JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. Defendants’ Regular Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, stands admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- “1. Whether the ld. First appellate court could have granted a decree for possession in a suit for injunction simplicitor, more so when the findings of both the courts is that on the date of filing the suit the plaintiff was not in possession and in the plaint no relief qua possession has been prayed for and keeping in view the provisions of Order 7 Rule 7 CPC? 2. Whether the ld. First appellate court could have granted the relief of possession which was not claimed and for which court fees had not been paid by the plaintiff, as the same had to be given according to the value of the subject matter whereas the court fee was paid only to obtain an injunction. If so, its effect thereupon? 3. Whether general reliefs can be granted by the civil courts in view of the specific provisions of Order 7 Rule 7 which provides that relief is to be specifically stated. If so its effect thereto? 2. On 3.3.2004 plaintiff Gokal Chand (respondent herein) filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction pleading that the defendants Anil Kumar, Roop Lal and Smt. Ram Payari (appellants herein) have been interfering with his cultivatory possession over the suit land owned by him. On 28.2.2004, despite resistance, defendants threw mud over the suit land. With these averments, plaintiff prayed as under:- “It is, therefore, prayed that in view of the submissions made herein above, a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction, restraining the defendants from interfering in the suit land of the plaintiff, in any manner or changing the nature of the suit land in any manner may kindly be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. And/or any other relief, to which the plaintiff be found entitled to, in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, may also be awarded in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants alongwith the costs of present suit and justice be done.” 3. Defendants resisted the suit claiming themselves to in possession of the suit land and having perfected their title by way of adverse possession. 4. Based on the respective pleadings of the parties, trial Court framed the following issues: “1. Defendants resisted the suit claiming themselves to in possession of the suit land and having perfected their title by way of adverse possession. 4. Based on the respective pleadings of the parties, trial Court framed the following issues: “1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction? OPP 2. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD 3. Whether the suit is bad for min-joinder of necessary parties? OPD 4. Relief.” 5. Even though no specific issue with regard to the title of the defendants was framed, yet the parties led evidence on the same. Answering the issues and adjudicating the points raised, trial Court, in terms of judgment and decree dated 1.10.2005, passed in Civil Suit No. 8 of 2004, titled as Gokal Chand vs. Anil Kumar & others, dismissed the suit holding that: (i) in view of the demarcation report dated 9.5.2001 (Ext. DW-1/A) prepared prior to the institution of the suit, plaintiff already stood dispossessed from the suit land; and (ii) defendant had no right or title over the same. 6. Such findings stood accepted by the defendant but however in the plaintiff’s appeal, the lower appellate Court, in exercise of its powers under Order VII Rule 7 CPC, in terms of the judgment and decree dated 23.5.2006, passed in Civil Appeal No. 114 of 2005, titled as Gokal Chand vs. Anil Kumar & others, while reversing the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, decreed the plaintiff’s suit as under:- “As a sequel to my finding on point No. 1 above, the appeal is accepted and the impugned judgment and decree are set aside. The suit filed by the plaintiff is hereby decreed for possession of the land comprised in khewat khatauni No. 72/91 khasra No. 53, 54, and 56 and khata khatauni No. 73/92 khasra No. 55, situated at village Chadyara/346 tehsil Sadar, District Mandi, H.P. However, there is no order as to costs. Decree sheet be prepared.” 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties as also perused the record, I am of the considered view that no ground for interference is made out in the present appeal. 8. Assailing the judgment, learned counsel for the appellant invites attention of the Court to the decision rendered by the apex Court in Union of India vs. Ibrahim Uddin & another, (2012) 8 SCC 148 . 9. 8. Assailing the judgment, learned counsel for the appellant invites attention of the Court to the decision rendered by the apex Court in Union of India vs. Ibrahim Uddin & another, (2012) 8 SCC 148 . 9. In the said decision, Court was dealing with a case where the plaintiff sought declaration of his title of ownership without praying for the relief of possession and thus, the Court observed as under:- “77. This Court while dealing with an issue in Kalyan Singh Chouhan vs. C.P. Joshi, (2011) 11 SCC 786 , after placing reliance on a very large number of its earlier judgments including Trojan & Co. vs. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235 , Om Prakash Gupta vs. Ranbir B. Goyal, (2002) 2 SCC 256 , Ishwar Dutt vs. Collector (LA), (2005) 7 SCC 190 , and State of Maharashtra vs. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. (2010) 4 SCC 518 , held that relief not founded on the pleadings cannot be granted. A decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. No evidence is permissible to be taken on record in the absence of the pleadings in that respect. No party can be permitted to travel beyond its pleadings and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. It was further held that where the evidence was not in the line of the pleadings, the said evidence cannot be looked into or relied upon.” “85.6. The court cannot travel beyond the pleadings as no party can lead the evidence on an issue/point not raised in the pleadings and in case, such evidence has been adduced or a finding of fact has been recorded by the court, it is just to be ignored. Though it may be a different case where in spite of specific pleadings, a particular issue is not framed and the parties having full knowledge of the issue in controversy lead the evidence and the court records a finding on it.” 10. Here the facts are different and the decision inapplicable. 11. Suit pertaining to declaratory decrees is filed under Chapter VI, Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and suit for perpetual injunctions is filed under Chapter VIII, Section 38 of the Act. Here the facts are different and the decision inapplicable. 11. Suit pertaining to declaratory decrees is filed under Chapter VI, Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and suit for perpetual injunctions is filed under Chapter VIII, Section 38 of the Act. Whereas suit for recovery of immoveable property is filed under Chapter I of the Act. 12. The parties to the lis, as is evident from the testimonies of the witnesses, claim their respective title and ownership over the suit land. However, concurrently courts have held the plaintiff to be the lawful owner. In fact, defendants’ plea of having perfected his title by way of adverse possession stands repelled concurrently by the courts below. 13. It is true that as on the date of filing of the suit plaintiff stood dispossessed, which fact, as is so observed by the courts below, is evident from the report of the revenue officer. 14. The question which needs to be considered is as to whether the lower appellate Court was right in moulding the relief and directing the defendants to hand over the possession of the suit land or not. 15. Order VII Rule 7 of Code of Civil Procedure reads as under:- “7. Relief to be specifically stated. - Every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims either simply or in the alternative, and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief which may always be given as the Court may think just to the same extent as if it had been asked for. And the same rule shall apply to any relief claimed by the defendant in his written statement.” 16. From the plaint it is evident that the defendants had been repeatedly interfering with the plaintiff’s possession. It was so done in the years 1998, 2000, 2001 and lastly in the year 2004. In para-4 of the plaint it is categorically pleaded that on 28.2.2004, despite the plaintiff’s request of not interfering with his possession, defendants threw mud on the suit land. Defendants failed to establish their right, title or interest over the suit land by way of adverse possession. They being trespassers had no right in retaining possession. Parties had been litigating for the last 18 years. Plaintiff has been continuously resisting interference. Defendants failed to establish their right, title or interest over the suit land by way of adverse possession. They being trespassers had no right in retaining possession. Parties had been litigating for the last 18 years. Plaintiff has been continuously resisting interference. Without relegating the parties to the original position and keeping in view the evidence led by the parties, the lower Appellate Court committed no illegality or irregularity in decreeing the plaintiff’s suit by moulding the relief. 17. The jurisdiction of the court in granting such relief is not in dispute. “General or other relief” in the given facts and circumstances would include the relief of possession which the court is competent to grant. The Court in its wisdom thought it just, fair and prudent to grant the said relief, finding itself competent to do the same, to the same extent, as though it had been asked for. 18. Thus the decision rendered by the apex Court in Ibrahim Uddin (supra) is inapplicable in the given facts and circumstances, where there was a statutory bar in not doing so. 19. It is not the case of the appellants that the alternate relief “to which the plaintiff be found entitled to” cannot be granted by the Civil Court. [See: Rajendra Tiwary vs. Basudeo Prasad & another, (2002) 1 SCC 90 ] 20. The apex Court in Ganesh Shet vs. Dr. C.S.G.K. Setty & others, (1998) 5 SCC 381 has further held that:- “15. The question is whether, when parties have led evidence in regard to a contract not pleaded in the evidence, relief can be granted on the basis of the evidence and whether the plaintiff can be allowed to give a go-by to the specific plea in the plaint. Is there any difference between suits for specific performance and other suits? 16. It appears to us that while normally it is permissible to grant relief on the basis of what emerges from the evidence - even if not pleaded, provided there is no prejudice to the opposite party, such a principle is not applied in suits relating to specific performance.” …… 21. 