JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. In this appeal filed under Section 374 Cr.P.C., convict Sajjan Kumar has assailed the judgment dated 26.10.2013, passed by Special Judge-I, Sirmaur District at Nahan, H.P., in Sessions Trial No.23-ST/7 of 2013, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh Versus Sajjan Kumar, whereby he stands convicted for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the NDPS Act) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years and to pay fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- (rupees one lac) and in default thereof, further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year. 2. It is the case of prosecution that on 28.12.2012, police party comprising of HC Jagir Singh, Constable Vicky (not examined), Baljeet Singh (PW.3), headed by SI Ankush Dogra (PW.7) were on patrol duty at Giripul (H.P). A Naka was set up and vehicles were checked. At about 5.30 PM, bus bearing No.HP-64-7494, which came from Pulbahal side was checked. Accused, who was sitting inside the bus, was found carrying a yellow coloured bag on his lap. By associating independent witnesses Som Chand (PW.1) and Lokesh Attri (PW.2), the bag was checked and contraband substance weighing about 1 kg 865 grams was recovered. NCB form (Ex.PW.7/B) was filled up on the spot. The bag was sealed with a seal having impression ‘P’ and after taking sample of the seal on a separate piece of cloth (Ex.PW.7/A), seal was handed over to Som Chand (PW.1). The contraband substance was seized. Baljeet Singh (PW.3) carried Rukka (Ex.PW.3/A) which led to registration of FIR No.119/2012, dated 28.12.2012 (Ex.PW.3/B), under the provisions of Section 20 of the NDPS Act, by ASI Rajinder Kumar (PW.4) at Police Station, Rajgarh, District Sirmaur, H.P., against the accused. Accused was arrested on the spot. Contraband substance was entrusted to MHC Ram Lal (PW.8), who after making entries in the Malkhana register sent the sample through Anil Kumar (PW.5) for chemical analysis, report (Ex.PW.7/J) whereof, was also obtained by the police. With the completion of investigation, which revealed complicity of the accused to the alleged crime, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. The accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 20 of the NDPS Act, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. With the completion of investigation, which revealed complicity of the accused to the alleged crime, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. The accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 20 of the NDPS Act, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to establish its case, in all, prosecution examined as many as eight witnesses. Statement of the accused under the provisions of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was also recorded, in which he took defence of innocence and false implication. No evidence in defence was led by the accused. 5. Appreciating the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Trial Court convicted the accused of having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 20 of the NDPS Act and sentenced him as aforesaid. Hence the present appeal by the convict. 6. Having heard Mr. Anoop Chitkara, learned counsel, on behalf of the appellant as also Mr. Kush Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General and Mr. J.S. Guleria, learned Assistant Advocate General, on behalf of the State, as also minutely examined the testimonies of the witnesses and other documentary evidence, so placed on record by the prosecution, we are of the considered view that trial Court committed great illegality in convicting the accused, for the reasons discussed hereinafter. Contradictions and improbabilities which are glaring, rendering the prosecution case to be extremely doubtful, if not true, stand ignored. Conviction has resulted into travesty of justice. 7. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and another Versus State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 , the apex Court, has held as under: “…Lord Russel delivering the judgment of the Board pointed out that there was "no indication in the Code of any limitation or restriction on the High Court in the exercise of its powers as an appellate Tribunal", that no distinction was drawn "between an appeal from an order of acquittal and an appeal from a conviction", and that "no limitation should be placed upon that power unless it be found expressly stated in the Code". … (Emphasis supplied) 8. … (Emphasis supplied) 8. The apex Court in Lal Mandi v. State of W.B., (1995) 3 SCC 603 , has held that in an appeal against conviction, the appellate Court is duty bound to appreciate the evidence on record and if two views are possible on the appraisal of evidence, benefit of reasonable doubt has to be given to the accused. 9. Also it is settled position of law that graver the punishment the more stringent the proof and the obligation upon the prosecution to prove the same and establish the charged offences. 10. It is a matter of record that independent witnesses Som Chand (PW.1) and Lokesh Attri (PW.2) did not support the prosecution. They were declared hostile and extensively cross-examined by the Public Prosecutor, yet nothing fruitful could be elicited by the prosecution. We find that trial Court erred in rejecting their testimonies in toto. While doing so, trial Court relied upon the decision rendered by the apex Court in Jagir Singh Versus The State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1975 SC 1400 . It is here, we find the trial Court to have misapplied the provisions of law, for the judgment was based on distinguishable facts and attending circumstances and subsequently overruled in Sat Paul Versus Delhi Administration, (1976) 1 SCC 727 . 11. On the issue, Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in Sat Paul (supra) has held that:- “Granting of a permission by the Court to cross-examine his own witness does not amount to adjudication by the Court as to the veracity of a witness. It only means a declaration that the witness is adverse or unfriendly to the party calling him and not that the witness is untruthful.” 12. In State of U.P. Versus Ramesh Prasad Misra @ Anr., (1996) 10 SCC 360 Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has further held that:- “It is equally settled law that the evidence of a hostile witness would not be totally rejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution or the accused, but it can be subjected to close scrutiny and that portion of the evidence which is consistent with the case of the prosecution or defence may be accepted.” 