Balya @ Rameshwar Motiram Yelekar v. D. I. G. Prison (E)(R)
2015-07-27
A.B.CHAUDHARI, P.N.DESHMUKH
body2015
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : A.B. Chaudhari, J. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard by consent of the learned Counsel for the rival parties. 02] This is a writ petition filed by the petitioner/prisoner, sent from the jail. The prayer in the petition is for his release on furlough for a period of two weeks. Respondent no.2 has filed reply and in paragraphs 6 and 7, the following details have been furnished. “6. The police verification report is adverse. On last occasion when he was released on leave, he had not surrendered on due date. Moreover, the police authority had arrested the petitioner/prisoner and brought him back to prison after a long period of about 5 years, 4 months and 7 days. Due to this aforesaid reason, the prison and police authorities have not recommended to release the petitioner on furlough leave. Due to adverse circumstances, the competent authority has rightly rejected the furlough leave application of the petitioner/prisoner vide its order dated 09/12/2014 under the provisions of sections 4(4) (6)(10) of the Parole and Furlough Rules, 1959. 7. The following chart showing the details of the petitioner is as under : Sr. No. Particulars Date of Release Date of Surrender Remarks 1 Furlough Leave 01/02/2006 Not Surrendered on due date Surrendered himself but late by 5 days i.e. on 06/03/2006. 2 Parole Leave 30/09/2006 Not surrendered on due date The petitioner was absconding and the police authority had to make strong efforts to trace the whereabouts of petitioner. The petitioner was arrested by police authority and brought back to the prison after a period of 5 years, 4 months and 7 days i.e. 06/05/2012. 03] It is stated in the reply that on the previous occasion, he was required to be brought back by arresting him, he having jumped the parole leave after a period of 5 years, 4 months and 7 days. In paragraph 9 of the reply, respondent no.2 has relied on some judgments of this Court about disentitlement in the eventuality of jumping of parole/furlough leave by the prisoner, when released. “9.
In paragraph 9 of the reply, respondent no.2 has relied on some judgments of this Court about disentitlement in the eventuality of jumping of parole/furlough leave by the prisoner, when released. “9. It is pointed out that the Division Bench of this Ho'ble Court of which relied on the earlier Division Bench Judgments of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Murlidhar Ramchandra Bhalerao vs. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in 2011 ALL MR (Cri) 2132 and Ramchandra Raghu naik vs. State of Maharashtra, vide judgment dated 25/06/2013 in Criminal Writ Petition No.224/2013 and others has held that if a prisoner released on furlough or parole, was required to be arrested for bringing him back in prison, he would not be entitled to be released on furlough or parole. In that view of the matter, since the petitioner was required to be arrested for bringing him back in the prison, further not reported back in time in each and every occasion when he was released, thus he is not entitled for grant of furlough leave.” 04] Learned Counsel Mr. Chhabra, appointed for the petitioner has invited our attention to order dated 08/07/2014 in Criminal Writ Petition No.454/2014 and has submitted in that case, the prisoner was arrested and brought back to jail after 2381 days and thereafter he was again released on parole twice and still surrendered late by 3 days so also by 32 days. In relation to that, this Court observed thus : “This Court has in several matters found that mere late reporting by itself is not sufficient ground to reject the prayer for furlough. The reasons which did not permit the petitioner to report back within time need to be evaluated. In impugned order, there is no such application of mind.” Thus this Court has found that the reasons for reporting back within time need to be evaluated by the authority. 05] Upon giving a careful consideration to the above order, we think a further clarification, particularly in relation the period period of five years, four months and seven days, as in the instant case, for which the prisoner did not report back and was required to be arrested by the police and brought back to jail, is required to be made.
Any reasonable and prudent person ought to draw a conclusion that the prisoner absconded after having been released on parole/furlough in order to evade further imprisonment in such an open and shut case of remaining away for over a period of five years. As to the evaluation of the reasons for the said period, we think, it would be appropriate to have a look at the provision of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, which reads thus: “106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” Reading of the above provision clearly shows that the reasons for absconding for a period of over five years are within the exclusive knowledge of the prisoner, and if at all the prisoner wants the evaluation thereof, it is for him to make a request accordingly; but the competent authority cannot be asked to evaluate in such open and shut cases. To ask the authority to evaluate on its own would not be in consonance to Section 106 of the Evidence Act in the first place and secondly, there is no legal basis for expecting the authority to evaluate on its own. To repeat, it would be legitimate for the authority to draw a straight conclusion about unauthorized absence or his conduct of absconding to evade the course of law for such a long period. With the above clarification, we proceed to deal with the present case. 06] In the instant case, admittedly, the prisoner was absconding for a period of five years, four months and seven days and did not make any request for evaluation of the reasons for absence, nay, in fact, he did not give any reasons at all and, therefore, we draw a concrete inference that in order to evade the course of law, he was absconding for the aforesaid period. That being so, we are not inclined to entertain his request for release on furlough. In the result, we make the following order ORDER (a) Criminal Writ Petition No. 441 of 2015 is dismissed. (b) Fees payable to learned Advocate (appointed) for the petitioner are quantified in a sum of Rs. 1500/(Rupees One Thousand Five Hundred only). (c) Rule is discharged with no order as to costs.