JUDGMENT Ashok Bhushan, C.J. 1. These writ appeals have been Filed against the common judgment dated 15.1.2009 raising similar questions of law and fact, hence, are being decided by this common judgment. 2. Appellants were respondents in the writ petitions. Aggrieved by the judgment of learned Single Judge allowing the original petitions, these appeals were filed. Parties can be referred to as they are arrayed in the original petitions. Brief facts giving rise to these o appeals are as follows: W.A. No.2430/2009 3. This writ appeal arises out of O.P No.33852 of 2001 filed by the petitioner. Petitioner was enrolled in army on 31.3.1963. With effect from 31.3.1978, he was discharged. Petitioner being in lower medical category, has appeared before the Release Medical Board and his disability was assessed as 30% for two years. Petitioner was granted disability pension w.e.f 1.4.1978. Petitioner was examined before the Re-survey Medical Board from time to time and granted continuation of disability pension till 8th September, 1998. Petitioner was again assessed by Re-survey Medical Board. By Medical Adviser (Pension), petitioner was reassessed and his disability was found less than 20% which was communicated vide order dated 27.8.1998. In March, 2000 petitioner was not paid disability pension. He enquired into the matter and found that his disability pension has been stopped. A representation dated 15.4.2000 was sent o to second respondent with copies to respondents 3 and 4 praying that his disability pension be restored. Letter dated 29.4.2000 was sent by third respondent informing the petitioner that in Re-survey Medical Board held on 16.4.1998, his disability element has been discontinued, being assessed at less than 20% w.e.f 9th September, 1998 to 15th April, 2003. Letter dated 27.5.2003 was also sent by third respondent informing the aforesaid fact. Copy of letter dated 24.9.1998 informing that if the petitioner desires to file an appeal, he may prefer the same to the Chief CDA(P), Allahabad. Copy of which is produced as Ext.P4 to the CP. It was further communicated that Re-survey Medical Board shall be arranged during the month of July 2002. On the recommendation of Vth Central Pay Commission, Government of India issued order dated 7.2.2001 on modalities for implementation of the recommendation of Vth Central Pay Commission contained in paragraphs 160.10 and 160.22 regarding the findings of the Medical Board - an adjudication of cases of disability pension. On the recommendation of Vth Central Pay Commission, Government of India issued order dated 7.2.2001 on modalities for implementation of the recommendation of Vth Central Pay Commission contained in paragraphs 160.10 and 160.22 regarding the findings of the Medical Board - an adjudication of cases of disability pension. The petitioner was again assessed by Re-survey Board and by order dated 12.2.2002 his disability was assessed as 30%. The petitioner was granted disability pension w.e.f 16.4.2003 for life. The petitioner in the CP prayed for following reliefs: "i. call for the records leading to Exhibits-P3 and P4 and issue a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing Exhibits-P3 and P4. ii. issue a writ in the nature of mandamus order or direction directing the 2nd respondent to issue a copy of letter No.03/RA6/98/8447/IV dated 27.8.1998 to the petitioner; iii. issue a writ of mandamus order or direction directing the respondents to consider the appeal to be filed by the petitioner against the order dated 27-8-1998 on merits; iv. declare that Exhibit-P5 so far as it refuses to grant the benefit of onetime assessment of disability to the pre 1-1-19%/disability pensions as un- constitutional, void and inoperative and direct the respondents to grant to the petitioner ail consequential benefits;" W.ANo.1584/2009 4. This writ appeal arises out of O.P No.2300 of 2003. Petitioner was enrolled in the army on 27.2.1963 and discharged from military service on 28.2.1983. At the time of discharge, his disability was assessed as 20% attributable to -the military service. Hence, petitioner was receiving disability pension. As per existing rules, petitioner was directed to undergo examination before the Re-survey Medical Board and he continued to receive disability pension till 14.5.1996. During April, 1996, petitioner's disability was reassessed at less than 20%, which fact was communicated by letter dated 13.8.1996 to the petitioner. Though the petitioner preferred an appeal to the PCPDA(P), the appeal was rejected by letter dated 7th September, 1998. The Central Government, in the meantime, on the recommendation of Vth Central Pay Commission had issued order dated 17.2.2001 providing that cases which have become final prior to the issue of letter shall not be re-opened. Though the petitioner preferred an appeal to the PCPDA(P), the appeal was rejected by letter dated 7th September, 1998. The