JUDGMENT 1. (Oral) - Prakash Chand Meena s/o Ramdhan, alongwith his father, Ramdhan were tried for the offence under Section 304-B IPC by the court of Special Judge (Woman Attrocities Cases), Jaipur City. The trial court acquitted Ramdhan, father of the appellant, and held the appellant, Prakash Chand Meena guilty of offence under Section 304-B IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo three months' R.I. 2. Mr. Suresh Sahni, the learned counsel for the appellant, has restricted his prayer only qua quantum of sentence and in support of his contention, has relied upon the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sunil Dutt Sharma v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [ (2014) 4 SCC 375 ] . 3. It is to be noted that minimum sentence prescribed for the offence under Section 304-B IPC is seven years. The trial Judge in Para 32 of the judgment for awarding life imprisonment stated that the deceased was aged 20 years. She had not completed one and a half year of her marriage, and she had not died due to consumption of poison, or drowning or hanging, and it is not a case of suicide, but as per medical evidence, the cause of death of victim is strangulation and later, an effort was made by the accused to depict that she hanged herself. 4. The Learned counsel for the appellant has stated that in the case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra) also, wife of Sunil Dutt Sharma had died due to asphyxia resulting from strangulation and thus, the case of the present appellant cannot be distinguished from the case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra). 5. In the present case, the FIR was lodged on the basis of written complaint (Exhibit-P/11) submitted by Ramphool (P.W.7), brother of the deceased, Heera. In the written complaint, it was submitted that his sister, Heera was married with the present appellant sixteen months before the occurrence. At the time of marriage, they had given dowry according to their capacity. In the dowry, they had given silver ornaments, and bracelets of silver and ivory, silver neckless and golden earrings and other articles along with cash of Rs. 41,000/-. The details of jewellery and other articles was given in the FIR. At the time of marriage, they had given dowry according to their capacity. In the dowry, they had given silver ornaments, and bracelets of silver and ivory, silver neckless and golden earrings and other articles along with cash of Rs. 41,000/-. The details of jewellery and other articles was given in the FIR. It was stated that Panchi Devi, wife of Ramdhan, Ramdhan, father-in-law and husband of the deceased, Prakash Chand Meena used to taunt the deceased sister of the complainant on the account that her parents had not given motorcycle in dowry, and even the cash given in the dowry was not up to their expectations. The accused were not giving food to his deceased sister. She was starved; they were not even sending his sister to meet her family. They did not send the deceased on Rakhi festival to tie the rakhi on the complainant. It was further complained that the accused were demanding Rs. 50,000/- for setting up a factory for the husband. It was stated that the complainant had given Rs. 20,000/- to the accused so that marriage of his sister could survive. On 4.10.2004, at about 2:00 - 3:00 PM, the complainant had received an information that his sister had died. He had gone to the house of his sister's in-laws and found his sister hanging. 6. Panchu Ram (P.W.1), Kailash (P.W.2) and Damodar (P.W.3) have not supported the prosecution case, and have been declared hostile. 7. Bhola Ram (P.W.4) had attested the Panchayatnama (Exhibit-P/6). Chhitarmal (P.W.5) had attested the arrest memo of the accused, and the memo regarding recovery of various articles from the spot. Devendra Meena (P.W.6) had attested the memo (Exhibit-P/5), whereby plastic rope was taken into possession by the Investigating Agency. Ramphool Meena (P.W.7) reiterated as what was stated by him in the FIR. Akash (P.W.8) was posted as Sub-Divisonal Magistrate, Amer. In his presence, Panchayatnama (Exhibit-P/6) and inquest report were carried. Shravanlal (P.W.9) has not supported the prosecution case and was declared hostile. Ram Narayan (P.W.10) is uncle of the deceased, Heera. He stated that upon receiving information, he had gone to the house of the deceased, and there he learnt that after Heera was murdered, she was hanged to show that it as a case of suicide. However, this witness has not witnessed the occurrence. Ram Narayan (P.W.10) is uncle of the deceased, Heera. He stated that upon receiving information, he had gone to the house of the deceased, and there he learnt that after Heera was murdered, she was hanged to show that it as a case of suicide. However, this witness has not witnessed the occurrence. Ramjas (P.W.11) proved the arrest memo (Exhibit- P/7 and Exhibit-P/8), whereby Ramdhan and Prakash Chand Meena were arrested. Dr. R.C. Gupta (P.W.12), had conducted autopsy on 5.10.2004, on the dead body of the deceased. As per opinion of the Doctor, cause of death in the present case was asphyxia, due to strangulation. Mohan Lal (P.W.13) being Photographer, was called at the spot to take photographs. He had taken the photographs of the spot and stated that as per his opinion, the deceased had committed suicide. Mathura Devi (P.W.14) stated that Heera was her Nanand (sister-in-law). This witness is wife of the complainant Ramphool (P.W.7). She has deposed to the effect that the deceased was subjected to harassment and cruelty. Rameshwar (P.W.15) has also not supported the prosecution case, and was declared hostile. Panchi (P.W.16), mother of the deceased, had also deposed that her daughter was harassed by the accused. Rajendra Singh (P.W.17) stated that on 6.10.2004, he was posted as SHO, police station Amer. The complainant had presented the written complaint (Exhibit-P/11), on the basis of which the formal FIR (Exhibit-P/29) was registered. Surendra Tiwari (P.W.18), the Investigating Officer proved various facets of the investigation. 8. Thereafter, accused had examined two witnesses in defence. We need not notice the defence witnesses, as counsel for the appellant had not addressed arguments on merits. 9. Mr. Suresh Sahni, the learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that nobody had seen the appellant committing the offence. The co-accused of the appellant, his father, Ramdhan, who was also resident of the house, has already been acquitted by the trial court. 