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2015 DIGILAW 172 (KAR)

Appasab Patil v. State of Karnataka

2015-02-12

L.NARAYANA SWAMY

body2015
ORDER 1. The common prayer made by the petitioners in these petitions is for a direction to the second respondent Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies & Registrar of Societies, Gulbarga to induct the petitioners as Members of the third respondent Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Society’ for short). Prayer is also made to quash the endorsement issued on various dates in respect of the resolution dated 24th October 2011 passed by the third respondent Society. 2. Commonness in all these petitions are that the petitioners are the residents of Hyderabad Karnataka region, which comprises of four districts, viz. Gulbarga, Bidar, Raichur and now Yadagiri. They have made application to the Society for membership pursuant to the Notification issued on 8th October 2010 and the third respondent Society has rejected their applications by returning the Demand Drafts sent along with it. The said notification of the third respondent Society was issued as per their undertaking given to the Court in Writ Petition No. 19466 of 2010, which by its order dated 5th October 2010 came to be disposed of, considering the said undertaking of the third respondent, and further directing the third respondent to issue a paper publication inviting applications for membership to the Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society. It was also made clear that the Notification would specifically indicate that the format of the Application would be displayed on Notice Boards of all the institutions being run and managed by the Society. The Society issued notification only as a formality and none of the petitioners have been taken as its members. The rejection of their membership is because of the resolution made by way of amendment to the byelaws by incorporating Rule 7(B)(ii). 3. The petitioners claim that they are the residents of Hyderabad Karnataka region and are agriculturists, social-workers, advocates, professors, doctors, and etc. They are interested in becoming members of the Society to serve the said region as well as the State. It is also stated in the petition that keeping the said object the Society was registered in the year 1957. The memorandum dated 19th March 1958 came-up with an intention of developing higher education in professional courses in Hyderabad Karnataka region and was desirous of forming a Society for the said purpose. There was no higher education facility in the field of Engineering and Medicine, etc. The memorandum dated 19th March 1958 came-up with an intention of developing higher education in professional courses in Hyderabad Karnataka region and was desirous of forming a Society for the said purpose. There was no higher education facility in the field of Engineering and Medicine, etc. The petitioners state that the then Divisional Commissioner, Gulbarga Division along with District Commissioners of two Districts viz. Raichur and Bidar, formed an association along with council of members comprising 25 in number, of which four members are Divisional Commissioner and District Commissioners and the remaining 21 comprised of Legislators, Members of Parliament and elite members from the three Districts of erstwhile Hyderabad Karnataka. Clause (iv) of the byelaws of the Association permits, any member, who contributes Rs.1,000/or more to the Society, would be a Patron of the Society and any person who contributes not less than Rs.500/and not more than Rs.1,000/as a life member of the society. Further, any member who contributes not less than Rs.25/per annum shall be an ordinary member of the Society. As per this Clause, each and every person could become a member of the Society by paying the said amount. In course of time, more particularly in the year 1980-81, the newly elected governing council, brought an amendment to byelaws through Resolution No.5 to byelaw 7(B)(ii) that “the Governing Council shall scrutinize all applications and to admit the applicant as a Member, if he/she is supported by not less than 2/3rd majority of the Governing Council Members present. If the applicant is not admitted then the amount of admission fee shall be refunded to him. Reasons for rejection of application need not be given. The decision of the Government Council is final. The refusal shall be communicated to the applicant concerned within 15 days from the date of the decision.” The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that by virtue of said amendment to the byelaw, the elected governing council is acting contrary to the interest, aims and objects to which the founders formed the Society. The refusal shall be communicated to the applicant concerned within 15 days from the date of the decision.” The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that by virtue of said amendment to the byelaw, the elected governing council is acting contrary to the interest, aims and objects to which the founders formed the Society. When the petitioners were not permitted to become the members by virtue of the said amendment, they approached this court in Writ Petition No. 19466 of 2010 and the Division Bench of this Court while disposing of the petition by its order dated 05th October 2010 directed the third respondent to issue notification along with the format of application to invite applications to get membership to the Society. After the disposal of the said petition, a notification though was issued, but by operating amended byelaw 7(B)(ii), rejected the applications of these petitioners without assigning any reasons and the rejection was also in the blank printed format and only the names of the petitioners and date were filled in and issued to the petitioners. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the action of the Society in rejecting the applications of the petitioners is contrary to the direction issued by this Court in Writ petition No. 19466 of 2010 as well as its byelaws. 4. It is also submitted that the resolution was passed in the Special General Body Meeting conducted on 30th March 1981 and the same was forwarded to the District Registrar of Societies, Gulbarga, and in turn the Registrar, by its order dated 31st March 1981 by exercising his power under Section 10(2) of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, ordered to register all the 41 amendments made through resolution by Special General Body Meeting on 30th March 1981 with effect from 31st March 1981. Hence, it is submitted that this Resolution of making amendment to byelaws by a Special General Body Meeting on 30th March 1981 is contrary to Section 10(2) of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short. To buttress this submission, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Hebbar Sree Vaishnava Sabha, Bangalore vs. G.S. Yognarasimha and Others, 2009 (4) Kar. To buttress this submission, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Hebbar Sree Vaishnava Sabha, Bangalore vs. G.S. Yognarasimha and Others, 2009 (4) Kar. L.J 11 wherein it is held that “Until and unless the members let known as to the proposed amendment, it may not be proper for him to exercise his proxy vote. Thus, both the provisions of Sections 9 and 10 mandate that the Special General Body Meeting should contain a written or printed report and proposed amendment apart from the date, time and place of the meeting. Therefore, we are unable to appreciate and accept the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant that there is no mandatory requirement for inclusion of the report of the proposed amendment.” On these grounds the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted to set aside the order of the second respondent and also prayed for a direction to the Society to issue application forms to the petitioners with prior intimation to the Governing Council and provide membership to them. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the Society submitted to dismiss the petition on the following counts, viz. on maintainability, on delay and laches and on the ground of locus standi. He also submitted to dismiss the petition on the ground of jurisdiction. With regard to the submission to dismiss these petitions on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of the petitioners, it is submitted that the amendment was brought to byelaws by its Special General Body Meeting as back as on 30th March 1981 as also its acceptance on 31st March 1981, should have been challenged by the petitioners if they are so aggrieved, at the earliest point of time or within a reasonable time. It is submitted that the amendment made to the byelaws is only in the form of contract between the Members of the Society. When a contract is entered into between the Members by way of an understanding through a Special General Body Meeting, the same shall not be the subject matter of this Court and if at all the petitioners are aggrieved, they have to approach the Civil Court. 6. When a contract is entered into between the Members by way of an understanding through a Special General Body Meeting, the same shall not be the subject matter of this Court and if at all the petitioners are aggrieved, they have to approach the Civil Court. 6. With regard to the locus standi of the petitioners, it is submitted that the petitioners are strangers and are unrelated to the Society or its administration; and hence they do not have any locus standi to challenge the amendment made to byelaw of the Society. The amendment to byelaw is purely an internal administration of the Society for which the majority members of the society have agreed, and the same has been accepted and registered by the Registrar of cooperative Societies. Hence, on the said ground the petitions are to be dismissed. It is further submitted that the byelaws and/or the amendment made to byelaws cannot be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In support of this submission, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Sri Panchalinga Panchappa Pattanashetti and Others vs. Commisioner for Cane Development and Director of Sugar and Others, 2004 (4) KCCR 2489 wherein it has been held that “the amendment to byelaw is neither a law nor a statute for the purpose of Article 13 of the Constitution of India and the byelaw is only a term of contract between the members of the Society. He also relied upon the judgment in the case of Gurappa vs. South Central Railway Employees Consumers Cooperative Society Limited and Others, 1983 (1) KAR. L.J. 106 wherein it is held that “a byelaw of a cooperative society is not ‘law’ within Article 13 of the Constitution and the byelaw comparable to the Articles of Association of a company or a friendly society is only a term of contract between a member and the society.” Hence, it is submitted that a writ petition challenging byelaw is not maintainable. On similar lines, the learned counsel also relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chander Mohan Khanna vs. National Council of Educational Research and Training and Others, 1981 (4) SCC 578 and in the case of Smt. Damyanti Naranga vs. Union of India and Others, AIR 1971 SC 966 . 