Central Government, in the meantime, on the recommendation of Vth Central Pay Commission had issued order dated 17.2.2001 providing that cases which have become final prior to the issue of letter shall not be re-opened. Petitioner in the O.P prayed for following reliefs: "(I) Declare that Ext.P2 so far as it refuses to grant the benefit of one time assessment of disability to the pre 1-1-1996 disability pensioners as unconstitutional, void and inoperative; and (II) Direct the respondents to grant to the petitioner disability pension from the dates on which the same was stopped;" W.A.No.l587/2009 5. This writ appeal arises out of O.P No. 13916 of 2002. The petitioner was discharged from military service on 1-6.12.1977. At the time of discharge, petitioner's disability was assessed as 50% and he was sanctioned disability pension. As per the existing rules, petitioner was examined by Re-survey Medical Board from time to time. Petitioner appeared before the Re-survey Medical Board in July, 1996. By Ext.P3, petitioner was communicated that he is sanctioned Rs.90/- as disability element per month for 10 years w.e.f 30.7.1996. Petitioner sent letter dated 10.3.1997 praying for correcting the mistake in sanctioning only Rs.90/-. Petitioner claims that subsequently he was communicated by letter dated 2.4.2002 that in the Re-survey Medical Board held on 18.7.1996, his disability was accepted at 20%. In the meantime, the Central Government has issued order dated 17.2.2001 on the basis of Vth Central Pay Commission's recommendations. The petitioner in the O.P has grayed for the following reliefs: "(i) issue a writ in the nature of mandamus order or direction directing the respondents to continue to treat the disability of the petitioner as 50% even after the RSMB held on 18-7-19% and grant all consequential benefits; (ii) declare that Ext.P6 so far as it refuses to grant the benefit of one time assessment of disability to the-pre 1-1-96 disability pensioners as unconstitutional, void and inoperative and direct the respondents to grant to the petitioner all consequential benefits." 6. The learned Single Judge by common judgment dated 15.1.2009 held that the cut off date provided in the order of the Central Government dated 7.2.2001 is arbitrary and discriminatory. The learned Single Judge by common judgment dated 15.1.2009 held that the cut off date provided in the order of the Central Government dated 7.2.2001 is arbitrary and discriminatory. It was held that treating the retirees who retired prior to 1.1.1996 and o those who retired after 1.1.1996, differentiaiity is discriminatory and hit by law laid down by the Apex Court in O.S.Nafcara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 . The original petitions were allowed. The learned Single Judge held that the disability assessed prior to 1.1.1996 with regard to petitioners would be final and they shall be eiigible for disability element of pension without any reduction and also entitled for arrears. The Union of India aggrieved by the judgment have come up in appeals. 7. Sri.S.Krishnamoorthy, learned counsel appearing for the appellants contend that the learned Single Judge committed error in holding that the cut off date 1.1.1996 as provided in the circular dated 7.2.2001 is arbitrary and discriminatory. It is submitted that circular dated 7.2.2001 was issued on the recommendations of Vth Central Pay Commission for the purpose of application of Liberalised Pension Scheme in the matter of assessment of disability. The recommendations of Vth Central Pay Commission have the impact only from 1.1.1996. The circular dated 7.2.2001 recommended for o the procedure for assessing the disability of service personal which provide that there need only be one or two Medical Board for assessing the disability for those military personnel serving in the department. 8. The order dated 7.2.200.1 suggests an intelligibie differentia in the procedure for medical examination to assess the -disability, curtailing the same in one or two medical examinations which is beneficial for the ex-service men. The procedure which was contemplated for those who were in service on or after 1.1.1996 cannot be equated with those personnel who have undergone several medical examinations prior to 1.1.1996. It is submitted that the circular did not provide for differential disability pension for ex- service men who retired prior to 1.1.1996 or subsequent to 1.1.1996., Rather the circular confined only to the holding of Medical Board for assessing the disability. 9. The learned Single Judge committed error in applying the D judgment of DS.Nakara's case (cited supra) which had no application in the facts of the present case. 9. The learned Single Judge committed error in applying the D judgment of DS.Nakara's case (cited supra) which had no application in the facts of the present case. The procedure prescribed by the circular dated 7.2.2001 regarding the Re-survey Medical Board had intelligible differentia and nexus with the object sought to be achieved. An error was committed by #ie learned Single Judge in striking the cut off date fixed in paragraph (10) of the order dated 7.2.2001. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner refuting the submission of learned counsel for the appellants contended that there was no rational in making results of the Medical Board for ex-service men held prior to issue of circular dated 7.2.2001 as final whereas giving opportunity of appearing before the Medical Board to those who retired on or after 1.1.1996. For those who retired prior to 1.1.1996, there cannot be any discrimination on the basis of date of retirement since those who retired after 1.1.1996 were given opportunity to appear before the Medical Board for assessing their o disability. It is submitted that the judgment of the learned Single Judge did not suffer from any error of law. The Apex Court in D.S.Nakara's case (cited supra) has held that there cannot be any discrimination between the pensionary benefits of the retirees on the basis of date of retirement. The retirees -prior to 1.1.1996 and those who retired after 1.1.1996 forms a homogeneous class and there cannot be any discrimination regarding the payment of pension between the two. 11. Learned counsel for both the parties have relied on various judgments of the Apex Court which shall be referred to while considering the submissions in detail. 12. The issue which arises in these writ appeals is as to (i) whether the cut off date 1.1.1996 fixed in paragraph (10) of the circular dated 7.2.2001 with regard to assessment of disability by Medical Board is discriminatory and arbitrary, and as to (ii) whether the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in D.S.Nakara's case (cited supra) is applicable in the facts of the present cases. 13. The sanction of the disability pension to an army personnel is granted on the basis of assessment of disability. As per the procedure prevalent prior to the recommendation of Vth Central Pay Commission, the percentage of disability of ex-service men was periodically considered by the Re-survey Medical Board. 13. The sanction of the disability pension to an army personnel is granted on the basis of assessment of disability. As per the procedure prevalent prior to the recommendation of Vth Central Pay Commission, the percentage of disability of ex-service men was periodically considered by the Re-survey Medical Board. Petitioners before us were discharged on 13.3.1978, 28.2.1983 and on 16.12.1977 respectively. At the time of discharge, the disability of all the petitioners was more than 20% enabling them to receive pension as well as element of disability. In the Re-survey Medical Board held in 1998, disability of the petitioner in O.P No.33852 of 2001 was assessed as less than 20%. Similarly the disability of the petitioner in O.P No.2300 of 2003 was assessed by Re-survey Medical Board held in the year 1996 as less than 20%. The disability of the petitioner in O.P No. 13916 of 2002 was also assessed by the Re-survey Medical Board held on 18.7.1996 as 20% and his disability pension was reduced to ?90/-. The disability of the petitioner in O.P No.33852 of 2001 subsequently on the basis of Re-survey Medical Board held in 2002 was assessed as 30% and his disability pension has been continued. 14. Before the Vth Central Pay Commission, there was a demand from ex-service men that those who have been discharged on account of medical disability be not subjected to periodical medical boards. The Vth Central Pay Commission considered the said demand in its report. Paragraph 164.10 made the following recommendations: "164.10. The armed forces have also represented that the existing system of reassessment of the disability after specific periods of time leads to considerable Delays, thereby causing unnecessary hardships to the disabled pensioner. They have suggested that disability as stated in the Release Medical Board should be treated as final unless the individual request for a review. We have considered this aspect and agree that the existing system is prone to delays and since the personal has been boarded out on the basis of the disability constant compensation is justified. We have already suggested rationalization of the existing system of percentage of disability and in our opinion the scope for change in the degree of disability would be minimized. We have already suggested rationalization of the existing system of percentage of disability and in our opinion the scope for change in the degree of disability would be minimized. We have also suggested that for disability capable for improvement, provision to retain personnel should be made, considering all these, we agree with the proposal that the disability once assessed may be treated as final unless the individual himself requests for a review." 