JUDGMENT : Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia, J. Rajesh Kumar was convicted and sentenced by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.1, Kota vide impugned judgment dated 13.6.2008 for offence under Section 302 IPC and was sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and pay a fine of Rs. 100/- and in default thereof, to undergo three months rigorous imprisonment. The trial court had granted benefit of Section 428 Cr.P.C. to the appellant. 2. In the present case, charges were drawn on 13.6.2008. On the said date, appellant admitted his guilt and declined his right to have the trial. On the very said date, the learned trial Judge vide impugned judgment dated 13.6.2008 convicted the appellant and vide a separate order of even date, passed the order of sentence. 3. Briefly stated, a written report was submitted by Ghasilal on the basis of which formal FIR bearing FIR No.58/2008 was registered at Police Station Kotwali, Kota. In the written statement, Ghasilal deposed that on 17.3.2008 he was sleeping at his house. In the night at about 1.45 AM accused-appellant came to his house and confessed that he had committed murder of his two sisters, Radha aged 18 years and Jamana aged 25 years as he had an altercation with them over making of dinner. After making confession, accused ran away from the spot. Ghasilal complainant went to the house and found two sisters of the appellant unconscious. Complainant along with his son Golu brought two sisters for treatment to the hospital where doctor declared Jamana as dead. Radha was admitted in the hospital. Subsequently, Radha also died. 4. Investigating agency had submitted charge-sheet. The trial Judge on 13.6.2008 had drawn the following charge:- ^fnukad 17-03-2008 dks jkf= ds yxHkx 1-45 cts tc vkids ?kj ij vkidh cgusa teuk o jk/kk xqokM+k ds pcwrjs ij lks jgh Fkh rks vkius lk'k; ;k ;g Kku j[krs gq, nksuksa cguksa ds elkyk ckaVus ds iRFkj ls flj ij ekjdj e`R;q dkfjr dj lnks"k ekuoo/k dj gR;k dkfjr dh] vkidk ;s d`R; tqeZ tSj nQk 302 Hkk0n0la0 ds rgr n.Muh; tqeZ gS tks bl U;k;ky; ds izlaKku esa gSA* 5. On the question asked whether he has understood the charge, the appellant replied in affirmative. On the question asked whether he has understood the charge, the appellant replied in affirmative. When he was asked whether he accepts his guilt and claim trial, the accused stated as under:- ^tqeZ Lohdkj gS vUoh{kk ugha pkgrk gwa rFkk eSaus esjh cfgu jk/kk o teuk dks iRFkj ls flj ij ekjdj gR;k dh gSA* 6. Shri Rajesh Choudhary, learned Amicus Curiae, has questioned the procedure adopted by the trial Judge. The learned counsel has contended that the procedure adopted by the trial Judge is fraught with dangerous consequences. It is contended that even if a murder is committed by another person, the police may sent a wrong person and the said person may be prompted to admit his guilt. Thus, it is contended before us that it is incumbent for the court to satisfy itself that the offence has been committed by the appellant alone and by nobody else. 7-8. We find merit in the contention raised by the learned Amicus Curiae. A Division Bench of this court in Sattar v. State of Rajasthan [1980 RCC 68] has held as under:- "2. Under Section 229, CrPC, 1973, it has been stated that if the accused pleads guilty the judge shall record the plea and may in his discretion convict him thereon. In Vijia v. The State 1969 (19) FIR Raj. 101 the accused pleaded guilty to the charge and the prosecution did not examine any witness. The statement of the accused was recorded as a defence witness. It was held that the accused cannot be convicted on the basis of the statement of the accused as a defence witness. In this particular case, the accused pleaded guilty to the charge in the following terms: I have heard the charge and understood it. I admit to have committed the offence. I have intentionally murdered Navia. I want to give my statement on oath and for that purpose I have made an application separately. I do not want a trial. This plea of the accused in the case referred to was not accepted by this Court. Murder is a mixed question of law and fact, and unless the Court is satisfied that the accused knew exactly what was implied by his plea of guilty, the plea should not be accepted, but the Case should be tried specially where the accused is an ignorant person. Murder is a mixed question of law and fact, and unless the Court is satisfied that the accused knew exactly what was implied by his plea of guilty, the plea should not be accepted, but the