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2015 DIGILAW 1578 (RAJ)

Manni Devi v. State of Rajasthan

2015-08-25

BELA M.TRIVEDI

body2015
ORDER 1. The notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'), being the same, all the petitions were heard together and are being disposed of finally at the admission stage, with the consent of the learned counsels for the parties. 2. The short facts giving rise to the present petitions are that the lands of the petitioners were sought to be acquired by the State Government vide the notification dated 5.2.08 issued under Section 4 of the said Act, for the purpose of construction of road for the respondent No.3-JDA in relation to Special Economic Zone Scheme. The Land Acquisition Officer having submitted the report after the inquiry under Section 5(A), the State Government issued the declaration under Section 6 of the said Act on 6.2.08. The said declaration was earlier challenged by the petitioners by filing the SBCWP No. 1997/09 and two others on the ground that the petitioners were not given the opportunity of hearing in the inquiry as contemplated under Section 5(A) of the said Act. The said petitions came to be allowed by the High Court vide the common judgment dated 8.7.11 in which directions were given to the Land Acquisition Officer to consider the objections of the petitioners filed by them under Section 5(A) of the said Act. It was further observed interalia that the respondents shall be at liberty to proceed further with the notification under Section 4 of the said Act, after affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioners in terms of Section 5(A) of the said Act in accordance with law. The Land Acquisition Officer thereafter considered the objections of the petitioners and submitted the report to the State Government, which issued fresh declaration under Section 6 of the said Act on 9.7.12. The said declaration has again been challenged by the petitioners in the instant petition on the ground that the fresh declaration issued under Section 6 was beyond the period of limitation prescribed therein. The petition has been resisted by the respondent No.3 by filing the reply to which the petitioners have filed the rejoinder. 3. The said declaration has again been challenged by the petitioners in the instant petition on the ground that the fresh declaration issued under Section 6 was beyond the period of limitation prescribed therein. The petition has been resisted by the respondent No.3 by filing the reply to which the petitioners have filed the rejoinder. 3. The bone of contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the second declaration issued by the State Government under Section 6 of the said Act being after the prescribed period of one year of the last publication of Section 4 notification, the same was bad in law in view of the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in case of Padma Sundara Rao (dead) & ors. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 533 . 4. While distinguishing the facts of the present case from the facts of the aforestated decision of the Supreme Court, the learned counsel Mr. G.S Gill, AAG for the respondent- State and Mr. Anuroop Singh and Mr. Mahendra Goyal for the respondent-JDA submitted that 70% of the lands under Section notification have already been acquired and the road also has been constructed thereon and it is only the lands of the petitioners which are required for completion of road for approaching the National Highway, and that great hardship would be caused if the entire road is not allowed to be completed. 5. Though the learned counsels for the parties have argued at length, the controversy involved in the instant cases move in a very narrow compass. The moot question is, whether after quashing of the notification under Section 6 of the said Act, fresh period of one year is available to the State Government to issue another notification under Section 6? As such, the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Padma Sundara Rao (dead) & ors. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.(supra) clinches the said issue. In the said case the Apex Court while overruling the decision in the case of N. Narasimhaiah Vs. State of Karnataka (1996) 3 SCC 88 and in case of State of Karnataka Vs. D.C. Nanjudaiah (1996) 10 SCC 619 , held as under :- "14. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. In the said case the Apex Court while overruling the decision in the case of N. Narasimhaiah Vs. State of Karnataka (1996) 3 SCC 88 and in case of State of Karnataka Vs. D.C. Nanjudaiah (1996) 10 SCC 619 , held as under :- "14. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. [See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. vs. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd. ( 2000 (5) SCC 515 )]. ‘The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. Language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah’s case (supra). In Nanjudaiah’s case (supra), the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of High Court’s order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clauses (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent. 15. Two principles of construction one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result", said Danckwerts, L.J., in Artemiou v. Procopiou (1966 1 QB 878), "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available". Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke v. I.R.C. (1966 AC 557) where at p. 577 he also observed: "this is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges".] 16. The plea relating to applicability of the stare decisis principles is clearly unacceptable. The decision in K Chinnathambi Gounder (supra) was rendered on 22.6.1979 i.e. much prior to the amendment by the 1984 Act. If the Legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under Section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation. The maxim ’actus curia neminem gravibit’ highlighted by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court has no application to the fact situation of this case." 6. The undisputed facts in the present cases are that the first declaration issued under Section 6 of the said Act on 9.9.08, was set aside by the High Court vide order dated 8.7.11, in the Writ Petition being No. 1997/09 and others, and the matter was sent back to the Land Acquisition Officer for affording opportunity to the petitioners in terms of Section 5(A) of the said Act in accordance with law. Thereafter the fresh declaration under Section 6 was issued by the State Government on 9.7.12. Thereafter the fresh declaration under Section 6 was issued by the State Government on 9.7.12. Since the period of one year from the date of last publication of Section 4 notification had already expired, when the High Court passed the order in the writ petition on 8.7.11, the State Government could not have issued fresh declaration under Section 6 as sought to be done on 9.7.12, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the aforestated decision in case of Padma Sundra Rao (supra). 7. Though it was sought to be submitted by the learned AAG Mr. Gill for the respondent-State that since the petitioners had not challenged the order passed by the High Court in the earlier writ petitions directing the Land Acquisition Officer to afford an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners under Section 5 (A) of the said Act, the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the said Act could not be said to have been lapsed and the petitioners were estopped from raising the contention that the subsequent declaration issued under Section 6 one year after the last publication of the notification under Section 4 of the said Act was bad in law. It is difficult to accept the said submission of the learned AAG in view of the decision of the Apex Court in case of Vijay Narayan Thatte & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2009) 9 SCC 92 , in which it has been held that there cannot be an estoppel against the Statute. In similar facts, the Supreme Court in the said case has observed as under :- "In our opinion, there can be no estoppel against a statute. Since the statute is very clear, the period of limitation provided in clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6 of the Act has to be followed, and concessions of the counsel can have no effect. As already stated above, the proviso is mandatory in nature, and must operate with its full rigour vide Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana (2007) 3 SCC 470 ." 8. As already stated above, the proviso is mandatory in nature, and must operate with its full rigour vide Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana (2007) 3 SCC 470 ." 8. In view of the aforesaid settled legal position, it is required to be held that the subsequent declaration dated 9.7.12 issued by the State Government under Section 6 of the said Act, having been issued after the period of limitation prescribed in the proviso to Section 6(1) of the said Act, the land acquisition proceedings in respect of the petitioners' lands have stood lapsed. It is needless to state that the respondent-State would always be at liberty to initiate fresh land acquisition proceedings as may be permissible under the law. 9. In that view of the matter, the notification dated 5.2.08 issued under Section 4 and the declaration dated 9.7.12 issued under Section 6 of the said Act, by the respondent-State in respect of the petitioners' lands in question are hereby quashed and set aside. All the petitions stand allowed accordingly. The stay applications and any other application pending in all the writ petitions also stand disposed of accordingly. A copy of this order be placed in other two connected petitions.