JUDGMENT : BHANDARI, J. By this petition, challenge is made to the order dated 2nd September, 2015, whereby candidature of the petitioner for direct recruitment in the District Judge Cadre was rejected in reference to Rule 33(iii) of Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010 (as amended) (in short “Rules of 2010”). It is stated that an advertisement was issued by the respondents inviting applications for the post in District Judge Cadre. The petitioner applied for the post. He was allowed to appear in written examination. The result of the written examination was declared on 20.08.2015 and petitioner qualified for interview. The respondents thereafter passed impugned order rejecting candidature of the petitioner. It is precisely on the ground that petitioner has not been an Advocate preceding seven years on the last date of submission of application form. It is by giving erroneous interpretation to Rule 33 (iii) of the Rules of 2010. Para 7.2 of the application form requiring preceding seven years as an advocate was contrary to Rule 33(iii) of the Rules of 2010. One is not required to be an Advocate or Pleader preceding seven years from the last date of submission of the application form. What has been provided under Rule 33(iii) is that one must have been an Advocate for a period of seven years. Para No.7.2 of the application form was thus contrary to the Rules of 2010. The petitioner was enrolled as an Advocate in the year 1999 and continued till joining of judicial services on 10.03.2008. The petitioner has been an Advocate for seven years by that time itself. The petitioner resigned from judicial services on 21.04.2010 and enrolled again as an Advocate on 22.04.2010 thus he is eligible for appointment in the District Judge cadre. The period of two years as Judicial Officer can also be counted towards required seven years period as an Advocate if it is to be preceding seven years on the last date of submission of application form. It is because petitioner had discharged judicial work during that period which adds to the required experience. The petitioner has made alternative argument also. He submits that if period of Judicial Service cannot be taken as an Advocate or Pleader, then petitioner has been an Advocate for a period of more than seven years. It is because petitioner had discharged judicial work during that period which adds to the required experience. The petitioner has made alternative argument also. He submits that if period of Judicial Service cannot be taken as an Advocate or Pleader, then petitioner has been an Advocate for a period of more than seven years. The period cannot be taken preceding seven years on the last date of submission of application, rather, it can be any seven years. To support the argument, he has referred the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Rameshwar Dayal Vs. State of Punjab & Ors., reported in AIR 1961 SC 816 . In the said case, similar issue came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court. It was held that seven years need not to be preceding seven years on the last date of submission of application but can be any seven years. The prayer is accordingly made to cover his case by the judgment in the case of Rameshwar Dayal (supra). A further reference of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of All India Judges' Association & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (1998) 8 SCC 771 has been given. The petitioner, in person, submits that judgment in the case of Deepak Aggarwal Vs. Keshav Kaushik & Ors., reported in (2013) 5 SCC 277 is not on the issue raised herein. The respondents have referred the judgment aforesaid in ignorance of question framed by Apex Court therein. Whether required period as an Advocate should be preceding seven years on the last date of submission of application was not before the Hon'ble Apex Court. If dealt with, it should be taken as an observation or the opinion thus obiter and not a binding precedence. The reply submitted by the respondents largely refers the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Deepak Aggarwal (supra) but it is not applicable to the case in hand. The petitioner may be held eligible and directed to be called for interview by quashing the impugned order, qua the petitioner. Shri A.K. Sharma, Senior counsel assisted by Mr. V.K. Sharma appearing for the High Court has contested the case. The petitioner may be held eligible and directed to be called for interview by quashing the impugned order, qua the petitioner. Shri A.K. Sharma, Senior counsel assisted by Mr. V.K. Sharma appearing for the High Court has contested the case. He submits that Rule 33(iii) has to be given same interpretation as it has been given by the Hon'ble Apex Court to Article 233(2) of Constitution of India in the case of Deepak Aggarwal (supra). The words “have been” used in the Rule indicate present perfect continuous tense, therefore, one must have been an Advocate preceding seven years on the last date for submission of application. The petitioner has not been an Advocate for last seven years preceding the last date of submission of application. The petitioner submitted application form knowing it well that he has not been an Advocate/Pleader preceding seven years on the last date for submission of application form. He cannot now challenge the condition of the application form. It is moreso when a declaration was given by the petitioner in Para 9 of the application form to abide by the terms and conditions of the Notification. He