7. On similar lines, the learned counsel also relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chander Mohan Khanna vs. National Council of Educational Research and Training and Others, 1981 (4) SCC 578 and in the case of Smt. Damyanti Naranga vs. Union of India and Others, AIR 1971 SC 966 . 7. Lastly, it is submitted that the contention of the petitioners that they have not been heard before rejecting of their applications is only an illusion of the petitioners. Since the petitioners are not members and are only strangers, they need not be heard before rejecting their applications and on this ground also petitions are to be dismissed. 8. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. Before going to the merits of the case, the objections raised by the third respondent, especially on the ground of maintainability, is required to be dealt with. Amendment was brought to the byelaws of the third respondent Society on 30th March 1981 and the same was registered on 31st March 1981. It is the case of the third respondent that there is an inordinate delay of more than three decades in approaching this Court and hence on the ground of delay and laches these petitions are to be dismissed. The petitioners, basically, are not the members of the Society and are approaching the Society to get membership. It is their case that since the Hyderabad Karnataka region felt lack of facilities for higher education in professional courses, the then Divisional Commissioner of Gulbarga Division and the District Commissioners of two Districts viz. Raichur and Bidar made an effort to register an Association to improve this field of education. Till then, there was no Society existing in this region to improve the education in the field of higher education to professional courses. If original byelaw is looked into, it is the Divisional Commissioner and the District Commissioners of two Districts viz. Raichur and Bidar have constituted a Managing Council and the remaining 21 members comprised of elite persons like Legislators, Members of Parliament, Doctors, Lawyers, Professors, etc. The Divisional Commissioner and the District Commissioners, by using their good offices, have collected money and material appealing to the public to donate generously for the said cause by issuing pamphlets. Raichur and Bidar have constituted a Managing Council and the remaining 21 members comprised of elite persons like Legislators, Members of Parliament, Doctors, Lawyers, Professors, etc. The Divisional Commissioner and the District Commissioners, by using their good offices, have collected money and material appealing to the public to donate generously for the said cause by issuing pamphlets. The pamphlets were printed in local language as also in Marathi and Urdu including English languages and distributed locally for the purpose of establishing the Society. The Chairman of the Council Divisional Commissioner instructed the Government departments to collect additional revenue, tax from each cultivator of all the three districts and in response to the same, the cultivators of the region paid additional revenue to help the governing council to proceed further. It is stated in the petitions that an amount in the tune of Rs.99,58,784/was collected in the year 1957 itself. Presidents of the Marketing Committees, Senior Marketing Officers, Regional Transport Officers and other Government Officials were requested to collect funds vide proceedings of the Divisional Commissioner Gulbarga dated 27th December 1957. Resolution dated 3rd August 1958 was passed to authorize the Chairman Divisional Commissioner to open an account in his name. The governing body, to manage the affairs of the Engineering College, constituted Candidates Selection Committee, Purchase Committee and Staff Selection Committee. It is further to be stated that the District Committee, Gulbarga collected one thousand tonnes of cement for the construction of Engineering College, giving a rebate of Rs.20/per tonne; and the Government of India through Government of Mysore was requested to waive levy of excise duty and baggage charges on one thousand tonnes of cement. Though these things are pleaded in the petition, the same are not countered by the respondent by filing objections. The Society opened an Engineering College and a Medical College for which even the Government of India and the Government of Mysore have contributed. These submissions have been made by the petitioners in order to emphasise that the Society came into existence at the instance of the Divisional Commissioner, the District Commissioners and the general public. The byelaw, provide and permit that all the persons of this region can become members of the Society. These submissions have been made by the petitioners in order to emphasise that the Society came into existence at the instance of the Divisional Commissioner, the District Commissioners and the general public. The byelaw, provide and permit that all the persons of this region can become