13. In Radha Mohan Singh @ Kaksagev Versus State of U.P., (2006) 2 SCC 450 , a three Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held that:- “It is well settled that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witness cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent his version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof. [See: Bhagwan Singh Versus State of Haryana, AIR 1976 SC 202 , Rabinder Kumar Dey Versus State of Orissa, AIR 1977 SC 170 , Syed Akbar Versus State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848 and Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari Versus State of Madhya Pradesh, 1992(3) RCR (Crl.) 158 (SC)”.] 14. This decision stands followed in Khairudding and others Versus State of West Bengal, (2013) 5 SCC 753 and Sushil Ansal Versus State through Central Bureau of Investigation, (2014) 6 SCC 173 . 15. Thus, trial Court erred in holding that with the witness being declared hostile and cross-examined, he loses credibility and his testimony cannot be relied upon by the defence. 16. Though independent witnesses state that bus and the passengers sitting inside were searched, but they have categorically denied recovery of the contraband substance from the conscious possession of the accused. It be only observed that the witnesses in their uncontroverted testimonies have also deposed that police recovered the contraband substance from an unclaimed bag lying on the shelf, near the front window of the bus. Witnesses have further clarified that they signed the papers under pressure and threat of false implication. Their version stands probablized in view of admission made by the Investigating Officer Ankush Dogra (PW.7). He admits that though the police party had challaned several vehicles, but despite the driver and the conductor (private witnesses) not producing the permit, the bus was not challaned. Why so? remains unexplained. 17. In this backdrop, we find the version of the prosecution of having recovered the contraband substance from the conscious possession of the accused to be extremely doubtful. In fact two views with regard to recovery of the contraband substance from the conscious possession of the accused have emerged on record. 18. Why so? remains unexplained. 17. In this backdrop, we find the version of the prosecution of having recovered the contraband substance from the conscious possession of the accused to be extremely doubtful. In fact two views with regard to recovery of the contraband substance from the conscious possession of the accused have emerged on record. 18. It is also well established principle of law that (i) the appellate Court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be more probable; (ii) while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court must consider entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether views of the trial court are perverse or otherwise unsustainable; (iii) the appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, trial Court failed to take into consideration any admissible fact; and (iv) the trial Court failed to take into consideration any admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration evidence brought on record contrary to law. (See: Balak Ram & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1974 SC 2165 ; Allarakha K Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 3 SCC 57 ; Raghunath v. State of Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC 398 ; State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh & Ors., (2007) 13 SCC 102 ; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 2066 ; Sambhaji Hindurao Deshmukh & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 186 ; Arulvelu & Anr. v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 ; Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P., (2009) 16 SCC 98 ; and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 445 ). 19. In Sheo Swaroop and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 186 ; Arulvelu & Anr. v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 ; Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P., (2009) 16 SCC 98 ; and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 445 ). 19. In Sheo Swaroop and Ors. v. King Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227 , the Privy Council held that: "...the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses...." 20. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , the apex Court observed as under: "(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 21. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne @ Baijnath & Ors., (2009) 4 SCC 271 , the apex Court gave illustrations of certain circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court, which principle, in our considered view, would squarely apply to the judgment under review by us. The circumstances include; (i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; (ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; (v) Apex Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; and (vi) the apex Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal. The apex Court further held that “Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference with the decision of the trial court in a routine manner, where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for such interference.” (Emphasis supplied). The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference with the decision of the trial court in a routine manner, where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for such interference.” (Emphasis supplied). 22. It is also a settled proposition of law that sole testimony of police official, which if otherwise is reliable, trustworthy, cogent and duly corroborated by other witnesses or admissible evidence, cannot be discarded only on the ground that he is a police official and may be interested in the success of the case. It cannot be stated as a rule that a police officer can or cannot be a sole eyewitness in a criminal case. It will always depend upon the facts of a given case. If the testimony of such a witness is reliable, trustworthy, cogent and if required duly corroborated by other witnesses or admissible evidences, then the statement of such witness cannot be discarded only on the ground that he is a police officer and may have some interest in success of the case. It is only when his interest in the success of the case is motivated by overzealousness to an extent of his involving innocent people; in that event, no credibility can be attached to the statement of such witness. 23. It is not the law that Police witnesses should not be relied upon and their evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars by other independent evidence. The presumption applies as much in favour of a police officer as any other person. There is also no rule of law which lays down that no conviction can be recorded on the testimony of a police officer even if such evidence is otherwise reliable and trustworthy. Rule of prudence may require more careful scrutiny of their evidence. If such a presumption is raised against the police officers without exception, it will be an attitude which could neither do credit to the magistracy nor good to the public, it can only bring down the prestige of police administration. 