JUDGMENT : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. Subject matter of this writ petition is the order dated 1.9.2008, Annexure P8, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, whereby the Original Application filed by the petitioner came to be dismissed, for short “the impugned judgment”. Briefs facts. 2. The petitioner was working as Extra- Departmental Agent with the respondent-department w.e.f. 11.12.1984. Respondent-department, on 14.6.2007, has notified the vacancy position, relating to the cadre of the postman and the examination was held on 22.7.2007, in which the writ petitioner and other persons/employees participated. The result was declared on 4.1.2008, Annexure P2, wherein writ petitioner, along with two other persons, particulars of whom are given in the writ petition and the reply, had made the grade. Writ respondents, without any reason, are stated to have not deputed the writ petitioner and one another selectee for training which is sina qua non, after declaration of the result, in order to enable the selectees to reap the fruits of selection to enter and join the service as postman by promotion, constraining the writ petitioner to file Original Application before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, which was dismissed vide order dated 1.9.2008, Annexure P8, impugned in this writ petition. 3. The mistake was brought to the notice of the department by way of a complaint, which was examined by the department and it was found that the writ petitioner and another selectee, in fact, had not made the grade and only one candidate, namely, Mool Raj, who was deputed for training, had made the grade. 4. The petitioner, by the medium of this petition has averred that the respondents, without hearing the petitioner and another selectee declared that the marks recorded were not in accordance with the answers and there are some interpolations and mistakes on the face of the record and withdrew the selection, so far as it related to petitioner and another selectee. 5. The star ground urged before the Tribunal was that the writ petitioner was not heard. The Tribunal had discussed the said issue in the judgment and held that granting any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner was not required for the simple reason that the merit awarded was not in accordance with the answers and virtually, there were interpolations in the answer sheets. The Tribunal had discussed the said issue in the judgment and held that granting any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner was not required for the simple reason that the merit awarded was not in accordance with the answers and virtually, there were interpolations in the answer sheets. The Tribunal has further recorded that the same question had arisen before the Tribunal in another Original Application which was dismissed, which is discussed in para 4.2 of the impugned judgment. Further, it is held that the selection and appointment made without following rules or which is made by committing illegality or irregularity or mistake(s) the principle of natural justice cannot be pressed into service. The said fact has been discussed in paras 5.1 and 5.2 of the impugned judgment. 6. It is worthwhile to mention herein that the Tribunal has also perused the papers, particularly the paper “C” and recorded that the mistakes were apparent on the face of the answer sheet. It is profitable to reproduce para 5 of the impugned judgment herein. “5.The enquiry report and the original answer sheets were produced before us. It was found that there were apparent inconsistencies in the award of marks to the applicants. Paper “C” comprising of Hindi and English dictations was set up for a maximum 50 marks. As per records, in Hindi dictation applicants no. 1 and 2 have been shown to be given 23 marks each against more than 30 and 50 spelling mistakes respectively. It was also found that with the similar level of mistakes, the number of marks awarded to other candidates who had been declared failed was much less. Similarly, in English dictation for applicant no. 1 it is stated that no a single sentence was found to be correct still 17 marks had been awarded. With similar observations, the marks given to other candidates who had been declared failed, was much much less. Incase of applicant no.2, it was observed in the enquiry report that few sentences were correct, but there were lot of cuttings and over writings. However, 15 marks had been awarded to him.” 7. It is beaten law of the land that mere selection does not create any indefeasible right to claim appointment. 8. The apex Court in cases titled Dir. S.C. T.I. for Med. Sci. & Tech. & Anar. However, 15 marks had been awarded to him.” 7. It is beaten law of the land that mere selection does not create any indefeasible right to claim appointment. 8. The apex Court in cases titled Dir. S.C. T.I. for Med. Sci. & Tech. & Anar. Versus M. Pushkaran reported in 2007 AIR SCW 7560 and Raj Rishi Mehra and others versus State of Punjab and another reported in 2013 AIR SCW 4883, held that the Court in exercise of its power of judicial review would not ordinarily direct issuance of any writ in absence of any pleading and proof of malafide or arbitrariness on the part of the employer. It is apt to reproduce paras 16, 17 and 18 of the judgment rendered in Dir. S.C.T.I’s case supra. “16.It is, therefore, evident that whereas the selectee as such has no legal right and the superior court in exercise of its power of judicial review would not ordinarily direct issuance of any writ in absence of any pleading and proof of mala fide or arbitrariness on the part of the employer. Each case, therefore, must be considered on its own merit.” 