is thus estopped to challenge the condition. In view of above, the petitioner was rightly declared ineligible vide impugned order dated 2nd September, 2015. The judgment in the case of Deepak Aggarwal (supra) cannot be considered to be obiter as the question was raised and decided by Hon'ble Apex Court in reference to Article 233(2) of the Constitution. It was held that seven years as an Advocate/Pleader has to be preceding seven years on the last date of submission of application form. Since the issue raised herein has already been dealt by the Hon'ble Apex Court, it should be decided accordingly. A further reference of Rule 36 of the Rules of 2010 has been given. Therein, seven years as an Advocate has to be preceding seven years from the last date of submission of application form. If Rules 33 and 36 of the Rules of 2010 are read together, would make it clear that candidate must have been an Advocate or Pleader preceding seven years from the last date of submission of application form. In view of above also, the candidature of the petitioner has rightly been rejected vide the impugned order. The writ petition may accordingly be dismissed having no merit. In view of above also, the candidature of the petitioner has rightly been rejected vide the impugned order. The writ petition may accordingly be dismissed having no merit. We have considered rival submissions made by the parties and perused the record. The petitioner in person has raised two issues and prayer as a consequence thereof. The first issue and the prayer is to consider two years judicial services to be an experience and exposure for manning judicial post thus, to be counted towards seven years required period as an Advocate or Pleader. If petitioner's judicial service is added then petitioner possesses required length of seven years as an Advocate or Pleader preceding seven years from the last date of submission of application. The second issue and prayer is to take seven years as an Advocate or Pleader for any period and not the preceding seven years from the last date for submission of application. Before dealing with the issues raised by the petitioner, it would be gainful to refer brief facts of the case. The petitioner was enrolled as an Advocate on 23rd August, 1999. He was then selected and appointed in Rajasthan Judicial Services on 10.03.2008. The petitioner got his “Sanad” suspended from the Rajasthan Bar Council. The petitioner remained Judicial Officer between 10.03.2008 to 21.04.2010. It is before his resignation from the judicial services on 21.08.2010. The petitioner got his “Sanad” revived on 22.04.2010. The petitioner applied for the post in District Judge Cadre in pursuance to the Notification dated 26.04.2015. He was called for the written examination. The result of which was declared on 20th August, 2015. The petitioner remained successful in the written examination thus was qualified for the interview. It was however on provisional 2nd basis. The respondents thereafter passed impugned order on September, 2015 declaring him to be ineligible thus, his candidature was rejected. It was in pursuance to Rule 33(iii) of the Rules of 2010. It is precisely on the ground that petitioner has not been an Advocate/Pleader for preceding seven years on the last date of submission of the application. The petitioner thus challenged the said order. The impugned order has been passed in reference to Rule 33 of the Rules of 2010 thus it would be gainful to refer the aforesaid rule for ready reference and is quoted thus: “33. The petitioner thus challenged the said order. The impugned order has been passed in reference to Rule 33 of the Rules of 2010 thus it would be gainful to refer the aforesaid rule for ready reference and is quoted thus: “33. Eligibility for direct recruitment.-For the purpose of direct recruitment under sub-rule (3) of Rule 31, applications shall be invited by the Court from those Advocates, who fulfill the following conditions of eligibility:- (i) must have attained the age of 35 years and must not have attained the age of 45 years on the first day of January following the last date fixed for receipt of the applications: Provided that (a) the upper age limit mentioned above shall be relaxed by 5 years in case of candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Women Candidates. (b) If a candidate would have been entitled in respect of his/her age to appear at the examination in any year in which no such examination was held, he/she shall be deemed to be entitled in respect of his/her age to appear at the next following examination. (c) If for any reason, the written examination/interview is cancelled in any particular year, it shall be open to the High Court to grant age relaxation to the candidate to appear in the next examination. * Inserted (ii) must hold a degree of Bachelor of Laws (Professional) of any University established by Law in India and recognised as such under the Advocates Act, 1961. (iii) must have been an Advocate for a period of not less then seven years on the last date fixed for receipt of applications. (iv) must possess a thorough knowledge of Hindi Written in Devnagri script and Rajasthani dialects and social customs of Rajasthan. (v) the character of a candidate must be such as to render him suitable in the opinion of the Court in all respects for appointment to the service. He must produce a certificate of good character from the District Judge of the District in which he has been practising as a lawyer and two such certificates, written not more than six months