members of the Society. In view of the same, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are also entitled and eligible to become the members of the governing council, but clandestinely the elected members of the Society, on 30th March 1981, brought amendment to the byelaws to prevent the general public becoming Members with an intention to protect their own interest. Since the date of amendment to byelaws, these petitioners are making attempt by approaching the Government and the third respondent, to become members of the Society. As stated earlier, a writ petition was also filed before this Court seeking a direction to the respondents to give membership to the petitioners. This effort shows that an attempt has been made by the petitioners to get membership. When a claim of this nature is made, the persons who approach this Court, cannot be shunted out on the ground of limitation. No doubt, it is very clear from the pleadings of the petitioners that there is a huge gap between the date of amendment to the byelaws and the date of filing the petitions, but, limitation is not applicable to the petitioners to file writ petition invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is a well-established principle that a statute cannot regulate the jurisdiction of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Smt. Sudama Devi vs. Commissioner and Others, (1983) 2 SCC 1 held that “there is no period of limitation prescribed by any law for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is in fact doubtful whether any such period of limitation can be prescribed by law. In any event one thing is clear and beyond doubt that no such period of limitation can be laid down under Rules made by the High Court or by practice. In every case it would have to be decided on the facts and circumstances whether the petitioner is guilty of laches and that would have to be done without taking into account any specific period as a period of limitation. In every case it would have to be decided on the facts and circumstances whether the petitioner is guilty of laches and that would have to be done without taking into account any specific period as a period of limitation. There may be cases where even short delay may be fatal, while there may be cases where even a long delay may not be evidence of laches on the part of the petitioner.” As it is held in the above said judgment, the delay and laches has to be screened depending upon case to case. Even under Article 226 of the Constitution the delay of merely a few days may be fatal to the cases and an inordinate delay of decades together also may be cases for condonation. 9. The second ground taken by the Society with regard to maintainability is that the byelaws are the contract between the Members of the Society and are not open to challenge. No doubt, it is true that the members of the Society can amend the byelaws of the Society and can delete or bring in new amendments to the byelaws by holding a Special General Body meeting. The said objection is not applicable to the present case for the reason that amendment has been made to the byelaws of the third respondent Society on 30th March 1981 by conferring power on the governing council to decide the fate of the applications seeking membership depending upon the voting of two-third majority of members. The said amendment was made by the Special General Body Meeting on 30th March 1981 which itself is not an end and the same should be in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is useful to refer to Section 10(2) of the Act which reads thus: (1) xxxxxxxxx (2) Every amendment made under subsection (1) shall, within thirty days be filed with the Registrar. If the Registrar is satisfied that the amendment made under subsection (1) is in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and the rules made thereunder, he shall register it. Such amendment shall have effect from the date of resolution passed under subsection (1).” 10. If the Registrar is satisfied that the amendment made under subsection (1) is in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and the rules made thereunder, he shall register it. Such amendment shall have effect from the date of resolution passed under subsection (1).” 10. The said amendment to the byelaw could be brought by a Resolution passed in a Special General Body meeting, and for conducting such Meeting, written or printed notice shall have to be communicated to all the members of the society twenty-one days prior to the date of meeting. The provision itself has fixed the mandatory proceedings for the purpose of issuance of notice in writing or in a printed form and it is to be delivered by registered post twenty-one days prior to such Special General Body meeting and if the same is examined, in the proceedings made by the third respondent, I find that there is no discussion made in the proceedings as to whether twenty-one days’ prior notice has been given to all the members and what was the total number of members present in the meeting and the presence of “10. Change of name, rules and regulations proxy members for the said purpose. Proviso to Subsection (2) of Section 10 of the Act further provides that the resolution passed has to be forwarded within thirty days to the Registrar and the byelaws are to be accepted on satisfaction by the District Registrar of Societies. It also says that after the Registrar