JUDGMENT : Shree Achalgach Jain Shwetambar Trust, a public trust registered under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 (for short, 'Act'), with its office bearers have jointly preferred this writ petition to challenge impugned order dated 4th of August, 2015 (Annex.15) passed by Assistant Commissioner, Deavsthan Department Jodhpur with other ancillary reliefs. In substance, the petitioners have craved for issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain to Assistant Commissioner, Devsthan Department from conducting inquiry under Section 23 of the Act. Succinctly stated, the facts of the case are, that in village Bhinmal, District Jalore many families reposing faith in Jain religion are living since time immemorial and some of them are professing the tenets of Achalgach sect. As per version of petitioners, for almost last nine centuries Sangh is maintaining a temple, dharmshala and other movable and immovable properties owned by Sangh, and as per prevailing tradition, village Bhinmal and its Haveli Patti of nine villages are being managed by the family of second petitioner as its Mukhiya/head. Earlier, second petitioner's father and grand-father also remained in helm of affairs of the Sangh. After promulgation of the Act, Sangh was registered as a public trust and an order to this effect was passed by third respondent on 21st July, 1987. A copy of registration certificate bearing registration number of the trust as 3/87 is also placed on record. The petitioners have set out a specific case that the Trust is an agglomeration of the persons having faith in Achalgach sect and there is no formal mode of conferment of membership to its followers. With these averments, it is also pleaded that there exists no formal list of members of the Trust. By efflux of time, many followers of Achalgach sect migrated from Bhinmal but their commitment for the Sangh remained undiminished and many of them attend annual function of temple so also other social functions on receiving intimation from Sewak and mouth publicity. It is averred in the petition that since inception of the Trust, members of the Trust have unanimously selected the trustees in a cordial and congenial manner. In fact, they have reposed immense faith in the Trust and as such said atmosphere has created no formal distinction between members and the trustees. Most of the members and trustees are close family members and neighbours. In fact, they have reposed immense faith in the Trust and as such said atmosphere has created no formal distinction between members and the trustees. Most of the members and trustees are close family members and neighbours. The petitioners have specifically averred in the writ petition that a meeting of general body of Trust was convened on 16th September, 2013 by sending intimation through Sewak/Pujari as per practice and in accordance with the trust-deed, and the said meeting was attended by 22 members. After conclusion of the meeting, a resolution was taken to induct new trustees, namely, Mukesh Kumar S/o Devi Chand, Kishor Mal S/o Shri Tagaji and Vijay Kumar S/o Shri Laxmanji in place of three trustees namely Shri Devichand, Rikhab Chand and Indermal on account of their death. The election of these three trustees facilitated the requisite strength of thirteen trustees of the Trust as per the trust-deed. It is further averred that immediately on election of three new trustees, requisite information was divulged to third respondent by letter dated 20th of September, 2013. It transpires from the pleadings that second petitioner personally visited the office of third respondent along with list of thirteen trustees and letter dated 20th September, 2013 but the third respondent made an endorsement on the said letter asking second petitioner to furnish details in prescribed Form-8 along with resolution of the Trust. Second respondent also sought explanation about delay in furnishing such information. Thereupon, requisite informations were furnished in the office of third respondent alongwith Form No.8 vide letter dated 29th May, 2015. After receiving the aforesaid letter and the requisite information in prescribed Form No.8, third respondent commenced inquiry under Section 23 of the Act by registering the proceedings on 9th June, 2015. Third respondent asked the Trust to produce the documents by fixing next date as 6th of July, 2015. It so happened, as is evident from the pleadings, that second petitioner called a general body meeting of the Trust on 12th of June, 2015 at 3:00 PM, wherein as per the version of the petitioners, some of the miscreants created ruckus and that led to adjournment of the meeting when the inquiry proceedings were going on before third respondent. It so happened, as is evident from the pleadings, that second petitioner called a general body meeting of the Trust on 12th of June, 2015 at 3:00 PM, wherein as per the version of the petitioners, some of the miscreants created ruckus and that led to adjournment of the meeting when the inquiry proceedings were going on before third respondent. Thereafter, counsel representing cause of respondent No.4 & 5 submitted an application on 15th June 2015 along with Form No.8 under the signature of fourth respondent showing the names and details of newly elected trustees, who were elected