prior to the date of submission of the application to the Court, from two responsible persons not related to him. He must produce a certificate of good character from the District Judge of the District in which he has been practising as a lawyer and two such certificates, written not more than six months prior to the date of submission of the application to the Court, from two responsible persons not related to him. (vi) a person dismissed by the Central Government or by a State Government or convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude or any such offence, which in the opinion of the Recruiting Authority renders him unsuitable for appointment in Judicial Service shall not be eligible for appointment. (@Substituted) (vii) no person shall be appointed as a member of the service unless he is in good mental and bodily health and free from any physical defect likely to interfere with the efficient performance of his duties as a member of the service. Before a candidate is finally approved for appointment by direct recruitment, he shall be required to appear before a medical board which will examine him and certify if he is fit for appointment to the service.” The reference of Rule 36 of the Rules of 2010 has also been given by the respondents thus, said rule is also quoted hereunder: “36. Submission of application.-*(1) While submitting application, candidate shall furnish particulars of 10 Judgments of the preceding seven years in which he has argued personally. He shall produce such judgments at the time of interview also. (2) Every application shall be accompanied by a certificate from the District Judge concerned where ordinarily the applicant is practicing, as to the fitness, character and length of actual practice of the candidate alongwith such other documents as may be specified. In case the applicant is practicing in the High Court, the certifying authority shall be Registrar of the concerned High Court (@Substituted)”. In the light of the facts and relevant rules given above, two issues raised by the petitioner need to be considered. The first prayer of the petitioner is to count two years judicial services to be an experience and exposure in discharge of work required for the post in the District Judge Cadre. To support the argument, reference of judgment in the case of All India Judges' Association & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (supra) has been given. For ready reference, said judgment is quoted hereunder: “1. To support the argument, reference of judgment in the case of All India Judges' Association & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (supra) has been given. For ready reference, said judgment is quoted hereunder: “1. The question of permitting the Legal Assistants working in different institutions other than the courts for the purpose of appointments on the ground that they should be treated as having experience at the Bar cannot be entertained. The Legal Assistants working in different institutions and bodies do not get the experience and exposure which is important for the purpose of manning judicial posts and it is not possible to lay down guidelines on the basis of a few appearances but what is important is not mere appearance but actual intimate knowledge and association with the system itself. We, therefore, reject the applications. 2. Writ Petition No.51 of 1995 is heard. 3. No order. 4. Disposed of.” The perusal of the judgment quoted above does not reveal a decision or direction to include judicial services for determining total length as an Advocate or Pleader. The issue aforesaid was not there before the Apex Court. The Rule 33 of the Rules of 2010 does not provide that while determining seven years as an Advocate or Pleader, any period spent in judicial services would also be reckoned in the total period. The reference of Article 233 would be relevant for this purpose and is quoted thus: “233. Appointment of district judges.-(1) Appointments of persons to be, and the posting and promotion of, district judges in any State shall be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. (2) A person not already in the service of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a district judge if he has been for not less than seven years an advocate or a pleader and is recommended by the High Court for appointment.” Article 233 provides about the appointment in the cadre of District Judge. Clause (2) of Article 233 of the Constitution is relevant in this case. As per the said Article, a candidate can be appointed in the cadre of District Judge if he has been an Advocate or Pleader for not less than seven years and is recommended by the High Court. Clause (2) of Article 233 of the Constitution is relevant in this case. As per the said Article, a candidate can be appointed in the cadre of District Judge if he has been an Advocate or Pleader for not less than seven years and is recommended by the High Court. Article 233(2) does not provide for inclusion of judicial services while determining total length as an Advocate or Pleader. In view of aforesaid, first ground and prayer made by the petitioner to include period of judicial service cannot be accepted. Clause (2) of Article 233 provides for appointment in the cadre of District Judge from and amongst Advocates or Pleaders. The judgment in the case of All India Judges' Association (supra) was given in the facts of that case. It is true that experience and exposure of judicial work may be important for the purpose of judicial service but, while judging