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2015 DIGILAW 1649 (RAJ)

Vinay Kumari Chopra v. Vijay Singh

2015-09-10

PRAKASH GUPTA

body2015
Order 1. Since both these appeals arise out of the common order dated 15/09/2012 passed by the Additional District Judge No.4, Kota, whereby, the applications filed by the plaintiffs-appellants seeking temporary injunction has been rejected, they are being decided by this common order. 2. The facts of S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 4137/2012 as mentioned in memo of appeal in brief are that plaintiffs Vinay Kumari and Lalit Kumari filed a suit alleging therein that they are members of the Joint Hindu Family and thus are entitled to partition. To appreciate the correct factual position of the case, it will be apposite to mention herein below the pedigree of the parties:- Onkar Singh Ajeet Singh Nav Nidhi Kumari Vijay Singh (Res. No.6) Jaswant Singh (Res.No.2) Smt.Sushila Kumari (Res.No.3) Smt.Asha Kumari (Res. No.4) Vijay Kumari (App.) Lalit Kumari (App.) Pratap Singh (Res.No.6) Sanjay Singh (Res. No.7) Smarty Kumari (Res. No.8) 3. Late Onkar Singh was a Jagirdar in the erstwhile Kota State and during his life time, he acquired various properties in Kota, Palayatha, Vinod Kundanpur, Bambooliya, Mirzapur, Sorson, Amba, Akedi etc. Sh. Onkar Singh expired on 27/06/1951 and did not execute any will during his life time and after his death, Ajeet Singh succeeded to the aforesaid properties. He expired on 08/02/1970 and his wife Smt.Nav Nidhi Kumari expired on 14/08/2007 but none of them executed any will during their lifetime. There was no partition of Joint Hindu Family properties and they are continuing as such in which the plaintiffs and defendants have their right. Defendant Nos.1 & 2 being elder members of the Joint HUF, sold some of the aforesaid properties illegally for getting undue benefits without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs and when this fact came to the knowledge of the plaintiffs, they decided to seek partition of the Joint HUF properties by meets & bounds. When they asked defendant No.1 and 2 for partition, defendant No.2 told them about the released-deed dated 27/09/1971 and decree dated 17/01/1972 passed by District Judge, Kota in favour of the defendant Nos.5 to 8. On that basis defendant No.1 and 2 have denied partition. The released-deed dated 27/09/1971 is null and void against the plaintiffs. When they asked defendant No.1 and 2 for partition, defendant No.2 told them about the released-deed dated 27/09/1971 and decree dated 17/01/1972 passed by District Judge, Kota in favour of the defendant Nos.5 to 8. On that basis defendant No.1 and 2 have denied partition. The released-deed dated 27/09/1971 is null and void against the plaintiffs. If on the basis of the said release deed, defendant Nos.5 to 8 have obtained any decree on 17/01/1972 against defendant No.1 collusively, it is illegal, unauthorized and ineffective and, therefore, defendant Nos.5 to 8 do not have any legal right, title or interest over the Joint Hindu Family properties on the basis of the collusive decree dated 17/01/1972. Therefore, the properties as mentioned in the plaint, may be partitioned by meets & bounds. Plaintiffs also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 r/w. S.151 CPC with the prayer to restrain the defendants from selling, alienating, transferring or disposing of the Joint Hindu Family properties further or giving possession thereof to anybody else. 4. Defendant Nos.1, 5, 6, 7 & 8 filed a joint reply and defendant No.4 filed separate reply to the application for injunction contending therein that at no point of time, the plaintiffs were members of the Joint Hindu Family as they were born much after the death of late Sh.Onkar Singh. Hindu Undivided Family properties was partitioned between defendant Nos. 1 to 4 and wife of late Shri Ajeet Singh Nav Nidhi Kumari with their consent and for last 44-45 years, they are in possession of the properties, which came in their respective share. In order to avoid any future complications and disputes, a release-deed dated 27/09/1971 was executed, which was also registered and the parties are in possession of the properties according to their shares. Sh. Jaswant Singh (defendant No. 2), who is father of the plaintiffs, has also filed another suit for partition and during his life time, plaintiffs cannot file any suit. The decree dated 17/01/1972 was obtained on the basis of the release-deed dated 27/09/1971, which was registered with by mutual consent and the parties have been in possession of the properties since then and the plaintiffs cannot raise objections against it. The decree dated 17/01/1972 was obtained on the basis of the release-deed dated 27/09/1971, which was registered with by mutual consent and the parties have been in possession of the properties since then and the plaintiffs cannot raise objections against it. Defendant No.2 and his wife admitted the said partition in proceedings before the Additional Director, Urban land (Ceiling and Regulation) Kota showing the properties, which came in their possession after verbal partition took place in the year 1966. Smt. Nav Nidhi Kumari sold some of those properties to Asha Kumari on 12/11/1980 and thus the parties have acted upon the family partition and, therefore, the suit as well as the application for temporary injunction deserves to be rejected. 