JUDGMENT : Prashant Kumar Mishra, J. Petitioner has assailed the legality and validity of the order passed by the competent authority under the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 (henceforth, 'Act, 1986, Raipur issuing recovery certificate against the petitioner for recovery of Rs. 20,000/- in each writ petition. In the matter of M.C. Mehta Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others, (1996) 6 SCC 756 , while dealing with the issue of abolition of child labour the Supreme Court constituted a Committee, obtained a report and thereafter held that every employer who is found engaging a child labour must be asked to pay compensation for every child employed in contravention of the provisions of the Act, a sum of Rs. 20,000/-; and the Inspectors whose appointment is visualized by section 17 to secure compliance with the provisions of the Act, should do this job. The Inspector appointed under section 17 was directed to see that for each child employed in violation of the provisions of the Act, the employer concerned pays Rs. 20,000/- which sum would be deposited in a fund to be known as Child Labour Rehabilitation-cum-Welfare Fund. The fund so generated shall form corpus whose income shall be used only for the child concerned. 2. Soon after the judgment of the Supreme Court the Inspector started issuing orders for recovery of Rs. 20,000/- without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. The matter was taken to the High Court wherein the proceedings were quashed in W.P. No. 84/1998 only on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice and the authorities were directed to take fresh decision in the matter after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. 3. The State Government, exercised its power under section 17 of the Act to issue a notification on 19/03/1997 appointing Inspectors for the purposes of securing compliance of the provisions of the Act. The notification said that all the members of the Survey Team constituted by the District Collectors are appointed as Inspectors under the Act, within their respective jurisdiction. Since, in the meanwhile the Collectors have also constituted Survey Team, each of the member of Survey Team, functioning as Inspectors under the Act, conducted survey in the various households wherein Gharkhata workers were engaged in rolling Beedis. 4. The present batch of writ petitions have been filed by two Beedi manufacturers. Since, in the meanwhile the Collectors have also constituted Survey Team, each of the member of Survey Team, functioning as Inspectors under the Act, conducted survey in the various households wherein Gharkhata workers were engaged in rolling Beedis. 4. The present batch of writ petitions have been filed by two Beedi manufacturers. In course of survey, the members of the Survey Team i.e. the Inspectors found that the petitioner has engaged the child labour and the said child labour was found rolling Beedi at the time of survey. On finding that the child found working in the house is aged less than 14 years the Inspector sent a notice to the petitioner asking him to deposit Rs. 20,000/- towards Child Labour-cum-Rehabilitation Fund. After submission of reply by the petitioners, statement of the Inspectors was recorded and thereafter the Assistant Labour Commissioner passed the impugned orders directing issuance of revenue recovery certificate for recovery of Rs. 20,000/- in each of the case. 5. Assailing the validity of the order, learned Counsel for the petitioners have urged that ...(i) appointment of Inspector by the Notification dated 28th November, 1996 and 13th October, 1997 amounts to delegating the power in favour of the Collector which is not permissible in law, (ii) there is no cogent proof or evidence that the child allegedly found rolling Beedi in his/her house is aged less than 14 years, (iii) the survey was conducted in the house of Gharkhata Workers over which petitioners have no control and thus, by virtue of proviso to section 3 of the Act, the petitioners cannot be held liable under the said provision, (iv) the Inspector submitted the report without visiting the establishment of petitioner or verifying in any other manner as to whether the petitioner, has employed the parents of the child or the child himself, therefore, the survey was not conducted in proper and fair manner. They would further argue that in the case of Hemendra Bhai Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2003) 2 LLJ 645 ,? this Court has already held that in cases where the parents of the child are Gharkhata Workers, the employer having no control over the engagement of such child by the parents, the provision of section 3 would not apply, therefore, the impugned orders deserves to be set-aside. 6. Shri Vyas, learned Assistant Solicitor General and Shri Rathore, learned State Counsel would support the impugned order. 