JUDGMENT : CAV 893/2015 Since Counsel as above appears for the respondents/caveators, the caveat stands discharged. W.P. (C) 8125/2015 1. The challenge in this writ petition is to the order of the Delhi School Tribunal (‘Tribunal’ in short) dated May 19, 2015 in Appeal No. 70/2010, whereby the Tribunal has allowed the appeal filed by the respondents herein and had set aside their termination and directing their reinstatement with all consequential benefits. With regard to back wages, the Tribunal directed the respondents to make a representation to the petitioner in terms of Rule 121 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 within four weeks, as to how and in what manner they would be entitled to the back wages. 2. It is the submission of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the respondents having been appointed in the year 2009 for a period of 10 months their appointment has expired by efflux of time and the termination could not have been held illegal. That apart it is her submission that their appointment having not been done through the procedure contemplated and being illegal, no right had accrued in their favour seeking regularization, more particularly keeping in view the settled law in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. v. Uma Devi & Ors., III (2006) SLT 539 = 2006 (4) SCC 1 , and this Court in Keshav Dutt & Ors. v. Delhi Tourism & Transport Development Corporation Ltd. & Anr., 220 (2015) DLT 5 (CN)=2015 (150) DRJ 406. It is also her submission that the conclusion of the Tribunal that the respondents are deemed to be confirmed employees after three years of their initial employment is not tenable as there is no concept of deemed confirmation under the Delhi School Education Act and the Rules made thereunder, so also in terms of the law laid down by this Court. 3. Insofar as the submission of Ms. 3. Insofar as the submission of Ms. Jyoti Singh, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the appointment having expired by efflux of time the termination could not have been held illegal is concerned, the same is liable to be rejected in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Management Committee of Montfort Senior Secondary School v. Shri Vijay Kumar & Ors., VI (2005) SLT 674 = III (2005) CLT 312 (SC)= (2005) 7 SCC 472 , wherein in para No. 10 the Supreme Court has held as under: “In St. Xaviers’ case (supra) the following observation was made, which was noted in Frank Anthony's case (supra)— ‘A regulation which is designed to prevent maladministration of an educational institution cannot be said to offend Clause (1) of Article 30. At the same time it has to be ensured that under the power of making regulation nothing is done as would detract from the character of the institution as a minority educational institution or which would impinge upon the rights of the minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The right conferred by Article 30(1) is intended to be real and effective and not a mere pious and abstract sentiment; it is a promise of reality and not a teasing illusion. Such a right cannot be allowed to be whittled down by any measure masquerading as a regulation. As observed by this Court in the case of Rev. Sidhajbjai Sabhai (supra), regulations which may lawfully be imposed either by legislative or executive action as a condition of receiving grant or of recognition must be directed to making the institution while retaining its character as minority institution as an educational institution. Such regulation must satisfy a dual test the test of reasonableness, and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution and is conclusive to making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority or other persons who resort to it.’ The effect of the decision in Frank Anthony's case (supra) is that the statutory rights and privileges of Chapter IV have been extended to the employees covered by Chapter V and, therefore, the contractual rights have to be judged in the background of statutory rights. In view of what has been stated in Frank Anthony's case (supra) the very nature of employment has undergone a transformation and services of the employees in minorities unaided schools governed under Chapter V are no longer contractual in nature but they are statutory. The qualifications, leaves, salaries, age of retirement, pension, dismissal, removal, reduction in rank, suspension and other conditions of service are to be governed exclusively under the statutory regime provided in Chapter IV. The Tribunal constituted under Section 11 is the forum provided for enforcing some of these rights. In Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay & Ors., ( 1976 (1) SCC 496 ), it has been observed that if a statute confers a right and in the same breath provides for a remedy for enforcement of such right, the remedy provided by the statute is an exclusive one. If an employee seeks to enforce rights and obligations created under Chapter IV, a remedy is available to him to get an adjudication in the manner provided in Chapter IV by the prescribed forum i.e. the Tribunal. That being so, the Tribunal cannot and in fact has no power and jurisdiction to hear the appeal on merits and only way is to ask the parties to go for arbitration.” 4. In view of the above, it is clear that the very nature of employment of the employees of the School in Delhi governed by the Delhi School Education Act and the Rules are not contractual but statutory inasmuch as the issue related to qualifications, leaves, salary, age of retirement, pension, dismissal, removal, reduction in rank, suspension and other conditions of service are to be exclusively governed under the statutory regime provided in Chapter IV. Once the appointment is regulated by the statutory rules, the same has to be necessarily followed and that is the basis for the Tribunal to set aside the order of termination of the respondents when in para No. 45 the Tribunal holds as under: “45. Once the appointment is regulated by the statutory rules, the same has to be necessarily followed and that is the basis for the Tribunal to set aside the order of termination of the respondents when in para No. 45 the Tribunal holds as under: “45. Moreover all these authorities are up to the year 2007 i.e. prior to the law laid down by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Hamdard Public School (supra), Management Committee of Montfort Senior Secondary School v. Vijay Kumar and Others (supra), Army Public School v. Narender Singh Nain (supra), Mamta Chaturvedi (supra) and Satyachakrovarti (supra) which pertain to the year 2013 to 2015, thus decided recently considering the various previous authorities.” 5. Insofar as her submission that no right has accrued in favour of the respondents to seek regularization keeping in view the judgment of the Supreme Court in Uma Devi's case (supra) and Keshav Dutt's case (supra) is concerned, suffice to state the Tribunal has not given any such direction, rather it was the conclusion of the Tribunal that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Uma Devi's case (supra) has no applicability. 6. Insofar as her submission that there is no concept of deemed confirmation is concerned, the said finding of the Tribunal has not been challenged in the writ petition inasmuch as no plea has been taken in that regard. That apart, the same has to be seen from the perspective that the Tribunal on the basis of the reply submitted by the Directorate of Education, wherein the Directorate of Education has stated that the following are the initial dates of appointment of the respondents, held that the respondents nave put in 5 to 10 years of service with which this Court concurs. “Name Date of Appointment Smt. Chandra Rani, TGT (S. Skt) 1.8.2000 Smt. Aruna Sharma, Asstt. Teacher 2.8.1999 Mr. Phiroz Khan, TGT (Eng) 1.9.2001 Mr. Aruna Kumar Sharma, TGT (Maths) 2.9.2004 Smt. Kumud Sharma, Asstt. “Name Date of Appointment Smt. Chandra Rani, TGT (S. Skt) 1.8.2000 Smt. Aruna Sharma, Asstt. Teacher 2.8.1999 Mr. Phiroz Khan, TGT (Eng) 1.9.2001 Mr. Aruna Kumar Sharma, TGT (Maths) 2.9.2004 Smt. Kumud Sharma, Asstt. Teacher 17.8.2005” No doubt, there is no concept of deemed confirmation under the Act and the Rules and also as held by this Court in the case of Deputy Director of Education v. Veena Sharma, 175 (2010) DLT 311 (DB), but at the same time the period of 5-10 years service put in by the respondents can't be overlooked which is in any case more than three years, the period considered as appropriate by the Tribunal for confirmation, and also on a finding that there are no adverse remarks against the respondents. 7. In view of the above, I do not see any merit in the writ petition. The same is dismissed. CM No. 16892/2015 In view of the order passed in the writ petition, the present application is dismissed as infructuous. Writ Petition dismissed.