5. Defendant No.2 also filed a separate reply to the injunction application admitting the facts contained in the application for injunction. 6. According to memo of appeal, the facts giving rise to appeal No. 4996/2012 are that the appellant-plaintiff-Jaswant Singh filed suit for partition and accounts along with application for temporary injunction against the defendants/respondents on 16/02/09. It was stated in the application for temporary injunction that plaintiff and defendants are descendants of Shri Onkar Singh. He was jagirdar of Kota State and acquired various properties during his lifetime as mentioned in para 2 of the plaint. He expired on 27/06/1951. Shri Ajeet Singh S/o Shri Onkar Singh had two sons namely Vijay Singh (defendant No.1) and Jaswant Singh (plaintiff) and two daughters namely Smt. Sushila Kumari (defendant No.2) and Smt. Asha Kumari (Defendant No.3). It was stated that Sh. Ajeet Singh expired on 08/02/1970 and Smt. Nav Nidhi Kumari W/o Ajeet Singh expired on 14/08/07. They did not execute any will during their lifetime. No partition of Joint Hindu Family Properties took place till date as such the plaintiff and the defendants have their right. It is alleged that defendant No.1 being elder member & karta of the Joint Hindu Family illegally started to sell out some of the aforesaid properties for getting undue benefits without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff. 7. That defendants No.1 and 3 filed a joint reply and denied averment of application for temporary injunction interalia stating that the suit is not maintainable as there has been prior partition of the Joint Hindu Family properties between the members of the family and they are enjoying the same since then. 7. That defendants No.1 and 3 filed a joint reply and denied averment of application for temporary injunction interalia stating that the suit is not maintainable as there has been prior partition of the Joint Hindu Family properties between the members of the family and they are enjoying the same since then. It was stated that a release-deed dated 27/09/1971 was executed which was got registered and the parties are in possession of the suit properties according to it. It was also stated that defendant No.1's (Vijay Singh) wife and his two sons and one daughter filed suit for partition against Shri Vijay Singh which was decreed vide judgement and decree dated 17/01/1972. It was also stated that the plaintiff and his wife had admitted the family partition in proceedings before the Additional Director, Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Kota showing the properties which came in their possession by oral partition. It was also stated that Smt. Nav Nidhi Kumari sold some of those properties to Asha Kumari on 12/11/1980 and thus, the parties have acted upon the family partition and the suit as well as application for injunction deserves to be rejected. 8. That defendant No.2 filed reply and admitted the facts contained in the application for temporary injunction. 9. The trial Court dismissed the applications filed for temporary injunction vide common order dated 15/09/2012 being aggrieved by the same, the appellants-plaintiffs filed these misc. appeals. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 11. Shri Mahendra Singh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that by the impugned order, the trial Court virtually decided the suit itself while deciding upon the injunction application. He contended that the trial Court has wrongly placed reliance on the release-deed dated 27/09/1971 for rejecting the application of the appellants, when they were not even party to the said documents and as such, they are not bound by it. The said release-deed cannot be termed as a partition-deed. He further submitted that after substitution of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by the Amending Act of 2005, daughter of a co-parcener are along with other coparcener in their own right therefore, the appellants are entitled to get their share in the suit property as co-parcener but the trial Court failed to consider this legal aspect. He further submitted that after substitution of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by the Amending Act of 2005, daughter of a co-parcener are along with other coparcener in their own right therefore, the appellants are entitled to get their share in the suit property as co-parcener but the trial Court failed to consider this legal aspect. He submitted that Section 6 (5) of the Act of 1956 provides that the section 6 of the Act of 1956 shall not apply to a partition, which was effected before 20/12/2004 but the partition must be by a duly registered deed or one affected by a decree of a Court. For the sake of the argument even if it is assumed that the disputed property was partitioned orally, it will not affect any right of the plaintiffs in view of the provisions of said section. He submitted that the release-deed is a suspicious document. He submitted that substantial question was raised bonafidely by the plaintiffs, which needs investigation and inquiry and which cannot be decided without marshaling the evidence of both the parties in true perspective. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for the plaintiffs has placed reliance upon the Maharwal Khewaji Trust Vs. Baldev Dass : AIR 2005 SC 104 , Narendra Kante Vs. Anuradha Kante & Ors. : (2010) 2 SCC 77 , Jagan Singh (Dead) through LRs Vs. Dhanwanti & Ors. : (2012) 2 SCC 628 , T.G. Ashok Kumar Vs. Govindammal : (2010) 14 SCC 370 , Ratnam Chettiar & Ors Vs. S.M. Kuppuswami Chettiar & Ors. : (1979) 2 SCC 463 , Sukhrani (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. Vs. Hari Shanker & Others : (1976) 1 SCC 214 , Kale & Others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation : (1976) 3 SCC 119 , Bhagwant P.Sulakhe Vs. Digambar Gopal Sulakhe and Ors. : (1986) 1 SCC 366 and M.L. Subbaraya Setty (dead) by LRs. And Ors. Vs. M.L. Nagappa, Setty (dead) by LRs and Ors. : (2002) 4 SCC 743 . Learned counsel for the appellant-Jaswant Singh reiterated the same contentions. 12. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has supported the impugned order and submitted that the plaintiff have not come with clean hands. They concealed material facts from the Court. Therefore, they are not entitled to the discretionary relief of temporary injunction. : (2002) 4 SCC 743 . Learned counsel for the appellant-Jaswant Singh reiterated the same contentions. 12. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has supported the impugned order and submitted that the plaintiff have not come with clean hands. They concealed material facts from the Court. Therefore, they are not entitled to the discretionary relief of temporary injunction. It is submitted that the suit property was already partitioned and the plaintiff and their father (defendant No.2) sold the various properties by different sale deeds. It is submitted that the plaintiff had also sold their properties through their power of attorney holder (defendant No.2). Counsel further submitted that the provisions of Section 6 of the Act of 1956 do not apply to grand-daughters. It is submitted that in matters related to temporary injunction, the jurisdiction of the first appellate Court is very limited and the interference can be called for only when it finds that the order of the trial court is arbitrary, capricious or perverse. 13. I have considered rival submission made by the learned counsel for the parties. 14. It is revealed from the impugned order that the learned trial Court took into consideration the above mentioned registered release-deed dated 27/9/1971, the judgment dated 14/10/1988 passed by the Additional Director and Authorized Officer, Urban land Ceiling, Kota under Section 9 of the Act of 1976, an affidavit filed by defendant No.2 in the said proceedings mentioned in the aforesaid Order and admission of defendant No.2 in the said proceedings that the ancestral property was received by him vide a family settlement. The trial Court also took into consideration the application dated 15/01/1981 which was filed in the ceiling proceedings by the wife of defendant No.2, reply of the notice filed by defendant No.2 and his wife in the ceiling proceedings. Further, trial Court also took into consideration special power of attorney executed by Smt. Asha Kumari in favour of Sh. Bajrang Lal Kamdar. After detailed discussion of the aforesaid documents, the learned trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that prima-facie, it is proved that the disputed property has been partitioned either in the year 1971 or prior to it and therefore the disputed property is not a Hindu Undivided Family property since then. Bajrang Lal Kamdar. After detailed discussion of the aforesaid documents, the learned trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that prima-facie, it is proved that the disputed property has been partitioned either in the year 1971 or prior to it and therefore the disputed property is not a Hindu Undivided Family property since then. It was also observed by the learned trial Court that no objection was ever raised by defendant No.2 and plaintiffs-Vinay Kumari and Lalit Kumari prior to the filing of this suit. It is further observed by the learned trial Court that defendant No.2 himself and his wife and plaintiffs Vinay Kumari and Lalit Kumari had sold various