Hon'ble RAFIQ, J.— This appeal is preferred by Mohd. Shabbir and Smt. Aziza Khatun, respectively son and mother, challenging the judgement dated 29.7.2006 by which the Special Judge (Women Atrocities and Dowry Cases) Jaipur City, Jaipur convicted them for offence u/S. 498A and 304B IPC. While both the accused-appellants were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years in respect of their conviction under Section 498A. As regards their conviction for offence u/S. 304 IPC, however, the appellant No. 1 Mohd. Shabbir has been sentenced to life imprisonment with fine of Rs. 100 and appellant No. 2 Smt. Aziza Khatun was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of ten years. 2. Learned Public Prosecutor at the outset has stated that as per the information received from the SHO, Smt. Aziza Khatun died on 7.11.2011. The appeal of the appellant No. 2 Aziza Khatun thus stands abated. However, the appeal in respect of appellant No. 1 Mohd. Shabbir survives. Shri S.S. Rathore, learned counsel for the appellants has, therefore, confined his arguments regarding challenge to conviction recorded and sentence awarded to that appellant No. 1 Mohd. Shabbir only. 3. The facts of the case are that a criminal complaint was filed in the Court of ACJM No. 8, Jaipur City, Jaipur by one Salim Khan on 17.7.2003 alleging that his sister Firoza @ Pari was married to appellant-Mohd. Shabbir in October, 2001 as per the muslim customs and rites. Number of dowry articles were given at the time of marriage, details of which were mentioned in paras 1 to 4 of the complaint. While initially their relations were cordial, but after sometime, appellant No. 1 Mohd. Shabbir, husband, appellant No. 2 Smt. Aziza Khatun, mother-in-law of deceased Firoza and her sister-in-law Mahazabeen started maltreating her. They forced her to bring from her parents a sum of Rs. 50,000, which they required for arranging second marriage of another sister-in-law Nek Parveen, who was divorcee. When Firoza approached her parents, they expressed their inability to do so. The accused-persons thereafter started torturing Smt. Firoza. Her father by sale of his house at Nari-Ka-Naka gave Rs. 25,000 to her, which she in turn passed on to the accused-appellants. However, this did not satisfy their greed and they continued to subject Firoza to marpeet. Her parents and the complainant at times gave her sum of Rs. 10,000, Rs. 4,000 or Rs. Her father by sale of his house at Nari-Ka-Naka gave Rs. 25,000 to her, which she in turn passed on to the accused-appellants. However, this did not satisfy their greed and they continued to subject Firoza to marpeet. Her parents and the complainant at times gave her sum of Rs. 10,000, Rs. 4,000 or Rs. 6,000 to satisfy demand of the accused-persons and their family. Her sister-in-law Mahazabeen and Nek Parveen usually instigate the appellant-Mohd. Shabbir against Firoza, who then subjected her to beating by use of belts. Firoza used to show the injury marks to her parents whenever she visited her parents. The accused several times drove away Firoza from their house. The complainant used to send her back to in-laws place on persuasion through the responsible persons of their community. During this period, however, Firoza gave birth to a male child, but her harassment did not stop. Firoza ultimately was forced to come back to her parents in July, 2003. Her uncle-Hamid Khan and in-laws of her another sister and residents of the colony again intervened and prevailed upon the accused to take her back in family and on such persuation, the accused agreed and, therefore, Firoza was sent to here in-laws on 14.7.2003. At that time, her in-laws had openly said that they would accept Firoza only if their demands are satisfied. Her sister-in-law Mahazabeen stated that they would divorce Firoza and arrange another marriage of her brother. On 15.7.2003, in-laws of Firoza and the residents of the colony informed the complainant that Firoza has been admitted to SMS Hospital, Jaipur due to burn injuries. The complainant and family members reached the hospital and found Firoza having burnt injuries to the extent of 95%. Nasir, Dau, Arsad and Moin were found there and they informed that in the morning of that day at about 8.00-9.00 AM, her mother-in-law Khatun poured kerosene oil over the body of Firoza and appellant-Mohd. Shabbir lit the fire. Her sister in-laws Mahazabeen and Nek Parveen subjected her to severe beatings prior thereof by bolting the house from outside. Firoza told that she made hue and cry for help and thereupon some of the residents of the colony came forward and opened the main gate from outside and poured water over her body. Firoza succumbed to the burn injuries on 15.7.2003. Firoza told that she made hue and cry for help and thereupon some of the residents of the colony came forward and opened the main gate from outside and poured water over her body. Firoza succumbed to the burn injuries on 15.7.2003. The aforesaid criminal complaint was sent for investigation under Section 156 Cr.P.C. to the Police Station Ramganj, Jaipur, whereupon the FIR No. 296/2003 was registered for offence u/S. 498A, 304B, 406 and 120B IPC. After investigation, challan was filed against the accused-appellants and during trial charges for the offences were framed, which they denied and claimed trial. The prosecution produced 27 witnesses and exhibited 30 documents. In their examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the accused denied the allegations and claimed trial. The accused in their defence produced 10 documents and 6 witnesses. On conclusion of the trial, the appellant was convicted and sentenced in the manner indicated above. 