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2015 DIGILAW 1527 (KER)

Palpatta Veeran v. State of Kerala

2015-11-02

ANIL K.NARENDRAN, P.R.RAMACHANDRA MENON

body2015
JUDGMENT : P.R. Ramachandra Menon, J. Interference declined by the Forest Tribunal, Kozhikode, dismissing the claim petition filed by the appellant seeking for a declaration that the property concerned herein is not a 'vested forest', is the subject-matter of challenge in the appeal. 2. The case of the appellant is that, he had obtained an 'oral lease' of 1 acre of property from the receiver appointed by a Civil Court, which originally belonged to the Nilambur Kovilakom, for cultivating ginger, tapioca, cashew, mango, jack fruit, etc. and that he had effected the cultivation and was enjoying the property as aforesaid. While so, a criminal case came to be registered against the appellant by the Forest Department in the year 1984, leading to CC No. 413 of 1984 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Manjeri. It is stated that the proceedings ended in acquittal. Subsequently, the Forest Department attempted to interfere with the possession and peaceful enjoyment of the property in the year 1990, by putting up some cairns. Later, another case came to be registered against the appellant under Section 27(1)(f) and Section 62(d) of Forest Act in the year 1992. This also ended up in acquittal. In due course, the appellant was issued a purchase certificate by the Land Tribunal in the year 1975 and he was enjoying the properties accordingly. 3. The appellant, later filed OA before the Forest Tribunal, Palakkad seeking for a declaration as mentioned already. The said OA was dismissed by the Tribunal, holding that it was barred by limitation. This was sought to be challenged by filing O.P.No. 11396 of 1991. During the course of hearing, it was found by this Court that no proper publication as envisaged under the relevant rules was effected and hence that dismissal of the OA on the ground of limitation was not liable to be sustained. Accordingly, the order passed by the Tribunal was set aside and the matter was directed to be considered on merits. By that time the Forest Tribunal at Palakkad was abolished and the matter came within the jurisdiction of the Forest Tribunal, Kozhikode. The issue was considered by the said Tribunal, ultimately leading to the verdict dated 13/11/2004 in OA No. 17 of 2003 dismissing the same, which is under challenge in this appeal. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. 5. The issue was considered by the said Tribunal, ultimately leading to the verdict dated 13/11/2004 in OA No. 17 of 2003 dismissing the same, which is under challenge in this appeal. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant points out that the property was under cultivation of the appellant from date much prior to the appointed day, i.e., 10/05/1971 and that the very issuance of the purchase certificate in favour of the appellant in the year 1975 presupposes the possession from 01/04/1964. Reliance is sought to be placed on the decisions rendered by the Apex Court reported in Ahmmed Kutty v. Mariakutty Umma, 2000 KHC 160 : 2000 (1) KLT 829 : (2000) 2 SCC 417 : AIR 2000 SC 1853 , and a Division Bench of this Court in Muhammed Basheer v. State of Kerala and Another, 2002 (1) KLT SN 4. The observations made by the Tribunal are stated as not correct, both on the question of fact and on the question of law. 6. The learned Government Pleader submits that the idea and understanding of the appellant is not correct and that issuance of the purchase certificate cannot be a proof as to the possession of the property or the personal cultivation allegedly being effected as on the appointed date, nor is it binding on the respondents. Reliance is sought to be placed on two judgments rendered by Division Bench of this Court reported in Ahammed v. State of Kerala, 1988 KHC 615 : 1988 (2) KLT 967 : 1988 (2) KLJ 756 and State of Kerala v. Alexander, 1993 KHC 168 : 1993 (1) KLT SN 4 : ILR 1993 (1) Ker. 731. The learned Government Pleader also points out that legal question came to be subsequently considered by the Supreme Court as well, with regard to the binding nature of the orders passed by the Taluk Land Board and it was held that such orders could only be part of evidence and not binding upon the authority of the Forest Department, as held in Kunjanam Antony (dead) by L.Rs. v. State of Kerala, 2003 KHC 902 : (2003) 3 SCC 221 : AIR 2003 SC 1510 : JT 2003 (2) SC 155 : 2003 (2)CHN 173 (SC Sup) (para 9). 7. v. State of Kerala, 2003 KHC 902 : (2003) 3 SCC 221 : AIR 2003 SC 1510 : JT 2003 (2) SC 155 : 2003 (2)CHN 173 (SC Sup) (para 9). 