satisfying himself that the amendment made is in accordance with the provisions of the Act, then only he has to accord sanction to the amendment to be brought in to the byelaws. In the present case, the order of second respondent is examined and no reference is made in that regard and it is not clear as to whether he had applied his mind with regard to he satisfying in bringing amendment to the byelaws. The words employed in subsection (2) of Section 10 of the Act are to be understood in an objective manner. The Registrar has to verify and assign reasons in his order as to whether he had been satisfied with the formalities and requirements provided under subsection (1) of Section 10 of the Act and the same has been complied by the third respondent Society. The Registrar has to verify and assign reasons in his order as to whether he had been satisfied with the formalities and requirements provided under subsection (1) of Section 10 of the Act and the same has been complied by the third respondent Society. Resolution was passed on 30th March 1981 in principle, the approval has been accorded and are accepted under sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act on the very next day i.e. on 31st March 1981. It is not forthcoming as to whether the Registrar has applied his mind in that regard. The words employed therein raises doubt as to whether Registrar has exercised his power for the purpose of satisfaction under sub-section 2 of Section 10 of the Act or not? Since the District Registrar has not discharged his statutory duty and amendment to the byelaws have not been accepted and adopted as per the provisions of the Act, the same suffers and are ultra vires to the provisions of the Act. On this ground when it is examined, it is found that the exercise made by the second and third respondents is bad in law. The submission made on behalf of the Society to the effect that it is for the Society to amend its byelaws though is valid, but in the light of the discussion made above the same is not sustainable. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N. Balaji vs. Virendra Singh and Others, 2004 (8) SCC 312 at paragraph 12 of the judgment has held that “the exercise of the discretionary power can be interfered by the High Court only if the order passed is violative of some fundamental or basic principle of justice and fair play or suffers from any patent or flagrant error." The said judgment squarely applies to the case on hand. Hence, it is to be held that the action of the third respondent is in violation of Section 10(2) of the Act. 11. In the case of Gridco Limited and Another vs. Sadananda Doloi and Others, (2011) 15 SCC 16, it is held that “Interference is permissible where action of authority is mala fide, arbitrary, irrational, disproportionate or unreasonable or perverse or irrational or in such outrageous defiance of logic that person taking decision can be said to have taken leave of his senses.” 12. The next defence taken by the respondents is that the petitioners are strangers and do not have any locus standi. The respondents should not forget that it was only the strangers, who have formed the Society, with a staunch desire to develop an Education Society to impart higher education in professional courses in Hyderabad Karnataka region. The members, as on that day, felt that the region lacks facilities for higher education in professional courses in the backward districts, and it is at that time such strangers decided to form a Society. When the third respondent is also one such stranger, how can it raise such an objection when the other competent members make an application to get membership to the Society. The selfless action of the governing council members in 1958, has made the Society to reach to this height today, wherein it has got forty education institutions, of which thirty institutions are getting aid by Government of India and the Government of Karnataka. Apart from getting aid, the institutions are also getting concessions from the Government. Initially, land was given by the Government. Materials and funds were raised by the Government Officials of various departments as also Government of Mysore gave concessions and the Government of India waived levy of excise duty and baggage charges on one thousand tonnes of cement at Rs.20/per tonne. When such is the position of the respondent at the initial stage, now it is untenable to take that stand. Clause (4) in the original byelaw provides for membership to all the persons irrespective of caste, colour and creed and the attempt made by the elected members in the year 1981 to empower the governing council to decide the fate of the applicants to get membership by voting of two-third majority can be termed only as an ulterior motive. No doubt, making amendment to its byelaws is for the Society, but while so amending they should have looked back at the founders who laid foundation for the Society and on which foundation today this castle has come-up. Hence, the submissions of the learned counsel for the third respondent Society that the petitioners have no locus standi cannot be accepted and accordingly rejected. 13. The another objection raised by the Society is that byelaws cannot be challenged in a writ jurisdiction. Hence, the submissions of the learned counsel for the third respondent Society that the petitioners have no locus standi cannot be accepted and accordingly rejected. 