10. 9. Mr. Suresh Sahni, the learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that nobody had seen the appellant committing the offence. The co-accused of the appellant, his father, Ramdhan, who was also resident of the house, has already been acquitted by the trial court. 10. Be that as it may, since the death in the present case had occurred in unnatural circumstances within seven years of marriage of victim, i.e. wife of the appellant, in the matrimonial home, because soon before the death the husband and his relations had subjected the deceased to cruelty by raising demand of dowry, we are convinced that finding given by the learned Trial Court for convicting appellant Prakash Chand Meena for the offence under Section 304-B IPC calls for no interference. We affirm the conviction of the appellant Prakash Chand Meena for the offence under Section 304-B IPC. 11. Mr. Sahni, has further relied upon the judgment rendered by us in the case of Deen Mohammad @ Murli v. The State of Rajasthan [D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 13/2005] decided by us on 25.11.2014 , wherein while relying upon Sunil Dutt Sharma's case (supra), we have held as under:- "Having affirmed the conviction of the appellants, we have been called upon to answer whether sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the learned Trial Court, in the facts and circumstances, is adequate and justified? Counsel for the appellant had relied upon case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra) wherein Their Lordships referring to case law, had culled out the principles which till now had been applied for awarding death as sentence and thereafter had observed that application of same principles while determining sentence in the case of dowry death also make better sense. In a very erudite judgment by culling out the principles laid in Jagmohan Singh v. The State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20 , and Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 , it was held that since sentencing is an onerous exercise to be undertaken by the court, court should take note of aggravating and in mitigating circumstances. Their lordships in case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra) had also taken note of principles laid in a recent pronouncement by Hon'ble Apex Court in Sangeet and Another v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 . Their lordships in case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra) had also taken note of principles laid in a recent pronouncement by Hon'ble Apex Court in Sangeet and Another v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 . It was held that evolution of principles of sentencing policy are to be distinguished from judge centric to fair amount of certainty. It will be appropriate for us to extensively quote from the judgment rendered by Apex Court in Sunil Dutt Sharma's case (supra):- "10. Are we to understand that the quest and search for a sound jurisprudential basis for imposing a particular sentence on an offender is destined to remain elusive and the sentencing parameters in this country are bound to remain judge centric? The issue though predominantly dealt with in the context of cases involving the death penalty has tremendous significance to the Criminal Jurisprudence of the country inasmuch as in addition to the numerous offences under various special laws in force, hundreds of offences are enumerated in the Penal Code, punishment for which could extend from a single day to 10 years or even for life, a situation made possible by the use of the seemingly same expressions in different provisions of the Penal Code as noticed in the opening part of this order. 11. As noticed, the "net value" of the huge number of in depth exercises performed since Jagmohan Singh (supra) has been effectively and systematically culled out in Sangeet and Sankar Kisanrao Khade (supra). The identified principles could provide a sound objective basis for sentencing thereby minimising individualized and judge centric perspectives. Such principles bear a fair amount of affinity to the principles applied in foreign jurisdictions, a resume of which is available in the decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Prem Sagar and Others, (2008) 7 SCC 550 . The difference is not in the identity of the principles; it lies in the realm of application thereof to individual situations. While in India application of the principles is left to the judge hearing the case, in certain foreign jurisdictions such principles are formulated under the authority of the statute and are applied on principles of categorisation of offences which approach, however, has been found by the Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh (supra) to be inappropriate to our system. While in India application of the principles is left to the judge hearing the case, in certain foreign jurisdictions such principles are formulated under the authority of the statute and are applied on principles of categorisation of offences which approach, however, has been found by the Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh (supra) to be inappropriate to our system. The principles being clearly evolved and securely entrenched, perhaps, the answer lies in consistency in approach. 12. To revert to the main stream of the case, we see no reason as to why the principles of sentencing evolved by this Court over the years through largely in the context of the death penalty will not be applicable to all lesser sentences so long as the sentencing judge is vested with the discretion to award a lesser or a higher sentence resembling the swing of the pendulum from the minimum to the maximum. In fact, we are reminded of the age old infallible logic that what is good to one situation would hold to be equally good to another like situation. Beside paragraph 163 (underlined portion) of Bachan Singh (supra), reproduced earlier, bears testimony to the above fact. 13. Would the above principles apply to sentencing of an accused found guilty of the offence under Section 304-B inasmuch as the said offence is held to be proved against the accused on basis of a legal presumption? This is the next question that has to be dealt with. So long there is credible evidence of cruelty occasioned by demand(s) for dowry, any unnatural death of a woman within seven years