4. Shri S.S. Rathore, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned trial Court did not evaluate the evidence in the proper legal manner and passed the impugned judgement dated 29.7.2006 in a manner unknown to the sound principles of law. The learned trial court ignored the vital fact of criminal trial and the settled proposition of law relating to interested witnesses. A pious duty is casted upon the Court to avoid the risk of mere suspicion. However, strong the same may be as the suspicion or doubt of any degree cannot take the place of proof and the moral conviction as time and again been depreciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. But, in the present case, the learned trial Court while passing the impugned judgement of conviction, brushed aside all the settled propositions of law and erroneously and illegally relied upon the interested witnesses, which are not even remotely relevant with the culpability of the appellants and ignored the material available on record, specifically PW1 to PW5, PW6, PW7 and PW12 to PW15 and the same weightage of the defence version has not been provided while evaluating the evidence. Hence, the impugned judgement is not sustainable in law. 5. Hence, the impugned judgement is not sustainable in law. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the trial court has grossly misread the evidence which resulted into manifest mis-appreciation of evidence, which in turn caused great prejudice to the appellants, therefore, the impugned judgement dated 29.7.2006 is per se bad in law, illegal, erroneous, not sustainable in the eye of law. It is argued that the learned trial court while passing the impugned judgement dated 29.7.2006 relied on the prosecution witnesses PW.3, PW.25 and PW.22 and the dying declaration Exhibit-P29 and convicted the present accused-appellants in the light of section 113B of the Evidence Act, whereas the material available on record itself transpires that Exhibit D2 was not being given weightage and the defence witnesses as well as prosecution witnesses which were left by the prosecution and same were placed by the defence, has not been provided same weightage and convicted the present accused-appellants. Therefore, the impugned judgement is legally not tenable and merit to be set aside in toto. It is contended that the evidence marshalled by the prosecution is shaky, shabby, shocking and shallow one. The documentary evidence relied upon by the learned trial court was also not proved in accordance with the law. The trial Court has committed serious error of law by discarding the documentary evidence placed on record by the appellants. 6. Alternatively, learned counsel for the appellants has argued that even though the trial court has convicted both the accused-appellants only for offence u/S. 304B, yet it has given different punishments to them, wherefor no specific reasons have been assigned. While appellant No. 1- Mohd. Shabbir was sentenced to undergo life imprisonment, appellant No. 2- Smt. Aziza Khatun was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of ten years. There was no justification whatsoever to make such a distinction. Besides, when the conviction of appellant No. 1 Mohd. Shabbir has been recorded for 304B IPC for which offence seven years is the minimum sentence merely because such sentence is expendable to life imprisonment, the penalty of life imprisonment cannot be mechanically awarded. It is argued that the Supreme Court in catena of judgements has held that when there is a range of choice of punishment from 7 years to life imprisonment, the Court, if it decides to award the maximum sentence of life imprisonment, has to give reasons in support of its decision. It is argued that the Supreme Court in catena of judgements has held that when there is a range of choice of punishment from 7 years to life imprisonment, the Court, if it decides to award the maximum sentence of life imprisonment, has to give reasons in support of its decision. Learned counsel in support of his arguments has relied on the judgement in Sunil Dutt Sharma vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi)- (2014) 4 SCC 375 , Satish Chandra & Anr. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh - (2014) 6 SCC 723 and Hari Om vs. State of Haryana & Anr.- (2014) 10 SCC 577 . 7. Learned Public Prosecutor opposed the appeal and submitted that the order of conviction of the accused-appellant No. 1 Mohd. Shabbir for offence u/S. 304B and 498A has rightly been recorded by the learned trial court. Such evidence clearly proved that deceased Firoza was being subjected to cruelty soon before her death in connection with demand of dowry and such death having been taken place within two years of marriage, a legal presumption with reference to Section 113 of the Evidence Act would arise that she was put to dowry death. The appellants wholly failed to rebut that presumption. The trial court has rightly discarded the parcha bayan of deceased Firoza Ex. D2, which has been described as the first dying declaration because it was recorded in the presence of the accused and their family members. The dying declaration which was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate Ex. P. 29 has rightly been believed to convict the accused-appellants. 