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2015 DIGILAW 170 (KER)

Yohannan v. State of Kerala

2015-02-19

BABU MATHEW P.JOSEPH, K.T.SANKARAN

body2015
ORDER : K.T. Sankaran, J. 1. The question involved in these appeals at present is whether there is any period of limitation for filing an appeal by the victim challenging the acquittal of the accused and if so, what is the period of limitation. All these appeals are filed by the victims in the respective cases. There is no dispute that the appellants are victims as defined in S. 2(wa)of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appeals were filed beyond ninety days from the date of the judgment passed by the Sessions Court. The Registry raised an objection that the appeals are time barred. The appellants take the stand that since there is no period of limitation for filing an appeal by the victim, there is no need to file any application for condonation of delay. 2. The proviso to S. 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for an appeal by the victim. For the sake of convenience, Section 372 is extracted below: "372. No appeal to lie unless otherwise provided.--No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided for by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force: Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court." The proviso to Section 372 was inserted by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 (Act 5 of 2009). The definition of "victim" was also introduced as Section 2(wa)by Act 5 of 2009. 3. The appeal which the victim may file as per the proviso to S. 372 shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court. That means, the appeal by the victim would lie either before the Sessions Court or before the High Court, depending upon the Court which tried the case. Before the amendment of S. 372 by Act 5 of 2009, the victim, if he is a complainant, could file an appeal against acquittal under sub-s. (4) of S. 378 of the Code. That means, the appeal by the victim would lie either before the Sessions Court or before the High Court, depending upon the Court which tried the case. Before the amendment of S. 372 by Act 5 of 2009, the victim, if he is a complainant, could file an appeal against acquittal under sub-s. (4) of S. 378 of the Code. But a victim who was not a complainant could only file a revision under S. 397 challenging the acquittal. After the amendment by Act 5 of 2009, for the first time, a right is conferred on the victim who is not a complainant to file an appeal against acquittal, conviction for a lesser offence or imposition of inadequate compensation. Even after the amendment by Act 5 of 2009, sub-s.(4) of S. 378 is kept in tact. 4. Under Section 378(4) of the Code, an appeal against acquittal in a case instituted on complaint could be filed only after getting special leave to appeal. An application for granting special leave can be filed as provided under sub-s. (5) of S. 378 within six months if the complainant is a public servant, and within sixty days in every other case. The period of six months or sixty days, as the case may be, shall be computed from the date of the order of acquittal. It is well settled that the time taken for obtaining certified copy of the judgment could be excluded under S. 12 of the Limitation Act for computing the period of limitation for filing an application for special leave to appeal. However, no period of limitation is provided for filing an appeal by a victim under the proviso to S. 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. No leave is also necessary for filing such an appeal. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that since no period of limitation is provided for an appeal filed by the victim against acquittal as provided under the proviso to S. 372, the appeal can be filed at any time and the only question to be considered by the Court is whether the appellant has designedly or deliberately filed the appeal belatedly. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, even if no period of limitation is provided, a reasonable period has to be taken as the period of limitation and the reasonable period can be treated as sixty days for an appeal filed before the Sessions Court and ninety days for an appeal filed before the High Court. 5. The Limitation Act provides for the period of limitation for the appeals under Articles 114 to 117 in the Second Division to the Schedule. Article 114 of the Limitation Act reads as follows: SECOND DIVISION- APPEALS Description of appeal Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 114. Appeal from an order of acquittal - (a) under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 417 of the Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898) Ninety Days The date of the order appealed from. (b) under sub-section (3) of section 417 of the Code. Thirty days The date of the grant of special leave. Article 114 of the Limitation Act does not refer to Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 but it refers to S. 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. S. 417 of 1898 Code corresponds to S. 378 of 1973 Code. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of S. 417 of the 1898 Code corresponds to sub-sections (1) and (2) of S. 378 of the 1973 Code. Sub-section (3) of S. 378 of the 1973 Code was not there in S. 417 of the 1898 Code. Sub-section (4) of S. 378 of 1973 Code corresponds to sub-section (3) of S. 417 of the 1898 Code. Sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 378 of 1973 Code substantially corresponds to sub-sections (4) and (5) of S. 417 of the 1898 Code. 6. Clause (a) of Article 114 of the Limitation Act deals with only appeals under sub-sections (1) and (2) of S. 417 of the 1898 Code, which corresponds to sub-sections (1) and (2) of S. 378 of the 1973 Code. The period of limitation provided under clause (a) of Article 114of the Limitation Act is ninety days. Clause (b) of Article 114 deals with an appeal under sub-section (3) of S. 417 of the 1898 Code which corresponds to sub-section (4) of S. 378of the 1973 Code and the period of limitation is thirty days from the date of granting of special leave. Clause (b) of Article 114 deals with an appeal under sub-section (3) of S. 417 of the 1898 Code which corresponds to sub-section (4) of S. 378of the 1973 Code and the period of limitation is thirty days from the date of granting of special leave. For a complainant, other than a public servant, the period within which the application for special leave to appeal should be filed is sixty days and after granting special leave he would get another thirty days for filing the appeal. It cannot be contended that Article 114 of the Limitation Act could be in any way applied to an appeal under the proviso to S. 372 of the Code. Then the question arises whether such appeal should be filed within a reasonable period or is it that the Legislature permitted filing of such appeal at any time by the victim. The further question is, if a reasonable period is to be fixed what should be the reasonable period, since the victim need not necessarily be a party in the proceedings before the Trial Court. It is to be noted that the victim who is a complainant is not a category of appellant coming under the proviso to S. 372. An appeal under the proviso to S. 372 can be filed by a person who is not eo nomine a party to the proceedings before the criminal court. A victim need not necessarily be a witness in the case also. Sometimes, a victim may not be aware of the proceedings before the Criminal Court. Going by the definition of "victim", a legal heir of the deceased is also a victim. A legal heir of the deceased need not necessarily be an eye witness. Therefore, it is also likely that there may arise cases where a victim may not be called to the court at all for the trial of the case. In such cases, there is no mechanism by which the victim gets notice of the trial of the case or the decision rendered by the Trial Court. 7. Section 365 of the Code provides that in cases tried by the Court of Session or a Chief Judicial Magistrate, the Court or such Magistrate as the case may be, shall forward a copy of its or his finding and sentence (if any) to the District Magistrate within whose jurisdiction the trial was held. 7. Section 365 of the Code provides that in cases tried by the Court of Session or a Chief Judicial Magistrate, the Court or such Magistrate as the case may be, shall forward a copy of its or his finding and sentence (if any) to the District Magistrate within whose jurisdiction the trial was held. It is to be noted that S. 365 does not refer to any other Magistrate. A victim who is entitled to file an appeal against acquittal could be a victim in a case tried by any other Magistrate. Sub-section (5) of S. 363 of the Code provides for supply of a copy of the judgment or order or any deposition or other part of the record to any person affected by the judgment or order passed by a criminal court, on his application, and the proviso therein also provides for supplying the copy free of cost, if the court thinks it fit for special reasons. Sub-section (6) of S. 363 empowers the High Court to make rules providing for the grant of copies of any judgment or order of a criminal court to any person who is not affected by the judgment or order. There is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure to give notice to the victim about the date of trial or the date of judgment. There is also no provision for forwarding a copy of the judgment or order to the victim. R. 92 of the Criminal Rules of Practice in Kerala provides that the Courts of Session shall, as far as possible, within two weeks from the date of pronouncing of the judgment in trial cases, print sufficient number of copies of the judgment and distribute the same free of cost in the manner provided in the Rule to the District Collector, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Superintendent of Police, High Court, accused, Superintendent of the jail to which the prisoner is committed, Chemical Examiner, Head of Department of the government servant who is an accused, local Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor, etc. There is no provision in R. 92 to provide a copy of the judgment to the victim. There is no provision in R. 92 to provide a copy of the judgment to the victim. Rules 156 to 161 of the Criminal Rules of Practice in Kerala provide for forwarding copy of the judgment to the Chemical Examiner, the Director of State Forensic Science Laboratory, the Serologist and the Chemical Examiner to the Government of India, Home Secretary to the Government, the Principal of Medical College, Bar Council, the Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor in the contingencies mentioned in those Rules. Nowhere in the Criminal Rules of Practice in Kerala there is a provision for forwarding copy of the judgment to the victim. 