JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner (through legal heirs) namely Suresh Kumar Prajapati, Uttam kumar Prajapati, Lalit Kumar Prajapati, Smt. Manju and Smt. Asha, in the instant writ application, aggrieved of the impugned order dated 27th January, 1976, terminating his service and award made by the Industrial Tribunal, Ajmer dated 14th March, 1997, has instituted the writ proceedings praying for the following relief(s): "(A) Issue a writ of certiorari and thereby quash and set aside the charge sheet Ex.1 (Ex.W-3) dismissal order Ex. 2 (Ex.W-6) and the Award dated 14.3.97 Ex. 5 and consequently reinstate the petitioner in the services of the Respondent Board as driver with all back wages and with all consequential benefits. (B) That the relevant record of L.C.R. Case file No. 6/95 may kindly be called for from the Labour Court Ajmer in the interest of justice and fair play. (C) cost of this writ petition may kindly be allowed to the petitioner from the respondents. (D) That any other relief in the facts and circumstances of the case that this Hon'ble High Court deems just and proper, may also kindly be granted in favour of the petitioner." 2. Shorn off unnecessary details, the skeletal material facts necessary for appreciation of the controversy raised herein are that the petitioner was initially appointed as 'Helper' in the Rajasthan State Electricity Board on 26th February, 1964, he was confirmed on 7th January, 1970. On 7th August, 1974, an FIR No. 166/1974, was lodged, against the petitioner for the offence under Section 379 Indian Penal Code (IPC), for theft of electricity by his employer (respondent No. 2) and on that basis a Criminal Case No. 827/74, was registered in the Court of Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, Beawar. Simultaneously, the petitioner was also proceeded with the domestic enquiry under Rule 21(C) of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board Standing Orders, 1962 (for short, Standing Orders of 1962). As a consequence of departmental proceedings, the Executive Engineer, imposed the penalty of dismissal from service vide impugned order dated 27th January, 1976, under the Rajasthan State Electricity Board Rules and Regulations, 1962 (hereinafter referred to, 'Regulations of 1962', for short). An appeal preferred to the Chief Engineer, Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur, was declined on 6th October, 1976. As a consequence of departmental proceedings, the Executive Engineer, imposed the penalty of dismissal from service vide impugned order dated 27th January, 1976, under the Rajasthan State Electricity Board Rules and Regulations, 1962 (hereinafter referred to, 'Regulations of 1962', for short). An appeal preferred to the Chief Engineer, Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur, was declined on 6th October, 1976. On conclusion of the trial, the Court of Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, Beawar, vide judgement and order dated 30th August, 1978, found the petitioner guilty of the charge. However, the petitioner was released extending the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. On an appeal, the Additional District Judge, Ajmer, vide judgement and order dated 15th April, 1981, quashed and set aside the order dated 30th August, 1978, passed by the Court of Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, Beawar, acquitting the petitioner of the charge. 3. On an industrial dispute raised by the petitioner, the departmental enquiry was held to be unfair vide order dated 12th December, 1994, while permitting the respondent-Board to lead evidence to establish the charge against the petitioner. In course of time, the matter was transferred to the Labour Court, Ajmer for disposal, which has been adjudicated upon vide impugned award dated 14th March, 1997. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner, reiterating the pleaded facts and grounds of the writ application, has assailed the legality, validity and correctness of the impugned order of termination of his service as well as the impugned award dated 14th March, 1997, primarily on four counts; firstly, for the petitioner could not have been proceeded with and punished under the Regulations of 1962, for the reason that Clause 2, dealing with the extent and scope of application of the Regulations, specifically excluded under sub clause (i)(c) persons governed by Labour Laws, Factory Legislation and Regulations. 5. Secondly, it is further pointed out that in the Schedule-II, appended to the Regulations of 1962, the designation of the post at serial number 39 is that of 'Motor Driver' whereas the petitioner was 'Vehicle Driver'. 5. Secondly, it is further pointed out that in the Schedule-II, appended to the Regulations of 1962, the designation of the post at serial number 39 is that of 'Motor Driver' whereas the petitioner was 'Vehicle Driver'. Referring to the Technical Workmen Service Regulations, 1975, learned counsel further pointed out that the post of 'Vehicle Driver' has been indicated in the Appendix-I, for Technical Subordinate Staff under group 'Skilled 'B' at serial No. 19, and therefore, the case of the petitioner, if at all, could have been proceeded with under the Regulations of 1975, which came into force w.e.f. 27th January, 1976. According to the learned counsel, the factual position has not been disputed by the respondent, as would be reflected from evidence and materials available on record. 6. Thirdly, while assailing the legality and validity of the order dated 27th January, 1976, terminating the employment of the petitioner, by inflicting the penalty of dismissal, learned counsel asserted that Regulations 22 of Regulations of 1975, made it mandatory for the competent authority while awarding punishment under the Regulations to take into account the gravity of the misconduct, the previous record, if any, of the workman and any other extenuating or aggravating circumstances that may exist. Regulations 22 (5) further contemplated the requirement of a copy to be supplied to the workman concerned of the order passed by the Manager. Since the order of penalty did not take into consideration the nature of misconduct allegedly committed by the petitioner, the previous record, if any, of the workman and any other extenuating or aggravating circumstances; the impugned order terminating the employment of the petitioner vide impugned order dated 27th January, 1976, is a non-speaking order, and therefore, is bad in the eye of law on that count alone. 7. Regulations 21 (C), further details out the acts and omission of the types, mentioned therein are to be treated as misconduct, while an employee is on duty and in the premises of the employer and such acts or omission cannot have the effect of its operation while the petitioner was off the duty, is another limb of the argument. 