JUDGMENT : P.K. Lohra, J. The appellant-State has preferred this leave to appeal under Section 378(iii) and (i) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, 'Cr.P.C.') to challenge the judgment dated 11.06.2015 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nagaur (for short, 'learned trial Court'), whereby learned trial Court has acquitted accused-respondent for the offences under Sections 363, 366-A and 376 IPC. 2. The prosecution story, in nutshell, as unfurled from report dated 08.09.2010 (Ex.P/10), is that complainant Bundu Khan (P.W.4) submitted missing report of prosecutrix Ms. 'R', precisely, with the averments that she is mentally weak and left the home at 3.00 a.m. in the night and has not been traced out despite efforts. Subsequently, P.W.4 lodged yet another report on 20.09.2010 (Ex.P/7) wherein it is alleged that Ms.'R' was taken by accused-respondent and three other incumbents, namely, Rafiq, Deenaram and Shaitan Ram by misguiding her and all of them molested and misbehaved with her. In order to show that Ms. 'R' is minor, school T.C. is also enclosed with the report. On investigation, FIR No. 42/2010 was registered for the offences under Sections 363, 366-A and 376 IPC and challan was submitted against the accused-respondent alone for the aforesaid offences before the Judicial Magistrate, Jayal. The Judicial Magistrate, thereafter, committed the case to the Sessions Court. Learned Sessions Judge framed charges against the accused-respondent for the offences under Section 363, 366-A & 376 IPC on 18.04.2011. To bring home guilt against the accused, prosecution examined in all eighteen witnesses and also produced umpteen documents which were exhibited. After conclusion of the prosecution evidence, the statements of accused-respondent under Section 313 Cr.P.C. were recorded and in defence respondent produced three documents in evidence however no oral evidence was tendered. 3. Learned trial Court, thereafter, examined the matter in its entirety, and on analysing the prosecution evidence, including the medical evidence, has seriously doubted the age of prosecutrix and also the fact that she was abducted and molested by the accused-respondent. In the considered opinion of the learned trial Court, it appears highly improbable that accused-respondent had abducted the prosecutrix and ravished her against her will. In the considered opinion of the learned trial Court, it appears highly improbable that accused-respondent had abducted the prosecutrix and ravished her against her will. While dilating on the age of the prosecutrix, learned trial Court has opined that the entry made in school register, which is not founded on information furnished by the parents or any other person having any special knowledge about the date of birth, carries no evidentiary value and the same cannot be relied upon. Even on examining the medical evidence wherein the Medical Jurist, Dr. Yogendra Negi (P.W.14) has though opined the age of prosecutrix to be between 16 to 18, has very candidly admitted that for ascertaining her age no radiological test was performed. The witness has further admitted that actual age can be ascertained only after radiological examination of the bones of the incumbents. In totality, the so-called incriminating material, in the form of the prosecution witnesses, has not impressed the learned trial Court to bring home guilt against the accused for the alleged offences and that eventually facilitated acquittal of the accused-respondent by extending benefit of doubt. 4. I have heard the learned Public Prosecutor and thoroughly examined the impugned judgment. 5. Upon examining the impugned judgment and the serious discrepancies in the testimony of prosecutrix during her deposition before the Court and her statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C., there remains no shadow of doubt that the version of prosecutrix in both the statements is not consistent. There appears no plausible reason to infer that she was forced by the accused-respondent to accompany her and even during her stay with the accused she made no effort to put any resistance against the alleged overt acts of the accused-respondent. It is quite surprising that even while travelling in the bus, she did not raise any alarm to the co-passengers so as to castigate the accused that she is forcibly abducted by him. There remains no quarrel that prosecutrix stayed with the accused for more than 18 days and during this period she made no alarm or hue & cry. She has admitted that she was not kept by the accused-respondent at any secluded place, further raises serious doubts about the entire prosecution story. There remains no quarrel that prosecutrix stayed with the accused for more than 18 days and during this period she made no alarm or hue & cry. She has admitted that she was not kept by the accused-respondent at any secluded place, further raises serious doubts about the entire prosecution story. In totality, the medical evidence is not convincing so as to prove the charge of rape against accused-respondent inasmuch as P.W.14 has not found any external mark of violence on the person of the prosecutrix. 6. The cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence is that accusation is required to be proved by prosecution beyond all reasonable doubts and if the evidence tendered by the prosecution is hazy so as to establish commission of offence by accused-respondent, accused deserves benefit of doubt. In the instant case, the learned trial Court has made sincere endeavour to critically analyse the entire prosecution evidence and thereafter concluded that the evidence is not inspiring confidence so as to bring home guilt against the accused-respondent and thereupon extended the benefit of doubt, which in my considered opinion, cannot be categorized as infirm or improbable. Learned trial Court has rightly discarded the testimony of the prosecutrix as unworthy of credence by taking note of basic infirmities or improbabilities in her testimony. 7. Therefore, viewed from any angle, I have no hesitation in holding that the learned trial Court has not committed any error in appreciation of evidence and recording its findings after taking cognizance of serious discrepancies in the prosecution case, and consequently, the impugned judgment whereby accused-respondent is acquitted by extending benefit of doubt, cannot be categorized as perverse, infirm or against the basic tenets of criminal jurisprudence. Resultantly, I am not persuaded to grant leave in the matter, and the same is, therefore, declined and consequently, the appeal is rejected.