Judgment : Prashant Kumar, J. In this writ application the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs : (a) For issuance of an appropriate writ/order/direction for setting aside the order dated 02.03.2013 passed by the Vidyut Upbhokta Shikayat Niwaran Forum, Electric Supply Area, Hazaribagh passed in Case no. 04/2012 corresponding to VUSNF Hazaribagh case no. 21/2012 whereby and where under the claim of the petitioner has been dismissed. (b) For issuance of an appropriate writs/orders/directions holding that the initial period of supply/commencement of supply to an unit can be only one, irrespective of any supplementary agreement or additional agreement having been entered into subsequently, after the energisation of the line. (c) For issuance of appropriate writ or writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the bill dated 01.04.2013 received by the petitioner, whereby and where under bill dated 18.06.2005 on account of Minimum Guarantee Charges is being sought to be realized along with Delayed Payment Surcharge for the period 01.05.2008 to 28.02.2013, since the issue was pending before the Forum in terms of an order of this High Court and as such the levy of DPS itself is unreasonable and contradictory to the settled principle of law inasmuch as for the period, the stay was operative, the Board could not have levied Delayed Payment Surcharge. (d) For issuance of an appropriate writ or a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing the bill for the month of May, 2005 in respect of connection no.NR-410 to the extent the Board has sought to levy and realise Minimum Guarantee Charges for 23 months, commencing from June, 2005 to April 2007 and has sought to realise a sum of Rs. 31,62,500/- pursuant to the notice of disconnection given by the petitioner under Clause 9 of the HT Agreement. (e) For issuance of any other appropriate writ/ directions/orders as Your Lordships may deem fit and proper in view of the facts and circumstances of the case for doing conscionable justice to the petitioner." 2. Petitioner was a High Tension consumer, and its connection number was NR 410. The contract demand of the petitioner was 550 KVA. It is stated that the electrical connection was given in the premises of petitioner for the first time in the year 1971. The load of the petitioner revised from time to time either by increasing or decreasing the contract demand as per its requirement. The contract demand of the petitioner was 550 KVA. It is stated that the electrical connection was given in the premises of petitioner for the first time in the year 1971. The load of the petitioner revised from time to time either by increasing or decreasing the contract demand as per its requirement. It is stated that the petitioner entered into an agreement on 21.05.1988 for reduction of contract load from 150 KVA to 115 KVA. Thereafter, petitioner's contract load was enhanced to 200 KVA. Then, petitioner entered into a fresh agreement on 03.03.1997 and its contract demand enhanced from 200 KVA to 360 KVA. It is stated that thereafter, again on 08.07.1998, petitioner entered into a fresh agreement as the contract demand of the petitioner enhanced from 360 KVA to 460 KVA. It is then stated that in the year 2001, when M/s Maithan Minerals Pvt. Ltd. amalgamated with M/s Maithan Ceramics Ltd., petitioner again entered into a fresh agreement with the Board on 30.01.2001 for the same contract demand i.e. 460 KVA. It is stated that petitioner again applied for enhancement of contract load to the extent of 90 KVA i.e. from 460 KVA to 550 KVA and the Electrical Superintending Engineer vide its letter no. 760 dated 05.05.2004 enhanced the contract demand of the petitioner. In the said sanction letter, it was stated that petitioner had to execute a fresh agreement for enhancement of contract load. It is stated that as stipulated in the sanction order, petitioner executed a fresh agreement on 03.06.2004 for enhancement of its contract load from 460 KVA to 550 KVA. It is stated that thereafter, petitioner's company started suffering due to irregular supply of power and frequent power cuts. It is also stated that the power supplied by the Board was not stable in comparison with the other licensees and the same is also much more expensive. Thus, as per Clause 9 of the HT Agreement, petitioner gave notice for determination of the agreement. It is stated that as per notice given by the petitioner, the Board's authority finally disconnected the electrical line of the petitioner on 21.05.2005. It is further stated that after disconnection of electrical connection, the respondent-Board issued a bill in the month of May, 2005, wherein they levied Minimum Monthly Charges from June, 2005 to April, 2007 i.e. for 23 months to the tune of Rs. It is further stated that after disconnection of electrical connection, the respondent-Board issued a bill in the month of May, 2005, wherein they levied Minimum Monthly Charges from June, 2005 to April, 2007 i.e. for 23 months to the tune of Rs. 31,62,500/-, besides current monthly charges for the month of May, 2005. 3. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid bill petitioner filed a writ application, vide W. P.(C) No. 3738/2005. The aforesaid writ application has been disposed of by a Bench of this Court vide order dated 14.02.2012, with an observation that petitioner shall approach the Vidyut Upbhoktya Shikayat Niwaran Forum, for redressal of its grievance. This court further observed that if the petitioner approaches the Forum, then the Forum shall hear the petitioner and dispose of its grievance on merit. This Court further ordered that during pendency of final decision of the Forum, the Board will take no coercive steps against the petitioner for realization of remaining dues. It appears that thereafter, petitioner has filed a complaint before the Forum at Ranchi. However, after creation of Vidyut Upbhoktya Shikayat Niwaran Forum at Hazaribagh, the case of the petitioner transferred to the said Forum. It is stated that the Board filed its counter affidavit before the Forum and contested the case. It is stated that after hearing both the parties, the Forum ultimately dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner vide order dated 02.03.2013 (Annexure-12). It is stated that just after few days of the order passed by the Forum, the Board served another bill dated 01.04.2013, whereby, apart from the balance amount of Minimum Guarantee Charges, the Board levied DPS for the period from 01.05.2008 to 28.02.2013. The aforesaid order of the Forum as well as the Bill dated 01.04.2013 has been challenged in this writ application. 4. It is submitted by Sri M.S. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner that Clause 9 of the Agreement clearly states that the agreement cannot be determined at the instance of consumer before expiry of three years from the date of commencement of supply of the energy. He further submits that commencement of supply of the energy is only be one and there cannot be various dates for commencement of supply. He further submits that commencement of supply of the energy is only be one and there cannot be various dates for commencement of supply. He submits that there may be supplementary or additional agreement entered in between the Board and the consumer for enhancement or reduction of the load, but the date of commencement of supply of the energy can only be one. He further submitted that in the agreement dated 08.07.1988, the date of commencement of supply of the energy mentioned as January, 1998, whereas in the agreement dated 30.01.2001 and 30.06.2004, no date has been mentioned in Col.8 of the agreement. Meaning thereby that the date of commencement of supply can be taken as January, 1998. Accordingly, he submitted that the period of three years mentioned in Clause 9 of the agreement can be counted from 1998. In alternative, he submitted that even if, it is taken into consideration that a fresh agreement entered by the petitioner after amalgamation in the year 2001, then also the period of three years has already lapsed much before the date, on which petitioner gave notice for disconnection of electrical connection and determination of agreement. Under the said circumstance, petitioner is not liable to pay Minimum Guarantee Charges for 23 months. It is submitted that the respondents-Board raised the Minimum Guarantee Charges, treating the date of commencement of the period of three years supply of energy from 3rd June, 2004, is wholly erroneous and against the law. It is submitted that the Forum has wrongly come to the conclusion that as per agreement, petitioner is liable to pay Minimum Guarantee Charges for 23 months. It is submitted that the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court relied by the Forum is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. Therefore, the aforesaid order passed by the Forum is liable to be quashed. It is submitted that this Hon'ble Court by order dated 23.08.2005, passed in W.P.(C) No. 3738/2005, had stayed the operation of impugned demand of Minimum Guarantee Charges for 23 months from June, 2005 to April, 2007 on the condition that petitioner shall deposit Rs. 10 lacs within 10 days. It is further submitted that while disposing of the writ application, this Court had ordered that no coercive steps shall be taken against the petitioner for realization of remaining dues till final decision of the Forum. Accordingly, Mr. 10 lacs within 10 days. It is further submitted that while disposing of the writ application, this Court had ordered that no coercive steps shall be taken against the petitioner for realization of remaining dues till final decision of the Forum. Accordingly, Mr. Mittal submitted that from 23.08.2005 to 02.03.2013 the impugned bill issued on 18.06.2005 (Annexure-7) is not operational, because of the aforesaid order passed by the High Court. Under the said circumstance, action of the Board, by which it levied DPS for the above period i.e. 01.05.2008 to 28.02.2013, is wholly arbitrary and illegal, therefore, the same cannot be sustained. 