7. The primary question to be considered is with regard to the Scheme of the Statute, that is the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 (in short, the Vesting Act). It has been declared by a Full Bench of this Court as I per decision reported in Bhargavi Amma v. State of Kerala, 1997 KHC 406 : 1997 (2) KLT 513 : 1997 (2) KLJ 337 : ILR 1997 (3) Ker. 771 : AIR 1998 Kef. 1 that 'vesting' under the 'Act' is automatic. In other words, the vesting does not depend upon the notification to be issued under the relevant Rules. This being the position by virtue of the commencement of the Statute with effect from 10/05/1971, the property came to be vested with the Government from that date and the burden is upon the party concerned to substantiate the position, if contrary, that the property is not a vested forest. With regard to the 'burden of proof' as well, judgment rendered by the Full I Bench of this Court as per the verdict reported in State of Kerala v. Chandralekha, 1995 KHC 274 : 1995 (2) KLT 152 : 1995 (2) KLJ 121 : ILR 1995 (3) Ker. 430 declares that the same is upon the party, who pleads for the benefit. The point to be considered is whether such burden has been discharged by the appellant by raising sufficient pleadings and evidence before the Tribunal. 8. The evidence adduced before the Tribunal has been discussed in detail with reference to the oral testimony of PW 1 and the documents produced as Exts. A1 to A18, besides the Commission Report/plan marked as Exts. C1 and C2. Incidentally, it has to be noted that there was a contention for the State/Department with regard to the plea of limitation, which is stated as not pressed by the learned Government Pleader, in view of the verdict already passed by this Court in OP No. 11396 of 1991 mentioned hereinbefore, finding fault with the Department for not completing the steps and procedure envisaged under relevant Rules in this regard. As it stands so, the remaining question to be considered is whether the appellant is entitled to have a declaration as sought for before the Tribunal, to have the property excluded/exempted from 'vesting'. 9. The Scheme of the Statute reveals that the vesting as envisaged under Section 3(1) of the Act is clothed with the 'exclusions' as provided under Clauses A to D of Section 2(f)(1) of the Act-defining the term 'private forest'. The matter requires to be further examined whether the party is entitled to have 'exemption' as provided under Section 3(2) of the Act (if the property actually 'personally cultivated' by him) and also under Section 3(3) of the Act (as to whether the property was held by him with 'intention to cultivate'). The requirements under Section 3(2) of the Act are that the property should be under the 'personal cultivation' of the claimant and that it should be within the ceiling limit of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. Coming to Section 3(3) of the Act, there must be a proper title for the party in respect of property concerned by a registered document; that there should be intention to cultivate the property and further that the property should be within the ceiling area under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. 10. Whether issuance of 'assignment certificate' under the relevant provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act will be a conclusive proof with regard to possession and personal cultivation of the property, which is vested with the Government under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971, so as to arrive at an inference that the party concerned was personally cultivating the property as on the appointed day, i.e. 10/05/1971 is another point to be answered in this case. It is also required to consider whether the decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court on 18/09/2001 in MFA No. 1160 of 1991 holding the position in affirmative does require any reconsideration. 11. As pointed out already, the scheme of the Vesting Act' is such that, 'Vesting' would take place immediately on commencement of the Act., i.e. on 10/05/1971. 11. As pointed out already, the scheme of the Vesting Act' is such that, 'Vesting' would take place immediately on commencement of the Act., i.e. on 10/05/1971. It is true that a Notification has to be issued by the concerned Officer in terms of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Rules (for short Assignment Rules) demarcating boundaries, which has to be published at least in two dailies and such other offices as stipulated under the relevant Rules. But vesting of the property under the Act as envisaged under Section 3(1) of the Act is not postponed till the custodian of the vested forests demarcates the boundaries and issues the said notification. The law in this regard was originally laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in 1991 (2) KLT 49 : 1991 KHC 339 : 1992 (1) KLJ NOC 18 : ILR 1991 (3) Ker.179 (Range Sesha Hills (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala). Subsequently, another Division Bench of this Court answered the position, the other way round, holding that issuance of notification was mandatory as held in State of Kerala v. Komalavally, 1995 KHC 250 : 1995 (2) KLT 26 : ILR 1995 (2) Ker. 593. Because of divergent views, the matter came to be referred to a Full Bench and accordingly the matter was considered by the Bench in detail in Bhargavi Amma v. State of Kerala, 1997 KHC 406 : 1997 (2) KLT 513 : 1997 (2) KLJ 337 : ILR 1997 (3) Ker. 771 : AIR 1998 Ker. 1 . As per the said decision, the dictum laid down in 1995 (2) KLT 26 : 1995 KHC 250 : 1995 (2) KLT 26 : ILR 1995 (2) Ker. 593 was overruled and the views expressed in 1991 (2) KLT 49 : 1991 KHC 339 : 1992 (1) KLJ NOC 18 : ILR 1991 (3) Ker.179 and MFA No. 510 of 1984 was affirmed. It was also made clear by the Full Bench, that the competent authority to consider the dispute, if at all any, was none other than the Forest Tribunal and that Civil Court will not have jurisdiction to entertain the dispute coming within the purview of Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 8 of the Vesting Act, even if they pertain to properties, which had not been notified. 