on 12th of June, 2015. In the application, Form No.8 submitted to third respondent an intimation that the general body has elected 22 trustees on 12th June, 2015 is divulged. For substantiating these assertions, the minutes of the meeting of the Trust are also enclosed. The petitioners have categorically alleged in the writ petition that the minutes of the meeting dated 12th June 2015, submitted by respondents No.4 & 5 are forged and spurious documents and as such these documents have no legal sanctity. It is further averred that the minutes are recorded in absence of second petitioner, who is President of the Trust, and in want of his signature on the minutes, such minutes are void and of no significance. The petitioners have set out a specific case that some of the miscreants created disturbance in the meeting dated 12th of June, 2015, and because of their nefarious designs and nuisance second petitioner postponed the meeting. As a matter of fact, the petitioners have came out with a case that after adjournment of meeting by its President, respondents No.4 & 5 organized an unlawful congregation to give it shape of general body meeting, and therefore, the so-called election of 22 trustees is an outcome of that congregation. Categorising the said meeting as illegal, the petitioners have taken serious exception to the so-called trustees elected in that meeting. As per petitioners, the alleged trustees have no right to act as trustees or to misuse the name of the Trust. In that background, at the behest of first and second petitioner, an application is submitted before third respondent on 24th June, 2015 to reject Form No.8 submitted on 15th June 2015 and further for issuance of a restraint order against them from using name of the Trust. In that background, at the behest of first and second petitioner, an application is submitted before third respondent on 24th June, 2015 to reject Form No.8 submitted on 15th June 2015 and further for issuance of a restraint order against them from using name of the Trust. The said application of the first and second petitioner found favour of third respondent and an order was made on 29th June, 2015 thereby respondents No.4 & 5 were asked not to use the name of Trust and further they were restrained from collecting fund on behalf of the Trust. Thereafter, rival claims were considered by the third respondent and after hearing counsels for both the parties, on 27th July, 2015, third respondent posted the matter for 4th August, 2015 for further hearing/investigation with a direction to produce original register and minutes etc. On 4th August, 2015, third respondent heard parties and examined record. After perusal of the record, third respondent by the order impugned directed for convening meeting of the general body on 25th August, 2015 at 1:00 PM at the registered office of the Trust for conducting inquiry/verification of particulars of trustees of rival group. Third respondent further directed the parties to give public notice of the ensuing meeting in a newspaper having circulation in the area, in which members of the Trust reside. It is this order, with which the petitioners are aggrieved. Precisely, the petitioners have taken shelter of Section 23 of the Act by urging that the procedure adopted by third respondent for making inquiry is contrary to the mandate of Section 23 of the Act. Petitioners' whole grievance is the manner of holding inquiry by third respondent, and they have attempted to categorise the procedure adopted by third respondent for the inquiry infirm and dehors the law. The petitioners have also taken shelter of Section 18 of the Act and Rule 22 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Rules, 1962 (for short, ‘Rules of 1962’) by submitting that this sort of inquiry is not at all permissible under law. Therefore, in that background, the petitioners have craved for issuance of a writ of prohibition to stall inquiry undertaken by third respondent under Section 23 of the Act. Respondent No.5 has submitted reply to the writ petition refuting all the averments contained in the writ petition. Therefore, in that background, the petitioners have craved for issuance of a writ of prohibition to stall inquiry undertaken by third respondent under Section 23 of the Act. Respondent No.5 has submitted reply to the writ petition refuting all the averments contained in the writ petition. As per fifth respondent, a meeting of general body of the Trust was convened on 12th June, 2015 and during the meeting, second respondent left the meeting and that necessitated completing the meeting in presence of 117 members of the Trust having faith in Achalgach sect. It is also submitted that the general body, while expressing serious concern about mis-management in the Trust, elected 22 trustees and a list containing their names is submitted before third respondent in Form No.8. While adverting to the inquiry under Section 23 of the Act conducted by third respondent, it is urged that the same is in accordance with law and cause of grievance of the petitioners, in this behalf, is not tenable. Defending the impugned order, it is submitted that the whole attempt of third respondent is to unearth the truth for the purpose of verifying the correctness of the entries in the register or ascertaining whether any