JUDGMENT 1. - Appellants have preferred this second appeal to challenge the impugned judgment dated 02.06.1994 passed by District Judge, Balotra (for short, learned lower appellate Court'), whereby learned lower appellate Court has affirmed the judgment and decree dated 08.10.1990 passed by Munsif Magistrate, Siwana (for short, 'learned trial Court'). 2. The facts, in brief, are that respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent against Amba Shanker, whose legal representatives are appellants No. 1/1 to , and second appellant Manoharlal. The suit was filed after serving notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, 'Act'). In the plaint, it is inter-alia pleaded by the respondent-plaintiff that in the disputed premises, which is a dwelling house, Amba Shanker and his son-second appellant, were inducted as tenants on 20.12.1972 and agreed rent was Rs. 10/- per month. As per the terms of tenancy, the tenancy was at will. The rent-deed, which was executed by Amba Shanker and second appellant, was also placed on record. 3. The respondent-plaintiff specifically pleaded that tenants, Amba Shanker and appellant No.2, did not pay the requisite rent despite demand and also demolished the window, which was on the upper storey of house at the height of 14 ft. and also utilised debris after demolition. In that background, respondent-plaintiff asserted that a notice for terminating tenancy was served on 28.01.1974 which was delivered to Amba Shanker on 04.02.1974. By the aforesaid notice, as per the version of respondent-plaintiff, tenancy was terminated w.e.f. 20.02.1974. The appellants craved the relief of eviction of tenants from the premises and also claimed arrears of rent and mesne profit for use and occupation. 4. The suit was contested by appellants and factum of tenancy was disputed. In the return, it was specifically averred that no rent-deed was ever executed in favour of respondent-plaintiff. A defence was also set out in the written statement that in fact the suit property owned by Amba Shanker was mortgaged with respondent-plaintiff but by misleading him sheer manipulation he got the rent-deed executed in his favour. As regards the receipt of notice, it was pleaded in the written statement that the notice was false, based on fabricated facts and not in accordance with law. 5. Learned trial Court, on the basis of pleadings of rival parties, framed five issues for determination and the parties led their evidence. As regards the receipt of notice, it was pleaded in the written statement that the notice was false, based on fabricated facts and not in accordance with law. 5. Learned trial Court, on the basis of pleadings of rival parties, framed five issues for determination and the parties led their evidence. The learned trial Court, after evaluation of the evidence and materials available on record, adjudicated the matter and passed a decree for eviction against the appellants so also ordered them to pay the arrears of rent and mesne profit. It may be observed here that during pendency of the suit, amendment was sought in the plaint by respondent-plaintiff by adding three other grounds for eviction. Appellants also filed amended written statement and thereafter, four additional issues were framed. 6. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, appellants approached the learned lower appellate Court and the learned lower appellate Court while partly allowing the appeal maintained the decree for eviction but directed the respondent-plaintiff to pay a sum of Rs. 5,500/- or deposit the same in the Court. 7. It is in that background, appellants have approached this Court. The appeal came for admission before this Court, and while admitting the appeal, following substantial question of law is framed:- "Whether the notice terminating the tenancy Ex.7 is in accordance with law?" 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused both the judgments of learned Courts below and also examined entire record of the case. 9. The substantial question of law, which requires adjudication in the instant appeal, lies in narrow compass. The Court's concern is to adjudicate the validity of notice on the basis of available material. Section 106 of the Act, as it was obtaining before the amendment of 2003, reads as under:- "106. 9. The substantial question of law, which requires adjudication in the instant appeal, lies in narrow compass. The Court's concern is to adjudicate the validity of notice on the basis of available material. Section 106 of the Act, as it was obtaining before the amendment of 2003, reads as under:- "106. Duration of certain leases in absence of written contract or local usage.- In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of tenancy. Every notice under this section must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property." 10. The aforesaid provision envisages that lease of immoveable property for any other purpose, i.e., other than agricultural or manufacturing purposes, shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month and terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of the month of the tenancy. 11. In the present case, in Para 5 of the plaint, respondent-plaintiff has set out a specific case that the notice under Section 106 of the Act was sent to the lessee on 28.01.1974 and it was delivered on 04.02.1974. As per notice, the tenancy was terminated w.e.f. 20.02.1974, as such, respondent-plaintiff came out with a case that there was clear notice of fifteen days and the same is a valid notice. The fact, that notice was received by lessee, is not disputed in the written statement, but an omnibus plea was sought to be raised that notice was not in accordance with law. The fact, that notice was received by lessee, is not disputed in the written statement, but an omnibus plea was sought to be raised that notice was not in accordance with law. It may be noticed that even the positive assertion of the respondent-plaintiff, that notice was served on 04.02.1974, has not been disputed in the written statement. The parties have led their evidence and notice bearing date 28.01.1974 (Annex.7) is on record. Although postal receipt is not on record but acknowledgement is there which bears two seals, and one of them is of 04.02.1974, indicating the delivery of the letter. This presumption can be drawn for the simple reason that one more seal is there which was of the date when the registered envelope was sent. This documentary evidence coupled with the oral evidence of respondent-plaintiff, more particularly the statement of Manakchand makes it crystal clear that the notice was delivered to lessee on 04.02.1974. If the statements of Amba Shanker, defendant No.1., are examined with bird's eye view then it would ipso facto reveal that there is no whisper in his testimony about validity of the notice and the entire statements are confined to disputing the tenancy. In fact, Amba Shanker has made an attempt to substantiate the defence by stating that he is not tenant, but rather the owner of property and it was simply mortgaged with the respondent-plaintiff who by practising fraud got that document executed in the form of rent-deed. In this view of the matter, the respondent-plaintiff has been able to discharge his burden that a notice under Section 106 of the Act was served on the lessee and the tenancy was terminated in accordance with law before instituting the civil suit. Umpteen materials available on record has persuaded me to believe that there was valid delivery of notice and the notice was served on appellant lessee fifteen days before the date of termination of tenancy, and as such the notice cannot be categorized as infirm within the four corners of Section 106 of the Act. Therefore, the substantial question of law deserves answer in favour of respondent-plaintiff and against the appellants.In view of aforesaid answer to substantial question of law, the appeal as such has got no merit and the same is, therefore, dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******