12. 12. There is a case for the appellant that the property herein came to his hands in the year 1964, pursuant to an 'oral lease' given by the Receiver appointed by the Civil Court in respect of the properties belonging to the Nilambur Kovilakam. Admittedly, no evidence was adduced to establish the lease, by producing any rent receipt or such other documents of a date prior to the appointed day i.e. 10/05/1971. All the documents produced before the Forest Tribunal (Exts. A1 to A18) are subsequent to the appointed day. If at all any oral lease' was given by the Receiver appointed by the Civil Court, it had to be ratified by the Court, and no such proceedings or order was produced. Similarly, the appellant did not choose to examine the Receiver before the Tribunal and it was in the said circumstance, that an adverse finding was rendered against the case put up by the appellant. 13. With regard to the reliance sought for on the purchase certificate' issued by the Land Tribunal, the learned Counsel for the appellant submits that, it was pursuant to an application submitted before the Land Tribunal, that the matter was considered and the assignment certificate was issued (Ext. A1). Once an Assignment Certificate is issued in terms of the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, it is a conclusive proof insofar as the said certificate is concerned, as to the possession prior to 01/04/1964. This is for the obvious reason that any lease after the date of 01/04/1964 is prohibited under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The rights, liberties and eligibility of the appellant to have an Assignment Certificate issued by the competent authority, having been accepted, leading to issuance of such certificate, it could not have been said that the appellant was not having possession prior to 10/05/1971. Reference is also made to the evidence adduced by way of the Commissioner's report, to the effect that there were different crops/trees/plants cultivated by the appellant and that there were remnants of shed/building in the property. 14. On going through the evidence discussed by the Tribunal, it is seen that the Commissioner's report does not say anything as to the age of the trees, to infer that they were in existence prior to the appointed day, i.e. 10/05/1971. 14. On going through the evidence discussed by the Tribunal, it is seen that the Commissioner's report does not say anything as to the age of the trees, to infer that they were in existence prior to the appointed day, i.e. 10/05/1971. So also, the Commissioner's report is silent as to the age of the building, if any and no reliable material was produced by the appellant in this regard. Documents/tax receipt for the period subsequent to 10/05/1971 cannot be of any significance or consequence, so as to infer 'possession and personal cultivation' of the property as on 10/05/1971. 15. Support is sought to be drawn by the appellant from the decision rendered by this Court in MFA No. 160 of 1991. It is to be noted that in the said case, reference was made to Section 72B and 72K of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, besides placing reliance on the decision rendered by the Apex Court in 2000 (1) KLT 829 : 2000 KHC 160 : (2000) 2 SCC 417 : AIR 2000 SC 1853 (Ahmmed Kutty v. Mariakutty Umma). The Apex Court observed that, once a purchase certificate is issued in terms of Section 72K of the Land Reforms Act, it is conclusive and binding upon the Land Board, by virtue of the mandate of Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was also made clear that involvement of any instance of fraud, will, of course, stand excluded from the above proposition. 16. The Division Bench of this Court observed in the judgment in MFA 160 of 1991, that the purchase certificate issued in the said case was pursuant to a 'suo motu' proceeding, whereby the competent authority/Revenue Officer had made necessary enquiry and certified that the property was in possession and cultivation of the person concerned. It was accordingly, that the benefit intended to be given to the cultivating tenant, who was holding property prior to 01/04/1964 was decided to be given and the benefit was given accordingly. It was accordingly, that the benefit intended to be given to the cultivating tenant, who was holding property prior to 01/04/1964 was decided to be given and the benefit was given accordingly. Though a contention was raised from the