JUDGMENT : Anupinder Singh Grewal, J. The petitioner joined the Rajasthan Judicial Services on 03.04.1988. He was posted as the Civil Judge (Junior Division) & Judicial Magistrate, Badi, District Dholpur from the year 1991 till 1993. He was communicated adverse remarks in his Annual Confidential Report (hereinafter referred to as 'the ACR') for the year 1993 vide letter dated 27.01.1996 (Annexure-2). His integrity certificate was also withheld for the period from 01.01.1993 to 15.06.1993. The petitioner submitted his representation against these adverse remarks on 25.03.1996. This representation was rejected by the Committee constituted by the Chief Justice vide letter dated 04.06.1999 (Annexure-6). The petitioner then filed a review petition on 24.07.1999 against rejection of his representation. The review petition was also dismissed by another Committee which had been constituted by the Chief Justice. 2. Through the instant petition, the petitioner has sought quashing of the adverse remarks in the ACRs for the years 1993 & 1994, as well as quashing of the orders dated 04.06.1999 (Annexure-6) and 03.07.1999 (Annexure-11). He has also sought for a direction for consideration of his case for promotion from the date his juniors were promoted by ignoring the adverse entries in the ACRs. Adverse remarks recorded in the ACR of the petitioner for the year 1994 were communicated to him on 12.02.1997. The petitioner submitted his representation for expunction of these adverse remarks recorded in the ACR for the year 1994. Vide order dated 03.07.1999, these adverse remarks relating to integrity for the year 1994 were expunged and the entry with regard to his disposal of work was treated as advisory in nature. Thus, the basis to challenge these remarks does not survive and hence there is no need to dwell any further on this aspect. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the adverse remarks, recorded in his ACR for the year 1993, were communicated to him on 27.01.1996. Hence this delay of two & half years in communicating these remarks has seriously prejudiced the petitioner, and these remarks are liable to be quashed. He has further submitted that these adverse remarks, recorded in the ACR for the year 1993, are based on the same material which led to a departmental enquiry against him wherein he was exonerated. His exoneration in the departmental enquiry should be deemed to have the effect of wiping out the adverse entries in the ACRs. He has further submitted that these adverse remarks, recorded in the ACR for the year 1993, are based on the same material which led to a departmental enquiry against him wherein he was exonerated. His exoneration in the departmental enquiry should be deemed to have the effect of wiping out the adverse entries in the ACRs. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the judgments of this Court in Tek Chand vs. The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jodhpur [1994(2) WLC (Raj.) 688], and Rai Singh Bissu vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. [ 2008(2) WLN 73 ]. 4. Learned counsel has further submitted that in any case, these adverse remarks for the year 1993 are vitiated as the officer, who recorded these remarks, was biased against the petitioner, and hence these remarks were not recorded properly as there was no basis to record the same. In support of these submissions, he has relied upon the judgment of this Court in S.K.Bansal vs. The Rajasthan High Court [2002(7) SLR 667], and judgments of the Supreme Court in Sukhdeo vs. Commissioner Amravati Division, Amravati & Anr. [ 1996 (5) SCC 103 ], State of U.P. vs. Yamuna Shanker Misra & Anr. [ 1997(4) SCC 7 ], and P.K.Shastri vs. State of M.P. & Ors. [ 1999(7) SCC 329 ]. 5. On the contrary, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the High Court respondent No.1 has submitted that the delay in communication of the ACR for the year 1993 is not fatal in this case as no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. He has relied upon the judgments of this Court in Kishorilal Mathur vs. The State of Rajasthan [1998(1) WLC (Raj.) 462] and The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan through its Registrar vs. Shri Ramavtar Khendelwal [D.B.Special Appeal (Writ) No.565/1992, decided on 25.07.2006]. He has also submitted that mere exoneration in the departmental enquiry cannot wash out the adverse remarks in the ACRs as the departmental enquiry and recording of ACR cannot be equated. He has relied upon a judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in L.P.A. No.362/2011 (O&M) in C.W.P. No.476/2008 [Davinder Singh vs. State of Haryana & Ors., decided on 11.05.2011]. 6. He has relied upon a judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in L.P.A. No.362/2011 (O&M) in C.W.P. No.476/2008 [Davinder Singh vs. State of Haryana & Ors., decided on 11.05.2011]. 6. Lastly, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent High Court has submitted that the scope of judicial review against the adverse remarks is very limited and ordinarily courts would be reluctant to interfere in such matters. He has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajendra Singh Verma (Dead) Through LRs. vs. Lieutenant Governor (NCT of Delhi) [ (2011)10 SCC 1 ], and State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Srikant Chaphekar [ AIR 1993 SC 1221 ]. 7. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the record including that which was furnished to us by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent High Court during the course of hearing. 8. At the outset, we deem it necessary to refer to the adverse remarks recorded in the ACR of the petitioner for the year 1993. These remarks are extracted hereunder: “He is corrupt Officer. He believes in total partiality. He is hot tempered. He has been advised to avoid certain acts, which tarnish the image of judiciary. He has not followed directions strictly. The quality of judgments needs serious improvements. Attention is invited to expedite the disposal of old cases. Serious disharmony noticed in the relationship with staff. Enquiries are pending. He has not kept adequate and firm control over the proceedings of the court and often over looked the procedure prescribed by law. Relation with bar not good. Once Bar wanted to go on strike due to his unwanted behaviour. On the whole he has been rated poor. He has no sense of proportions and conduct was of sheer insubordination. Integrity certificates is withheld (for the period 1.1.93 to 15.6.1993). Numerous complaints against him. His integrity is doubtful.” 9. It is also necessary to refer to the observations made by the Inspecting Judge for the period from January, 1993 to 15.06.1993, which reads as under: “Numerous complaints against him. His integrity is doubtful. He needs to be closely watched.” 10. The representation of the petitioner against these adverse remarks recorded in his ACR was put up before the then Inspecting Judge, on which following observations were made on 08.05.1997: “Seen. His integrity is doubtful. He needs to be closely watched.” 10. The representation of the petitioner against these adverse remarks recorded in his ACR was put up before the then Inspecting Judge, on which following observations were made on 08.05.1997: “Seen. Perused the representation of Shri B.S.Pareva and the relevant record. During my visit to Dholpur & Bari in the year 1993, the office bearers of Bar Associations Bari & Dholpur as also numerous advocates had complained about the doubtful integrity and work of Shri Pareva. I was convinced about the correctness of these complaints. The D.J., Dholpur had also reported in details in the ACR of Shri Pareva. Therefore, the representation of Shri B.S.Pareva regarding my adverse remarks made by me as Inspecting Judge in his ACR for the period 01.01.1993 to 15.06.1993 (15.06.1993) deserves to be dismissed.” 11. After obtaining views of the Inspecting Judge, this representation was put up before a Committee constituted by the Chief Justice comprising of three Judges of the High Court. The Committee after examining the matter had observed as under: “Having considered the representation and the overall assessment of performance of the officer, we reject the representation filed by him. The remarks shall stand.” 12. The review petition preferred by the petitioner was placed before another Committee comprising the Chief Justice and two other judges of the High Court. This Committee, while deciding the review petition, held as under: “Having considered the entire material on record and the review application, we find no merit in the application. Therefore, application to review the earlier order is rejected.” 13. It is also evident that these adverse remarks which were recorded by the then District Judge were duly approved by the Inspecting Judge. The Inspecting Judge had even made adverse observation about his integrity and that his conduct needs to be watched. The allegations of bias against the District Judge are without any foundation. There is no material on record that the District Judge was biased against the petitioner. It is trite that allegations of bias are easily made than made out. The bald assertion that when the particular officer Shri Ram Narayan Singh took over charge of District Judge, there was flood of complaints, are not worthy of acceptance. 14. There is no material on record that the District Judge was biased against the petitioner. It is trite that allegations of bias are easily made than made out. The bald assertion that when the particular officer Shri Ram Narayan Singh took over charge of District Judge, there was flood of complaints, are not worthy of acceptance. 14. In this regard, it is also necessary to note that the adverse remarks were also recorded by the Inspecting Judge in the ACR of the petitioner for the year 1992 wherein the integrity of the petitioner was recorded as doubtful. These remarks in the ACR for the year 1992 were challenged by the petitioner by preferring D.B.Civil Writ Petition No.2045/1995 and the same was dismissed vide order dated 27.01.1997. Therefore, there is no basis in the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that except these adverse remarks in the ACR for the year 1993, the other service record of the petitioner was satisfactory and only after the posting of the Reporting Officer in December, 1992, there was a flood of complaints against the petitioner. 15. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel appearing for the petitioner are distinguishable on facts and not applicable to the instant case. The judgment in Sukhdeo vs. Commissioner Amravati Division, Amravati & Anr. (supra) pertains to a case of compulsory retirement on the basis of adverse remarks which considered in the light of other remarks recorded in the same ACR were held to be mutually inconsistent. It was also held that although in the ACR it was recorded that he was a man of integrity & honesty and had the intelligence for satisfactorily discharging his duties and fit for promotion, it was also recorded that his public image was poor. It was in such circumstances that the order of the compulsory retirement was quashed by holding that these remarks were not recorded objectively. 16. In the case of State of U.P. vs. Yamuna Shanker Misra & Anr. (supra), except for the period when the adverse remarks were recorded the entire service record earlier and later thereto of the respondent therein was found to be satisfactory which is not the situation in the instant case as the ACR of the petitioner for the year 1992 also had adverse remarks which have attained finality. 17. The judgment in P.K.Shastri vs. State of M.P. & Ors. 17. The judgment in P.K.Shastri vs. State of M.P. & Ors. (supra) pertains to direction of the High Court for making an entry in confidential role of the Presiding Officer that he had no control over the proceedings of the court. It was held that other than the fact situation of a single case and that too with reference to the capacity of the officer concerned to control the proceedings of the court, there was no material before the High Court that this was the case with the concerned Sessions Judge in other cases as well. Hence the direction issued by the High Court was set aside. 18. In the case of S.K.Bansal vs. The Rajasthan High Court (supra), the adverse remarks were considered in the light of the material placed by the petitioner therein regarding bias of the Reporting Officer. The remark that he should improve his relation with the members of the staff and colleagues and that he should improve his knowledge of law and quality of his judgments, were held to be advisory and not adverse. Only the adverse remark that he does not have sound reputation was held to be absolutely bald and vague remark. 19. We also do not find any merit in the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that these adverse remarks were the basis of the departmental enquiry and his exoneration therein would wipe out these adverse remarks. It is evident from the record that 30 complaints against the petitioner were received while the departmental enquiry was based upon a solitary incident. It was observed by the Inspecting Judge in his Secret Report dated 10.08.1993 that certain individuals, whose criminal cases were pending in the court of MJM, Bari, used to frequently go to the house of the petitioner and consume drinks with him and they often used to tell the litigants that they could get their cases settled in their favour for consideration. Other allegations included taking bribe and showing undue interest in criminal matters. Therefore, there were numerous other complaints and the adverse remarks were recorded on the overall satisfaction of the Reporting Officer which had been duly approved by the Inspecting Judge. Hence it could not be said that these remarks were based only on complaint which led to the departmental enquiry. Therefore, there were numerous other complaints and the adverse remarks were recorded on the overall satisfaction of the Reporting Officer which had been duly approved by the Inspecting Judge. Hence it could not be said that these remarks were based only on complaint which led to the departmental enquiry. Even otherwise, an entry in the ACR with regard to integrity of the Officer does not require to be supported by any accompanying record or detailed material and such entry can be based on personal knowledge of the Reporting Officer, although such remarks should be recorded objectively with due care and caution as they may jeopardise the service career of the officer. In many cases, it could be difficult for the Reporting Officer to place on record any objective material with regard to the integrity of the officer, although he can form an impression about the integrity of the officer by watching the officer from close quarters. If one gets material on record regarding the doubtful or dubious integrity of the officer, then the officer concerned could also be liable to disciplinary action. It is also manifest that the object and purpose of recording ACRs is entirely different from initiation of departmental action for any misconduct. The recording of ACR is based on the assessment of the reporting officer after watching the conduct from closed quarters while departmental action is meant to punish the officer for the misconduct. We draw support from the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Puran Singh vs. State of Punjab [1981(1) SLR 338], wherein it was observed as under: “6. It appears to me that the aforesaid twin contentions stem from a basic fallacy and misapprehension of the very nature and purpose of an annual confidential report as against the formal departmental enquiry, whilst the former is specifically for the internal assessment of estimate of the performance of a public servant by his superiors over the period of one year the latter is intrinsically intended as the foundation for taking a punitive action against him if the charges come to be proved. The very nature and purpose of the two are consequently distinct and separate and to confuse them as either identical or similar, would to my mind be patently erroneous. An annual confidential report is in essence subjective and administrative whilst a departmental enquiry is inevitably objective and quasi-judicial.” 