13. The another objection raised by the Society is that byelaws cannot be challenged in a writ jurisdiction. This similar contention was discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Zee Telefilms vs. Union of India and Others, (2005) 4 SCC 649 wherein it has been discussed that though the societies are registered under Societies Registration Act, but its functions and control over the other limb is the deciding factor. In this regard, it is also useful to refer to judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of C. Lakshmiah Reddiar vs. Sri Perumbadur Taluk, AIR 1962 MAD 169 . The facts in the said case are that the appellant’s nomination was rejected on the ground that he had not brought to the Society the quantity of fifty maunds of paddy for sale through the Society when the society was a private society and the proceedings relating to the internal administration of such a society will fall outside the special jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The dismissal order of the learned single Judge was challenged in Writ Appeal. By its order dated 3rd May 1961, the order of dismissal was confirmed. While dismissing the writ appeal, the Division Bench referred some of the judgments, which I am borrowing, as they are academically relevant to the case on hand. In the said judgment at paragraph 3 of the judgment, it is observed that the objection raised by the Advocate General was that a writ could not issue under Article 226 of the Constitution to any body, which was not a judicial or quasi judicial Tribunal statutorily entrusted with the right and duty to decide the disputes between parties. (Rex vs. Electricity Commissioners, 1924 (1) KB 171). In R. vs. Disputed Commission of Dentai Tech, 1953 (1) AELR 327, Lord Goddard, Chief Justice, has observed that “the bodies to which in modern times the remedies of these prerogative writs have been applied are all statutory bodies on whom Parliament has conferred statutory powers and duties the exercise of which may lead to the detriment of subjects.” By referring to the said judgments, the Division Bench held that “the regulations are framed by the Society itself and have no statutory force. Clearly, thereon an order of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot issue to quash the proceedings of such a body.” 14. The judgments referred to above are of the year 1961 and much water has flown since then. Enormous interpretations and plethora of judgments of the High Courts and Hon'ble Supreme Court are available today. The question of the Society as to whether it is the case to be entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution or not, no more depends on it. The deciding factor is its activities and functions. In the instant case, the society was formed in the year 1958 to establish educational institutions for professional courses in Hyderabad Karnataka region. The petitioners have placed materials and from that it is found that the funding, to establish these education institutions, was contributed by the officials of Government Departments and general public. Even today, it is not clear from the third respondent as to whether the place where the institution is put up is a Government land or the land granted to it. When the Society was started, it was confined to three districts and now it is four districts, i.e. after the formation of a new District Yadgiri. Initially, there might have been only 23 institutions whereas today the society has grown up enormously and nearly forty Engineering and Medical institutions are established out of which thirty institutions are getting aid from the Government of India and the Government of Karnataka. The public function and the public obligation which ought to have been discharged by the Government or public authority for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, have been extended and now being carried out by the Society. When such being the case, making classification as to whether it is a State or an authority for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution, depends upon the nature of the Society and its capacity. When such being the case, making classification as to whether it is a State or an authority for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution, depends upon the nature of the Society and its capacity. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of G. Bassi Reddy vs. International Crops Research Institute and Another, (2003) 4 SCC 225 at paragraph 28 of the judgment has held that “A writ under Article 226 can lie against a person if it is a statutory body or performs a public function or discharges a public or statutory duty (Praga Tools Corporation V. C.A. Imanual, Sri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Trust V. V.R. Rudani SCC at p.698 and VST Industries Ltd. V. Workers’ Union). ICRISAT has not been set up by a statute nor are its activities statutorily controlled. Although, it is not easy to define what a public function or public duty is, it can reasonably be said that such functions are similar to or closely related to those performable by the State in its sovereign capacity.” 