properties, which they received by way of release-deed dated 27/09/1971. From these facts, it is prima-facie proved that the property in dispute is not Hindu Undivided Family property rather, the same had been partitioned. It was also observed by the learned trial Court that it is not prima-facie proved that the release-deed is forged. It was further observed that no objection was raised by the appellants when part of the disputed property was sold by some of the parties to the suit. 15. There is no force in the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that the learned trial Court has virtually decided the suit itself. In the considered opinion of this Court the learned trial Court has taken into consideration the three facts i.e. prima-facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, which are necessary to take into account while deciding application for temporary injunction. 16. So far as the contentions regarding non-execution of released deed by the appellants are concerned, suffice it is to say that admittedly appellant-Jaswant Singh was a party to the said document. The learned counsel for the appellants could not convince the Court about the requirement of the signature of the two appellants on the release-deed when it bears the signature of their father. 17. Regarding the next submission made by the learned counsel about the substitution of Section 6 of the Act of 1956, it is beneficial to reproduce the said provision. “6. 17. Regarding the next submission made by the learned counsel about the substitution of Section 6 of the Act of 1956, it is beneficial to reproduce the said provision. “6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property.-(1) On and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005*, in a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall,- (a) by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son; (b) have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son; (c) be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son, and any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter of a coparcener: Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place before the 20th day of December, 2004. (2) Any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of sub-section (1) shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and shall be regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force in, as property capable of being disposed of by her by testamentary disposition. (2) Any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of sub-section (1) shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and shall be regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force in, as property capable of being disposed of by her by testamentary disposition. (3) Where a Hindu dies after the commencement of the hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005*, his interest in the property of a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship, and the coparcenary property shall be deemed to have been divided as if a partition had taken place and, - (a) the daughter is allotted the same share as is allotted to a son; (b) the share of the pre-deceased son or a pre-deceased daughter, as they would have got had they been alive at the time of partition, shall be allotted to the surviving child of such pre-deceased son or of such pre-deceased daughter; and (c) the share of the pre-deceased child of a pre-deceased son or of a pre-deceased daughter, as such child would have got had he or she been alive at the time of the partition, shall be allotted to the child of such pre-deceased child of the predeceased son or a pre-deceased daughter, as the case may be. Explanation. -For the purposes of this subsection, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. Explanation. -For the purposes of this subsection, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. (4) After the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005*, no court shall recognise any right to proceed againt a son, grandson or great-grandson for the recovery of any debt due from his father, grandfather or great-grandfather solely on the ground of the pious obligation under the Hindu law, of such son, grandson or great-grandson to discharge any such debt: Provided that in the case of any debt contracted before the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005*, nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect- (a) The right of any creditor to proceed against the son, grandson or great-grandson, as the case may be; or (b) Any alienation made in respect of or in satisfaction of, any such debt, and any such right or alienation shall be enforceable under the rule of pious obligation in the same manner and to the same extent as it would have been enforceable as if the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 had not been enacted. Explanation.