6. Shri Vyas, learned Assistant Solicitor General and Shri Rathore, learned State Counsel would support the impugned order. They would submit that the appointment of Inspectors cannot be challenged collaterally without challenging the notification. According to them, the survey was conducted by the members of the Survey Team constituted by the Collector and there is no ground to disbelieve the statement made by the member of the Survey Team who was discharging the functions of Inspectors. 7. Under the Scheme of the Act, the liability of payment of amount of Rs. 20,000/- cannot be fastened without holding the petitioners' guilty of committing an offence which is made punishable under section 14 of the Act. The question as to whether any independent proceeding for recovery of amount of Rs. 20,000/- for engaging a child labour can be registered without initiating any criminal case or without the guilty persons being punished for committing an offence under section 14 of the Act is to be answered by referring to the order passed by the Supreme Court. In M.C. Mehta (supra) the Supreme Court has directed for creation of Child Welfare-cum-Rehabilitation Fund and has also directed that a sum of Rs. 20,000/- be recovered from each 'offending employer' who is found to engage child labour and the amount so recovered shall be paid to the concerned child. This direction is independent of any criminal action which may be initiated against the employer. The word offending employer/offending person has not been used in its literal sense to denote an accused or convict but it has been used only to point out the person who is found engaging a child labour. Similar view has been taken by Karnataka High Court in the matter of P. Sooryanarayana Shetty and Another Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (1999) ILR (Kar) 4721. 8. In the case in hand, the Surveyor had gone to conduct survey in the house of a Gharkhata Beedi Worker who is otherwise engaged by the petitioners. In fact there is no dispute about the fact that parents of the child involved in each of the writ petition are working as Gharkhata Worker and their names are submitted to the different authorities under the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966, Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Acts, 1952. In fact there is no dispute about the fact that parents of the child involved in each of the writ petition are working as Gharkhata Worker and their names are submitted to the different authorities under the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966, Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Acts, 1952. In some of the cases petitioners have filed the form submitted before the PF Commissioner, wherein name of the concerned child is mentioned as the child dependent upon the employee who is engaged by the petitioner. Thus, there appears no dispute whatsoever that the employee engaged by the petitioner is a Gharkhata Worker. 9. In the above state of fact, this Court is required to address itself as to whether by virtue of proviso to section 3 of the Act, the petitioners can be held guilty of violating section 3 and thereby throwing themselves in the net of the mischief created under the Act, 1986. Section 3 of the Act which is relevant for the issue is reproduced hereunder:-- "3. Prohibition of employment of children in certain occupations and processes.-- No child shall be employed or permitted to work in any of the occupations set forth in Part A of the Schedule or in any workshop wherein any of the processes set forth in Part B of the Schedule is carried on: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any workshop wherein any process is carried on by the occupier with the aid of his family or to any school established by, or receiving assistance or recognition from, Government." 10. The proviso to section 3, quoted above unequivocally declares that the mischief created under the provision in the main section is not applicable to any workshop wherein any process is carried on by the occupier with the aid of his family there is also no dispute about the practice prevalent in the Beedi manufacturing that Gharkhata Workers are usually employed by the Beedi manufacturers. In some cases, the house of such Gharkhata Worker has been treated to be part of establishment of Beedi manufacture. See: W.P.(L) No. 2684/2007. M/s. Manilal Dayalji and Company v. Smt. Gayatri Bai decided by this Court on 26th November, 2013. 11. In some cases, the house of such Gharkhata Worker has been treated to be part of establishment of Beedi manufacture. See: W.P.(L) No. 2684/2007. M/s. Manilal Dayalji and Company v. Smt. Gayatri Bai decided by this Court on 26th November, 2013. 