17. In All India SC & ST Employees" Association and Another v. A. Arthur Jeen and Others [ (2001) 6 SCC 380 ], it was opined: "10. Merely because the names of the candidates were included in the panel indicating their provisional selection, they did not acquire any indefeasible right for appointment even against the existing vacancies and the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies as laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court, after referring to earlier cases in Shankarsan Dash Vs. Union of India. [See also Malkiat Singh (supra), Pitta Naveen Kumar and Others v. Raja Narasaiah Zangiti and Others (2006) 10 SCC 261 , State of Rajasthan & Ors. V. Jagdish Chopra 2007 (10) SCALE 470, Union of India & Others v. S. Vinodh Kumar & Others, 2007 (11) SCALE 257 and State of M.P. & Ors. v. Sanjay Kumar Pathak & Ors. 2007 (12) SCALE 72] 18. The application of law would, therefore, depend upon the fact situation obtaining in each case. The judgment of the High Court in view of the aforementioned authoritative pronouncements cannot be said to be perverse. v. Sanjay Kumar Pathak & Ors. 2007 (12) SCALE 72] 18. The application of law would, therefore, depend upon the fact situation obtaining in each case. The judgment of the High Court in view of the aforementioned authoritative pronouncements cannot be said to be perverse. The respondent was to be offered with the appointment at a point of time when no policy decision was taken. There was, thus, no reason not to offer any appointment in his favour. Why the select panel was ignored has not been explained. Even the purported policy decision was not in their contemplation. We, therefore, do not see any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment.” 9. The competent authority can reject the recommendations and selectee cannot plead breach of principle of natural justice. The same question arose before the apex Court in case titled Dr. H. Mukherjee versus Union of India and others with another matter reported in 1994 Supp (1) SCC 250. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 9 of the said judgment herein: “9……….Therefore, neither of the two decisions on which reliance is placed come to the rescue of respondent No. 1. It seems well settled that the function of the Public Service Commission being advisory, the Government may for valid reasons to be recorded on the file, disapprove of the advice or recommendation tendered by the Commission, which decision can, if at all, be tested on the limited ground of it being thoroughly arbitrary, mala fide or capricious.” 10. Similar question also arose before the apex Court in case titled Major General H. M. Singh VSM versus Union of India and another reported in 2014 AIR SCW 758. It is apt to reproduce para 12 of the said judgment herein. “12. Dissatisfied with the dismissal of Writ Petition No. 15508 of 2008, the appellant filed an intra court Writ Appeal No. 779 of 2009. In the process of adjudicating upon the controversy raised in the abovementioned Writ Appeal, a Division Bench of the High Court framed two questions for its consideration. Firstly, whether the appellant Major General H.M. Singh had any fundamental right for promotion solely on the basis of the recommendation of the Selection Board. In the process of adjudicating upon the controversy raised in the abovementioned Writ Appeal, a Division Bench of the High Court framed two questions for its consideration. Firstly, whether the appellant Major General H.M. Singh had any fundamental right for promotion solely on the basis of the recommendation of the Selection Board. And secondly, whether Appointments Committee of the Cabinet was liable to accept the recommendation made by the Selection Board in favour of the appellant, and consequently, order the appellant's promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. Relying on paragraph 108 of the Regulation of Army which delineates the constitution and duties of the Selection Board, the Division Bench concluded that the recommendations of the Selection Board were merely recommendatory in nature, and therefore, answered the first question in the negative. The Division Bench further held, that a legitimate claim for the promotion would arise, only if a recommendation made by the Selection Board gets the approval of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet. Relying on the judgments rendered by this Court in Dr. H. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India and others, 1994 Supp1 SCC 250, Union of India and others Vs. N.P. Dhamania and others, 1995 Supp1 SCC 1, and Food Corporation of India and others Vs. Parashotam Das Bansal and others, 2008 5 SCC 100 , the Division Bench of the High Court further concluded, that the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet was not bound by the recommendation of the Selection Board. It accordingly held, that for justifiable reasons, the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet had the right to either accept, or to refuse the recommendation of the Selection Board. In sum and substance it came to be concluded, that unless it was shown that the determination of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet suffered from arbitrariness or malafides and capriciousness, the same could not be interfered with. The Division Bench of the High Court having found none of the above noted vices in the determination of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, answered the second question also in the negative.” 11. The apex Court in another judgment in case R. Vishwanatha Pillai versus State of Kerala and others, reported in AIR 2004 SC 1469 held as under: “15. This apart, the appellant obtained the appointment in the service on the basis that he belonged to a Scheduled Caste community. The apex Court in another judgment in case R. Vishwanatha Pillai versus State of Kerala and others, reported in AIR 2004 SC 1469 held as under: “15. This apart, the appellant obtained the appointment in the service on the basis that he belonged to a Scheduled Caste community. When it was found by the Scrutiny Committee that he did not belong to the Scheduled Caste community, then the very basis of his appointment was taken away. His appointment was no appointment in the eyes of law. He cannot claim a right to the post as he had usurped the post meant for a reserved candidate by playing a fraud and producing a false caste certificate. Unless the appellant can lay a claim to the post on the basis of his appointment he cannot claim the constitutional guarantee given under the Article 311 of the Constitution. As he had obtained the appointment on the basis of a false caste certificate he cannot be considered to be a person who holds a post within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Finding recorded by the Scrutiny Committee that the appellant got the appointment on the basis of false caste certificate has become final. The position, therefore, is that the appellant has usurped the post which should have gone to a member of the Scheduled Caste. In view of the finding recorded by the Scrutiny Committee and upheld up to this Court he has disqualified himself to hold the post. Appointment was void from its inception. It cannot be said that the said void appointment would enable the appellant to claim that he was holding a civil post within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. As appellant had obtained the appointment by playing a fraud he cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own fraud in entering the service and claim that he was holder of the post entitled to be dealt with in terms of Article 311 of the Constitution of India or the Rules framed thereunder. Where an appointment in a service has been acquired by practising fraud or deceit such an appointment is no appointment in law, in service and in such a situation Article 311 of the Constitution is not attracted at all.” 12. Where an appointment in a service has been acquired by practising fraud or deceit such an appointment is no appointment in law, in service and in such a situation Article 311 of the Constitution is not attracted at all.” 12. The principle of natural justice can be pressed into service where any indefeasible right is taken away and the action of the authority is arbitrary, or actuated with mala fides or caprice. The issue involved in this petition is that because of the mistakes, the petitioner found the place in the select list which was brought to light through a complaint and after conducting inquiry the allegations contained in the complaint were found correct. Thus, there is no question of providing any opportunity of being heard or it cannot be said that the said act is violative of principle of natural justice. 13. The apex Court in case State of Punjab versus Jagir Singh, reported in 2004 AIR SCW 5421 has laid down the test and discussed when the principle of natural justice can be pressed into service. 14. The apex Court in another case titled Dr. (Mrs.) Gurjeewan Garewal versus Dr. (Mrs.) Sumitra Dash and others reported in 2004 AIR SCW 2755 in paras 11 and 15 has held as under. “11. The first question for consideration is the correctness of the decision by High Court. Relying upon the decisions of this Court in Jai Shanker, State of Assam v. Akshaya Kumar, Deokinandan Prasad and Uptron India Ltd. (all cited supra) the High Court went on to find that respondent No. 1 was not given an opportunity of hearing. Is the High Court correct in its approach? To judge this issue, primarily, the general nature of cases upon which the High Court placed its reliance need to be looked into. It is pertinent to note that all these cases emanate due to the violation of Art. 311 of the Constitution. 12 to 14…. …… …. …. …. 15. In this background the view subscribed by the High Court, that the 1st respondent was not given an opportunity of hearing and since her removal is bad under Art. 311, is not correct. The premise in which the High Court has proceeded is faulty. High Court has not examined the applicability of Art. 311 in the present case. This results in its wrong conclusion. The premise in which the High Court has proceeded is faulty. High Court has not examined the applicability of Art. 311 in the present case. This results in its wrong conclusion. Therefore, the cases relied upon by the High Court Jai Shanker, State of Assam v. Akshaya Kumar, Deokinandan Prasad and Uptron India Ltd. (all cited supra) are not applicable in the present context. All of them are distinguishable.” 15. The impugned judgment is well reasoned. No interference is required. 16. Having said so, the writ petition is dismissed along with pending applications, if any.