part of the Government/Department that the Purchase Certificate was issued without impleading the Government/Forest Department in the party array, the same was brushed aside by the Court, observing that the same could not be a valid ground to deny the benefit by virtue of conclusiveness of possession as stipulated under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, read with Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act. If at all there was any grievance for the State/Forest Department, the assignment Certificate should have been challenged then and there and having not chosen to do so, the State/Forest Department was not justified in contending that the property was still remaining as vested forest by virtue of Section 3(1) of the 'Vesting Act'. The appeal was accordingly allowed. This appears to be the 'trump card' of the appellant, to sustain the case put up before this Court. 17. At the very outset, we would like to mention that the above verdict was passed by the Division Bench without referring to the decisions rendered by other coordinate Benches of this Court. More than a decade back, from the date of passing the above judgment, almost a similar issue as involved herein had come up for consideration before this Court in Ahammed v. State of Kerala, 1988 KHC 615 : 1988 (2) KLT 967 : 1988 (2) KLJ 756 . There also, the contention put up by the party was that purchase certificate was already issued under the Kerala Land Reforms Act; that the Government/Forest Department was in the party array and it was after hearing them that the certificate was issued. As such, a declaration was sought for in that regard. After meticulous analysis of the facts and figures and the relevant provisions of law, particularly with reference to Sections 8 and 13 of the Vesting Act, the Division Bench held that the finding of the Land Tribunal cannot have any effect to exclude the jurisdiction of the Forest Tribunal. As such, a declaration was sought for in that regard. After meticulous analysis of the facts and figures and the relevant provisions of law, particularly with reference to Sections 8 and 13 of the Vesting Act, the Division Bench held that the finding of the Land Tribunal cannot have any effect to exclude the jurisdiction of the Forest Tribunal. By virtue of the mandate under Section 13 of the Vesting Act, it was only the Forest Tribunal, who could have considered the matter and no Civil Court can have jurisdiction to decide the issue or deal with any question or determine any matter, which is by or under the Act required to be decided or dealt with by the Tribunal or Custodian or by any other officer. 18. As pointed out earlier, the 'Vesting Act' was enacted by the State to promote the policy of 'grow more food'. The properties were sought to be vested with the Government immediately with effect from the appointed day, i.e. 10/05/1971 and such properties were originally intended to be allotted/assigned to deserving persons for cultivation. Definition of the term Private Forest as defined under Section 2(f) of the Act, insofar as it relates to Malabar District, 'private forest' meant any land to which the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 (MPPF Act) was applicable. At the same time, some 'exclusion' was provided under Clauses (A), (B), (C) and (D). If the circumstances involved under (A), (B), (C) and (D) are established, it will not be a 'private forest' and the burden was upon the party who claimed the benefit. Even if the party does not succeed to establish any of the exclusion under (A), (B), (C) and (D), still there is chance for him to claim the benefit of exemption either under Section 3(2) (where the property was in the personal cultivation) or under Section 3(3), (where there was an intention to cultivate subject to possession of valid title by a registered deed) provided the property is within the ceiling limits. The dispute, if any, has to be preferred before the Forest Tribunal under Section 8 of the Act. The dispute, if any, has to be preferred before the Forest Tribunal under Section 8 of the Act. By virtue of Section 13 of the Vesting Act, the Forest Tribunal alone shall have such jurisdiction to decide such questions as to whether the land in question is private forest or not; whether the property will fall under any of the exclusion Clauses of (A)(B)(C) and (D) or whether any exemption under Section 3(2) or 3(3) of the Act can be given. 