Case should be tried specially where the accused is an ignorant person. In the instant case, the charge was framed on the same day, the plea of the guilty was recorded on the same day, the conviction was recorded on the same day, and the sentence was also imposed on the same day. Under these circumstances, it appears that though the Court had a discretion to accept the plea of the guilt, but the discretion should be judiciously exercised. It is safer for the courts to explain to the accused as fully as possible the technical ingredients of the offence and fully satisfy itself that the accused has understood them before the plea of guilt is accepted and a conviction is based thereon. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has basically relied upon the word "Hatya" in the plea of guilty by the accused. The details of the injuries were not put to the accused. It has normally been the practise that in murder cases the plea of guilt should be accepted with due caution and vigilance." 9. A Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Ramesan v. State of Kerala, 1981 Cri.L.J. 451 took into consideration entire case law and held as under:- "6. One of the earliest cases on the point under the Code of 1898 is the decision of the Bombay High Court reported in Emperor v. Chinia Bhika Koli (1906) 3 Cri LJ 337. In that case the Sessions Judge accepted the prisoner's plea of guilty. The trial Court held that the accused did not put forward any circumstance which might reduce the sentence to one of culpable homicide, and therefore, awarded the extreme penalty of death. Jenkins C.J., who pronounced the judgment on behalf of the Bench observed- "It is not in accordance with the usual practise to accept a plea of guilty in a case where the natural sequence would be a sentence of death. Jenkins C.J., who pronounced the judgment on behalf of the Bench observed- "It is not in accordance with the usual practise to accept a plea of guilty in a case where the natural sequence would be a sentence of death. The learned Judge proceeded to say- "A man may plead that he hit some one who thereby died, and that he did it for the purpose of taking away the ornaments of the person injured without necessarily admitting that he committed murder, for murder under the Penal Code requires a certain intention or a certain knowledge." Holding that it was not safe to accept the conclusion of the Sessions Judge the High Court set aside the conclusion and sent the case back to the Sessions Judge for trial according to law. 7. In Queen-Empress v. Chinna Pavuchi (1900) ILR 23 Mad 151, the Madras High Court observed: "The Code (Section 271) only says that 'the plea shall be recorded, and he may be convicted thereon'. As a matter of practise the Sessions trials-especially in murder cases many Judges, as we think very properly, prefer not to act on the plea of guilty, but proceed to take the evidence just as if the plea had been one of not guilty, and decide the case upon the whole evidence, including the accused's plea." 8. In Dalli v. Emperor AIR 1922 All 233 (1) the Allahabad High Court held on the question whether a plea of guilty should be acted upon in a case of murder: "In a case of murder it has long been the practise not to accept the plea of guilty. After all murder is a mixed question of fact and law and unless the Court is perfectly satisfied that the accused knew exactly what was necessarily implied by his plea of guilty, the case should be tried." The above decision was followed in Mt. Sukhia v. Emperor AIR 1922 All 266 and the rule of practise was reaffirmed in the following words: "That Rule is that when an accused is on his trial on a capital charge, it is not expedient that the Court should convict him even upon a plea of guilty entered before the trial Court itself. Sukhia v. Emperor AIR 1922 All 266 and the rule of practise was reaffirmed in the following words: "That Rule is that when an accused is on his trial on a capital charge, it is not expedient that the Court should convict him even upon a plea of guilty entered before the trial Court itself. As a matter of practise the Court should, in its discretion, put such a plea on one side and proceed to record and consider the evidence, in order to satisfy itself, not merely of the guilt of the accused, but of the precise nature of the offence committed and the appropriate punishment for the same: See also Lahori v. Emperor AIR 1925 All 647. The High Court of Calcutta has also been in favour of a similar practise as is clear from the following observation