8. A victim in a crime may be a complainant or may not be a complainant. If the victim files a complaint, he is a party to the proceedings. If the victim is not a complainant, he cannot be imputed with the knowledge of the trial of the criminal case or the judgment to be pronounced therein. Sometimes, the victim may be an injured who may be examined before Court. Even then such a witness need not be aware of the further proceedings in the case. Sometimes, the victim need not even be an injured or an eye witness. The victim may even be a legal heir of the deceased. How does he know about the proceedings before the Criminal Court? How can we fix a point of time from which the period of limitation should begin to run? The third column in the schedule to the Limitation Act provides for the time from which the period begins to run. What should be the starting point for the period of limitation to run in the case of a victim? Even if a reasonable time is fixed as sixty days or ninety days, from what point of time it should be counted or computed? Is it the date of judgment or is it the date of knowledge of the judgment or is it the date when the copy was received? If date of knowledge of the judgment is the relevant starting point, is it not necessary for the victim/appellant to establish the date of knowledge of the judgment? 9. Is it the date of judgment or is it the date of knowledge of the judgment or is it the date when the copy was received? If date of knowledge of the judgment is the relevant starting point, is it not necessary for the victim/appellant to establish the date of knowledge of the judgment? 9. In the statement of objects and reasons of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 it is stated thus: "At present, the victims are the worst sufferers in a crime and they don't have much role in the court proceedings. They need to be given certain rights and compensation, so that there is no distortion of the criminal justice system.......There is an urgent need to provide relief to women, particularly victims of sexual offences, and provide fair-trial to persons of unsound mind who are not able to defend themselves......." 10. The law makers thought it fit to provide a right to the victim to file an appeal challenging the acquittal or challenging the conviction for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation, by inserting a proviso to S. 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also by defining the term "victim". It cannot be assumed that the law makers were unaware of the period of limitation provided under Article 114 of the Limitation Act and sub-section (5) of S. 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Still, the Legislature did not think it fit to provide a period of limitation for an appeal by the victim. To our mind, this omission was deliberate, thereby, providing an opportunity to the victim to file appeal under the proviso to S. 372 on coming to know of the judgment impugned in the appeal. So long as there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure to intimate the victim about the commencement of the trial of the case, the various proceedings in the case and the date on which the case is posted for judgment, it is only reasonable to assume that the law makers provided a right for the victims to file an appeal on getting knowledge about the judgment in the case. 11. In Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & Anr. 11. In Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. & Anr. (1999 (2) KLTSN 52 (C. No. 56) SC : AIR 1999 SC 1351 ), the Supreme Court held that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act are not applicable to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act and that the relief under the Act cannot be denied to the workmen merely on the ground of delay. The question considered in that case was whether the delay of seven years in referring the dispute to the Labour Court could be justified. The contention put forward that Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act applies, was negatived. The Supreme Court referred to the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Chander Morya v. State of Haryana ((1999) 1 SCT 141), where the Punjab and Haryana High Court took the view that the demand for reference of a dispute by the appropriate Government to the Labour Tribunals should be made within five years and thereafter, the Government can refuse to make a reference on the ground of delay. The Supreme Court held that the Punjab and Haryana High Court was not justified in prescribing the limitation for getting the reference made or an application under S. 37-C of the Industrial Disputes Act for adjudication. The Supreme Court held: "... It is not the function of the Court to prescribe the limitation where the Legislature in its wisdom had thought it fit not to prescribe any period. The courts admittedly interpret law and do not make laws. Personal views of the Judges presiding the Court cannot be stretched to authorize them to interpret law in such a manner which would amount to legislation intentionally left over by the Legislature....." 12. In Moideen Kova v. Kunhammed Haji ( 1999 (2) KLT 646 (F.B.)), the Court considered the question as to the procedure to be adopted where a revision under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is filed beyond ninety days. The Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act does not provide for any period of limitation for filing a revision. The Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act does not provide for any period of limitation for filing a revision. Rule 44 of the Kerala High Court Rules provides that where no period of limitation is prescribed by any other law, a revision petition shall be presented within ninety days of the order complained of and that the provisions of Sections 5 and 12of the Limitation Act shall apply to such petitions. The Full Bench held that Rule 44 of the High Court Rules cannot be taken as one providing a period of limitation. It was noticed that the Legislature specifically made a provision for limitation in the matter of filing appeal under Section 18 of the Act, but no period of limitation was provided for a revision under Section 20. By incorporating Rule 44 to the High Court Rules, it was held that no period of limitation can be prescribed for filing a revision. If no period of limitation is prescribed under law, there is no question of filing an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in filing the revision. The Full Bench held thus: "... It will be open to the Legislature to bring in a provision under S. 20of the Kerala Act prescribing a period of limitation for filing the revision petitions as it was done in the Limitation Act, 1963 for revisions under S. l15 of the C.P.C. So long as no such provision is made in the statute it has to be taken that there is no period of limitation prescribed by law for filing a revision under S. 20 of the Act." The Full Bench held that it is sufficient if an affidavit is filed by the revision petitioner explaining the delay in filing the revision. 13. In Padmanabha Pillai Arunachalam Pillai v. Narayana Pillai Natarajan & Anr. (1969 KLJ 614), a case coming under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, it was held thus: "The revision was filed, as I said earlier, over 2 years after the appeal was disposed of, but was admitted and heard because, by a strange omission in the statute, so both sides submitted, no period of limitation is fixed in the matter of entertaining a revision. Litigation can become a long-acting torment if an order can be challenged years later on the pretext that there is no period of limitation fixed in the statute. Of course, it is for the legislature to remedy this lacuna, but it is certainly open to the revisional Court to decline to exercise its discretion when a party moves for relief after a period of Indiscreet delay." 14. In Uttam Namdeo Mahale v. Vithal Deo & Ors. ( AIR 1997 SC 2695 ), the Supreme Court considered the scope of S. 21 of the Mamlatdar's Court Act, 1906, where no period was prescribed for execution of the orders, and held that in the absence of any specific limitation, necessary implication is that the general law of limitation provided in the Limitation Act stands excluded. It was held that the order can be executed at any time. The contention raised in that case that in the absence of any period of limitation having been prescribed the power of the Court can be exercised only within a reasonable time, was also negatived by the Supreme Court. 15. In Parmeshwar Mandal v. State of Bihar & Ors. (2014 (2) KLT SN 11 (C. No. 16) Pat. : 2014 Crl.L.J. 1046), the Patna High Court considered the question of limitation for the victim to file an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and held: "... Hence, prescribing the same limitation for preferring appeal by a victim, as applicable in the case of an appeal by the State Government or the Central Government or a complainant, will amount to putting fetters and circumscribing the right of a victim, not intended and prescribed by the Legislature. Judicial discipline requires from courts to refrain from supplying any casus omissus in the legislation, for it is duty of the court to interpret, and not to legislate............No limitation of time has been provided by the Legislature for exercise of such a right of appeal by the "victim" in terms of the said Proviso. Hence, in the fact and circumstances of each case, the Court has to determine as to whether the appeal was entertainable, or not, on the ground of absence of bona fide explanation for delay by the appellant...." 16. In Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu & Ors. Hence, in the fact and circumstances of each case, the Court has to determine as to whether the appeal was entertainable, or not, on the ground of absence of bona fide explanation for delay by the appellant...." 