19. There cannot be any dispute to the fact that the question of tenancy, if any, has to be decided by the Land Tribunal. But the adjudication by the Land Tribunal under the KLR Act, with regard to question of tenancy, is in fact the adjudication as to the rights of the parties over the land as on 01/04/1964 or 01/01/1970, as the case may be. On the other hand, the question which is to be considered by the Forest Tribunal is whether the applicant was a lessee or a person having right to possess and enjoy the forest land as on 10/05/1971, i.e. appointed day. The question of tenancy determined by the Land Tribunal issuing a purchase certificate, could be a decision to hold it conclusive for the purpose of that Act, i.e. the Kerala Land Reforms Act (KLR Act). The provisions in relation to the tenancies under the KLR Act, particularly in Chapter II (as amended) do not apply to leases in respect of private forests, except in the cases of persons who are entitled to fixity of tenure immediately before 21st January, 1961 under any law then in force or persons claiming such relief in view of Section 3(1)(vii) of the said Act. It was accordingly, that the Division Bench of this Court held in 1988 KHC 615 : 1988 (2) KLT 967 : 1988 (2) KLJ 756 (cited supra) that determination by the Land Tribunal regarding tenancies of private forests to which Chapter II of the Act does not apply, cannot have any effect on the proceedings under Section 8 of the 'Vesting Act' to decide whether an area is a 'private forest' or not; or whether the 'private forests' are vested or not; also observing that if a finding is rendered by the Land Tribunal about the tenancy of a private forest, it shall have no effect on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Forest Tribunal to decide whether an area is a 'private forest' or not; or whether private forests are vested in the State or not. Even if any such finding has been rendered, it could only be for the limited purpose of the Land Reforms Act and it shall be subject to the decision of the Forest Tribunal in exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction under Section 8 and 13 of the Vesting Act. 20. It will be worthwhile to note the observations made by the Bench in 1988 KHC 615: 1988 (2) KLT 967 : 1988 (2) KLJ 756 particularly in paragraph 9'. For the convenience of reference we extract the same, as given below: "Evidently the Forest Tribunal in thus disposing of the case without any independent scrutiny and deciding the relevant question has committed a grave error of law. It was for the Forest Tribunal to consider the effect of the various documents and the evidence tendered for the purpose of deciding whether the land in dispute is 'private, forest' as defined in Act 26 of 1971 and if so whether it is held by the petitioners as owners thereof and the same is under their personal cultivation. The effect of the finding recorded by the Land Tribunal regarding the nature of the right of the petitioners should have been considered in the correct perspective without rushing to the conclusion that all the relevant questions have been finally decided by that authority and the parties are concluded by such decision. The nature of the land as on 10/05/1971 incidentally arising in these proceedings was to be considered by the Forest Tribunal. The nature of the land as on 10/05/1971 incidentally arising in these proceedings was to be considered by the Forest Tribunal. In deciding the question whether the petitioners are owners of the land as on 10/05/1971 the Forest Tribunal had to consider the claim that the petitioners are deemed tenants under Section 7D of the Land Reforms Act. In Mathew v. Hamsa Haji, 1987 (2) KLT 1 (SC) the Supreme Court has said that Section 7D gives protection only to persons whose possession had a lawful origin in the sense that they had either bona fide believed the lands to be Government lands of which they could later seek assignment or had taken the lands on lease from persons who had bona fide believed to be competent to grant such lease or had come into possession with the intention of attorning to lawful owners or on the basis of arrangements like varam etc. which were only in the nature of licenses and fell short of a lease held right. In K.D. Mani v. State of Kerala, ILR 1987 (1) Ker. 570 a Division Bench of this Court has pointed out that in a case where the party based his claim mainly on the purchase certificate he had obtained from the Land Tribunals to prove his possession of the land and his cultivation the certificate issued long after the appointed days as per Section 3(1) of Act 26 of 1971 in a proceeding initiated subsequent to the vesting without the junction of the Government in the proceedings cannot affect the rights of the Government. Possession by itself creates no right to possession and enjoyment of forest land within the meaning of the term 'owner' under Section 2 of the Act (Vide State of Kerala v. Velayudhan Sivanandan, 1966 KLT 1026 ) The lower authority was therefore, bound to consider the issues in the light of the legal principles and the evidence tendered by their parties and record its findings. Since the relevant questions had not been considered or decided, the only course open to us is to set aside the order and remand the case for disposal afresh. We do so accordingly." 21. It has been categorically held by a Division Bench of this Court in K.D. Mani v. State of Kerala, 1987 KHC 742 : ILR 1987 (1) Ker. We do so accordingly." 