15. Discharging of function of the Society is a function performable by the State Government and also it is a public duty and public obligation carried out by the third respondent Society. Under the Constitution of India, it is the duty of the State to provide education and now it is the fundamental right to get education. These two things are conjointly performed by the third respondent Society. While performing these duties, it is also receiving aid from the public and also aid from Government apart from receiving some concessions. When a society is functioning at this height, how can it not be amenable to this Court to find out whether its functions are being carried out in accordance with law and/or in the larger public interest? While answering whether it is a State or not, one thing is definite. This Court can interfere with the functioning of the society and cannot shut its door. “If it is not part of the State, the aggrieved person has a remedy under the Constitution by invoking power under Article 226. A violator who is a private body exercising public function would not go scot free merely because it is not part of the State under Article 12.” (borrowed from page 6584 Vol.6 8th Edition Commentary on the Constitution of India by Durga Das Basu.) 16. A violator who is a private body exercising public function would not go scot free merely because it is not part of the State under Article 12.” (borrowed from page 6584 Vol.6 8th Edition Commentary on the Constitution of India by Durga Das Basu.) 16. In this regard, it is necessary to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Binny Ltd. and Another vs. V. Sadasivan and Others, (2005) 6 SCC 657 wherein at paragraph 11 of the judgment, it is observed thus: “11. Judicial review is designed to prevent the cases of abuse of power and neglect of duty by public authorities. However, under our Constitution, Article 226 is couched in such a way that a writ of mandamus could be issued even against a private authority. However, such private authority must be discharging a public function and that the decision sought to be corrected or enforced must be in discharge of a public function. The role of the State expanded enormously and attempts have been made to create various agencies to perform the governmental functions. Several corporations and companies have also been formed by the government to run industries and to carry on trading activities. These have come to be known as Public Sector Undertakings. However, in the interpretation given to Article 12 of the Constitution, this Court took the view that many of these companies and corporations could come within the sweep of Article 12 of the Constitution. At the same time, there are private bodies also which may be discharging public functions. It is difficult to draw a line between the public functions and private functions when it is being discharged by a purely private authority. A body is performing a "public function" when it seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section of the public and is accepted by the public or that section of the public as having authority to do so. Bodies therefore exercise public functions when they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs in the public interest. Bodies therefore exercise public functions when they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs in the public interest. In a book on Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Fifth Edn.) by de Smith, Woolf & Jowell in Chapter 3 para 0.24, it is stated thus: "A body is performing a "public function" when it seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section of the public and is accepted by the public or that section of the public as having authority to do so. Bodies therefore exercise public functions when they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs in the public interest. This may happen in a wide variety of ways. For instance, a body is performing a public function when it provides "public goods" or other collective services, such as health care, education and personal social services, from funds raised by taxation. A body may perform public functions in the form of adjudicatory services (such as those of the criminal and civil courts and tribunal system). They also do so if they regulate commercial and professional activities to ensure compliance with proper standards. For all these purposes, a range of legal and administrative techniques may be deployed, including: rulemaking, adjudication (and other forms of dispute resolution); inspection; and licensing. Public functions need not be the exclusive domain of the state. Charities, selfregulatory organizations and other nominally private institutions (such as universities, the Stock Exchange, Lloyd's of London, churches) may in reality also perform some types of public function. As Sir John Donaldson M.R. urged, it is important for the courts to "recognise the realities of executive power" and not allow "their vision to be clouded by the subtlety and sometimes complexity of the way in which it can be exerted". Nongovernmental bodies such as these are just as capable of abusing their powers as is government." 