Judgment : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge (Oral) By medium of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the impugned notice dated 27.5.2015 (Annexure P-4) whereby her services came to be dispensed with. 2. The petitioner vide letter dated 14.3.2013 was offered appointment of Nursing Assistant (X-ray Assistant/Radiographer) for ECHS Polyclinic Kullu where she after executing the requisite agreement joined as such on 1.4.2013. The contract of the petitioner was thereafter renewed for another 12 months vide agreement dated 1.4.2014 and thereafter subsequently renewed for another 12 months on 4.4.2015. However, vide notice dated 27.5.2015 the petitioner was informed that since the scales of Nursing Assistants in the Polyclinic had been reduced, therefore, it had been decided to conclude her services. This action of the respondents has been assailed on the ground that once the contract of the petitioner had been renewed, there was no occasion for the respondents to have issued the impugned notice. Moreover, the petitioner was otherwise ready and willing to work under the reduced scale and should have therefore been offered the appointment on the reduced scales. 3. The respondents have filed their reply wherein the facts narrated in the petition have not been disputed/However, it has been submitted that during the period when the petitioner had been working on contractual basis, the scales of man-power authorization of ECHS Polyclinic Type-D had been reduced from two Nursing Assistants to one Nursing Assistant only. It was due to reduction of the scale of manpower, the services of the petitioner were terminated. In support of such submission, the respondents have also placed on record the extract of the reduction of the scales of manpower authorization as Annexure R-1. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case carefully and meticulously. 4. It is not in dispute that the services of the petitioner came to be dispensed with only on account of the rationalizing /restructuring and revamping of the respondent-organization whereby the scales of the authorized manpower was ordered to be reduced. Rationalizing/restructuring and revamping of services are essentially matters pertaining to ‘policy’ which ordinarily should not be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5. Rationalizing/restructuring and revamping of services are essentially matters pertaining to ‘policy’ which ordinarily should not be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5. Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is trite law that the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision making process. The judicial review is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision is made and the Court sits in judgment only on the correctness of the decision making process and not on the correctness of the decision itself. The Court confines itself to the question of legality and is concerned only with, whether the decision making authority exceeded its power, committed an error of law, or committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, reached an unreasonable decision or abused its powers. 6. On matters affecting policy, this Court does not interfere unless the policy is unconstitutional or contrary to the statutory provisions or arbitrary or irrational or in abuse of power. It is more than settled that the Government is entitled to make pragmatic adjustments and policy decisions, which may be necessary or called for under the prevalent peculiar circumstances. The Court may not strike down a policy decision taken by the Government merely because it feels that another decision would have been more fair or wise, scientific or logic. The principle of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness in governmental action is the core of our constitutional scheme and structure. Its interpretation will always depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. This has been the view of this Court in Nand Lal and another vs. State of H.P. and others, 2014 (2) HLR (DB) 982 and was followed in CWP No. 4625 of 2012 titled Gurbachan vs. State of H.P. and others, decided on 15.7.2014. 7. Its interpretation will always depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. This has been the view of this Court in Nand Lal and another vs. State of H.P. and others, 2014 (2) HLR (DB) 982 and was followed in CWP No. 4625 of 2012 titled Gurbachan vs. State of H.P. and others, decided on 15.7.2014. 7. That apart, the scope of judicial review and its exclusion was a subject matter of a recent decision by three Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Census Commissioner and others vs. R. Krishnamurthy (2015) 2 SCC 796 and it was held that it is not within the domain of Courts to embark upon enquiry as to whether particular public policy is wise and acceptable or whether better policy could be evolved, Court can only interfere if policy framed is absolutely capricious or not informed by reasons or totally arbitrary and founded on ipse dixit offending Article 14. It was held as under: “23. The centripodal question that emanates for consideration is whether the High Court could have issued such a mandamus commanding the appellant to carry out a census in a particular manner. 24. The High Court has tried to inject the concept of social justice to fructify its direction. It is evincible that the said direction has been issued without any deliberation and being oblivious of the principle that the courts on very rare occasion, in exercise of powers of judicial review, would interfere with a policy decision. 25. Interference with the policy decision and issue of a mandamus to frame a policy in a particular manner are absolutely different. The Act has conferred power on the Central Government to issue Notification regarding the manner in which the census has to be carried out and the Central Government has issued Notifications, and the competent authority has issued directions. It is not within the domain of the Court to legislate. The courts do interpret the law and in such interpretation certain creative process is involved. The courts have the jurisdiction to declare the law as unconstitutional. That too, where it is called for. The court may also fill up the gaps in certain spheres applying the doctrine of constitutional silence or abeyance. But, the courts are not to plunge into policy making by adding something to the policy by way of issuing a writ of mandamus. That too, where it is called for. The court may also fill up the gaps in certain spheres applying the doctrine of constitutional silence or abeyance. But, the courts are not to plunge into policy making by adding something to the policy by way of issuing a writ of mandamus. There the judicial restraint is called for remembering what we have stated in the beginning. The courts are required to understand the policy decisions framed by the Executive. If a policy decision or a Notification is arbitrary, it may invite the frown of Article 14 of the Constitution. But when the Notification was not under assail and the same is in consonance with the Act, it is really unfathomable how the High Court could issue directions as to the manner in which a census would be carried out by adding certain aspects. It is, in fact, issuance of a direction for framing a policy in a specific manner. 