21. It has been categorically held by a Division Bench of this Court in K.D. Mani v. State of Kerala, 1987 KHC 742 : ILR 1987 (1) Ker. 570 that, in a case where a party has obtained a 'purchase certificate' from the Land Tribunal, has to establish his case with reference to the ingredients of the Vesting Act. Such certificate (Purchase Certificate) issued after the appointed day, mentioned under Section 3(1) of the Vesting Act, that too, without involvement of the Government in the party array, cannot adversely affect the rights and interests of the Government. Since the property involved in the case reported in 1988 KHC 615 : 1988 (2) KLT 967 : 1988 (2) KLJ 756 also belonged to the Nilambur Kovilakam, an observation was made to the fact that property was under the management of the Receiver appointed by the Civil Court, in a civil suit filed in the year 1961. It was accordingly, that the appeal preferred by the claimant was dismissed and the appeal filed by the State was allowed. 22. The question came up for further consideration before this Court in State of Kerala v. Alexander reported in 1993 KHC 168 : 1993 (1) KLT SN 4 : ILR 1993 (1) Ker. 731. In the said case, the Forest Tribunal had observed that the appellant State had not challenged issuance of 'purchase certificate', by way of appeal or any other proceedings and that the same had become final. It was accordingly held that, the land was brought under cultivation prior to the appointed day, which was sought to be challenged by the State. The observations made in paragraph 6' are relevant, which are reproduced below: "6. On hearing the rival pleas urged before us, we are of the view that the plea of the appellants should prevail. As held by a bench of this Court in MFA No. 403 of 1980 [Mani v. State or Kerala and Another (1986 KLN case notes page 25 case No. 29)] the certificate of purchase issued under the Kerala Land Reforms Act without issue of individual notice to the concerned person cannot be said to be conclusive. In this case, the private forest vested in the State as early as 10th May 1971. Ext. P1 purchase certificate was issued in proceedings evidenced by Ext. P1 on 13th November 1978. Ext. In this case, the private forest vested in the State as early as 10th May 1971. Ext. P1 purchase certificate was issued in proceedings evidenced by Ext. P1 on 13th November 1978. Ext. P1 is only a certificate of purchase. The parent order has not been produced. There is no material to show that individual notice was served on the Government, in whom the forest had vested long ago. So, in the light of the Bench decision aforesaid, the certificate of purchase issued under the Kerala Land Reforms Act will have no bearing on the right of the Government, in whom the land in question had vested under Section 3(1) of the Act as early as 10th May 1971. The fact that the appellant did not file an appeal against Ext. P1 is of no consequence. The Forest Tribunal was in error in holding that Ext. P1 is binding on the appellants or that the failure to file an appeal against Ext. P1 has got any consequence. Ext. P1 will not bind the appellants. Similarly, Exts. P2 to 5 revenue receipts are of no consequence. Acceptance of tax for the land by the Village Officer is not relevant [State of Kerala v. T.V. Chandran, 1980 KLT 838 ]. There again, the Division Bench of this Court asserted that non-filing of any appeal by the State/Department in respect of a 'Purchase Certificate' issued by the Land Tribunal under the Kerala Land Reforms Act has no consequence in so far as the rights and liberties of the Forest Department/Government are concerned under the Vesting Act. The dispute, if any had to be considered by the Forest Tribunal Reference was also made to the verdict in Mani v. State of Kerala and Another, 1986 KLN Case Notes Page 25 (Case No. 29). 23. In this context, it is worthwhile to note the observations made by the Apex Court as per the decision reported in AIR 2003 SC 1510 : 2003 (3) SCC 221 : 2003 KHC 902 : JT 2003 (2) SC 155 : 2003 (2) CHN 173 (SC Sup) (Kunjanam Antony (Dead) by LRs. v. State of Kerala and Another) (Paragraphs)) which is extracted below: "9. There can be no doubt that the order of the Thaluka Land Board, a statutory authority, is binding on the authorities under the Land Reforms Act. v. State of Kerala and Another) (Paragraphs)) which is extracted below: "9. There can be no doubt that the order of the Thaluka Land Board, a statutory authority, is binding on the authorities under the Land Reforms Act. So far as the proceedings under the Forest Act are concerned, the order of the Thaluka Land Board would be a piece of evidence but it cannot be treated as a binding on the authorities under the Forest Act. Unless a contrary state of affairs is shown to exist, the order of the Thaluka Land Board would have to be given due weight. From the material placed before the High Court and also before us, it appears that there is no evidence in regard to the destruction of the rubber plantation due to fire. There is, however, material to show that the appellant has been cultivating tapioca. Further, the High Court recorded a finding that there was no evidence indicating that the appellant had intention to cultivate the land which only meant cultivation of rubber plantation. There is also nothing on record to show that absence of rubber plantation was for short