-For the purposes of clause (a), the expression “son”, “grandson” or “greatgrandson” shall be deemed to refer to the son, grandson or great-grandson, as the case may be, sho was boren or adopted prior to the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005”. (5) Nothing contained in this section shall apply to a partition, which has been effected before the 20th day of December, 2004. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section “partition” means any partition made by execution of a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908) or partition effected by a decree of a court]” From a bare perusal of the provision quoted above, it is clear that on and from 09/09/2005, in a joint Hindu Family the daughter of a co-parcener shall also be a co-parcener by birth in her own right and in the same manner as a son. Therefore, if a partition has already taken place before the 20/12/2004, the provisions of this section shall not apply unless the partition was made by the execution of a deed of partition duly registered under the Reg. Act, 1908 or partition was effected by a decree of a Court. In the case at hand the registered realese-deed dated 27/09/1971 has been given the title of a release-deed but virtually, through this deed the parties had partitioned the Hindu Undivided Family property in question and hence, it appears to be a partition deed. 18. It is a well-settled law that the relief of temporary injunction is a discretionary relief and a party who does not come with clean hands is not entitled to this equitable discretionary relief. The Hon'ble Apex Court in (2011) 7 SCC page 87 Amar Singh v. Union of India has observed as under: - “53. Courts have, over the centuries, frowned upon litigants who, with intent to deceive and mislead the courts, initiated proceedings without full disclosure of facts. Courts held that such litigants have come with “unclean hands” and are not entitled to be heard on the merits of their case. 54. In Dalglish v. Jarvie the Court, speaking through Lord Langdale and Rolfe B., laid down: (mac & G p. 231 : ER p. 89) “It is the duty of a party asking for an injunction to bring under the notice of the Court all facts material to the determination of his right to that injunction; and it is no excuse for him to say that he was not aware of the importance of any facts which he has omitted to bring forward.” 55. In Castelli v. Cook Vice-Chancellor Wigram, formulated the same principles as follows: (Hare p. 94: ER p. 38) “.... a plaintiff applying ex parte comes (as it has been expressed) under a contract with the Court that he will state the whole case fully and fairly to the Court. If he fails to do that, and the Court finds, when the other party applies to dissolve the injunction, that any material fact has been suppressed or not properly brought forward, the plaintiff is told that the Court will not decide on the merits, and that, as he has broken faith with the Court, the injunction must go.” 56. In Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus Bros. & Co. In Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus Bros. & Co. Kay, J. reminded us of the same position by holding: (LT p. 803) .“....If there is an important misstatement, speaking for myself, I have never hesitated, and never shall hesitate until the rule is altered, to discharge the order at once, so as to impress upon all persons who are suitors in this Court the importance of dealing in good faith with the Court when ex parte applications are made.” 57. In one of the most celebrated cases upholding this principles, in the Court of Appeal in R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commr., ex p Princess de Polgnac K.B. Scrutton, L.J. Formulated as under: (KB p. 514) “... and it has been for many years the rule of the court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts – facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it – the court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts, and the penalty by which the court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement.” 58. It is one of the fundamental principles of jurisprudence that litigants must observe total clarity and candour in their pleadings and especially when it contains a prayer for injunction. A prayer for injunction, which is an equitable remedy, must be governed by the principles of “uberrima fides”. 59. The aforesaid requirement of coming to court with clean hands has been repeatedly reiterated by this Court in a large number of cases. Some of which may be noted, they are: Hari Narain v. Badri das, Welcome Hotel v. State of A.P., G. Narayanaswamy Reddy V. Govt. of Karnataka, S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P., Prestige Lights Ltd. v. SBI, Sunil Poddar v. Union Bank of India, K.D. Sharma v. SAIL, G. Gayashree v. Bhagwandas S. Patel and Dalip Singh V. State of U.P. 19. of Karnataka, S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P., Prestige Lights Ltd. v. SBI, Sunil Poddar v. Union Bank of India, K.D. Sharma v. SAIL, G. Gayashree v. Bhagwandas S. Patel and Dalip Singh V. State of U.P. 19. Similarly, the Hon'ble Apex Court in (2006) 5 SCC page 294 Seema Arshad Zaheer v. Municipal Corpn. Of Greater Mumbai has observed as under:- “The discretion of the court is exercised to grant a temporary injunction only when the following requirements are made out by the plaintiff: (i) existence of a prima facie case as pleaded, necessitating protection of the plaintiff's rights by issue of a temporary injunction; (ii) when the need for protection of the plaintiff's rights is compared with or weighed against the need for protection of the defendant's rights or likely infringement of the defendant's rights, the balance of convenience tilting in favour of the plaintiff; and (iii) clear possibility of irreparable injury being caused to the plaintiff if the temporary injunction is not granted. In addition, temporary injunction being an equitable relief, the discretion to grant such relief will be exercised only when the plaintiff's conduct is free from blame and he approaches the court with clean hands.” (Emphasis supplied) 20. In the matter at hand, the appellants have concealed the fact that they had themselves sold substantial part of the disputed properties by different registered sale deeds. It is also pertinent to mention here the initially suit along with temporary injunction application No. 47/2009 was filed by defendant No.2 (father of the plaintiffs) in the learned trial Court on 16/02/2009. But when he failed to get an interim injunction in that application, suit No. 19/12 (160/10) and application for temporary injunction No. 27/2012 appears to have been filed by the appellants on 11/05/2010. This prima facie shows a malafide intention on part of the plaintiffs. Thus, it quite clear that they have not come with clean hands. Therefore, they are not entitled to an order for temporary injunction. 21. It is also well settled that in such matters, the jurisdiction of the first appellate Court is very limited, the first appellate Court should not interfere unless it is found that the order of the trial Court is arbitrary, capricious and perverse or is against sound legal principles and has been passed ignoring material on record. 22. 21. It is also well settled that in such matters, the jurisdiction of the first appellate Court is very limited, the first appellate Court should not interfere unless it is found that the order of the trial Court is arbitrary, capricious and perverse or is against sound legal principles and has been passed ignoring material on record. 22. The Hon'ble Apex Court in (2013) 9 SCC Mohd. Mehtab Khan v. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan has observed as under: - “In a situation where the learned trial court on a consideration of the respective cases of the parties and the documents laid before it was of the view that the entitlement of the plaintiffs to an order of interim mandatory injunction was in serious doubt, the appellate court could not have interfered with the exercise of discretion by the learned trial Judge unless such exercise was found to be palpably incorrect or untenable. The reasons that weighed with the learned trial Judge, as already noticed, according to us, do not indicate that the view taken is not a possible view. The appellate court, therefore, should not have substituted its views in the matter merely on the ground that in its opinion the facts of the case call for a different conclusion. Such an exercise is not the correct parameter for exercise of jurisdiction while hearing an appeal against a discretionary order. While we must not be understood to have said that the appellate court was wrong in its conclusions what is sought to be emphasised is that as long as the view of the trial court was a possible view the appellate court should not have interfered with the same following the virtually settled principles of law in this regard as laid down by this Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd. 21.Para 14 of the aforesaid judgment which is extracted below would amply sum up the situation: (Wander Ltd. Case, SCC p. 533) “14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion.” 23. Looking at peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, all the three ingredients necessary for granting a order for temporary injunction have been found to be against the appellants and therefore, the ratios laid down in the rulings cited on behalf of the appellants are not applicable to this case. 24. In the matter at hand, the learned trial Court has considered each and every aspect of the matter and also the material on record. Therefore, the order of the learned trial Court can not be termed as arbitrary, capricious, perverse or against sound legal principles. For the forging reasons, the appeals deserve to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed. Stay applications are also dismissed.