Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 1591 (RAJ)

Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited v. The Judge, Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal, Bhilwara

2015-08-27

GOVIND MATHUR, JAISHREE THAKUR

body2015
JUDGMENT 1. By a notification dated 16.6.2006 the Appropriate Government referred an industrial dispute for its adjudication to the Labour Court, Bhilwara in the terms that "Whether termination of the workman Rajesh Joshi S/o. Shri Om Prakash Joshi, resident of 223-A, Kashipuri, Bhilwara (Raj.) by his employer M/s. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited, B-2, Mahalaxmi Chamber, Bhula Bhai Desai Road, Mumbai (Maharashtra) 400 026 from service w.e.f. 16.6.2005 is just and valid? If not, then for what relief the workman is entitled?" 2. The workman submitted a statement of claim before the Labour Court on 19.10.2006 with assertion that being appointed as Medical Representative, he entered in service of the employer M/s. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited on 17.6.1999 and was promoted as Field Sales Officer on 24.4.2000. He was discontinued from service w.e.f. 16.6.2005 without adhering the procedure prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1947'). A copy of notice as well as statement of claim was sent to the employer at the given address but no one appeared on its behalf, despite service. The Labour Court, thus, on 19.10.1996 decided to proceed ex-parte. The Labour Court after examining the evidence adduced by the respondent-workman arrived at a conclusion that discontinuation from service in question amounts to retrenchment and that was effected without adhering the mandatory condition precedent to do so as prescribed under Section 25-F of the Act of 1947, thus, the workman is entitled for re-instatement in service with 50% of the back-wages accrued. 3. After passing of the Award and its publication, an application on 21.10.2008 was filed by the employer as per provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Dispute Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules of 1958') to set aside the ex-parte Award. The Labour Court on 22.1.2009 dismissed the application being not filed within a period of 30 days from the date of Award. Being aggrieved by the same, the employer-appellant/petitioner preferred a petition for writ, that came to be dismissed by the judgment impugned dated 19.3.2014. The learned Single Bench while dismissing the writ petition held that the notices issued to the firm sent through the Registered Post were served upon it but without any sufficient cause, no one appeared before the Labour Court, hence no reason exists to set aside the Award. The learned Single Bench while dismissing the writ petition held that the notices issued to the firm sent through the Registered Post were served upon it but without any sufficient cause, no one appeared before the Labour Court, hence no reason exists to set aside the Award. The learned Single Bench looking to this factual background refused to interfere with the order passed by the Labour Court. 4. In appeal, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant are:- (1) the respondent is a Medical Representative, hence is not a workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the Act of 1947, therefore, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the industrial dispute; (2) without prejudice to the above, the Labour Court failed to appreciate that the notice was served upon the address where the office of the appellant-petitioner was not functional and (3) the Labour Court is having ample power to condone delay in filing application under Rule 22-A of the Rules of 1958, but the authority aforesaid was not invoked without any just reason. 5. While opposing the appeal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Shri Rajesh Joshi submits that the petitioner being a Medical Representative is a sales promotion employee and by the force of Sub-Section (2) of Section 6 of the Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1976') the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is having absolute application. It is pointed out that, though, an amendment was introduced in the year 1982 to omit Sub-Section (2) of Section 6 of the Act of 1976 but that has yet not been omitted by bringing Section 24 of the Amendment Act in force. This fact has not been disputed by learned counsel for the appellant. It is further submitted that, though, the Labour Court is having power under Rule 22-A of the Rules of 1958 to condone delay in applying for setting aside the ex-parte Award but that can be done only on showing a sufficient cause and in the instant matter, no sufficient cause has been found by the Labour Court to condone the delay in filing application under Rule 22-A and also to set-aside the Award ex-party. 6. Heard learned counsels. 7. 6. Heard learned counsels. 7. So far as the application of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in the instant matter is concerned, suffice to mention that as per Sub-Section (2) of Section (6) of the Act of 1976, the Act aforesaid is having application. The parties too accept this legal position. 8. So far as sufficient cause to condone delay in filing the application is concerned, it shall be appropriate to mention that whatever reasons given in the application preferred under Rule 22-A are only with regard to the reasons for not appearing before the Labour Court, but no reason is given for causing delay in filing such application. The Award was passed by the Labour Court on 29.11.2006 and the application under Rule 22-A was preferred on 20.11.2008. No adequate reason was given for causing such delay. The application under Rule 22-A was filed even after publication of the notification as per Section 17 of the Act of 1947. 9. In view of whatever stated above, we do not find any wrong with the order passed by the Labour Court and its affirmation by the learned Single Bench. The appeal, therefore, is dismissed. No order as to costs.Appeal Dismissed. *******