20. The very nature and purpose of the two are consequently distinct and separate and to confuse them as either identical or similar, would to my mind be patently erroneous. An annual confidential report is in essence subjective and administrative whilst a departmental enquiry is inevitably objective and quasi-judicial.” 20. We also do not accept the submission of learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that these remarks are vitiated as they were communicated after the delay of two & half years after recording the ACR. Although learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has made an attempt to plead that the petitioner was prejudiced on account of this delay, however, we do not find any material on record in support of this contention. There is no such averment that the petitioner was either due for promotion and immediately before that these remarks had been recorded and the delay in communication denied him an opportunity to represent there against. No factual foundation of any prejudice having been caused to the petitioner has been set out in the instant case. The petitioner had promptly represented against these adverse remarks which was considered in a fair manner. Even the review petition preferred by the petitioner against rejection of his representation was dealt with after due consideration by another Committee. Reference can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of G.Mohanasundaram vs. R.Nanthagopal & Ors. [ (2014) 13 SCC 172 ], wherein the instructions stipulating the period for recording the ACR were held to be directory in nature. Reference can also be made to the judgment relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the High Court in Kishorilal Mathur vs. The State of Rajasthan (supra), wherein delay of two years in communicating the adverse entries was not held to be fatal as no prejudice had been caused to the petitioner therein. It was held as under: “17. It is further submitted that the adverse entries have been communicated at a very belated stage and in support of this submission, reliance is placed on the judgments of this Court in Ram Avtar Khandelwal v. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, through its Registrar 1992 (2) WLC 587 and Tek Chand v. The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan 1994 (2) WLC 688. We find no force in this submission also for the reason that in the aforesaid cases, the entry had been communicated after a lapse of several years. In the instant case, no doubt it was conveyed after a lapse of two years but the same cannot be said to be fatal. We fail to understand as in what manner, delay has caused prejudice to the petitioner. Moreover, in the aforesaid cases, the delay was inordinate and the facts of this case are quite distinguishable. The aforesaid cases have been considered by the Division Bench of this Court in Jhavar Prakash v. Rajasthan High Court 1995 (2) WLC 517, wherein it has been observed that: 'It has to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case as to whether delay in communicating of adverse remarks would result the vitiating the remarks itself and on that count, the remark deserves to be quashed or not. What is the reasonable time within which the remark should have been communicated will also have to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case.'” The judgments relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner are distinguishable on facts and not applicable to the instant case. 21. In the case of High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan through its Registrar vs. Shri Ramavtar Khendelwal (supra), the adverse remarks in the ACR of 1983 were communicated to the respondent therein after delay of six years on 27.09.1989, while he had been denied promotion and his juniors were promoted on 03.08.1989. Hence, the delay in communication of the adverse remarks had seriously prejudiced the respondent, who had been denied promotion. In the case of Rai Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (supra), there was delay of eight years in communicating adverse remarks and these remarks were the basis of complaint made by the Additional Sessions Judge regarding negligence in discharge of functions by the Officer which also led to departmental enquiry wherein he was exonerated. However, the adverse remarks against the petitioner are more serious as already discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. 22. However, the adverse remarks against the petitioner are more serious as already discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. 22. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment of the Single Bench of this Court in the case of Tek Chand vs. The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jodhpur (supra), wherein it was held that delay in communication of the adverse remarks, unless properly explained, will be a ground for striking down the adverse entries. Although the Single Bench made a reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. P.C. Wadhwa [ 1987(2) SCC 602 ], wherein time limit for communication of adverse remarks stipulated in the Rules was held to be directory, the Single Bench went on to hold that the adverse entries should be communicated before the expiry of one year, otherwise they would be vitiated. Therefore, when the Supreme Court has categorically held that the ACR has to be communicated within a reasonable time, in our considered view, no fixed period can be laid down by the Court within which an ACR should be communicated. It would all depend on facts and circumstances of each case. It could well be possible in certain cases where an employee is due for promotion or his colleagues are being promoted and the delay of a few months in communicating the adverse remarks could prejudice him by denying him the opportunity to represent there against while in other cases delay of several years may not cause any prejudice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Sukhdev Singh vs. Union of India [ (2013)9 SCC 566 ] held that every entry in the ACR, whether outstanding, very good or even adverse, should be communicated to the employee within a reasonable time. This view was also taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dev Dutt vs. Union of India & Ors. [ (2008)8 SCC 725 ]. What is 'reasonable time' depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is essentially a question of fact. 23. This view was also taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dev Dutt vs. Union of India & Ors. [ (2008)8 SCC 725 ]. What is 'reasonable time' depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is essentially a question of fact. 23. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that this judgment of Single Bench in Tek Chand vs. The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jodhpur (supra) does not lay down the correct law to the extent that if the adverse remarks are not communicated within a year, they would be vitiated especially when the Supreme Court has held in State of Haryana vs. P.C.Wadhwa (supra) that the period stipulated in the Rules for communication of ACRs is directory in nature. In the absence of any statutory period stipulated in the Rules or instructions it is not open to the court to hold that the remarks which are not communicated within a year, would be vitiated. 24. It is trite that the function of the courts is neither to legislate nor supplant the law but to interpret the law as it stands. Something which is not there in the Rules in the form of period of limitation, cannot be laid down by the Court in a straitjacket formula. The delay in communication of the adverse remarks in certain cases may, of course, cause prejudice to the officer concerned but to hold that merely because there is delay in communication of adverse remarks in the absence of any prejudice having been caused to the officer, it will result in vitiating or washing away the adverse entry would not be in accordance with law. The onus cannot in every case be straightaway put on the departmental authority to explain the delay in communicating ACR. Every case shall have to be examined in the light of its peculiar facts and circumstances. 25. We are also conscious of the settled principle of law that the scope of judicial review in recording of ACRs is rather limited and confined to the manner in which they are recorded. Rather the interference will be called for only in case these remarks are found to be wholly arbitrary or mala fide on the basis of material on record. Merely because another view is possible, the courts would not interfere as it does not exercise appellate jurisdiction over the decision of the disciplinary authority. Rather the interference will be called for only in case these remarks are found to be wholly arbitrary or mala fide on the basis of material on record. Merely because another view is possible, the courts would not interfere as it does not exercise appellate jurisdiction over the decision of the disciplinary authority. Due regard has to be given to the views of the Reporting Officer, who had the opportunity to watch the officer concerned from close quarters. 26. Reference may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Rajendra Singh Verma (Dead) Through LRs. vs. Lieutenant Governor (supra) wherein it was held as under: “147. Writing the confidential report is primarily and essentially an administrative function. Normally tribunals/Courts are loath to interfere in cases of complaints against adverse remarks and to substitute their own judgment for that of the reporting or reviewing officers. It is because these officers alone are best suited to judge the qualities of officials working under them and about their competence in the performance of official duties entrusted to them. Despite fear of abuse of power by prejudiced superior officers in certain cases, the service record contained in the confidential reports, by and large, reflects the real personality of the officer. 27. Therefore, we do not find any infirmity in recording of adverse remarks in the ACR of the petitioner for the year 1993 which would warrant interference in writ jurisdiction. Consequently, the question of any direction in terms of the prayer of the petitioner for consideration of his case for promotion by ignoring these adverse entries would not arise. In the result, the petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit.