ORDER 1. Leave granted. These appeals have been filed by the three accused who have been convicted Under Sections 376(g) and 341 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 8 years under Section 376(g) Indian Penal Code and fine of Rs. 1,000/- each in default simple imprisonment of three months. No separate sentence has been awarded under Section 341 Indian Penal Code. 2. The aforesaid conviction and sentence having been confirmed by the High Court in appeal, the accused -appellants have preferred these appeals by special leave Under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 3. The FIR was lodged by PW-6 the prosecutrix herself on 29.06.1988 alleging that the three accused had committed the offences in question which was eye witnessed by PW-1 Shanthi Devi. In the FIR, it was also alleged that the victim had informed the said incident to her mother (PW-5) and names and identity of the accused were revealed to her. 4. The aforesaid FIR was registered at Police station Narayanpur, Dumka District and on completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed against the accused who were sent for trial. In the trial, eight witnesses were examined on the behalf of the prosecution and none on behalf of the defence. At the conclusion of the trial and after recording of statements of the accused under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, the Trial Court sentenced the accused as aforesaid which order has been affirmed, as noted, in appeal by the High Court. 5. We have heard Learned Counsels for both sides. 6. We have considered the evidence of PW-1-Shanthi Devi- the eye witness; the evidence of prosecutrix-herself as well as the evidence of PW-5 the mother of the prosecutrix. We have also taken into account the evidence of the Doctor (PW-7) who had conducted medical examination of the victim. Though the medical report appears to be in the negative, in the face of the overwhelming evidence, particularly, of the victim herself as corroborated by the evidence of PW-1 Shanthi Devi and PW-5 the mother, we can find no infirmity in the conclusions reached by the Trial Court as affirmed by the High Court. The conviction of the accused, therefore appears to be justified on the basis of the evidence on record as brought by the prosecution. The conviction of the accused, therefore appears to be justified on the basis of the evidence on record as brought by the prosecution. Insofar as the sentence is concerned, no infirmity can be found on the said score. 7. The above findings and conclusions, however, would be in respect of the accused Nos. 2 and 3 above. Insofar as the accused-Appellant No. 1 Viz. Tikeshwar Murmu is concerned, the matter stands on a different footing. The said accused was found to be 17 years of age by the High Court. However, taking into account that the offence had occurred in the year 1988 when the Juvenile Justice Act 1986 was in force, the High Court was of the view that the changes brought by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2000 with regard to age of juveniles (18 years) would not apply to the first accused. Accordingly, the benefit of the provisions of the Act of 2000 was denied to the first accused. 8. In the absence of any challenge to the finding of the High Court with regard to the age of the first accused, we do not consider it necessary to go into the said issue at this stage. 9. The provisions of Section 2(k) of the Act of 2000 has been held by this Court in 2009 (2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 878 : 2009 (3) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 414 : 2009 (13) SCC 211 Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. to be applicable also to cases where offences had been committed even prior to coming into force of Act of 2000 i.e. 01.04.2001. In view of the aforesaid pronouncement in Hari Ram (supra), the conclusion recorded by the High Court namely that the accused-Appellant No. 1 was not a juvenile would not be correct. Following the aforesaid pronouncement, the accused-appellant No. 1, in our considered view, has to be treated as a juvenile and entitled to the benefit of Act of 2000. If that be so, the inevitable consequence that has to follow is that the trial had (held?) against the first accused is vitiated and the proceedings of the trial including the conviction and sentence would be open to interference. We, therefore, set aside the conviction of the accused-Appellant No. 1 and sentence imposed on him on the aforesaid grounds. 10. If that be so, the inevitable consequence that has to follow is that the trial had (held?) against the first accused is vitiated and the proceedings of the trial including the conviction and sentence would be open to interference. We, therefore, set aside the conviction of the accused-Appellant No. 1 and sentence imposed on him on the aforesaid grounds. 10. The next question that would require an answer is the course of action that would be appropriate to be followed in the case of the first accused following our conclusions as above. In Hari Ram (supra) confronted with a somewhat similar situation, this Court had remitted the matter to the concerned Juvenile Justice Board for disposal in accordance with law. We do not see why the same course of action should not be adopted in the present case. We accordingly remit the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board, Jamtara, Jharkhand, for disposal in accordance with law. The Board will keep in mind that the offence alleged against accused-Appellant No. 1 had occurred in the year 1988 and that he had served almost seven years and ten months of eight years of imprisonment imposed on him. Consequently, the appeals are disposed of affirming the conviction and sentence insofar as accused Nos. 2 and 3 is concerned while setting aside the same with the directions as above insofar as accused-Appellant No. 1 is concerned.