8. Learned Public Prosecutor submits that apart from dying declaration, the prosecution witnesses Salim Khan (PW.3), brother of deceased, Hamid Khan (PW.22), uncle of the deceased and Smt. Rukhsana (PW. 25), mother of the deceased have proved the offence against the accused-appellants. These witnesses have proved the allegation of cruelty and harassment and also of demand of dowry. Besides, Raghuveer Singh (PW. 23) the Deputy Superintendent of Police has also proved the different stages of investigation. 9. Learned Public Prosecutor referred to the postmortem report (Ex.P.23) to show that her death has been caused due to shock as a result of multiple dry burn injuries. Dr. P.K. Saini (PW.21) has proved the postmortem report. 10. With regard to sentence of life imprisonment awarded to accused-appellant No. 1 Mohd. 9. Learned Public Prosecutor referred to the postmortem report (Ex.P.23) to show that her death has been caused due to shock as a result of multiple dry burn injuries. Dr. P.K. Saini (PW.21) has proved the postmortem report. 10. With regard to sentence of life imprisonment awarded to accused-appellant No. 1 Mohd. Shabbir, learned Public Prosecutor submits that the trial court has given reasons to justify it by observing that a young woman and mother of a child of only two years old was put to death, owing to thee greed of the appellants and the child being rendered orphan, the trial court has observed that dowry, being a social menace, had to be dealt with iron head and hence convicted the accused-appellant accordingly. 11. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submission and perused the material on record. 12. The fact with regard to the demand of dowry and continuous harassment of the deceased and cruelty on her, which ultimately led to her death by burns, have been proved by overall evidence. Such allegations are amply proved by evidence of Salim Khan (PW.3), brother of deceased Hamid Khan (PW. 22), the uncle of the deceased and Smt. Rukhsana (PW.25), mother of the deceased. 13. We are therefore not inclined to uphold the argument of learned counsel for the appellants that merely because in the parcha bayan that was recorded by the police in the presence of cousin of the deceased and the members of the family of the accused, it was decided to be case of accidental fire, the dying declaration duly recorded by the Judicial Magistrate should be discarded. The dying declaration has been proved by Judicial Magistrate Shri Jagmohan Agarwal (PW.27). On the basis of these evidence, appellants were convicted under Section 304B and 498A IPC. We do not find any good reason to interfere with the conviction so recorded. 14. Coming now to the alternative submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants, we find that the Supreme Court in Sunil Dutt Sharma, supra after revisiting the previous case laws on the subject held out the certain principles while determining the quantum of sentence to be kept in view while sentencing an accused found guilty of offence u/S. 304B. Coming now to the alternative submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants, we find that the Supreme Court in Sunil Dutt Sharma, supra after revisiting the previous case laws on the subject held out the certain principles while determining the quantum of sentence to be kept in view while sentencing an accused found guilty of offence u/S. 304B. In para 15 of the report on the basis of study of 40 previous judgements on the subject it was held by their Lordships as under: "Would the above principles apply to sentencing of an accused found guilty of the offence under Section 304-B inasmuch as the said offence is held to be proved against the accused on basis of a legal presumption? This is the text question that has to be dealt with. So long there is credible evidence of cruelty occasioned by demand (s) for dowry, any unnatural death of a woman within seven years of her marriage makes the husband or a relative of the husband of such woman liable for the offence of "dowry death" under Section 304-B though there may not be any direct involvement of the husband or such relative with the death in question. In a situation where commission of an offence is held to be proved by means of a legal presumption the circumstances surrounding the crime to determine the presence of aggravating circumstances (crime test) may not be readily forthcoming unlike a case where there is evidence of overt criminal acts establishing the direct involvement of the accused with the crime to enable the Court to come to specific conclusions with regard to the barbarous or depraved nature of the crime committed. The necessity to combat the menace of demand for dowry or to prevent atrocities on women and like social evils as well as the necessity to maintain the purity of social conscience cannot be determinative of the quantum of sentence inasmuch as the said parameters would be common to all offences under Section 304-B of the Penal Code. The above, therefore, cannot be elevated to the status of acceptable jurisprudential principles to act as a rational basis for awarding varying degrees of punishment on a case to case basis. The