change has occurred in the members recorded in register. It is also submitted in the return by the fifth respondent that no specific mode of inquiry is prescribed under Section 23 of the Act and third respondent while passing the impugned order has made sincere endeavour to make inquiry in a democratic manner, which cannot be faulted in any manner whatsoever. On behalf of fourth respondent, no formal reply is submitted. Mr. M.S. Singhvi, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Dinesh Mehta, submits that the Assistant Commissioner has over-stepped its jurisdiction in calling general body meeting of the Trust on 25th of August 2015, and as such the order impugned cannot be sustained. Mr. Singhvi has urged that while passing the order, the Assistant Commissioner has not at all cared to examine the trust-deed and relevant provisions governing the province of inquiry under Section 23 of the Act. Mr. Singhvi has strenuously urged that the impugned order is wholly without jurisdiction, and therefore, it is a fit case wherein writ of prohibition is liable to be issued against the Assistant Commissioner not to continue the inquiry proceedings dehors the law. Lastly, Mr. Mr. Singhvi has strenuously urged that the impugned order is wholly without jurisdiction, and therefore, it is a fit case wherein writ of prohibition is liable to be issued against the Assistant Commissioner not to continue the inquiry proceedings dehors the law. Lastly, Mr. Singhvi would contend that the manner in which the inquiry is sought to be conducted by the Assistant Commissioner is a blatant attempt to enlarge the scope of inquiry envisaged under Section 23 of the Act and Rules 21 and 23 of the Rules of 1962. In support of his contentions, Mr. Singhvi has placed reliance on a Constitution Bench judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. V/s. Income-tax Officer, Companies District-I, Calcutta and Anr. [ AIR 1961 SC 372 ], wherein speaking for the majority Justice K.C. Das Gupta brushed aside the existence of alternative remedy for issuance of a writ of prohibition if it is found that authority is acting without jurisdiction. The Could held: Mr. Sastri mentioned more than once the fact that the company would have sufficient opportunity to raise this question, viz., whether the Income-tax Officer had reason to believe that under assessment had resulted from nondisclosure of material facts, before the Income-tax Officer himself in the assessment proceedings and, if unsuccessful there, before the appellate officer or the appellate tribunal or in the High Court under S.66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The existence of such alternative remedy is not however always a sufficient reason for refusing a party quick relief by a writ or order prohibiting an authority acting without jurisdiction from continuing such action. In the present case the company contends that the conditions precedent for the assumption of jurisdiction under S.34 were not satisfied and come to the court at the earliest opportunity. There is nothing in its conduct which would justify the refusal of proper relief under Art.226. When the Constitution confers on the High Courts the power to give relief it becomes the duty of the courts to give such relief in fit cases and the courts would be failing to perform their duty if relief is refused without adequate reasons. In the present case we can find no reason for which relief should be refused. On the ambit and scope of inquiry envisaged under Section 23 of the Act, Mr. In the present case we can find no reason for which relief should be refused. On the ambit and scope of inquiry envisaged under Section 23 of the Act, Mr. Singhvi has placed reliance on two decisions of this Court, namely, (i) Agrawal Samaj Sampati Trust, Bhilwara & Ors. V/s. State of Rajasthan & Anr. [2007-08 DNJ (Raj.) (Suppl.) 190], and (ii) Bhanwar Lal Kalani V/s. Assistant Commissioner, Devsthan & Ors. [2013 (1) RLW 661 (Raj.). In both these verdicts, as a matter of fact, the question involved was different and as such the Co-ordinate Bench had no occasion to examine the scope and ambit of inquiry under Section 23 of the Act. Per contra, Mr. P.P. Choudhary, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Sandeep Shah and Mr. Moti Singh, for the fourth respondent submits that there is no infirmity much less legal infirmity in the impugned order warranting interference. Mr. Choudhary, would contend that the Assistant Commissioner has made a sincere endeavour to ascertain wish of the members by calling meeting of general body and as such the procedure adopted for making inquiry is in consonance and conformity with Section 23 of the Act. Mr. Choudhary submits that calling general body meeting of the Trust is a most democratic way to verify occurrence of changes in any of the entries recorded in the register, more particularly, when information about the proposed changes made at the behest of petitioners was intimated to the Assistant Commissioner after a lapse of more than two years. To sum up his arguments, learned counsel would contend that writ of prohibition is not a matter of course and the same is to be resorted sparingly. Mr. R.K. Thanvi, learned Senior Advocate with Mr. Narendra Thanvi, for the fifth respondent urged that for making inquiry