11. The petitioners having employed Gharkhata worker and having obtained declaration from each of the Gharkhata Worker about the details of their family members including minors and child below 14 years, there was absolutely no control of the petitioners over the affairs which happens within four corners of the house of such Gharkhata Workers. It appears, considering the practice of permitting rolling of Beedis from the house and the possibility of the Gharkhata Workers being driven to be prosecuted for violation of the section 3 of the Act, the proviso has been engrafted so as to save such poor and innocent persons who on account of abject poverty or dying need of finances in times of ailment of senior members of the family may found to engage their children who eventually may be less than 14 years of age. 12. In the considered opinion of this Court, a child engaged by the such parents who happens to be a Gharkhata Worker or the employee who has no control over Gharkhata Worker cannot be held responsible for violating the provision contained in section 3 of the Act. 13. The argument with regard to excessive delegation by the State Government of its power to appoint Inspector should not detain this Court long because the present is not a case where the State Government has authorized the Collectors to appoint Inspectors. What the State Government has done is to notify a particular class of person i.e. the members of the Survey Team appointed by the Collectors, as Inspectors for discharging functions under the Act. If the State Government has appointed Inspectors by reference to their designation or capacity, such manner of appointment by issuing a notification is not violative of any provision of law. 14. In Habeeb Mohamed Vs. The State of Hyderabad, AIR 1953 SC 287 , the Supreme Court approved such appointment by designation by issuance of notification by the Chief Minister which has been held thus in para 13:-- "[13] The other question raised by the appellant relates to delegation of the authority by the Chief Minister to make over cases for trial by the Special Judge. Mr. Mr. Peerbhoy lays stress on section 5(b) of the Regulation which speaks of offences being "made over to the Special Judge for trial by the Chief Minister or by a person authorized by the Chief Minister in this behalf," and it is argued that this section requires that the delegatee is to be mentioned by name. What the Chief Minister has done is that he issued a notification authorising all civil administrators of the districts to exercise within their respective jurisdictions the powers of the Chief Minister under the said section. This, it is argued, is not in compliance with the provisions of the section. We do not think there is any substance in this contention. The delegatee can certainly be described by reference to his official designation and the authority may be vested in the holder of a particular office for the time being. This, we think, is quite a proper and convenient way of delegating the powers which are exercisable by the Chief Minister. In our opinion, the constitutional points raised by Mr. Peerbhoy fail. The application under Article 32 of the Constitution is thus rejected and the case is directed to be posted in the usual course for being heard on its merits." 15. In Beopar Sahayak (P) Ltd. and Others Vs. Vishwa Nath and Others, (1987) 3 SCC 693 , the Supreme Court has held thus:-- "Moreover, the appointment of Prescribed Authority was not as persona designate. On the other hand he exercised the powers of a Prescribed Authority by reason of his posting as Additional City Magistrate II, Kanpur, in the place of his predecessor, and by virtue of an earlier notification of the Government dated September 9, 1974 constituting the Additional City Magistrate II, Kanpur as the Prescribed Authority for certain area in Kanpur city. That notification was a general notification and therefore, whoever came to be posted as Additional City Magistrate II, Kanpur automatically became a Prescribed Authority for the areas indicated in the notification. Therefore, as long as the Government notification dated September 9, 1974 is not challenged, the exercise of powers by him as a Prescribed Authority cannot also be challenged." 16. In Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Golden Chariot Airport and Another, (2010) 10 SCC 422 , has held thus in para 62:-- "62. Therefore, as long as the Government notification dated September 9, 1974 is not challenged, the exercise of powers by him as a Prescribed Authority cannot also be challenged." 16. In Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Golden Chariot Airport and Another, (2010) 10 SCC 422 , has held thus in para 62:-- "62. It has not been argued by the learned Counsel for the contesting respondent that while issuing a notification under section 3, the Central Government will have to name a person or an individual as an Estate Officer. The appointment of such Estate Officer is by designation only. It is not in dispute that Mr. K.K. Gupta, who functioned as an Estate Officer and decided the case of the contesting respondent, was promoted and brought to Mumbai as Deputy General Manager (Land Management). This is admitted in the affidavit of the contesting respondent. Therefore, Mr. K.K. Gupta by virtue of his designation as Deputy General Manager (Land Management) discharged his function as a valid Estate Officer. There can be no dispute about his authority to do so since by the subsequent Notification dated 15.5.2007, the words "Airport Director" have been substituted for the words "Deputy General Manager (Land Management)". Hence, there is no substance in these contentions of the contesting respondent." 