26. In this context, we may refer to a three-Judge Bench decision in Suresh Seth V. Commr., Indore Municipal Corporation, (2005) 13 SCC 287 wherein a prayer was made before this Court to issue directions for appropriate amendment in the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 so that a person may be debarred from simultaneously holding two elected offices, namely, that of a Member of the Legislative Assembly and also of a Mayor of a Municipal Corporation. Repelling the said submission, the Court held: (SCC pp. 288-89, para 5) “5……In our opinion, this is a matter of policy for the elected representatives of people to decide and no direction in this regard can be issued by the Court. That apart this Court cannot issue any direction to the legislature to make any particular kind of enactment. Under out constitutional scheme Parliament and Legislative Assemblies exercise sovereign power to enact laws and no outside power or authority can issue a direction to enact a particular piece of legislation. In Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 187 (SCC para 51) it has been held that no court can direct a legislature to enact a particular law. In Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 187 (SCC para 51) it has been held that no court can direct a legislature to enact a particular law. Similarly, when an executive authority exercises a legislative power by way of a subordinate legislation pursuant to the delegated authority of a legislature, such executive authority cannot be asked to enact a law which it has been empowered to do under the delegated legislative authority. This view has been reiterated in state of J & K v A.R. Zakki, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 548. In A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271 , it was held that no mandamus can be issued to enforce an Act which has been passed by the legislature.” 27. At this juncture, we may refer to certain authorities about the justification in interference with the policy framed by the Government. It needs no special emphasis to state that interference with the policy, though is permissible in law, yet the policy has to be scrutinized with ample circumspection. 28. In N.D. Jayal and Anr. V. Union of India & Ors. (2004) 9 SCC 362 , the Court has observed that in the matters of policy, when the Government takes a decision bearing in mind several aspects, the Court should not interfere with the same. In Narmada Bachao Andolan V. Union of India (2000) 10 SCC 664 , it has been held thus: (SCC p. 762, para 229) “229. “It is now well settled that the courts, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, will not transgress into the field of policy decision. Whether to have an infrastructural project or not and what is the type of project to be undertaken and how it has to be executed, are part of policy-making process and the courts are ill-equipped to adjudicate on a policy decision so undertaken. The court, no doubt, has a duty to see that in the undertaking of a decision, no law is violated and people’s fundamental rights are not transgressed upon except to the extent permissible under the Constitution.” 29. The court, no doubt, has a duty to see that in the undertaking of a decision, no law is violated and people’s fundamental rights are not transgressed upon except to the extent permissible under the Constitution.” 29. In this context, it is fruitful to refer to the authority in Rusom Cavasiee Cooper V. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248 , wherein it has been expressed thus: (SCC p. 294, para 63) “63….It is again not for this Court to consider the relative merits of the different political theories or economic policies... This Court has the power to strike down a law on the ground of want of authority, but the Court will not sit in appeal over the policy of Parliament in enacting a law”. 30. In Premium Granites V. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 2 SCC 691 while dealing with the power of the courts in interfering with the policy decision, the Court has ruled that: (SCC p.715, para 54) “54. it is not the domain of the court to embark upon unchartered ocean of public policy in an exercise to consider as to whether a particular public policy is wise or a better public policy could be evolved. Such exercise must be left to the discretion of the executive and legislative authorities as the case may be. The court is called upon to consider the validity of a public policy only when a challenge is made that such policy decision infringes fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India or any other statutory right.” 31. In M.P. Oil Extraction and Anr. V. State of M.P. & Ors. (1997) 7 SCC 592 , a two-Judge Bench opined that: (SCC p. 611, para 41) “41........ The executive authority of the State must be held to be within its competence to frame a policy for the administration of the State. Unless the policy framed is absolutely capricious and, not being informed by any reason whatsoever, can be clearly held to be arbitrary and founded on mere ipse dixit of the executive functionaries thereby offending Article 14 of the Constitution or such policy offends other constitutional provisions or comes into conflict with any statutory provision, the Court cannot and should not outstep its limit and tinker with the policy decision of the executive functionary of the State.” 32. In State of M.P. V. Narmada Bachao Andolan & Anr. In State of M.P. V. Narmada Bachao Andolan & Anr. (2011) 7 SCC 639 , after referring to the State of Punjab V. Ram Lubhaya Bagga (1998) 4 SCC 117 , the Court ruled thus: (SCC pp. 670-71, para 36) “36. The Court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by the Government merely because it feels that another decision would have been fairer or more scientific or logical or wiser. The wisdom and advisability of the policies are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review unless the policies [pic]are contrary to statutory or constitutional provisions or arbitrary or irrational or an abuse of power. (See Ram Singh Vijay Pal Singh v. State of U.P., (2007) 6 SCC 44 , Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India, (2009) 7 SCC 561 and State of Kerala v. Peoples Union for Civil Liberties, (2009) 8 SCC 46 .)” 33. From the aforesaid pronouncement of law, it is clear as noon day that it is not within the domain of the courts to embark upon an enquiry as to whether a particular public policy is wise and acceptable or whether a better policy could be evolved. The court can only interfere if the policy framed is absolutely capricious or not informed by reasons or totally arbitrary and founded ipse dixit offending the basic requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution. In certain matters, as often said, there can be opinions and opinions but the Court is not expected to sit as an appellate authority on an opinion.” 8. Aforesaid exposition of law would go to show that policy matters cannot normally be interfered with by the Courts, except where the policy is contrary to law or is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution or is arbitrary or irrational and the Courts must then perform their constitutional duties by striking it down. 9. Now, in case the principles as enunciated in the aforesaid judgments, is borne in mind, then the decision taken by the respondents to reduce its manpower cannot be termed to be contrary to law or in violation of the provisions of the Constitution or termed to be arbitrary or irrational. 10. Having said so, I find no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed alongwith pending application(s) if any. The parties are left to bear their own costs.