17. Article 226 of the Constitution of India vests extraordinary power to the Court. Exercising of discretionary power depends upon case to case and fact to fact. Whenever it is found that the activities in the public interest are required to be interfered with, and to exercise the said right in the interest of public at large, this Court can exercise its discretionary power. Exercising of discretionary power depends upon case to case and fact to fact. Whenever it is found that the activities in the public interest are required to be interfered with, and to exercise the said right in the interest of public at large, this Court can exercise its discretionary power. In the case of Air India Ltd. vs. Cochin International Airport Ltd. and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 617 wherein at paragraph 7 of the judgment, it is observed thus: “7. Even when some defect is found in the decision making process the court must exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The Court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should intervene.” 18. As it is held in the above said case, it is for this Court to decide whether it is appropriate to interfere or not. As long as this extraordinary discretionary power is available under the Constitution of India this court shall not shirk in discharging its duties. This does not mean that illegality is being committed by the third respondent Society. What is to be conveyed is that the respondent cannot take a ground that this Court should not interfere even if some lapses are found. It is true that lapses could be found in the governing council of the Society or in administration of any other institution. But, what is required is, whether the lapses so committed or said to have occurred, are substantial in nature which are required to put to halt in the best interest of the Society and public at large. In the light of the reasons stated above and in the light of the judgments referred, I reject the contention taken by the Society that byelaws could not be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 19. As discussed earlier, the third respondent gave an undertaking before this Court that it would issue a paper publication inviting applications for membership to the Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society within one week. 19. As discussed earlier, the third respondent gave an undertaking before this Court that it would issue a paper publication inviting applications for membership to the Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society within one week. When such undertaking is given to the Court and the same has been believed and writ petition No.19466 of 2010 came to be disposed of, then the third respondent should have taken extraordinary care and responsibility in issuing notification. From the petition it is seen that in the year 1958 a notification was issued inviting applications for membership in three districts by issuing pamphlets in local language as also in Marathi, Urdu and English languages. When such great thing was done by the founders, the third respondent should have posed a question for itself, as to why it cannot issue such a notification. No doubt, notification was issued on 8th January 2010 and it has not placed any material before this Court as to how many applicants are given membership pursuant to the said Notification. It must also have stated that whether the Notification has been issued in wide publication in local language and also in Marathi, Urdu and English languages, since the portion of the region is dominated by the border area of Maharashtra and Hyderabad. No materials have been placed before this Court in that regard. On receiving applications, the same were rejected by issuing an endorsement which is in a printed format just by writing the names and the date which is a stereotype rejection. The third respondent Society should have stated as to why these applications have been rejected and whether two-third majority voting is secured or not pursuant to the amended byelaw is not forthcoming. 20. In the light of foregoing reasons, order Annexure-B dated 31st March 1981 passed by the third respondent Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies and Registrar of Societies, Gulbarga in No.RS/HKE/8081 is quashed. Consequently, the byelaws of the third respondent Society amended by Resolution dated 31st March 1981 are also quashed. 20. In the light of foregoing reasons, order Annexure-B dated 31st March 1981 passed by the third respondent Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies and Registrar of Societies, Gulbarga in No.RS/HKE/8081 is quashed. Consequently, the byelaws of the third respondent Society amended by Resolution dated 31st March 1981 are also quashed. The Respondent – Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society, is directed to issue notification as per the order dated 5.10.2010 in WP No. 19466/20910 in Kannada, Urdu, Marathi and English languages calling for membership, giving wide publication specifying therein the format of the application which has to be displayed in all the educational institutions of the respondent society, office of the Deputy Commissioners, Assistant Commissioners and Tahsildars of the Hyderabad Karnataka Districts. On receipt of the applications, the same shall be considered in accordance with byelaws of the society. The Registrar of Cooperative Societies is directed to supervise the respondent Society as to issuance of a public notification calling applications for membership to the Society and consideration of the same. Election to the Executive Council of the society shall be held for the remaining 21 members. The official members such as, Divisional Commissioner (now Regional Commissioner) and Deputy Commissioners of Hyderabad Karnataka Districts, shall continue as per the byelaw. Petitions are disposed of accordingly.