17. In view of the above, the issuance of notification for appointment of inspectors under the Act is not assailable and such members of survey team constituted by the Collector would automatically be entitled to perform the duties and functions of inspectors under the Act. 18. Shri Sharma has also argued that this Court already decided the same issue in Hement Bhai (supra) and the writ petition deserves to be allowed on the principle of 'doctrine of comity'. 19. The Supreme Court in India Household and Healthcare Ltd. Vs. LG Household and Healthcare Ltd., (2007) 5 SCC 510 , has held in para 16 thus:-- "16. The said issue is pending consideration before the Madras High Court. Not only the parties to the agreement but also those officers who have negotiated on behalf of the respective companies are also parties therein. LG Corporation which is the owner of the LG logo is also a party therein. Therein, an order of injunction had been passed. The said issue is pending consideration before the Madras High Court. Not only the parties to the agreement but also those officers who have negotiated on behalf of the respective companies are also parties therein. LG Corporation which is the owner of the LG logo is also a party therein. Therein, an order of injunction had been passed. In terms of the said order of injunction, the applicant herein was prohibited from taking any action in terms of the said agreement which would include the arbitration clause also. The order dated 21.1.2006 has become final. No appeal has been preferred there against. The applicant could have filed an appropriate application for modification of the order of injunction which it did not choose to do. The doctrine of comity or amity requires a Court not to pass an order which would be in conflict with another order passed by a competent Court of law. The Courts have jurisdiction to pass an order of injunction not only under Order XXXIX, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure but also under section 151 thereof." 20. The Supreme Court in Shankara Co-op Housing Society Ltd. Vs. M. Prabhakar and Others, (2011) 5 SCC 607 , has held in para 78 thus:-- "78. The doctrine of amity and comity requires the Court of concurrent jurisdiction to pass similar orders. In India Household and Healthcare Ltd. v. LG Household and Healthcare Ltd., this Court has held: (SCC p. 517, para 16) "16. The doctrine of comity or amity requires a Court not to pass an order which would be in conflict with another order passed by a competent Court of law." It was further held: (India Household case, SCC p. 517, para 17) "17. This aspect of the matter has been considered in A Treatise on the Law Governing Injunctions by Spelling and Lewis wherein it is stated: '8. Conflict and loss of jurisdiction.--Where a Court having general jurisdiction and having acquired jurisdiction of the subject-matter has issued an injunction, a Court of concurrent jurisdiction will usually refuse to interfere by issuance of a second injunction. There is no established rule of exclusion which would deprive a Court of jurisdiction to issue an injunction because of the issuance of an injunction between the same parties appertaining to the same subject-matter, but there is what may properly be termed a judicial comity on the subject. There is no established rule of exclusion which would deprive a Court of jurisdiction to issue an injunction because of the issuance of an injunction between the same parties appertaining to the same subject-matter, but there is what may properly be termed a judicial comity on the subject. And even where it is a case of one Court having refused to grant an injunction, while such refusal does not exclude another coordinate Court or Judge from jurisdiction, yet the granting of the injunction by a second Judge may lead to complications and retaliatory action....'" 21. On the basis of above discussion, this Court arrives at following conclusion:-- In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of M.C. Mehta (supra) the Inspector and the competent authority were entitled to draw the proceedings against the petitioners for violation of Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986. The notification dated 19.3.1997 appointing the member of Survey Team appointed by the Collectors as Inspectors under the Act 1986 does not suffer from vice of excessive delegation nor the competency of the Inspectors so appointed suffers from any illegality. The petitioners who are Beedi manufacturers having employed Gharkhata Workers and the said Gharkhata Workers having engaged their minor sons/daughters/family members, below the age of 14 years for rolling Beedis, they are protected under the proviso to section 3 of the Act and as such the provisions of the Act would not apply in cases where the concerned child labour was a family member of the Gharkhata Workers. On the basis of above conclusion, all the writ petitions are allowed. The impugned orders are quashed.