JUDGMENT : Anupinder Singh Grewal, J. This appeal is directed against the order of learned Single Judge dated 18.06.2015 whereby the writ petition preferred by the appellant-Corporation was dismissed and the order of the Industrial Tribunal dated 30.11.2010 declining approval to the order of removal of the respondent was upheld. 2. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant. 3. The respondent, while working as Conductor with the appellant-Corporation, had been issued two chargesheets dated 01.10.1990 & 31.05.1991. After regular enquiry, he was ordered to be dismissed from service. Application under section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was preferred by the appellant seeking approval of the order of dismissal. 4. It is apparent that in the charge sheet dated 01.10.1990 the allegations pertained to over-writing in place of destination from Ahmedabad to Abul Road and overwriting/cutting/interpolation in number of passengers instead of 11 to 1. It was held by the tribunal that in the way-bill only one ticket No.906 was indicated and 917 which would be the number in addition of 11 passengers had not been indicated and hence, it is evident that the error was on account of slip of pen, which fact had already been admitted by the complainant in the course of enquiry. The complainant had also admitted in cross-examination that he could make a statement as to the place of destination only after perusal of the ticket which had not been produced before the tribunal to enable it to ascertain the mentioned place of destination. The complainant had also made a categorical statement that during the course of enquiry it was not possible for any passenger to have travelled without ticket at the Palanpur Check Post. The bus had been inspected at this Check Post by Shri Vidhyanand, who also did not find any passenger without ticket. The enquiry officer had only found the charge as partly proved while he had also concluded that mentioning 11 instead of 1 was on account of slip of pen which could not be proved. No documentary or independent evidence has been produced on behalf of the appellant-Corporation during the course of the enquiry to sustain the charge. 5. The enquiry officer had only found the charge as partly proved while he had also concluded that mentioning 11 instead of 1 was on account of slip of pen which could not be proved. No documentary or independent evidence has been produced on behalf of the appellant-Corporation during the course of the enquiry to sustain the charge. 5. With regard to the second charge sheet dated 31.05.1991 pertaining to respondent permitting six passengers to travel without tickets, it is borne out from the finding of the tribunal that the only witness namely, Shri Narayan Singh who was produced in support of this charge, admitted that he had neither recorded the statement of the passengers nor checked the cash with the respondent-workman. He had further admitted that he did not himself inspect the vehicle and allegations were made on the basis of the inspection which was carried by other officials. Neither any of these officers, who had inspected the vehicle, was produced to substantiate the charge, nor any other independent evidence was brought on record. The witness who was produced in defence by the respondent fully supported his version, even though he was cross-examined at length by the enquiry officer. 6. It is, thus, evident that the finding of the tribunal, in declining approval of the termination of the respondent-workman, does not suffer from any manifest illegality or error warranting interference by this Court. It is well settled that the finding of the tribunal would call for interference by the courts only in case of gross illegality or perversity. The view taken by the tribunal appears to be a plausible one in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. Even if another view is possible on the given facts and circumstances, this Court would not interfere in the findings of the tribunal. Reference may be made to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of General Manager, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Silchar v. Oil and Natural Gas Commission Contractual Workers Union, [ (2008)12 SCC 275 ] wherein it was held:- "15. We have examined the arguments advanced by the learned counsel. This Court has held time and again that the High Court had the authority to enquire as to whether a finding arrived at by the Tribunal was based on evidence and to correct an error apparent on the face of the record. We have examined the arguments advanced by the learned counsel. This Court has held time and again that the High Court had the authority to enquire as to whether a finding arrived at by the Tribunal was based on evidence and to correct an error apparent on the face of the record. The observations in Trambak Rubber Industries Ltd. case are to this effect and it has been highlighted that the High Court would be fully justified in interfering with an award of an Industrial Court on account of a patent illegality. In Seema Ghosh case this Court observed that the High Court's interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution with an award of the Labour Court was justified as the award had been rendered contrary to the law laid down by this Court and as a measure of "misplaced sympathy", and was thus perverse. The other judgments cited by Mr. Dave lay down similar principles and need not be dealt with individually. It will be seen therefore that the interference would be limited to a few cases and as already noted above, in the case of a patent illegality or perversity. On the contrary, Mr Sanyal's reliance on Sadhu Ram case is more appropriate to the circumstances herein. It has been observed as under: (SCC p. 158, para 3). '3. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is truly wide but, for that very reason, it has to be exercised with great circumspection. It is not for the High Court to constitute itself into an appellate court over tribunals constituted under special legislations to resolve disputes of a kind qualitatively different from ordinary civil disputes and to res judicata upon questions of fact decided by those tribunals. That the questions decide pertain to jurisdictional facts does not entitle the High Court to interfere with the findings on jurisdictional facts which the Tribunal is well competent to decide. Where the circumstances indicate that the Tribunal has snatched at jurisdiction, the High Court may be justified in interfering. That the questions decide pertain to jurisdictional facts does not entitle the High Court to interfere with the findings on jurisdictional facts which the Tribunal is well competent to decide. Where the circumstances indicate that the Tribunal has snatched at jurisdiction, the High Court may be justified in interfering. But where the Tribunal gets jurisdiction only if a reference is made and it is therefore impossible ever to say that the Tribunal has clutched at jurisdiction, we do not think that it was proper for the High Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Labour Court and hold that the workman had raised no demand with the management.' 16. We are therefore the opinion that in the light of the fact that have come on record we find no perversity or patent illegality in the award of the Industrial Tribunal and on the contrary must appreciate that it has minutely examined the evidence in arriving at its decision. In this view of the matter, it was inappropriate for the learned Single Judge to have reappraised the evidence and come to a different conclusion." 7. Therefore, we do not find any illegality in the order of the learned Single Judge whereby the finding of the tribunal had been upheld. In the result, the appeal is dismissed being devoid of any merit. Appeal dismissed.