15. The report of the Vth Central Pay Commission was accepted by the Central Government and order dated 7.2.2001 was issued. Paragraphs (7) and (10) of the order which are relevant for the present cases are as follows: 7. Re-assessment of Disability: There will be no periodical reviews by the Resurvey Medical Boards for re-assessment of disabilities. In cases of disabilities adjudicated as being of a permanent nature, the decisions once arrived at will be final and for life unless the individual himself requests for a review. In cases of disabilities which are not of a permanent nature, there will be only one review of the percentage by a Reassessment Medical Board, to be carried out later, within a specified time frame. The percentage of disability assessed/recommended by the Reassessment Medical Board will be final and for life unless the individual himself ask for a review,. The review will be carried out by the Review Medical Board constituted by DCAFMS. The percentage of disability assessed by the Review Medical Board will be final. 10. The provision contained in this letter will be applicable to service personnel who were in service on or after Jan 96. the cases which have been finalised prior to issue of this letter will not be re-opened? As regards the Reassessment Medical Board held on or after the date of issue of this letter will be considered as final and for review will be carried out by Review Medical Board onstituted by DCAFMS. The percentage of disability assessed by the Review Medical Board will be final." 16. From the recommendation in paragraph 164.10, it is clear that the service personnels have represented that the existing system of reassessment of the disability after specific periods of time leads to considerable delay, hence it was stated that Release Medical Board should be treated as final unless the individual request for a review. From the recommendation in paragraph 164.10, it is clear that the service personnels have represented that the existing system of reassessment of the disability after specific periods of time leads to considerable delay, hence it was stated that Release Medical Board should be treated as final unless the individual request for a review. On the basis of the said recommendation, government of India issued the above said order where paragraph (7) deals with re-assessment of disability. Paragraph (7) of the order provides that: a) There will be no periodical reviews by the Re-survey Medical Boards for re-assessment of disabilities. b)in case of disabilities adjudicated as being of a permanent nature, the decisions once arrived at will be final and for life unless the individual himself requests for a review, c) In cases of disabilities which are not of a permanent nature, there will be only one review of the percentage by a Reassessment Medical Board, to be carried out later, within specified time frame. The percentage of disability assessed/recommended by the Reassessment Medical Board will be final and for life unless the individual himself ask for a review. 17. The aforesaid recommendations in paragraph (7) were to be implemented in the manner as contemplated in paragraph (10). Paragraph (10) contemplates that provision in the letter will be applicable to service personnel who were in service on or before January, 1996. It further state that the cases which have been finalised prior to the issue of this letter will not be re-opened and the Reassessment Medical Board held on or after the date of issue of the letter dated 7.2.2001 will be considered as final. 18. On a perusal of the aforesaid recommendation of the V"1 Central Pay Commission and paragraphs (7) and (10) of the circular 3 dated 7.2.2001, it is clear that the said provision was not with regard to any slab or amount of payment of disability pension to which an ex-service man is entitled to. The procedure only confined to Reassessment Medical Board. The periodical Re-survey Medical Board was done away with giving finality to the assessment regarding permanent disability and for disability which is not permanent in nature, only one review by Reassessment Medical Board was provided for. The procedure only confined to Reassessment Medical Board. The periodical Re-survey Medical Board was done away with giving finality to the assessment regarding permanent disability and for disability which is not permanent in nature, only one review by Reassessment Medical Board was provided for. Obviously the procedure which was to be implemented in view of the order dated 7.2.2001 could have applied to the service personnels with regard to whom, the Medical Boards were to be held after the issue of the order. The modified procedure was enforced taking the date 1.1.1996, which was the date for implementation of Vth Central Pay Commission, as applicability of the modified procedure. To those who were in service w.e.f 1.1.1996, it provided