under Section 23 of the Act, no specific procedure is provided under the Act and therefore the manner in which inquiry is sought to be conducted by learned Assistant Commissioner cannot be faulted. Mr. Thanvi submits that sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the Act envisages with clarity and precision that it is solely within the discretion of the learned Assistant Commissioner to make necessary inquiry for recording its satisfaction about occurrence of change under sub-section (3) on receipt of notice under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act. Lastly, Mr. Mr. Thanvi submits that sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the Act envisages with clarity and precision that it is solely within the discretion of the learned Assistant Commissioner to make necessary inquiry for recording its satisfaction about occurrence of change under sub-section (3) on receipt of notice under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act. Lastly, Mr. Thanvi submits that the whole endeavour of the Assistant Commissioner to verify occurrence of changes in any of the entries recorded in the register, is not liable to be stalled by issuing a writ of prohibition. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The Act, governing the province of public trust in the State of Rajasthan, was promulgated with laudable objects. Precisely, the aims and objects of the Act are to regulate and to make better provision for the administration of public, religious and charitable trusts in the State. The Act is inspired by Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. In Ratilal Panachand Gandhi [ AIR 1953 Bom. 242 ], speaking for the Court, Hon'ble Justice Chagla C.J., observed that “the whole attempt and the whole object is to see that the properties settled on public and charitable trusts are properly managed and are properly administered, that the trustees keep proper accounts, that the trustees render those accounts, answer questions put to them arising out of those accounts, and every single provision contained in the Act is incorporated from that point of view.” As, in the present case essentially, the lis involved is the nature of inquiry envisaged under Section 23 of the Act, it has become imperative for this Court to examine the nature, ambit and scope of the inquiry. In order to examine true purport of Section 23 of the Act, complete text of Section 23 is reproduced as infra: Sec. 23 - Changes: (1) Where any change occurs in any of the entries recorded in the register, the working trustee shall, within ninety days from the date of the occurrence of such change, or, where any change is desired in such entries in the interest of the administration of such public trust, the working trustee may, report in the prescribed form and manner such change or proposed change to the Assistant Commissioner. (2) For the purpose of verifying the correctness of the entries in the register or ascertaining whether any change has occurred in any of the particulars recorded in the register, the Assistant Commissioner may hold an inquiry. (3). If, after holding such inquiry as he may consider necessary under sub-section (2) either on receipt of a report under sub-section (1) or otherwise, the Assistant Commissioner is satisfied that a change has occurred or is necessary in any of the entries recorded in the register in regard to the particular public trust, he shall record a finding with the reasons therefore and the provisions of section 20 shall apply to such finding as they apply to a finding under section 19. (4). The Assistant Commissioner shall cause the entries in the register to be amended in accordance with the finding recorded under subsection (3) or, if an appeal has been filed therefrom, in accordance with decision of the Commissioner on such appeal and the provisions of section 21 and 22 shall apply to such amended entries as they apply to the original entries. In order to elicit the nature of inquiry as envisaged under Section 23 of the Act, quoted hereinabove, it is necessary to examine the connotation of the word “satisfied” under sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the Act. On harmonious construction of the language employed under Section 23 of the Act, there remains no quarrel that “satisfaction” implies a judicial or judicious satisfaction based upon materials, as against arbitrary or capricious satisfaction having no relation with the material. If sub sections (2) and (3) of Section 23 of the Act are construed liberally, then it would ipso facto reveal that the provisions intend to include a change proposed and desired in the interest of the administration of public trust. In such a situation, Assistant Commissioner is duty bound to make inquiry when any change is proposed or desired in the interest of administration of public trust and if he is satisfied about such proposed change and the validity and legality thereof he has to record a finding to that effect and to amend the entries in the Public Trust Register in accordance with such finding. In the backdrop of peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case, there are two rival fractions pitted against each other, one headed by second respondent and the other by respondents No.4 & 5. From the facts averred in the writ petition, it is amply clear as per version of the petitioners that for last many years, the family of second petitioner is managing affairs of the Trust and no record about the formal list of members of the Trust is available. Every individual, who is reposing faith in Achalgach sect, belonging to the area, is a member of Trust having interest in the affairs of the Trust. Taking into account this sort of situation, and there being apparent conflict of interest in between two fractions, the dispute which has cropped up, has rightly persuaded the learned Assistant Commissioner to make an inquiry in the interest of the administration of the Trust. A very redeeming feature of the case is that as per petitioners' assertion three new trustees were elected and in the year 2013 requisite information was divulged to the Assistant Commissioner and the election of new trustees, in the general body meeting of the Trust, was in presence of twenty-two members. The election of three trustees and divulging of information, in this behalf, is also seriously questionable for the simple reason that the Assistant Commissioner has found that the requisite information is divulged belatedly. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the claim of the rival fractions by submitting minutes of meeting of general body dated 12th June 2015, which is attended by as many as 117 members, wherein 22 new trustees were elected, coupled with Form No.8 submitted by that fraction, clearly goes to show that in the meeting dated 12th June, 2015 some deliberations took place raising voice against the administration of trust and further large number of the members of the Trust, having faith in Achalgach sect have elected 22 new trustees to ensure correction in the register of the Trust. Considering the rival claims wherein the fraction led by the respondents is supported by 117 members as against 22 members of the petitioners' fraction, the learned Assistant Commissioner has rightly resorted to make an inquiry under Section 23 of the Act. Considering the rival claims wherein the fraction led by the respondents is supported by 117 members as against 22 members of the petitioners' fraction, the learned Assistant Commissioner has rightly resorted to make an inquiry under Section 23 of the Act. I have made all endeavour to find out the true nature of the inquiry and, in my considered opinion, the discretion conferred on the Assistant Commissioner to hold inquiry is wide and the intent of Legislature is that Assistant Commissioner is required to unearth the truth about the change in the entries. In that background, if the impugned order is subjected to judicial scrutiny then it would, ipso facto, reveal that the learned Assistant Commissioner has resorted to a very transparent and democratic method of ascertaining the Will of the members of the Trust. In the democratic set up giving credence to the individual members of the Trust for verifying the proposed or desired changes in the entries of register of the Trust, in my opinion, is the best method, which the Commissioner has adopted. Therefore, I am unable to subscribe the view that the learned Assistant Commissioner has over-stepped its jurisdiction or has acted without jurisdiction. One more redeeming feature is that for making an inquiry in a transparent and pragmatic manner, no motive can be attributed to the Assistant Commissioner for finding any fault with the impugned order. The order or prohibition is not of a right unless the defect of jurisdiction is clear. In the instant case, Section 23 of the Act clearly confers jurisdiction on the Assistant Commissioner to make inquiry, and therefore, the contention of the petitioners falls flat that proceeding with the inquiry is an act, which is without jurisdiction. The main object of prohibition is to prevent excess of jurisdiction or failure to observe the law in exercise of jurisdiction. As there is no material on record to suggest that the learned Assistant Commissioner has acted de-hors the law, the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. (supra) cannot render any assistance to the cause of the petitioners. The Legislature has intrusted the learned Assistant Commissioner with the jurisdiction to make necessary inquiry under Section 23 of the Act which includes to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or to do something more. The Legislature has intrusted the learned Assistant Commissioner with the jurisdiction to make necessary inquiry under Section 23 of the Act which includes to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or to do something more. In totality, in my considered opinion, the learned Assistant Commissioner has made sincere endeavour to act fairly and reasonably to proceed with the inquiry for unearthing the truth. The manner in which he is proceeding with the inquiry is not only transparent but also in adherence of the ethos of the democratic norms and the tenets of the Act. Therefore, viewed from any angle, it is not a fit case wherein extraordinary equitable jurisdiction is to be exercised to stall on going inquiry and so also to upset the impugned order passed by the learned Assistant Commissioner. The upshot of above discussion is that there is no merit in this writ petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.