eligibility, it has to be in consonance to the provisions of law and not contrary thereto. In the light of discussion aforesaid, the first ground and prayer made by the petitioner is rejected summarily. The second ground and prayer of the petitioner is that it can be any seven years as an Advocate or Pleader to become eligible for the post in question. It should not be preceding seven years on the last date of submission of application. To support the argument, reference of Rule 33 has been given. Therein, it is not provided that one has been an Advocate or Pleader preceding seven years from the last date of submission of application. The petitioner thus, challenged Condition No.7.2 of the application form where a candidate is required to be an Advocate continuously for a period not less than seven years on the last date of submission of application. The Condition No.7.2 of the application form has been challenged treating it to be contrary to Rule 33 of the Rules of 2010. Let us first consider Article 233(2) of the Constitution of India. Whether as per Article 233(2) of the Constitution, candidates must have been an Advocate or Pleader preceding seven years on the last date of submission of application. It was an issue before the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Deepak Aggarwal (supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court found use of words “has been” to be for present perfect continuous tense. Whether as per Article 233(2) of the Constitution, candidates must have been an Advocate or Pleader preceding seven years on the last date of submission of application. It was an issue before the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Deepak Aggarwal (supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court found use of words “has been” to be for present perfect continuous tense. It means, the period begins from past and is still continuing. It was thus held that seven years as an Advocate or Pleader should be preceding seven years on the last date of submission of application. For ready reference, paras 1, 2, 35 and 102 of the said judgment are quoted hereunder: “Leave granted. What is the meaning of the expression ‘the service’ in Article 233(2) of the Constitution of India? What is meant by ‘advocate’ or ‘pleader’ under Article 233(2)? Whether a District Attorney/Additional District Attorney/Public Prosecutor/Assistant Public Prosecutor/Assistant Advocate General, who is a full-time employee of the Government and governed and regulated by the statutory rules of the State and is appointed by direct recruitment through the Public Service Commission, is eligible for appointment to the post of District Judge under Article 233(2) of the Constitution? These are the questions which have been raised for consideration in this group of appeals. 2. The above questions and some other incidental questions in these appeals have arisen from the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court delivered on 18.05.2010. The Division Bench of the High Court by the above judgment disposed of 12 writ petitions wherein challenge was laid to the selection and appointment of certain candidates to the post of Additional District and Sessions Judge in the Haryana Superior Judicial Service (HSJS) on diverse grounds. The High Court by its judgment disposed of the writ petitions in the following manner : “(A) Selections/appointments of Respondents 9 (Dinesh Kumar Mittal), 12 (Rajesh Malhotra), 13 (Deepak Aggarwal), 15 (Chandra Shekhar) and 18 (Desh Raj Chalia) in CWP No.9157 of 2008 (wherever they may be in other writ petitions) as Additional District and Sessions Judges, are hereby quashed. This direction shall, however, remain in abeyance for a period of two months to enable the High Court to make alternative arrangements. This direction shall, however, remain in abeyance for a period of two months to enable the High Court to make alternative arrangements. (B) As a consequence of the quashment of the selections/appointments of abovenamed respondents, the resultant five vacancies shall be filled up from the candidates next in the order of merit, out of the panel prepared by the Selection Committee. (C) The appointment of Fast Track Court Judges by a process of absorption after further examination and selection contained in the recommendation of the Selection Committee dated 18.03.2008 is affirmed. (D) The order dated 22.09.2008 (Annexure P-8 in CWP No. 17708 of 2008) rejecting the request of the High Court for dereservation of six vacancies (four Scheduled Caste, two Backward Classes) is hereby quashed. Resultantly, the matter is remitted back to the Government to reconsider the request of the High Court for dereservation in relaxation of rules by the competent authority empowered under the government instructions dated 7.9.2008 and Rule 31 of the Haryana Superior Judicial Service Rules, 2007. The process of re-consideration shall be completed within six weeks and the decision be communicated to the High Court. (E) If on such reconsideration, the State decides to dereserve the vacancies, candidates recommended by the High Court vide its recommendation letter dated 25.4.2008, shall be appointed.” “35. On the other hand, Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel for the respondent, Keshav Kaushik (writ petitioner before the High Court) in the appeal preferred by Deepak Aggarwal, referred to Article 233(2) of the Constitution and submitted that in order to be eligible, the candidate must not be in the service of the Union or the State