5. On the other hand, Sri Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that as per Clause 9 of the agreement, the agreement cannot be determined within the period of three years from the date of commencement of the supply. It is submitted that the petitioner had entered into a fresh agreement on 30.06.2004, when its load was enhanced from 460 KVA to 550 KVA. Thus, the earlier agreement deemed to have come to an end on execution of the fresh agreement. Accordingly, Sri Ajit Kumar, submitted that three years mentioned in Clause 9 of the agreement will be computed from the date of fresh agreement. Sri Kumar further submitted that petitioner had started taking supply of the electrical energy, at the contract demand of 550 KVA from the date of agreement, therefore, the date of commencement of energy mentioned in Clause 9 of the agreement will be the actual date of agreement. Sri Kumar submitted that electric supply of the petitioner was disconnected on 21.05.2005, thus, as per agreement he is liable to pay Minimum Guarantee Charges for remaining period i.e. 23 months. Under the said circumstance, the Board had rightly raised bill for Minimum Guarantee Charges from June, 2005 to April 2007 i.e. for 23 months. Hence, there is no illegality in issuing the aforesaid bill. It is submitted that the Forum has considered all the aspects of the matter including the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Uttarakhand Power Corporation Ltd. Vs. ASP Sealing Products Limited reported in 2009(9) SCC-701 (in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering its earlier judgment delivered in Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna & Others.Vs. It is submitted that the Forum has considered all the aspects of the matter including the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Uttarakhand Power Corporation Ltd. Vs. ASP Sealing Products Limited reported in 2009(9) SCC-701 (in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering its earlier judgment delivered in Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna & Others.Vs. M/s Green Rubber Industries and others reported in 1990(1) SCC-731), has held that the Board is entitled to charge Minimum Guarantee Charges for the remaining period. Mr. Ajit Kumar further submitted that it is well settled that once a writ application or any proceedings comes to an end with the dismissal, then in that case, it is the duty of the Court to put the parties in the same position they would have been irrespective of the interim orders of the court. For that purpose he relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. Vs. U.P. State Electricity Board and others reported in (1997)5 SCC-772. He submitted that after disposal of the complaint by the Forum, the bill as contained in Annexure-7 will revive and since petitioner has not paid the said bill, then he is liable to pay DPS on the same. Accordingly, Sri Kumar submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned bill as contained in Annexure-13, whereby DPS has been charged from 01.05.2008 to 28.02.2013. 6. From perusal of the pleadings of the parties, as well as the rival contention raised by the learned senior counsels appearing for the parties, the main question required to be determined by this Court relates to interpretation of Clause 8 and 9 of the H.T. Agreement entered in between the parties. Clause 8 and 9 of the Agreement runs as follows : "8. The agreement shall be ordinarily in force for a period of less than three years in the first instance (except in exceptional cases in which written consent of the Board will be taken) from the date of commencement of supply i.e. ....................... and thereafter shall continue from year to year until the agreement is determined as hereinafter provided. 9. (a) The consumer shall not be at liberty to determine this agreement before the expiration of three years from the date of commencement of the supply of energy. and thereafter shall continue from year to year until the agreement is determined as hereinafter provided. 9. (a) The consumer shall not be at liberty to determine this agreement before the expiration of three years from the date of commencement of the supply of energy. The consumer may determine this agreement with effect from any date after the said period on giving to the Board not less than twelve calendar months' previous notice in writing in that behalf and upon the expiration of the period of such notice this agreement shall case determine without prejudice to any right which may then have occurred to the Board hereunder provided always that the consumer may at any time with the previous consent of the Board transfer assign this agreement to any other person and upon subscription of such transfer. This agreement shall be binding on the transferee and Board and take effect in all respects as if the transferee had originally been a party hereto in place of the consumer who shall henceforth be discharged from all liabilities under or respect thereof. (b) In case the consumer's supply is disconnected by the Board in exercise of its powers under this agreement and/or law and the consumer does not apply for reconnection in accordance with law within the reminder period of the compulsorily availing of supply as started above or the period of notice whichever be longer, he will be deemed to have given a notice on the date of the disconnection in terms of aforesaid clause 9(a) for the determination of the agreement and on expiration of the above said remainder period of compulsorily availing of supply or the period of notice whichever is longer, this agreement shall cease and determine in the same way as above.” 