16. It appears to us that while normally it is permissible to grant relief on the basis of what emerges from the evidence - even if not pleaded, provided there is no prejudice to the opposite party, such a principle is not applied in suits relating to specific performance.” …… 21. The apex Court in L. Janakirama Iyer & others vs. P. M. Nilakanta Iyer & others, AIR 1962 SC 633 has held that “In construing the plaint the court must have regard to all the relevant allegations made in the plaint and must look at the substance of the matter and not its form.” 22. In The Arya Pradishak Pratinidhi Sabha through Lala Hans Raj vs. Chaudhri Ram Chand & others, 1924 Lahore 713 (Two Judges), privy counsel has held that:- “Court can award damages in a suit for specific performance though not specifically prayed for. It ought to award damages when it thinks that damages should be awarded. This principle applies even in cases where specific performance is decreed.” 23. The High Court of Patna in Bundi Singh vs. Shivanandan Prasad Sahu, AIR (37) 1950 Patna 89 (Two Judges), under similar circumstances, where plaintiff pleaded for injunction, decree for possession stood passed. 24. The power of the Court to mould the relief, on the basis of the pleadings and material so placed on record by the parties stands recognized and acknowledged by the various Courts. [Bal Krishan & others vs. Braham Dass & others, 2002 (2) S.L.J. 1359. [Also: Phul Chand Bishan Dass & others vs. Kalu Ram Lachhman Dass & others, AIR 1971 Punjab & Haryana 21; Karam Dass & others vs. Som Parkash, AIR 1986 Punjab & Haryana 89; and U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. vs. Uday Narain Pandey, (2006) 1 SCC 479 .] 25. It is a settled principle of law that pleadings particularly those of moffisil courts are to be construed liberally and not very strictly. The expression “general or other relief” is an omnibus phrase and wide enough to cover all such reliefs as are consistent with the averments made in the plaint. None of the parties to the lis have been taken by surprise. It is true that plaintiff has not specifically pleaded for the relief of possession but the pleadings generally make out such a case. None of the parties to the lis have been taken by surprise. It is true that plaintiff has not specifically pleaded for the relief of possession but the pleadings generally make out such a case. Insofar as Court fee is concerned, since the suit is on the basis of title, plaintiff can be directed to pay a nominal fee and the suit cannot be dismissed merely on such a ground. 26. The correctness of the reports of the revenue officials was disputed by both the parties and it is in this backdrop no fault can be found with the plaintiff in contending to be the owner of the suit land. In holding so, strength can be drawn from the decision rendered in Katihar Jute Mills Ltd. vs. Calcutta Match Works (India) Ltd. & another, AIR 1958 Patna 133 (Two Judges) wherein it is held as under:- 19.……. “The phrase "general or other relief" in this provision of law is an omnibus phrase wide enough to cover all such reliefs as are consistent with the averments made in the plaint. Mulla in his commentary on Order 14, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code (12 Edition) goes to the length of saying: "But where the substantial matters which constitute the title of all the parties are touched, though obscurely, in the issues, and they have been fully put in evidence, and have formed the main subject of discussion in the Court, the Court may grant a relief though it may not be founded on the pleadings..... But if a case not alleged by the plaintiff in his pleadings is disclosed in the evidence, the Court should not deal with it, unless a specific issue is raised on it and the defendant is given an opportunity of meeting it: Parshram v. Miraji, ILR 20 Bom 569 (O) and Gauri Shankar v. Jawala Prasad, AIR 1930 Oudh 312 (P).” Similarly in his commentary on Order 7, Rule 7, Civil Procedure Code, at page 610 it is stated : "Where a relief is claimed upon a specific ground, the Court may grant it upon a ground different from that on which it is claimed in the plaint, if the ground is disclosed by the allegation in the plaint and the evidence in the case Rasul Jehan v. Ram Sarun, ILR 22 Cal 589 (Q); Haji Khan v. Baldeo Das, ILR 24 All 90 (R) and Ram Chandra v. Jaith Mal, 1934 AIR(All) 990. Thus, in a case in which a plaintiff claimed an easement by prescription, and it was found that he was not entitled to the easement by prescription, their Lordships of the Privy Council dealing with the case as a special appeal," decreed the claim on the presumption of title arising from a grant: Rajroop v. Abdool, 7 Ind App 240 (PC) (T); Achul v. Rajun, ILR 6 Cal 812 (U) and Secretary of State v. Mathurabhai, ILR 14 Bom 213 (V)." In my opinion, these rules, as I understand them, are in their own turn rooted in a larger principle, namely, that on one hand no party at the trial should be taken by surprise and on the other in case of an alternative relief the same should not be such as to constitute any embarrassment at least to the party pleading it. Here no question of surprise can arise for the entire defence as also the discussion in the judgment on the issue of part performance is based on the assumption that the original title is with the plaintiff.” … … 27. Hence, in my considered view, there is no merit in the present appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. It cannot be said that the judgment passed by the lower appellate Court is based on incorrect and incomplete appreciation of facts and material placed on record by the parties or that the same is perverse which has resulted into miscarriage of justice. It cannot be said that the judgment passed by the lower appellate Court is based on incorrect and incomplete appreciation of facts and material placed on record by the parties or that the same is perverse which has resulted into miscarriage of justice. Substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.