in Hasaruddin Mohommad v. Emperor AIR 1928 Cal 775: "We desire to observe that we cannot too strongly impress upon the learned Sessions Judge that in cases under Section 302, I.P.C. it is undesirable to accept a plea of guilty and to bring the trial to an end thereon. The trial of an accused person does not necessarily end if he pleads guilty but evidence may and should be taken in cases of murder as if the plea had been one of not guilty and the case decided upon the whole of the evidence including the accused's plea." 9. The Chief Court of Cochin had occasion to consider the question on more than one occasion. In Sirkar v. Pathu 9 Cochin LR 397 (FB), Narayana Iyer, C.J., referred to the following passage in Queen-Empress v. Bhadu (1896) ILR 19 All 120: "In this country it is dangerous to assume that a prisoner of this class understands what are the ingredients of the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and what are the matters which might reduce the act committed to an offence under Section 304. Even in England it is used to be the practise of some Judges, and probably is still, although they were not bound to do so, to advise persons pleading guilty to a capital offence to plead not guilty and stand their trial." The learned Judge held- "The accused is charged with a capital offence, and it need hardly be pointed out that the usual practise in such cases is not to accept the plea of guilty, but to proceed to record evidence and base the order of conviction or acquittal according to the reliability or unreliability of that evidence." The above decision has been followed in Sirkar v. Raman Nayar, 27 Cochin LR 557 and Sirkar v. Kurumba, 28 Cochin LR 132. 10. Similar views have been expressed in Achar Sanghar v. Emperor AIR 1934 Sind 204 : (1935 Cri LJ 324), Abdul Kader v. Emperor AIR 1947 Bom 345 : (1947 Cri LJ 329), Laldin v. The State AIR 1952 Him Pra 3 and In re Gavisiddappa, AIR 1968 Mys 145 : (1968 Cri LJ 762). See also the dicta in State v. Moideen Batcha Allapicha 1953 Ker LT 547, State of Mysore v. Bantra Kunjanna AIR 1960 Mys 177, In re Nallayee 1961 (2) Cri Rs. J 581 (Mad) and State v. Gopinatha Pillai 1978 Ker LT 779 : (1980 Cri LJ NOC 39). 11. This does not however mean that a conviction entered on a plea of guilty in a case falling under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code should always be set aside. In fact there are cases where the Court has upheld conviction based on the plea of guilty even in cases of murder, and this has been done after satisfying that the accused understood the nature and effect of the charge to which he pleaded guilty. See Nga Ywa v. Emperor AIR 1935 Rang 49 : (1935-36 Cri LJ 336). 12. Reference may also be made to the decision in Rex v. Golathan (1915) 84 LJ KB 758. The appellant in the case was indicted with entering a dwelling house by night with intent to steal. At the commencement of the trial the appellant admitted that he entered the house, but not that he had done so with intent to steal. A plea of "guilty" was entered and after proof of previous convictions, the appellant was sentenced to seven years' penal servitude. At the commencement of the trial the appellant admitted that he entered the house, but not that he had done so with intent to steal. A plea of "guilty" was entered and after proof of previous convictions, the appellant was sentenced to seven years' penal servitude. From the records it came out that the appellant intended to admit that he entered the premises but not that he did so with intent to steal. The Court held that the plea of the appellant was not a plea of "guilty" and held that if there is any ambiguity in a plea, it must be treated as a plea of "not guilty" and the trial must proceed in the ordinary way." 10. Having taken note of the case law in the case of Ramesan (supra), the Division Bench of Kerala High Court held as under:- "13. The rule of practise adopted by the various High Courts in not acting upon a plea of guilty in cases of serious offences of murder is a rule of caution and prudence. An offence of murder involves not only the physical act of violence but also the mental element of intention or knowledge. A lay accused, when he pleads guilty is likely to be more concerned with the physical act and may not advert to the various ingredients constituting the offence. As mentioned in Dalli v. Emperor AIR 1922 All 233 (1) whether act constitutes murder is a mixed question of law and fact. The Court while holding an accused guilty of murder should also enter a finding that he did the act with the requisite intention or knowledge. For such a finding to be entered and to decide whether the offence is murder or a lesser offence, the Court should have before it the details of the occurrence, the circumstances under which the act was done and the motive if any and for this purpose it is desirable that the entire evidence is placed before the Court. 