that with regard to the percentage of disability only one review Medical Board shall be held and permanent disability as adjudicated shall be treated for life and the decision of the Medical Board shall also be treated for life. 19. The challenge raised by the petitioners in the original petitions was that the decision of the Medical Board held prior to 1.1.1996 should have also been given finality and the Reassessment Medical Board held after 1.1.1996 with regard to retirees prior to 1.1.1996 should not be relied. As noted above, all the petitioners were assessed by the Re-survey Medical Board after 1.1.1996 and their disability was found 20% or less than 20%. The first petitioner has been assessed less than 20%. With regard to the third petitioner, the disability was reduced, it being found only 20%. 20. The Government of India by accepting the demands of the service personnel and modifying the procedure for reassessment by Medical Board confining to only one Medical Board for assessing percentage of disability, could not have annulled the recommendations made by the Medical Boards prior to the issuance of circular dated 7.2.2001. The cases which Re-survey Medical Board have finalised prior to the issue of the circular were given finality to fulfill the objective of the recommendation made in paragraph 164.10 of the Vth Central Pay Commission. Present case is not a case of fixation of any different amount of pension for retirees prior to 1.1.1996 or retirees subsequent to 1.1.1996. The order dated 7.2.2001 only provide for assessment of disability by Reassessment Medical Board and give finality to earlier Re-survey Medical Boards held prior to the issuance of the circular. Present case is not a case of fixation of any different amount of pension for retirees prior to 1.1.1996 or retirees subsequent to 1.1.1996. The order dated 7.2.2001 only provide for assessment of disability by Reassessment Medical Board and give finality to earlier Re-survey Medical Boards held prior to the issuance of the circular. The date 1.1.1996 was the date for enforcement of Vth Central Pay Commission, hence it cannot be said that the date was taken out of hat. 21. There cannot be same criteria for ex-service men who had already subjected to Reassessment Medical Board prior to the issue of Government order dated 7.2.2001 and those who retired after 1.1.1996 and were given one opportunity to have one review board which was in line of the earlier procedure under which periodical reviews were made for assessing the percentage of disability. 22. Now we come to the judgment of the Apex Court in P.S.Nakara and others v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 . The judgment is the sheet anchor of the petitioners. In the above case, Government of India, Ministry of Finance issued an O.M dated 25th May, 1979 whereby the formula for computation of pension was liberalised. But, it was made applicable to Government servants, who were in service on 31.3.1979 and retired from service on or after that date. The computation of pension for the retirees after 31.3.1979 was based on more liberal formula under which average emoluments were determined with reference to last 10 months' salary instead of 36 months' salary provided earlier. The new formula for computation will have a high average coupled with raising a ceiling limit for pension. The new formula for computation of pension was beneficial to those who retired after 31.3.1979. But since the said computation formula was not applied to those who retired before 31.3.1979. the challenge was on the ground that it is arbitrary and violative of Article 14. it was contended that retirees priorto 31.3.1979 and those those who retired after 31.3.1979 forms a homogeneous class and there cannot be any difference in payment of pension by applying any changed formula. It was contended that the formula for computation of pension has to be liberalised, the benefit ought to have also been extended to those who retired prior to 31.1.1979. It was contended that the formula for computation of pension has to be liberalised, the benefit ought to have also been extended to those who retired prior to 31.1.1979. The Apex Court in the above case after considering the respective submissions and contents of the O.M laid down the following in paragraph (42): "42. If it appears to be undisputable, as it is does to us that the pensioners for the purpose of pension benefits form a class, would its upward revision permit a homogeneous class to be divided by arbitrarily fixing an eligibility criteria unrelated to purpose of revision, and would such Classification be founded on some rational principle? The classification has to be based, as is well settled, on some rational principle and the rational principle must have nexus to the objects sought to be achieved. We have set out the objects underlying the payment of pension. If the State considered it