JUDGMENT : The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that a direction be issued to Northern Regional Committee, National Council for Teacher Education and its parent body National Council for Teacher Education, New Delhi to grant recognition to the petitioner college for B.Ed. Course w.e.f. 2015-2016 in consonance with National Council for Teacher Education (Recognition Norms and Procedure) Regulations, 2014 (hereinafter called 'Regulations, 2014'). 2. The controversy raised in the present petition is in very narrow compass. Admittedly, the petitioner college had prepared on 29.5.2015 FDR and a list of staff recruited. The petitioner college presented the relevant material which included FDR and list of staff recruited along with other documents as per requirement of respondents, on 31.5.2015. 30th May, 2015 happened to be Saturday and 31st May, 2015 was Sunday. Both, Saturday and Sunday were not working days of the respondent organization. Hence, the documents furnished by the petitioner college along with FDR were not accepted. Admittedly, they were accepted on 1st June, 2015. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this Court to pleadings made in Para 5 of the writ petition and reply thereto filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3. Hence, the documents furnished by the petitioner college along with FDR were not accepted. Admittedly, they were accepted on 1st June, 2015. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this Court to pleadings made in Para 5 of the writ petition and reply thereto filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3. Para 5 of the writ petition reads as under:- “That, in compliance of letter of intent under clause 7(13) petitioner college submitted reply on 01.06.2015 before respondents alongwith F.D.R. Dated 29.05.2015 for require amount of Rs.12,00,000/- and details of teaching staff along with the approval letter of the affiliating university dated 29.5.2015, but Respondents have not accepted said application and FDR malafidely by saying that today is Sunday, hence, it can be submitted tomorrow, even otherwise also according to the provisions of Section 10 of General Clauses Act, 1897 application as well as FDR submitted by the petitioner college was to be treated within stipulated time, as admittedly there was holiday on 31.05.2015, therefore, next working day was to be treated as cutoff date i.e. 01.06.2015, but respondents have denied the recognition of petitioner college from the academic session 2015-16 by saying that the reply to the letter of intent has been submitted by the petitioner college after cutoff date i.e. 31.05.2015, in view of the above mentioned facts and circumstances it is crystal clear that the respondents have deliberately granted the recognition to the petitioner college from academic session 2016-17, whereas according to the provisions of clause 5(5) and 5(6) of the Regulation 2014, recognition for B.Ed. course was to be granted from academic year 2015-16, as application of the petitioner college was pending consideration in the office of the respondents prior 1st March, 2015 to 31st May, 2015. The copy of reply dated 31.05.2015 is enclosed herewith and marked as Annexure-5.” 4. In response to above averment, the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have taken following stand:- “That in reply to the contents of para no.5 in the Writ Petition it is submitted that the application was not accepted as it was received after the cutoff date and in the NCTE Regulations, 2014 it is no where mentioned that if the last cut off date falls on a Sunday then the next working day will be deemed to be the last cut-off date (Emphasis Supplied). The NRC-NCTE strictly follows the norms and procedures envisaged under the NCTE Regulations, 2014 and it has no malafide intention or any kind of bias against the petitioner college. Moreover, the petitioner college ought to have been vigilant and aware regarding timely submission of document etc.” 5. Ms. Sumati Bishnoi assisted by Mr. Sameer Sharma, appearing for the respondent submitted that except that there was a delay of one day on the part of the petitioner college in submitting the relevant documents including FDR, there is no other defect for which petitioner college has been denied recognition. It will be apposite here to reproduce Sub-clause (5) of Section 5 of the Regulations, 2014, as under:- “(5) Duly completed application in all respect may be submitted to the Regional Committee concerned between 1st March to 31st May of the preceding year from the academic session for which recognition is sought” 6. Mr. Prahlad Sharma, the learned counsel for the petitioner college contended that Sub-clause (5) of Section 5 of Regulations, 2014 is amenable to Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 10 of The General Clauses Act, 1897, reads as under:- “10. Computation of time.-(1) Where, by any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any Court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the Court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the Court or office is open: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act or proceeding to which the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877) applies. (2) This section applies also to all Central Acts and Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887.” 7. To fortify his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the case of Manohar Joshi vs. Nitin Bhaurao Patil and Another [ (1996) 1 SCC 169 ], wherein it was held that Section 10 of the General Clause Act, 1897 will apply even to the limitation prescribed for presentation of the election petition, under the Representation of People Act, 1951. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:- “14. The question now is: Whether the applicability of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act to the presentation of election petitions under the R.P. Act is excluded? No doubt the R.P. Act is a self-contained code even for the purpose of the limitation prescribed therein. This, however, does not answer the question. It has to be seen whether the context excludes the applicability of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act which is in the part therein relating to the General Rules of Construction of all Central Acts. The legislative history of prescribing limitation for presentation of election petitions in accordance with sub-section (1) of Section 81 is also significant for a proper appreciation of the context. Admittedly, Section 10 of the General Clauses Act applied when by virtue of the requirement in the then existing subsection (1) of Section 81, the period of limitation was prescribed by Rules framed under the R.P. Act, in Rule 119 of the 1951 Rules. This was expressly provided by Rule 2(6) of the 1951 Rules. There is nothing to indicate that providing the period of limitation in sub-section (1) of Section 81 itself by substitution of certain words by Act 27 of 1956 instead of prescribing the limitation by Rules, was with a view to exclude the applicability of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act. The change appears to have been made to provide for a fixed period in the Act itself instead of leaving that exercise to be performed by the rule-making authority. An express provision in Rule 2(6) of the 1951 Rules was required since the General Clauses Act ipso facto would not apply to Rules framed under the Central Act, even though it would to be Act itself. The context supports the applicability of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act instead of indicating its exclusion for the purpose of computing the limitation prescribed in sub-section (1) of Section 81 for presentation of election petitions. 15. The context supports the applicability of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act instead of indicating its exclusion for the purpose of computing the limitation prescribed in sub-section (1) of Section 81 for presentation of election petitions. 15. In view of the basis premise that the election petitioner is entitled to avail of the entire limitation of 45 days for presentation of the election petition as indicated by Ramlal, if the contrary view is taken, it would require the election petitioner to perform an impossible task in a case like the present, to present the election petition on the last day of limitation on which date the High Court as well as its office is closed. It is the underlying principle of this legal maxim which suggests the informed decision on this point, leading to the only conclusion that Section 10 of the General Clauses Act applies in the computation of the limitation prescribed by subsection (1) of Section 81 of the R.P. Act for presentation of an election petition. So computed, there is no dispute that the election petition presented in the present case on 16-4-1990 was within limitation and there was no non-compliance of sub-section (1) of Section 81 of the R.P. Act. 16. We have reached the above conclusion independent of the above decisions of this Court rendered on petitions presented subsequent to the amendment of sub-section (1) of Section 81. It may straightaway be said that in all these cases applicability of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act was either not doubted or was taken for granted. This is how the position has been understood for all these years and no case taking the contrary view has been cited at the Bar. This settled position is in conformity with the view we have taken on this point. There is no basis in law to take a different view.” 8. Mrs. Sumati Bishnoi, the learned counsel for the respondent has very fairly stated that if Section 10 of the General Clause Act is applied, the documents furnished by the petitioner college will be in order and the petitioner college shall be entitled to grant of recognition. 9. In somewhat similar circumstances, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mohd. Ayub versus State of U.P. & Ors. [ AIR 2010 SC 431 ], held as under:- “9. 9. In somewhat similar circumstances, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mohd. Ayub versus State of U.P. & Ors. [ AIR 2010 SC 431 ], held as under:- “9. It is common ground that the last date of submitting the application along with medical certificate was 14th of April, 2003, which was a gazetted holiday on account of Ambedkar Jayanti. The application of the applicant was incomplete only because it did not contain the medical certificate. The explanation of the appellant is that in view of the 14th April being a holiday and the previous days were also holidays, he could not obtain the medical certificate and he obtained it on the very next day i.e. 15th April and submitted it on that day itself. 10. In these circumstances, his application should have been considered on merit in view of the principles laid down in Section 10 of General Clauses Act. 11. Section 10 of the General Clauses Act has come up for consideration in various cases before this Court and also different High Courts. In the case of (H.H. Raja) Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh and others, AIR 1957 Supreme Court 271, a four-Judge Bench of this Court explained the object of Section 10 very lucidly. The learned Judges have held as under :- "...Where, therefore, a period is prescribed for the performance of an act in a Court or office, and that period expires on a holiday, then according to the section the Act should be considered to have been done within that period, if it is done on the next day on which the Court or office is open. For that section to apply, therefore, all that is requisite is that there should be a period prescribed and that period should expire on a holiday." (Page 273 of the report) 12. The decision in the case of Harinder Singh (supra) was rendered in the context of an election dispute but the general principles explained therein apply to all cases. 