7. It is submitted by Sri Mittal that as per Clause 8 of the Agreement, the same will remain enforceable for three years from the date of commencement of supply. He submitted that in the Agreement dated 03.06.2014, the date of commencement has not been mentioned. Thus, it will be presumed that the date of commencement of supply will remain the same, which was mentioned in the Agreement dated 08.07.1998 i.e. January, 1998. The aforesaid contention of Sri Mittal does not appears to be correct. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer B.S.E.B. and others. Vs. Thus, it will be presumed that the date of commencement of supply will remain the same, which was mentioned in the Agreement dated 08.07.1998 i.e. January, 1998. The aforesaid contention of Sri Mittal does not appears to be correct. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer B.S.E.B. and others. Vs. Raheshwar Singh and others (1990)1 SCC-741 at paragraph no.5 that "................the earlier agreement must be deemed to have come to an end on execution of the fresh agreement................." It is worth mentioning that vide annexure-3 the Superintending Engineer of the Board enhanced the sanctioned load of the petitioner from 460 KVA to 550 KVA on the condition that the petitioner will have to execute a fresh H.T. Agreement. It is not out of place to state here that in view of above condition petitioner executed a fresh H.T. Agreement on 3rd of June, 2004. Thus, on execution for fresh agreement the earlier agreements, entered into by the petitioner and the Board, have come to an end. 8. The contention of Sri Mittal that the date of commencement of supply will be deemed to be the date of commencement of supply mentioned in the 1998 agreement (because blank space provided in Clause 8 of 2004 agreement had not been filled up) is not acceptable. The note attached to Clause 8 of the Agreement reads as follows :- "In case where the date of commencement of supply is a date subsequent to that of the execution of this agreement the Board is given power to fill in the date in the blank space provided for the same in this clause with prior intimation to the consumer. The consumer can produce his copy of the agreement to have such date filled in by the Board." 9. Thus, from the plain reading of the aforesaid note, it is clear that the date is required to be filled in the blank space of Clause 8, if commencement of the supply is a date subsequent to that of the date of execution of the Agreement. Since in this case, the date has not been filled up in the blank space of Clause 8 of the Agreement, therefore, it will be presumed that supply of electricity at the contract load of 550 KVA commenced from the date of execution of the Agreement i.e. 03.06.2004. Since in this case, the date has not been filled up in the blank space of Clause 8 of the Agreement, therefore, it will be presumed that supply of electricity at the contract load of 550 KVA commenced from the date of execution of the Agreement i.e. 03.06.2004. In that view of the matter, as per Clause 9, the Agreement cannot be determined within three years from 03.06.2004. 10. Accordingly, as per terms of the Agreement, petitioner is required to pay Minimum Guarantee Charges for the rest 23 months i.e. from June, 2005 to April, 2007, the period for which the Agreement remain valid. Thus, I find no illegality in the order of the Forum and bill raised by the Board. 11. Now coming to the next question raised by Sri Mittal that petitioner is not liable to pay DPS, because the Hon'ble High Court passed stay orders on 23.08.2005 and 14.02.2012 in WPC 3738 of 2005, I find that the aforesaid contention is not acceptable, in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. Vs. (Supra), wherein at paragraph no.11 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows : "..........It is equally well settled that an order of stay granted pending disposal of a writ petition/suit or other proceeding, comes to an end with the dismissal of the substantive proceeding and that it is the duty of the court in such a case to put the parties in the same position they would have been but for the interim orders of the court..........." 12. In the instant case, the Forum has decided the case in favour of the Board. Therefore, in my view, the Board is entitled to levy DPS as per tariff. Under the said circumstance, I find no illegality in the impugned bill as contained in Annexure-13 to the writ application. 13. In view of the discussions made above, I find no merit in this writ application. Accordingly, the same is dismissed.