24. Rule of prudence may require more careful scrutiny of their evidence. If such a presumption is raised against the police officers without exception, it will be an attitude which could neither do credit to the magistracy nor good to the public, it can only bring down the prestige of police administration. 24. Wherever, evidence of a police officer, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form basis of conviction and absence of some independent witness of the locality does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution case. No infirmity attaches to the testimony of the police officers merely because they belong to the police force and there is no rule of law or evidence which lays down that conviction cannot be recorded on the evidence of the police officials, if found reliable, unless corroborated by some independent evidence. Such reliable and trustworthy statement can form the basis of conviction. [See: Govindaraju alias Govinda v. State by Srirampuram Police Station and another, (2012) 4 SCC 722 ; Tika Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 15 SCC 760; Girja Prasad v. State of M.P., (2007) 7 SCC 625 ); and Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra]. 25. Apex Court in Tahir v. State (Delhi), (1996) 3 SCC 338 , dealing with a similar question, held as under:- "6. ....In our opinion no infirmity attaches to the testimony of the police officials, merely because they belong to the police force and there is no rule of law or evidence which lays down that conviction cannot be recorded on the evidence of the police officials, if found reliable, unless corroborated by some independent evidence. The Rule of Prudence, however, only requires a more careful scrutiny of their evidence, since they can be said to be interested in the result of the case projected by them. Where the evidence of the police officials, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form basis of conviction and the absence of some independent witness of the locality to lend corroboration to their evidence, does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution case." 26. Now when we peruse the testimonies of Baljeet Singh (PW.3) and Ankush Dogra (PW.7), we do not find the same to be inspiring in confidence. Now when we peruse the testimonies of Baljeet Singh (PW.3) and Ankush Dogra (PW.7), we do not find the same to be inspiring in confidence. Baljeet Singh is not signatory to the recovery memo or for that matter any of the documents prepared on the spot. Except for his oral testimony, his presence on the spot remains unproven on record. The contradiction which we find to be material in the testimonies of these police officials further renders his presence to be doubtful. 27. According to SI Ankush Dogra (PW.7), both he and Baljeet Singh (PW.3) entered the bus from the rear window. Luggage was kept on the shelves inside the bus. Accused, who had kept a yellow coloured bag on his lap, was sitting ahead of the rear window of the bus. But this version stands contradicted by Baljeet Singh, according to whom, (i) he entered the bus from the front window and that (ii) the accused was sitting on the seat near the rear window. Presence of Baljeet Singh is further rendered to be doubtful, for he does not even remember how many bags were checked or whether any luggage was lying on the shelf or not. In this backdrop version of even Ankush Dogra is rendered doubtful. 28. Admittedly police had detained driver Som Chand (PW.1) and conductor Lokesh Attri (PW.2). Why so? remains unexplained. Possibility of their involvement in the crime has not been ruled out. Surprisingly no passenger of the bus was associated as a witness, for it is not the case of prosecution that except for the accused none else was sitting inside the bus or that none agreed to associate themselves. In fact, it is the admitted case of the police that at least 5-7 passengers were travelling at the time bus was checked. 29. Lokesh Attri (PW.2) does talk of recovery of a black coloured bag lying on the luggage shelf. It is a settled proposition of law that where there are two sets of evidence available on record, one favouring the accused must be preferred over the view favourable to the prosecution. We may observe that accused does not dispute his presence in the bus, but then his defence of false implication, being a soft target, as an outsider, stands probablized on record. 30. We may observe that accused does not dispute his presence in the bus, but then his defence of false implication, being a soft target, as an outsider, stands probablized on record. 30. Further prosecution case is rendered doubtful with the admission of the Investigating Officer Ankush Dogra (PW.7) of having prepared the site plan (Ex.PW.7/D) subsequently. Why so? He fails to explain. This renders his version of having prepared the documents on the spot to be doubtful. 31. Further this witness admits that in his previous investigations, he never carried weighing scales and camera. In the case in hand, police had no prior intimation of trafficking of any contraband substance. Only for routine traffic checking duty, police left the Police Station. Hence, version of the witness of having carried the weighing scales with him, cannot be said to be inspiring in confidence. 32. Decision rendered in Jagir Singh (supra) (by two Judges) cannot be taken as a binding precedence in view of the subsequent decisions rendered by Larger Benches of the same Court. 33. In this view of the mater, it would be highly unsafe to agree with the reasoning adopted and the findings returned by the trial Court in convicting the accused. 34. Findings returned by the trial Court, convicting the accused, cannot be said to be based on correct and complete appreciation of testimonies of prosecution witnesses. Such findings cannot be said to be on the basis of any clear, cogent, convincing, legal and material piece of evidence, leading to an irresistible conclusion of guilt of the accused. Incorrect and incomplete appreciation thereof, has resulted into grave miscarriage of justice, inasmuch as accused stand wrongly convicted for the charged offence. 35. Hence, for all the aforesaid reasons, appeal is allowed and the judgment of conviction and sentence, dated 26.10.2013, passed by Special Judge-I, Sirmaur District at Nahan, H.P., in Sessions Trial No.23-ST/7 of 2013, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh Versus Sajjan Kumar, is set aside and convict Sajjan Kumar is acquitted of the charged offence. Convict Sajjan Kumar, who is in jail, be released forthwith, if not required under any other process of law. Release warrants be prepared accordingly. Amount of fine, if deposited by the convict, be refunded to him. Appeal stands disposed of, so also pending application(s), if any.