necessary to liberalise the pension scheme, we find no national principle behind it for granting these benefits only to those who retired subsequent to that date simultaneously denying the same to those who retired prior to that date. If the liberalisation was considered necessary for augmenting social security in old age to Government servants then those who retired earlier cannot be worst off than those who retire later. Therefore, this division which classified pensioners into two classes is not based on any rational principle and if the rational principle is the one of dividing pensioners with a view to giving something more to persons otherwise equally placed, it would be discriminatory. To illustrate, take two persons, one retired just a day prior and another a day just succeeding the specified date. Both were in the same pay bracket, the average emolument was the same and both had put in equal number of years of service. How does a fortuitous circumstance of retiring a day earlier or a day later will permit totally unequal treatment in the matter of pension. One retiring a day earlier will have to be subject to ceiling of Rs. 8,100/- p. a. and average emolument to be worked out on 36 months' salary while the other will have a ceiling of Rs. 12,000/- p.a. and average emolument will be computed on the basis of last ten months average. One retiring a day earlier will have to be subject to ceiling of Rs. 8,100/- p. a. and average emolument to be worked out on 36 months' salary while the other will have a ceiling of Rs. 12,000/- p.a. and average emolument will be computed on the basis of last ten months average. The artificial division stares into o face and is unrelated to any principle and whatever principle, if there be any, has absolutely no nexus to the objects sought to be achieved by liberalising the pension scheme. In fact this arbitrary division has not only no nexus to the liberalised pension scheme but it is counter productive and runs counter to the whole gamut of pension scheme. The equal treatment guaranteed in Art. 14 is wholly violated in as much as the pension rules being statutory in character, since the specified date, the rules accord differential and discriminatory treatment to equals in the matter of commutation of pension. A 48 hours difference in matter of retirement would have a traumatic effect. Division is thus both arbitrary and unprincipled. Therefore, the classification does not stand the test of Art. 14. 23. The Apex Court held that the division in the aforesaid O.M which classified pensioners into two classes is not based on any rational principle and if the rational principle is the one of dividing pensioners with a view to giving something more to persons otherwise equally placed, it would be discriminatory. The Apex Court judgment in D.S.Nakam's case (cited supra) was thus based on the fact that the formula for computation of pension was difierentially applied to those who retired prior to 31.3.1979 and those who retired after 31.3.1979 where as the computation formula was beneficial to subsequent retirees. 24. Present is not a case with regard to applying any different criteria for determination of disability pension for retirees prior to 1.1.1996 or subsequent to 1.9.1996. What was achieved by the Government Order 7.2.2001 was the mode and manner of giving finality to the assessment by Reassessment Medical Board regarding the disability of ex-service men. 25. The judgment of the Constitution Bench of Apex Court in D.S.Nakara's case (cited supra) had been considered in subsequent decisions of the Apex Court in Kristiena Kumar v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 207 which was also a Constitution Bench judgment. 25. The judgment of the Constitution Bench of Apex Court in D.S.Nakara's case (cited supra) had been considered in subsequent decisions of the Apex Court in Kristiena Kumar v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 207 which was also a Constitution Bench judgment. The challenge before the Apex Court was by the petitioners who were retired railway employees receiving provident fund benefits after 1.4.1957. The employees who entered railway service on or after 1.4.1957 were automatically covered by the Pension Scheme instead of Provident Fund Scheme and the employees who were already in service on 1.4.1957 were given an option either to retain the provident fund benefits or to switch over to the pensionary benefits. Petitioners in that case had opted for provident fund benefits which was more or less similar to the pensionary benefits. However, subsequent revision, the pensionary benefits became more beneficial. The petitioners filed the writ petition alleging discrimination and contended that in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in D.S.Nakara's case (supra), there cannot be any differentiation in payment of retiral benefits to similarly situated employees. The