8. Regulations 21 (C), further details out the acts and omission of the types, mentioned therein are to be treated as misconduct, while an employee is on duty and in the premises of the employer and such acts or omission cannot have the effect of its operation while the petitioner was off the duty, is another limb of the argument. 8. Fourthly, the petitioner was acquitted by a Criminal Court of law on the same set of facts and evidence, therefore, the findings and conclusion arrived at by the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court, Ajmer, vide impugned award dated 14th March, 1997; is bad in the eye of law. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel placed reliance on the opinion in the case of Vijay Singh v. State of U.P. ,2012(5)SCC 242, M/s Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. P.O. Labour Court, Meerut and Ors.,1983 Lab.I.C 1909 , G. M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and Ors, 2006(5) SCC 446 , S. Bhaskar Reddy and Another v. Superintendent of Police and Another, 2015 (2) SCC 365 , Union of India v. H.C. Goel : AIR 1964 SC 364 , Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and ors, 2009(2) SCC 570 , State Bank of Patiala and Ors. v. S.K. Sharma: 1996(3) SCC 364 . 9. In response to the notice of the writ application, the respondents have filed their counter affidavit, supporting the impugned order dated 27th January, 1976, terminating the employment of the petitioner as well as the impugned award dated 14th March, 1997. 10. Mr. Abhishek Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, did not dispute the fact that the petitioner could not have been proceeded with under the Standing Orders of 1962. However, since the enquiry was held to be unfair by the Labour Court and opportunity was allowed to the respondents to lead evidence and thereafter, the matter was examined by the Labour Court, while arriving at the findings and conclusion that the charge was proved against the petitioner, therefore, the objection as to the procedure adopted under the Standing Orders and Regulations of 1962, is of no consequence. 11. 11. Learned counsel, referring to the text of Regulations 21(c), emphatically argued that the acts and omission constituting misconduct are not restricted in its operation only to the extent while the employee is on the duty in the premises of the employer but they extend even beyond for the reason that the acts and omissions of theft, fraud, or dishonesty in connection with Board's business or property extend beyond the premises as well. Thus, the phrase in connection with Board's business or property could not be given a restricted meaning, and therefore, the act of the petitioner while he committed theft of electricity, though he was not on duty in the premises but the act did amount to misconduct as contemplated under Regulation 21(c) of the Regulations of 1975. 12. Learned counsel, referring to the impugned award further asserted that the Industrial Tribunal, on a consideration of pleadings and analysis of the evidence and materials available on record, rightly ignored the technical objects while concluding that the charge of theft of electricity, was proved against the petitioner. 13. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as referred to and relied upon, in the case of S. Bhaskar Reddy(supra), is not attracted to the facts of the instant case at hand for the reason that the petitioner was not 'honourably acquitted' rather he was given the benefit of pendency of the proceedings before the Court, and therefore, the opinion has no application to the facts of the instant case. Reliance has also been placed on the opinions in the case of Samar Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.: 2011 (9) SCC 94 , State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya: 2011 (4) SCC 584 and Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. M.G. Vittal Rao: 2012 (1) SCC 442 . 14. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the materials available on record as well as gave my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions at Bar. 15. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was not on duty while he allegedly committed theft of electricity residing in a rented house. 14. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the materials available on record as well as gave my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions at Bar. 15. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was not on duty while he allegedly committed theft of electricity residing in a rented house. It is also not in dispute that the enquiry conducted was held to be unfair by the Labour Court vide order dated 12th December, 1994 and the respondents were allowed opportunity to lead evidence to sustain the charge. 16. From the findings arrived at by the Labour Court, it is evident that the departmental enquiry which was held to be unfair. Further, the criminal prosecution launched against the petitioner, was also based on similar set of facts and evidence. 17. It is further reflected from the impugned award that the witnesses, who appeared before the Court during the trial of the criminal case, namely, Bhuja, Abdul Hanney and Hukamraj Mehta, were also produced before the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court, to sustain the charge of theft of electricity against the petitioner. 18. In the case of S. Bhaskar Reddy(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the somewhat similar controversy referred to the expression 'honourably acquitted' in the backdrop of the earlier opinion in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police and Anr. v. S. Samuthiram , and held thus: "22.The meaning of the expression "honourable acquittal" was discussed by this Court in detail in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police and Anr. v. S. Samuthiram: (2013) 1 SCC 598 , the relevant para from the said case reads as under: 24. The meaning of the expression "honourable acquittal" came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v.Bhopal Singh Panchal. In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions "honourable acquittal", "acquitted of blame", "fully exonerated" are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions "honourable acquittal", "acquitted of blame", "fully exonerated" are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression "honourably acquitted".When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted. After examining the principles laid down in the above said case, the same was reiterated by this Court in a recent decision in the case of Joginder Singh v.Union Territory of Chandigarh and Ors. 23. Further, in Capt. M.Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Anr.(supra) this Court has held as under: 34. There is yet another reason for discarding the whole of the case of the Respondents. As pointed out earlier, the criminal case as also the departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts, namely, "the raid conducted at the Appellant's residence and recovery of incriminating articles there from". The findings recorded by the enquiry officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the Appellant were sought to be proved by police officers and panch witnesses, who had raided the house of the Appellant and had effected recovery. They were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer and the enquiry officer, relying upon their statements, came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the Appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case but the Court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the Appellant. The whole case of the prosecution was thrown out and the Appellant was acquitted. In this situation, therefore, where the Appellant is acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the "raid and recovery" at the residence of the Appellant were not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex parte departmental proceedings to stand. 35. In this situation, therefore, where the Appellant is acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the "raid and recovery" at the residence of the Appellant were not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex parte departmental proceedings to stand. 35. Since the facts and the evidence in both the proceedings, namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case were the same without there being any iota of difference, the distinction, which is usually drawn as between the departmental proceedings and the criminal case on the basis of approach and burden of proof, would not be applicable to the instant case. 24.Further, in the case of G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and Ors. (supra) this Court held as under: 20 ...Likewise, the criminal proceedings were initiated against the Appellant for the alleged charges punishable under the provisions of the PC Act on the same set of facts and evidence.It was submitted that the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar (verbatim) set of facts and evidence. The Appellant has been honourably acquitted by the competent court on the same set of facts, evidence and witness and, therefore, the dismissal order based on the same set of facts and evidence on the departmental side is liable to be set aside in the interest of justice. 30.The judgements relied on by the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law.........It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the Appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge-sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts, namely, raid conducted at the Appellant's residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer Mr. V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the Appellant. The Investigating Officer Mr. V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the Appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the Appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the Appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed that the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. 31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the departmental as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the Appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though the finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony case will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the Appellant deserves to be allowed." 19. In the instant case at hand, the appellate Court while setting aside the order of the trial Court observed that since the charge of theft of electricity, which is an offence, specifically dealt with, under Section 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910; the matter could not be remanded back for re-trial but having regard to the nature of evidence, did not think it proper even to remand the matter for retrial. 20. From the materials available on record, it is further reflected that the departmental proceedings instituted and the criminal trial conducted against the petitioner, were on the same set of facts. 20. From the materials available on record, it is further reflected that the departmental proceedings instituted and the criminal trial conducted against the petitioner, were on the same set of facts. So also the witnesses who appeared before the Criminal Court in the trial, were also produced as witnesses before the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court to sustain the charge of theft of electricity so as to bring the act of the petitioner, within the ambit of Regulations 21 (c) of the Regulations of 1975. 21. The Industrial Tribunal while arriving at the conclusion though has made a reference to the statements deposed by the witnesses produced on behalf of the respondent-employer but simultaneously also recorded a finding that none of the witnesses made a statement to the effect that there was flow of electric current during the process, the raid was conducted at the rented premises of the petitioner. The Tribunal has drawn the conclusion on the basis of procedure that is normally adopted while conducting such raids. 22. In the case of Union of India v. H.C. Goel (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that mere suspicion should not be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. The departmental enquiry is of quasi-judicial in nature and mere production of document is not enough unless the documentary evidence is proved by examining the witnesses, as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court of the land in the case of Roop Singh Negi (supra), reiterating the law in the case of H.C. Goel (supra). 23. In the case of State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the effect on previously concluded departmental proceedings and subsequent acquittal by a criminal Court which could not have an effect so as to render the disciplinary proceedings invalid for the standard of proof required in the two proceedings is not of the same nature. The opinion has no application to the instant case at hand wherein the conclusion by the Criminal Court preceded the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court where the respondents were accorded ample opportunity to prove the charges. 