16. In Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu & Ors. ( AIR 2001 SC 2699 ), the Supreme Court while considering the question of limitation for filing an application to set aside the sale under R. 89 of O. XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, held thus: "13. We have considered the submissions made by the parties. The settled principles of interpretation are that the Court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do. The Court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The Court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The Court cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are there." 17. In M/s. Tata Steel Ltd. v. M/s. Atma Tube Products Ltd. & Ors. (ILR 2013 (1) P. and H. 719), the Punjab and Haryana High Court took the view that the legislative intent behind Articles 114 and 115(b) of the Limitation Act in prescribing the period of limitation for appeals to the High Court or to the Court of Session against different types of orders, is the best guiding factor to determine reasonableness of the period of limitation for an appeal preferred at the instance of a victim also. It was held that it would be only reasonable to take the view that the period of limitation would be ninety days for an appeal against acquittal filed by a victim before the High Court and sixty days where such appeal lies to the Sessions Court. The Punjab and Haryana High Court also held thus: "138. It was held that it would be only reasonable to take the view that the period of limitation would be ninety days for an appeal against acquittal filed by a victim before the High Court and sixty days where such appeal lies to the Sessions Court. The Punjab and Haryana High Court also held thus: "138. The limitation period of ninety, sixty and thirty days, as the case may be, prescribed above for the maintainability of an appeal by a victim, in our considered view, ought to be counted from the date such 'victim' acquires knowledge of the order appealable under proviso to Section 372. We say so for the reason that in most of the State cases, the 'victim' has no participatory role at the trial stage and the possibility of his/her remaining in the dark, about the adverse order cannot be lightly brushed aside. The above rule of limitation, therefore, cannot be mechanically enforced even if the victim had no informed knowledge regarding culmination of the trial proceedings as it might cause serious prejudice to his/her rights, close to the extent of snatching away the right to appeal earned by the victims after a long drawn battle." The Patna High Court in Parmeshwar Mandal v. State of Bihar & Ors. (2014 (2) KLTSN 11 (C. No. 16) Pat. : 2014 Crl.L.J. 1046), did not agree with the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court. 18. In Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Anr. ( AIR 1985 SC 1285 ), the Supreme Court held that when on a consideration of the report made by the officer in charge of a police station under sub-section (2)(i) of S. 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is not inclined to take cognizance of the offence and issue process, the informant must be given an opportunity of being heard so that he can make his submissions to persuade the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence and issue process. Dealing with the contention that if notice is to be given to the informant it might result in unnecessary delay, the Supreme Court held thus: ".....But we do not think this can be regarded as a valid objection against the view we are taking, because in any case the action taken by the police on the First Information Report has to be communicated to the informant and a copy of the report has to be supplied to him under sub-section (2)(i) of S. 173 and if that be so, we do not see any reason why it should be difficult to serve notice of the consideration of the report on the informant. Moreover, in any event, the difficulty of service of notice on the informant cannot possibly provide any justification for depriving the informant of the opportunity of being heard at the time when the report is considered by the Magistrate." 19. In Kalimuthu v. State of Kerala (2014 (4) KLT 909) a learned Single Judge of this Court considered the question of delay in filing an appeal by the victim and held thus: "4......But it is pertinent to note that though the amendment was brought up, even now there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure to inform the victim regarding the fate or end of the trial i.e., whether the accused was convicted or acquitted. In a case instituted on the police report, after giving information to the police, the victim goes under an eclipse and he comes to the court only for giving evidence as a victim. Thereafter he will not be informed of whether the prosecution ended in conviction or acquittal. That apart, in a case instituted on the police report, the State is the master of the prosecution and victim has no role at all, except the role of a witness. So long as there is no procedure to inform the victim after the acquittal or conviction in the case, the victim may get information as regards the fate of the case, after a long lapse of time. In such a situation, I am of the opinion that long lapse of time may occur in filing the appeal under S. 372 of the Cr.P.C. by the victim in the absence of the appeal by the State. In such a situation, I am of the opinion that long lapse of time may occur in filing the appeal under S. 372 of the Cr.P.C. by the victim in the absence of the appeal by the State. Normally, the victim may think that the State, being the master of prosecution, would have preferred appeal promptly within the time. In such a situation, victim cannot be accused of the delay even if it is long, as it cannot be a culpable negligence. Normally an aggrieved victim may not cause delay deliberately at his own risk. Therefore, the Appellate Court is liable to take a lenient view in condoning the delay in filing the appeal by the victim under S. 372 of the Cr.P.C." 20. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Patna High Court in Parmeshwar Mandal v. State of Bihar and others (2014 (2) KLT SN 11 (C. No. 16) Pat. : 2014 Crl.L.J. 1046). With respect, we are not inclined to agree with the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in M/s. Tata Steel Ltd.'s case. 21. A new right is conferred on the victim by the insertion of the proviso to Section 372, by defining the term "victim" and by the introduction of Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Victim Compensation Scheme). No fetter of limitation is placed by the Legislature on the exercise of the right of the victim to file an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court cannot make a provision prescribing a period of limitation for an appeal for which either the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Limitation Act does not provide for a period of limitation. The victim would be entitled to file an appeal and if the Appellate Court finds that the appeal is designedly or deliberately delayed, the Appellate Court need not entertain the appeal on that ground. It would be sufficient if the appellant explains the circumstances under which he could not file the appeal within a reasonable time after the impugned judgment was passed. The Court would be entitled to consider the same and arrive at a conclusion as to the reasonableness or otherwise. It would be sufficient if the appellant explains the circumstances under which he could not file the appeal within a reasonable time after the impugned judgment was passed. The Court would be entitled to consider the same and arrive at a conclusion as to the reasonableness or otherwise. Every case has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of that case and no hard and fast formula can be prescribed with respect to the time within which the appeal is to be filed by the victim. So long as the victim is not a party to the proceedings before the court below, he cannot be imputed with the knowledge of the proceedings unless it is shown otherwise. Needless to say that the appellant has to file appeal within a reasonable time after the date of knowledge of the judgment impugned in the appeal. 22. We are of the view that the practical situation can be tackled by issuing a direction that in all cases where the appeals are filed beyond ninety days from the date of judgment, the appellant shall file an affidavit stating the circumstances under which the appeal could not be filed earlier. The Court will consider such affidavit at the time of admission taking into account the facts and circumstances of each case. Before parting with the case we would like to point out the following: The Criminal Rules of Practice in Kerala contains provision for forwarding copy of the judgment to various persons and authorities. The Rule can be amended incorporating a provision for sending a copy of the judgment to the victim as well. This can be conveniently done by directing the District Magistrate to see that the copy of the judgment is served on the victim. S. 363(5) provides that any person affected by a judgment or order passed by a Criminal Court shall, on an application made in this behalf and on payment of the prescribed charges, be given a copy of such judgment or order or any deposition or other part of the record. The proviso to sub-section (5) of S. 363 states that the Court may, if it thinks fit for some special reason, give it to him free of cost. If intimation is given to the victim about the passing of the judgment, he can be imputed with the knowledge of the judgment. The proviso to sub-section (5) of S. 363 states that the Court may, if it thinks fit for some special reason, give it to him free of cost. If intimation is given to the victim about the passing of the judgment, he can be imputed with the knowledge of the judgment. We do not think that any victim would deliberately cause delay in filing an appeal against acquittal or complaining about inadequacy of sentence. The Victim Compensation Scheme introduced as per S. 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure would also be a guiding factor to take the view that the victim has a right to be informed of the judgment passed by the Court. On such information being given, the victim would be entitled to apply for certified copy of the judgment as provided under S. 363(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The objection noted by the Registry is disposed of as above. Number the Criminal Appeals. A copy of the order shall be placed before the Rule Committee for appropriate action.