challenge was on the ground that differential treatment is discriminatory and violative of Article 14. The Apex Court considered the question as to whether that ratio in D.S.Nakara's case (supra) will be attracted in the case of provident fund retirees. The Apex Court while explaining the doctrine of precedent laid down the following in paragraphs (19) and (20): 19. The doctrine of precedent, that is being hound by a previous decision, is limited to the decision itself and as to what is necessarily involved in it. it does not mean that this Court is bound by the various reasons given in support of it, especially when they contain "propositions wider than the case itself required." This was what Lord Selborne said in Caledonian Railway Co. v. Walker's Trustees, 1882 (7) AC 259 and Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathern, 1901 AC 495 (502). Sir Frederick Pollock has also said: "Judicial authority belongs not to the exact words used in this or that judgment, nor even to all the reasons given, but only to the principles accepted and applied as necessary grounds of the decision." 20. In other words, the enunciation of the reason or principle upon which a question before a Court has been decided is alone as a precedent. In other words, the enunciation of the reason or principle upon which a question before a Court has been decided is alone as a precedent. The ratio decidendi is the underlying principle, namely, the general reasons or the general grounds upon which the decision is based on the test or abstract from the specific peculiarities of the particular case which gives rise to the decision. The ratio decidendi has to be ascertained by an analysis of the facts of the case and the process of reasoning involving the major premise consisting of a pre existing rule of law, either statutory or judge - made, and a. minor premise consisting of the material facts of the case under immediate consideration. If it is not clear, it is not the duty of the Court to spell it out with difficulty in order to be bound by it. In the words of Halsbury, 4th Edn., Vol. 26, para 573: "The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, as ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which when it is clear it is not part of a tribunal's duty to spell out with difficulty a ratio decidendi in order to be bound by it, and it is always dangerous to take one or two observations out of a long judgement and treat them as if they gave the ratio decidendi of the case. If more reason than one are given by a tribunal for its judgment, all are taken as forming the ratio decidendi." 26. The Apex Court ultimately held in the said case that the ratio in D.S.N&kam's case (supra) was not attracted in that case since while deciding the Krishena Kumar's case (supra), provident fund retirees were not in the mind of the Court. Following was laid down in paragraphs (32) and (33): "32. In Nakara ( AIR 1983 SC 1 .30) It was never held that both the pension retirees and the P. F. retirees formed a homogeneous olass and that any further classification among them would be violative of Art. 14. On the other hand the Court clearly observed that it was not dealing with the problem of a "fund". The Railway Contributory Provident Fund is by definition a fund. On the other hand the Court clearly observed that it was not dealing with the problem of a "fund". The Railway Contributory Provident Fund is by definition a fund. Besides, the Government's obligation towards an employee under C. P. F. scheme to give the matching contribution begins as soon as his account is opened and ends with his retirement when his rights qua the Government in respect of the Provident Fund is finally crystallized and thereafter no statutory obligation continues. Whether there still remained a moral obligation is a different matter. On the other hand under the Pension Scheme the Government's obligation does not begin until the employee retires when only it begins and it continues till the death of the employee. Thus, on the retirement of an, employee Government's legal obligation under the Provident Fund account ends while under the Pension Scheme it begins. The rules governing the Provident Fund and its contribution are entirely different from the rules governing pension, it would not, therefore, be reasonable to argue that what is applicable to the pension retirees must also equally be o applicable to P. F. retirees. This being the legal position the rights of each individual P. F. retiree finally crystallised on his retirement whereafter no trontkiukig obligation remained while, on the other hand, as regards pension retirees, the obligation continued till their death. The continuing obligation of the State in respect of pension retirees is adversely affected by fall in rupee value and rising prices which, considering the corpus already received by the P. F. retirees they would not be so