14. It may be recalled in this connection, that Section 354(3) of the Code directs that where the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or in the alternative with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years, the judgment should state the reasons for the sentence awarded and in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons for such sentence. In the absence of sufficient materials before Court by way of evidence, there has not been proper compliance of the provision in the instant case. 15. It would appear from the judgment that the trial Judge was hesitant to decide the case on the plea of guilty and did so only because the accused persisted in repeating the plea. The learned Judge did not advert to the fact, while under the old Code discretion in the matter of examination of witnesses had to be inferred from the use of the word "may" there is specific conferment of such discretion on the Court in Section 229 of the present Code. The offence involved being a grave crime, the learned Judge should have availed of the discretion so conferred and proceeded to dispose of the case after recording evidence." 11. Similarly, a Division Bench of Gauhati High Court in Wazamao & Ors. v. The State of Nagaland, 1983 Cri.L.J. 57 also held that the course adopted by the trial court is unacceptable. 12. A Division Bench of Bombay High Court in Tyron Nazarath v. The State, 1989 Cri.L.J. 123 held that it is not prudent to convict an accused on his plea at the time of framing charge for offence of murder. We reproduce Para-10 of the judgment as under:- "10. There is nothing in the law that bars a conviction on basis of a plea of guilt, however serious is the offence committed and however grave is the sentence provided in law. What the Courts had held is that in serious cases like offences of murder, it is not prudent to convict a man for such an offence without recording evidence. This is merely a rule of the prudence which the seriousness of the punishment justifies and the intricacies of the offence involve. This is what the Special Bench of this Court laid down in other words in Abdul Kader Allarakhia's case 1947 Cri LJ 329." 13. However, a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Ram Kishun v. State of U.P., 1996 Cri.L.J. 440 had taken a different view. We may notice here that another Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Ram Kumar v. State of U.P., 1998 Cri.L.J. 1267 reiterated the settled legal position that on an admission made by the accused at the time of framing of charge, conviction ought not to be recorded. We may notice here that another Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Ram Kumar v. State of U.P., 1998 Cri.L.J. 1267 reiterated the settled legal position that on an admission made by the accused at the time of framing of charge, conviction ought not to be recorded. G.P. Mathur, J. sitting in a Division Bench as His Lordship was then Judge of Allahabad High Court, observed as under:- "10. Almost all the High Courts of the country have taken the view that the court should not act upon the plea of guilty in serious offences but should proceed to take the evidence as if the plea had been one of not guilty and should decide the case upon the whole evidence including the accused plea. We do not consider it necessary to refer to those decisions in detail. As mentioned earlier the appellant had pleaded not guilty and as such there was no occasion for the court to record a finding of conviction as contemplated by Section 229, Cr.P.C. The prosecution having led no evidence to prove its case, the conviction of the appellant has to be set aside." 14. We also concur with the view formulated by the Division Bench of this court in case of Sattar (supra) way back in nineteen eighty. 15. Thus, we set aside the judgment of conviction and sentence of the accused and remand the case to the trial court for a fresh trial according to law. The appellant is in custody since 17.3.2008 and has undergone about seven years, five months and few days. Therefore, we direct the trial Judge to conclude the trial at the earliest. In view of above, present appeal stands disposed of. Appeal disposed of.