenge the said finding in want of substantial question of law is not tenable. Existence of substantial question of law is sine-qua-non for maintainability of second appeal. 24. In totality, I am unable to find any substantial question of law involved, i.e., a question of law which is fairly arguable, having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. A substantial question of law cannot be construed as a question which is technical, of no substance or consequence or academic merely. 25. In view of foregoing discussions, I am unable to lay my hands on any substantial questions of law involved in the matter and upon examination the substantial questions of law sought to be canvassed by the appellant, in my opinion, these questions are not satisfying the requirements as enumerated supra. 26. Therefore, I am not persuaded to interfere with the impugned judgment of the learned lower appellate Court whereby it has affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. 27. The upshot of above discussion is that the instant appeal lacks in merit and the same is, hereby, dismissed. Appeal Dismissed.