of her marriage makes the husband or a relative of the husband of such woman liable for the offence of "dowry death" under Section 304-B though there may not be any direct involvement of the husband or such relative with the death in question. In a situation where commission of an offence is held to be proved by means of a legal presumption the circumstances surrounding the crime to determine the presence of aggravating circumstances (crime test) may not be readily forthcoming unlike a case where there is evidence of overt criminal acts establishing the direct involvement of the accused with the crime to enable the Court to come to specific conclusions with regard to the barbarous or depraved nature of the crime committed. The necessity to combat the menace of demand for dowry or to prevent atrocities on women and like social evils as well as the necessity to maintain the purity of social conscience cannot be determinative of the quantum of sentence inasmuch as the said parameters would be common to all offences under Section 304-B of the Penal Code. The above, therefore, cannot be elevated to the status of acceptable jurisprudential principles to act as a rational basis for awarding varying degrees of punishment on a case to case basis. The search for principles to satisfy the crime test in an offence under Section 304-B of the Penal Code must, therefore, lie elsewhere. Perhaps, the time spent between marriage and the death of the woman; the attitude and conduct of the accused towards the victim before her death; the extent to which the demand for dowry was persisted with and the manner and circumstances of commission of the cruelty would be a surer basis for determination of the crime test. Coupled with the above, the fact whether the accused was also charged with the offence under Section 302 of the Penal Code and the basis of his acquittal of the said charge would be another very relevant circumstance. As against this the extenuating/mitigating circumstances which would determine the "criminal test" must be allowed to have a full play. The aforesaid two sets of circumstances being mutually irreconcilable cannot be arranged in the form of a balance sheet as observed in Sangeet (supra) but it is the cumulative effect of the two sets of different circumstances that has to be kept in mind while rendering the sentencing decision. This, according to us, would be the correct approach while dealing with the question of sentence so far as the offence under Section 304- B of the Penal Code is concerned." 12. We may also notice that in the case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra), while reducing the sentence, it was noted that wife of Sunil Dutt Sharma died due to asphyxia, resulting from strangulation. 13. Furthermore, in Hari Om's (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court considering question of sentence for offence under Section 304-B IPC, took note of case law on this question, and after considering various judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court, held as under:- "22. 13. Furthermore, in Hari Om's (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court considering question of sentence for offence under Section 304-B IPC, took note of case law on this question, and after considering various judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court, held as under:- "22. In the case of Hem Chand v. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 727 , the courts below had awarded life term to the accused under Section 304-B read with Section 498-A but this Court reduced it to 10 years. This was also a case where the accused was a police officer who had suffered life imprisonment. This Court held as under: "7........ the accused-appellant was a police employee and instead of checking the crime, he himself indulged therein and precipitated in it and that bride-killing cases are on the increase and therefore a serious view has to be taken. As mentioned above, Section 304-B IPC only raises presumption and lays down that minimum sentence should be seven years but it may extend to imprisonment for life. Therefore awarding extreme punishment of imprisonment for life should be in rare cases and not in every case. 8. Hence, we are of the view that a sentence of 10 years' RI would meet the ends of justice. We, accordingly while confirming the conviction of the appellant under Section 304-B IPC, reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life to 10 years' RI. ..." 23. xxx xxx xxx xxx 24. xxx xxx xxx xxx 25. Applying the principle of law laid down in the aforementioned cases and having regard to the totality of facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the considered opinion that the ends of justice would meet, if we reduce the sentence of the appellant from life imprisonment to that of 10 years. In our view, this case does not fall in the category of a "rare case" as envisaged by this Court so as to award to the appellant the life imprisonment. That apart, we also notice that while awarding life imprisonment, the courts below did not assign any reasons." 14. In our view, this case does not fall in the category of a "rare case" as envisaged by this Court so as to award to the appellant the life imprisonment. That apart, we also notice that while awarding life imprisonment, the courts below did not assign any reasons." 14. Having noted the principles of law governing sentencing, Their Lordships held that since in the case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (supra) death was due to strangulation and two injuries were present being laceration on the forehead, and scalp, it was appropriate to award sentence of ten years to the appellant in that case under Section 304-B of the IPC as same shall serve ends of justice. 15. We have also noticed that in the present case, occurrence had taken place on 6.10.2004 and the appellant has already served pain and agony of protracted trial and is in the corridors of the court for more than a decade. 16. Borrowing the dictum of law laid in Sunil Dutt Sharma's case (supra) and Hari Om's case (supra), while upholding conviction of the appellant Prakash Chand Meena, under Section 304-B IPC, we set aside sentence of life imprisonment awarded upon him, and reduce the same to ten years' R.I. However, we maintain the sentence of fine and the default clause. 17. In view of modification in the sentence, the present appeal stands disposed of. *******