13. Even while construing the provisions of Section 167 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1961, this Court accepted the same interpretation in respect of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act. [See haganti Satyanarayana and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1986)3 SCC 141 . (para 30 page 154 of the report)]. 14. 13. Even while construing the provisions of Section 167 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1961, this Court accepted the same interpretation in respect of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act. [See haganti Satyanarayana and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1986)3 SCC 141 . (para 30 page 154 of the report)]. 14. The learned Judges in Chaganti (supra) accepted the interpretation of Section 10 in the case of N. Sureya Reddy v. State of Orissa, 1985 Cri LJ 939 (Orissa), and held that the principle enunciated in Section 10 of General Clauses Act should be invoked on consideration of justice and expediency. 15. Rather recently in the case of Huda and another v. Dr. Babeswar Kanhar and another, 2005(3) RCR(Civil) 170 : (2005)1 SCC 191 , this Court held that there is a general principle that a party, prevented from doing an act for some reasons beyond his control, can do so at the first subsequent opportunity. The learned Judges further elaborated by saying that the underlying object of Section 10 is to enable a person to do what he should have done in a holiday, on the next working day. The learned Judges held that the said principle is based on doctrine that law does not compel the performance of an impossibility. In saying so, the learned Judges relied on an old decision of Calcutta High Court in the case of Hossein Ally v. Donzelle, ILR (1880) 5 Cal 906. This Court is in respectful agreement with the aforesaid principles.” 10. 31st May as deadline for submission of complete application on behalf of college/institution seeking recognition from respondents was prescribed as last date by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maa Vaishno Devi Mahila Mahavidyalaya vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors [ (2013) 2 SCC 617 ]. In the light of the guidelines given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, National Council for Teacher Education issued a Notification dated 28.11.2014 and in sub-clause (5) of the Section 5 of Regulations, 2014 has fixed 31st May as last date for filing of the application. 11. It is not denied that the petitioner college had filed its application on 30th October, 2008 and college had to complete the deficiencies by 31st May, 2015 in order to make their application complete. The National Council for Teacher Education required that the petitioner college should submit FDR amounting to Rs. 11. It is not denied that the petitioner college had filed its application on 30th October, 2008 and college had to complete the deficiencies by 31st May, 2015 in order to make their application complete. The National Council for Teacher Education required that the petitioner college should submit FDR amounting to Rs. 12 lakhs in the joint name of the respondents and also list of staff approved by the University. Since FDR was prepared on 29th May, 2015 and the list of staff approved by the University was also complete in all respect, they could not be received by the National Council for Teacher Education, on 30th May and 31st May being holidays on account of Saturday and Sunday. On the very next date on 1st June, 2015, FDR and list of staff approved by the University was accepted by National Council for Teacher Education. That being so, it will be a case of extreme hardship, in case Section 10 of the General Clause Act is not invoked in favour of the petitioner. 12. Interpretation of law laid in case of Manohar Joshi's case (supra) is in favour of the petitioner. As per enunciation of law Representation of People Act which is a selfcontaind code is governed by Section 10 of the General Clauses Act. Regulations, 2014 cannot be excluded from the command of legislature given in Section 10 of the General Clauses Act. Section 10 of General Clauses Act specifically state that all regulations shall be bound by the provision. The case of the petitioner college also cannot be differentiated from the case of the Mohd. Ayub (supra) where also similar law was laid. 13. Consequently, holding that since 30th May and 31st May of 2015 being Saturday and Sunday were holidays, and interpretation of Section 10 is in favour of the petitioner and furthermore, necessary documents were submitted by the petitioner college on 1.6.2015, on the very next day of the holiday they will be deemed to be within the period prescribed under Sub-clause (5) of Section 5 of Regulations, 2014. Except delay, according to counsel for respondent, there is nothing adverse against the petitioner college. Hence, the respondents are directed to grant recognition to the petitioner college for academic Session 2015-2016, as the respondents have already granted recognition to the petitioner college for Session 20162017. 14. Except delay, according to counsel for respondent, there is nothing adverse against the petitioner college. Hence, the respondents are directed to grant recognition to the petitioner college for academic Session 2015-2016, as the respondents have already granted recognition to the petitioner college for Session 20162017. 14. Consequently, the present writ petition is allowed and the stay application stand disposed of.