and must have been an advocate for at least seven years. It was submitted that the expression, “if he has been for not less than seven years an advocate” must be read to mean seven years immediately preceding his appointment/application. It cannot mean any seven years any time in the past. If that interpretation were to be accepted, it would mean that a person who is enrolled as an advocate for seven years and thereafter took up a job for the last twenty years would also become eligible for being appointed as District Judge. This would defeat the object of the qualification prescribed in Article 233(2).” “102. If that interpretation were to be accepted, it would mean that a person who is enrolled as an advocate for seven years and thereafter took up a job for the last twenty years would also become eligible for being appointed as District Judge. This would defeat the object of the qualification prescribed in Article 233(2).” “102. As regards construction of the expression, “if he has been for not less than seven years an advocate” in Article 233(2) of the Constitution, we think Mr. Prashant Bhushan was right in his submission that this expression means seven years as an advocate immediately preceding the application and not seven years any time in the past. This is clear by use of ‘has been’. The present perfect continuous tense is used for a position which began at sometime in the past and is still continuing. Therefore, one of the essential requirements articulated by the above expression in Article 233(2) is that such person must with requisite period be continuing as an advocate on the date of application.” Para 1 of the said judgment refers the main issue raised before the Hon'ble Apex Court but Para 2 shows not only the question given in Para 1 but other incidental questions raised in the appeals. The judgment shows decision on both the issues. The first issue was as to whether a District Attorney/Additional District Attorney/Public Prosecutor/Assistant Public Prosecutor/Assistant Advocate General is eligible for appointment on the post of District Judge. The other issue raised during the course of argument was as to whether period as an Advocate or Pleader for a period of seven years is to be preceding seven years on the last date of submission of application or it can be any seven years. The argument aforesaid is referred in Para 35 and decided with reasoning in Para 102 of the judgment (supra). In view of aforesaid, judgment in the case of Deepak Aggarwal (supra) covers the issue raised herein. It can be thus safely concluded that a candidate would be qualified if he has been an Advocate or Pleader preceding seven years on the last date of submission of application. The petitioner, however, submitted that judgment in the case of Deepak Aggarwal (supra) is to be considered as obiter. It can be thus safely concluded that a candidate would be qualified if he has been an Advocate or Pleader preceding seven years on the last date of submission of application. The petitioner, however, submitted that judgment in the case of Deepak Aggarwal (supra) is to be considered as obiter. It is precisely on the ground that issue as to whether seven years as an Advocate should be preceding the last date of submission of application was not raised before the Apex Court. We have considered the aforesaid argument also. The petitioner has given reference of Para 1 of the judgment in the case of Deepak Aggarwal (supra) to show the question involved therein ignoring Para 2 of the said judgment. It is true that main issue before the Hon'ble Apex Court has been given in Para 1 but Para 2 of the said judgment refers about incidental questions as well. The argument was made by the petitioner as to whether one has to be an Advocate preceding seven years on the last date of submission of application or it can be any seven years. The argument aforesaid was considered and decided by Hon'ble Apex Court in Para 102 with reasoning. In view of above, judgment in the case of Deepak Aggarwal (supra) is on the issue raised therein and decided. It cannot be taken as obiter. It is not that Hon'ble Apex Court, at its own, made observation or recorded its opinion without issue being raised by the parties so as to be taken it to be obiter. In view of above, the judgment in the case of Deepak Aggarwal (supra) cannot be said to be obiter. The petitioner has made a reference of Constitutional Bench judgment in the case of Rameshwar Dayal (supra). It is to show that question involved herein was an issue before the Hon'ble Apex Court and has been decided. To appreciate the argument, relevant paras of the said judgment are quoted hereunder: 7. We proceed now to a consideration of the main contention urged on behalf of the appellant, namely, that the appointment of respondents 2 to 6 as District Judges was made in contravention of the provisions of Art. 233 of the Constitution. It is convenient to read here Act. 233 of the Constitution : "Art. 233(1). We proceed now to a consideration of the main contention urged on behalf of the appellant, namely, that the appointment of respondents 2 to 6 as District Judges was made in contravention of the provisions of Art. 233 of the Constitution. It is convenient to read here Act. 233 of the Constitution : "Art. 233(1). Appointments of persons to be, and the posting and promotion of, district judges in any State shall be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. (2) A person not already in the service of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a district judge if he has been for not less than seven years an advocate or a pleader and is recommended by the High Court for appointment." 8. Now, the argument of learned Counsel for the appellant has ranged over a wide field; but the point for decision is a narrow one and depends on whether respondents 2 to 6 fulfilled the requirements of clause (2) of Art. 233 of the Constitution when they were appointed as District Judges by respondent 1. That clause lays down that a person not already in the service of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a district judge if (1) he had been for not less than seven years an advocate or a pleader and (2) is recommended by the High Court for appointment. As to the second requirement no question arises here, because admittedly respondents 2 to 6 were recommended by the High Court before their appointment. The dispute is with regard to the first requirement. Learned Counsel for the appellant has contended that respondents 2 to 6 did not fulfil the requirement of having been "seven years an advocate or pleader" and has put his argument in support of his contention in the following way. The dispute is with regard to the first requirement. Learned Counsel for the appellant has contended that respondents 2 to 6 did not fulfil the requirement of having been "seven years an advocate or pleader" and has put his argument in support of his contention in the following way. Firstly, he has submitted that the expression "advocate or pleader" is an expression of legal import and must be given its generally accepted meaning at the time the Constitution was adopted; and that expression according to learned Counsel means an advocate or pleader entitled to appear and plead for another in a Court in India, but does not include an advocate or pleader of a foreign Court; for this submission he has relied on the definition of the expression "legal practitioners" in the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879 (XVIII of 1879); of "pleader" in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (Act V of 1908); and of "advocate" in the Bar Councils Act, 1926 (XXXVIII of 1926). Secondly, he had submitted that by reason of the use of the present perfect tense "has been" in clause (2) of Art. 233, the rules of grammar require that the person eligible for appointment must not only have been an advocate or pleader before but must be an advocate or pleader at the time he is appointed to the office of District Judge. Thirdly, he has submitted that the period of seven years referred to in the clause must be counted as the standing of the advocate or pleader with reference to his right of practice in a Court in the territory of India as defined in Art. 1 of the Constitution; in other words, any right of practice in a Court which was in India before the partition of the country in 1947 but which is not in India since partition, cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of counting the period of seven years. 11. This is the background against which we have to consider the argument of learned Counsel for the appellant. 11. This is the background against which we have to consider the argument of learned Counsel for the appellant. Even if we assume without finally pronouncing on their correctness that learned Counsel is right in his first two submissions, viz., that the word "advocate" in clause (2) of Art. 233 means an advocate of a Court in India and the appointee must be such an advocate at the time of his appointment, no objection on those grounds can be raised to the appointment of three of the respondents who were factually on the roll of Advocates of the Punjab High Court at the time of their appointment; because admittedly they were advocates in a Court in India and continued as such advocates till the dates of their appointment. The only question with regard to them is whether they can count in the period of seven years their period of practice in or under the Lahore High Court. The answer to this question is clearly furnished by clause 6(2) of the High Courts (Punjab) Order, 1947, read with section 8(3) of the Bar Councils Act, 1926. That clause lays down that the right of audience in the High Court of East Punjab shall be regulated in accordance with the principle in force in the Lahore High Court immediately before the appointed day. The relevant rule in the Lahore High Court Rules laid down that Advocates who are Barristers shall take precedence inter se according to the date of call to the Bar; Advocates who are not Barristers, according to the dates when they became entitled to practice in a High Court. The same principle applied to the East Punjab High Court, and an advocate of the Lahore High Court who was recognised as an advocate entitled to practise in the new High Court counted his seniority on the strength of his standing in the Lahore High Court. He did not lose that seniority, which was preserved by the Bar Councils Act, 1926, and we see no reasons why for the purpose of clause (2) of Art. 233 such an advocate should not have the same standing as he has in the High Court where he is practising. 12. He did not lose that seniority, which was preserved by the Bar Councils Act, 1926, and we see no reasons why for the purpose of clause (2) of Art. 233 such an advocate should not have the same standing as he has in the High Court where he is practising. 12. Learned Counsel for the appellant has also drawn our attention to Explanation I to clause (3) of Art. 124 of the Constitution relating to the qualifications for appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court and to the Explanation to clause (2) of Art. 217relating to the qualifications for appointment as a Judge of a High Court, and has submitted that where the Constitution-makers thought it necessary they specifically provided for counting the period in a High Court which was formerly in India. Articles 124 and217 are differently worded and refer to an additional qualification of citizenship which is not a requirement of Art. 233, and we do not think that clause (2) of Art. 233 can be interpreted in the light of Explanations added to Arts. 124 and 217. Article 233 is a self contained provision regarding the appointment of District Judges. As to a person who is already in the service of the Union or of the State, no special qualifications are laid down and under clause (1) the Governor can appoint such a person as a district judge in consultation with the relevant High Court. As to a person not already in service, a qualification is laid down in clause (2) and all that is required is that he should be an advocate or pleader of seven years' standing. The clause does not say how that standing must be reckoned and if an Advocate of the Punjab High Court is entitled to count the period of his practice in the Lahore High Court for determining his standing at the Bar, we see nothing in Art. 233 which must lead to the exclusion of that period for determining his eligibility for appointment as district judge. The issue in the case of Rameshwar Dayal (supra) was different than raised herein. There, candidates so appointed in the cadre of District Judge, had previously been Advocates of Lahore High Court. The Punjab & Harayana High Court found those candidates to be ineligible. The issue in the case of Rameshwar Dayal (supra) was different than raised herein. There, candidates so appointed in the cadre of District Judge, had previously been Advocates of Lahore High Court. The Punjab & Harayana High Court found those candidates to be ineligible. If period as an Advocate in Lahore High Court is excluded, the appellants therein were not completing seven years period. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that period as an Advocate in Lahore High Court cannot be ignored to reckon the total period. The controversy therein was not similar. The petitioner, however, referred the facts pertaining to each of the appellants considered by the Apex Court in the case of Rameshwar Dayal (supra). It is to show that appellants therein had not been Advocates or Pleaders preceding seven years to the last date of submission of application. We find that facts for each candidate have been narrated by the Hon'ble Apex Court but issue therein was not raised and decided as to whether Article 233(2) or the Rules require that a candidate must have been an Advocate or Pleader preceding seven years to the last date of submission of application. In view of aforesaid, judgment in the case of Rameshwar Dayal (supra) does not provide any help or assistance to the petitioner. At this stage, reference of Rule 36 of the Rules of 2010 would be relevant, where words “preceding seven years” have been used. It is though for furnishing particulars of 10 judgments in preceding seven years but if Rules 33 and 36 of the Rules of 2010 are read together, it would show that one has to be an Advocate or Pleader preceding seven years to the last date of submission of application. The words “have been” used in Rule 33(iii) are for present perfect continuous tense. In the Article 233(2) of the Constitution, the words “has been” as an Advocate for the period of not less than seven years are used and the Hon'ble Apex Court has decided the issue in the case of Deepak Aggarwal (supra) after giving interpretation of the words “has been”. It is held that condition of not less than seven years as an Advocate is to be preceding seven years on the last date of submission of application. In view of the discussion made above, even the second ground and prayer made by the petitioner cannot be accepted. It is held that condition of not less than seven years as an Advocate is to be preceding seven years on the last date of submission of application. In view of the discussion made above, even the second ground and prayer made by the petitioner cannot be accepted. We are not going on the issue that while submitting the application, the petitioner had agreed to the terms and conditions given in the Notification/application form. It provides a declaration that a candidate has been an Advocate preceding seven years to the last date of submission of the application. Para 9 of the said application makes a declaration by the candidate for acceptance of all terms and conditions of the Notification, instructions and relevant rules. The petitioner having accepted condition of notification, instruction and rules, has now raised a controversy when he was declared ineligible. The issue of contradiction in the notification and the application form vis a vis Rule 33 of the Rules of 2010 has been raised but, in the light of discussion made above, we do not find any contradiction in the Notification or application form vis a vis Rule 33 of the Rules of 2010. The Rule 33(iii) of the Rules of 2010 has to be given same interpretation as has been given by the Hon'ble Apex Court to Article 233(2) of the Constitution in the case of Deepak Agarwal(supra). In the light of the discussion made above, we do not find any ground for interference in the impugned order. The writ petition thus fails and is dismissed accordingly.