search for principles to satisfy the crime test in an offence u/Sec. 304-B of the Penal Code must, therefore, lie elsewhere. The above, therefore, cannot be elevated to the status of acceptable jurisprudential principles to act as a rational basis for awarding varying degrees of punishment on a case to case basis. The search for principles to satisfy the crime test in an offence u/Sec. 304-B of the Penal Code must, therefore, lie elsewhere. Perhaps, the time spent between marriage and the death of the woman; the attitude and conduct of the accused towards the victim before her death; the extent to which the demand for dowry was persisted with and the manner and circumstances of commission of the cruelty would be a surer basis for determination of the crime test. Coupled with the above, the fact whether the accused was also charged with the offence under Section 302 of the Penal Code and the basis of his acquittal of the said charge would be another very relevant circum-stances. As against this the extenuating/mitigating circumstances which would determine the "criminal test" must be allowed to have a full play. The aforesaid two sets of circumstances being mutually irreconcilable cannot be arranged in the form of a balance sheet as observed in Sangeet (supra) but it is the cumulative effect of the two sets of different circumstances that has to be kept in mind while rendering the sentencing decisions. This, according to us, would be the correct approach while dealing with the question of sentence so far as the offence under Section 304-B IPC is concerned." 15. The Supreme Court in Satish Chandra, supra has observed that general unhappiness with marital life, though main reason for suicide being harassment for dowry, would yet constitute extinguishing and mitigating circumstances if she was happy with this marriage. 16. The Supreme Court in Hari Om, supra, while interpreting the expression "may" occurring in Section 304B IPC to decide choice of sentence, has observed that it is not mandatory for the Court in every case to award life imprisonment to the accused once he is found guilty of the offence u/S. 304B. The Court could award sentence in exercise of its discretion between seven years to life imprisonment depending upon the facts of each case. It was held that in no case it could be less than seven years and that extreme punishment of life term should be awarded in "rare cases" but not in every case, held the Supreme Court. 17. The Court could award sentence in exercise of its discretion between seven years to life imprisonment depending upon the facts of each case. It was held that in no case it could be less than seven years and that extreme punishment of life term should be awarded in "rare cases" but not in every case, held the Supreme Court. 17. The only reason that has been given by the trial Court in deciding to award extreme penalty of life imprisonment in the impugned judgment is that dowry is a social menace and it has to be dealt with iron hand. 18. The Supreme Court in Sunil Dutt Sharma, supra observed that necessity to combat the menace of demand for dowry or to prevent atrocities on women and like social evils as well as the necessity to maintain the purity of social conscience cannot be determinative of the quantum of sentence inasmuch as the said parameters would be common to all offence under Section 304B IPC. This, therefore, cannot be elevated to the status of acceptable jurisprudential principles to act as a rational basis for awarding varying degrees of punishment on a case-to-case basis. 19. Considering that the accused-appellant No. 1- Mohd. Shabbir has already served out sentence of ten years and ten months, ends of justice would be met if the sentence awarded to the accused-appellant No. 1 Mohd. Shabbir is reduced to the period already undergone by him. 20. In the result, the appeal filed by Smt. Aziza Khatun, she having died, stands abated and is accordingly dismissed. The appeal filed by Modh. Shabbir is partly allowed. In so far as his conviction for offence under Section 304-B and 498-A IPC, is concerned the same is upheld. However, considering that accused-appellant Mohd. Shabbir has already served out sentence of 10 years and 10 months, we, for the aforesaid said reasons, are persuaded to reduce his sentence of life imprisonment to the period already undergone by him. 21. The accused appellant-Mohd. Shabbir, who is in jail for last ten years and ten months, if not required to be detained in connection with any other offence, may be released forthwith. 22. Keeping in view, however, the provisions of Section 437A Cr.P.C., 1973, accused-appellant Mohd. Shabbir is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 21. The accused appellant-Mohd. Shabbir, who is in jail for last ten years and ten months, if not required to be detained in connection with any other offence, may be released forthwith. 22. Keeping in view, however, the provisions of Section 437A Cr.P.C., 1973, accused-appellant Mohd. Shabbir is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 20,000/- and a surety bond in the like amount, before the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of this Court, which shall be effective for a period of six months to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or on grant of leave, the said appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Supreme Court.