period and that the land was in the process of rubber plantation." From the above discussion, it is quite evident that, at the time of passing the judgment by the Division Bench of this Court in Muhammed Basheer v. State of Kerala, 2002 (1) KLT SN 4 (MFA 160/1991), the decisions rendered by a Division Bench of this Court reported in 1986 KLT SN 25 Case No. 29, 1986 KLN Case Notes Page 25 (Case No. 29), 1988 KHC 615 : 1988 (2) KLT 967 : 1988 (2) KLJ 756 , 1993 KHC 168 : 1993 (1) KLT SN 4 : ILR 1993 (1) Ker. 731 and the one rendered in 1997 (2) KLT 513 : 1997 KHC 406 : 1997 (2) KLJ 337 : ILR 1997 (3) Ker. 771 : AIR 1998 Ker. 1 (cited supra) were very much in existence. These decisions were never brought to the notice of the learned Judges, which led to the adverse finding. We are sure that the said finding would not have been there, had the parties brought the above decisions to the notice of the learned judges, particularly with reference to the mandate of Section 13 of the Vesting Act. These decisions were never brought to the notice of the learned Judges, which led to the adverse finding. We are sure that the said finding would not have been there, had the parties brought the above decisions to the notice of the learned judges, particularly with reference to the mandate of Section 13 of the Vesting Act. Further, the decision in Muhammed Basheer v. State of Kerala, 2002 (1) KLT SN 4 did not consider the 'non obstante clause' in the Vesting Act and so also, no reference was made to Section 13 of the said Act conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon the Forest Tribunal. This being the position, we respectfully disagree with the law laid down in MFA No. 160 of 1991 [2002 (1) KLT SN 4, Case No. 4, 2002 (1) KLT SN 4 (cited supra)], which cannot be regarded as good law, in view of the ruling rendered by different Benches of this Court in the earlier instance and it is held accordingly. 24. Yet another aspect to be looked into is that, even if possession could be established prior to 01/04/1964, having issued a purchase certificate by the Land Tribunal, it by itself may not be enough to confer the rights and liberties under the Vesting Act. Even if the party is in possession of the land in question from 1964, he need not be holding such property effecting personal cultivation as on 10/05/1971, so as to carve within the purview of Section 3(2) of the Vesting Act. Similarly, even if the party was in possession of the land prior to 01/04/1964, if there was intention to personally cultivate the property as on 10/05/1971, he cannot have the benefit contemplated under Section 3(3) of the Vesting Act. This aspect, as the case may be, has to be independently pleaded and proved. We have perused the records, but this exercise has not been satisfactorily done by the appellant herein. 25. Yet another aspect to be noted is that, in 2002 (1) KLT SN 4 Case No. 4, 2002 (1) KLT SN 4, it was a case where purchase certificate was issued in 'suo motu' proceedings, based on the report of the concerned Revenue Officer. 25. Yet another aspect to be noted is that, in 2002 (1) KLT SN 4 Case No. 4, 2002 (1) KLT SN 4, it was a case where purchase certificate was issued in 'suo motu' proceedings, based on the report of the concerned Revenue Officer. No such certificate has been issued in the instant case and the learned Counsel for the appellant fairly concedes that the proceedings were not initiated 'suo motu', but pursuant to an application preferred by the appellant. This being the position, the factual sequence stands on a different pedestal and the observation made by the Bench in 2002 (1) KLT SN 4 Case 4, 2002 (1) KLT SN 4 cannot, as such, be applied to promote the case of the appellant herein. 26. The learned Counsel for the appellant submits that there is a Panchayat road on one side of the property bordering the forest and as such, it could not have been a vested forest. The said contention has been rebutted by the Forest Department stating that the so called road is not a Panchayat road and that the same belongs to the Forest Department. The appellant has produced some certificate issued by the Panchayat, as Ext. A7. But the same has been refused to be accepted by the Forest Tribunal, for the reason that no road register has been caused to be produced by the appellant; more so when the status of the road itself was disputed by the Forest Department stating that it was a forest road and that the property was a part of a larger extent of 30.28 Hectares of land in R.S. No. 1186 of Edakkara Village. Insofar as the appellant has not established the factual position as to the existence of lease prior to 10/05/1971' and since evidence has to be weighed as a whole and not by number, this Court finds that no interference is called for under this head as well. In the above facts and circumstances, we find that the finding rendered by the Tribunal is perfectly within the four walls of law, based on the actual facts and figures and the relevant provisions of law. No interference is warranted under any circumstance. Appeal fails and the same is dismissed.