24. In the case of Samar Bahadur Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the issue and scope of standard of proof in the departmental proceedings as compared to the proceedings and nature of evidence in a criminal case. 24. In the case of Samar Bahadur Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the issue and scope of standard of proof in the departmental proceedings as compared to the proceedings and nature of evidence in a criminal case. There cannot be any dispute as to the principle law enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court of the land. 25. In the instant case at hand, merely mentioning the reason referring to the statements of the witnesses, without furnishing any reasoning to arrive at the conclusion; cannot sustain the charge of theft of electricity in the singular facts of the instant case. 26. In the case of Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. M.G. Vittal Rao (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the issue of loss of confidence, reiterated the principle with reference to the standard of proof in criminal prosecution vis-a-vis departmental action. The facts of the case referred to and relied upon, are entirely different and distinct from the facts of the case at hand. 27. In the case of State Bank of Patiala and ors. v. S.K. Sharma (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while summarising the principles in the backdrop of the facts of the case, held thus: "33. We may summarise the principles emerging from the above discussion. (These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee) : (1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature of (b) whether it is procedural in character. (2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case. (3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this : Procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. (3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this : Procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed.-Except cases falling under 'no notice', 'no opportunity' and 'no hearing' categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice in established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgement, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is sell - evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To report, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle slated under (4) herein below is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle. (4)(a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. The principle slated under (4) herein below is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle. (4)(a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee. (b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court on Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment) keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Kaninakar. The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called. (5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgement. In other words, a distinction must be made between "no opportunity" and no adequate opportunity, i.e., between "no notice/no hearing" and "no fair hearing", (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it "void" or a nullity if one chooses to). In other words, a distinction must be made between "no opportunity" and no adequate opportunity, i.e., between "no notice/no hearing" and "no fair hearing", (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it "void" or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b) But in the latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. (It is made clear that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere. (6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the Court/Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the ultimate and over-riding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arises before them. (7) There may be situations where the interests of state or public interest may call for a curtailing of the rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations, the Court may have to balance public/State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision. 34. Now, in which of the above principles does not violation of Sub-clause (iii) concerned herein fall? In our opinion, it falls under Principles No. 3 and, 4 (a) mentioned above. Though the copies of the statements of two witnesses (Kaur Singh, Patwari and Balwant Singh) were not furnished, the respondent was permitted to peruse them and take notes therefrom more than three days prior to their examination. Of the two witnesses, Balwant Singh was not examined and only Kaur Singh was examined. Though the copies of the statements of two witnesses (Kaur Singh, Patwari and Balwant Singh) were not furnished, the respondent was permitted to peruse them and take notes therefrom more than three days prior to their examination. Of the two witnesses, Balwant Singh was not examined and only Kaur Singh was examined. The respondent did not raise any objection during the enquiry that the non furnishing of the copies of the statements is disabling him or has disabled him, as the case may be, from effectively cross-examining the witnesses or to defend himself, the Trial Court has not found that any prejudice has resulted from the said violation. The Appellate Court has no doubt said that it has prejudiced the respondent's case but except merely, mentioning the same, it has not specified in what manner and in what sense was the respondent prejudiced in his defence. The High Court, of course, has not referred to the aspect of prejudice at all." 28. A glance of Clause 2 would reveal that a substantive provision has normally to be complied with and the theory of substantial compliance would not be available or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case. In the instant case at hand, the Labour Court held the enquiry unfair. While in the process of judicial review of the proceedings in the departmental enquiry the decision making process is subject to judicial scruitiny. Moreover, the Tribunal has not recorded any finding on the basis of materials and evidence, to arrive at the conclusion. 29. For the reasons and discussions herein above, the writ application succeeds and is hereby allowed. 30. The impugned order dated 27th January, 1976 and the impugned award dated 14th March, 1997, are hereby quashed and set aside. 31. As a result, the legal heirs would be entitled to all consequential benefits, which became due to the petitioner, on notional basis. 32. No costs.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******