adversely affected ipso facto. It, cannot, therefore, be said that it was the ratio decidendi in Nakara that the State's obligation towards its P. F. retirees must be the same as that towards the pension retirees. An imaginary definition of obligation to include all the government retirees in a class was not decided and could not form the basis for any classification for the purpose of this case. Nakara cannot, therefore, be an authority for this case. 33. Stare decisis et non quieta movera. To adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things which are settled. But it applies to litigated facts and necessarily decided questions. Apart from Art. 141 of the Constitution of India, the policy of courts is to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point. 33. Stare decisis et non quieta movera. To adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things which are settled. But it applies to litigated facts and necessarily decided questions. Apart from Art. 141 of the Constitution of India, the policy of courts is to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point. When court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable adhere to certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases where facts are substantially the same. A deliberate and solemn decision of Court made after argument on question of law fairly arising in the case, and necessary to its determination, is an authority, or binding precedent in the same Court, of in other Courts of equal or lower rank in subsequent cases where the very point is again in controversy unless there are occasions when departure is rendered necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice. It should be invariably applied and should not ordinarily be departed from where decision is of long standing and rights have been acquired under it, unless considerations of public policy demand it. But in Nakara it was never required to be decided that all the retirees formed a class and no further classification was permissible." 27. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Indian Ex-Services League and Others v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 104 had again the occasion to consider the applicability of D.S.Nakara's case (supra). In the above case, the writ petitions were filed by ex-service men. Referring to D.S.Nakam's case (supra), following was laid down in paragraph (12): 12. The liberalised pension scheme in the context of which the decision was rendered in Nakara ( AIR 1983 SC 1 30) provided for computation of pension according to a more liberal formula under which "average emoluments" were determined with reference to the last ten months' salary instead of 36 months' salary provided earlier yielding a higher average, coupled with a slab system and raising the ceiling limit for pension. This Court held that where the mode of computation of pension is liberalised from a specified date, its benefit must be given not merely to retirees subsequent to that date but also to earlier existing retirees irrespective of their date of retirement even though the earlier retirees would not be entitled to any arrears prior to the specified date on the basis of the revised computation made according to the liberalised formula. For the purpose of such a scheme all existing retirees irrespective of the of their retirement were held to constitute one class, any further division within that class being impermissible. According to that decision, the pension of all earlier retirees was to be recomputed as on the specified date in accordance with the liberalised formula of computation on the basis of the average emoluments of each retiree payable on his date of retirement. For this purpose there was no revision of the emoluments of the earlier retirees under the scheme, it was clearly stated that 'if the pensioners form a class, their computation cannot be by different formula affording unequal treatment solely on the ground that some retired earlier and some retired later'. This according to us is the decision in Nakara and no more." 28. The Apex Court held that the decision of D.S.Nakara's case (supra) has to be read as one of limited application and its ambit cannot be enlarged to cover all claims made by the pension retirees or a demand for an identical amount of pension to every retiree from the same rank irrespective of the date of retirement. Following was laid down in paragraph (14): "14. Nakara ( AIR 1983 SC 1 30) decision came up for consideration before another Constitution Bench recently in Krishena Kumar v. Union of India 1990 (4) SCC 207 : ( AIR 1990 SC 1782 ). The petitioners in that case were retired Railway employees who were covered by or opted for the Railway Contributory Provident Fund Scheme. it was held that P.F. retirees and pension retirees constitute different classes and it was never held in Nakara that pension retirees and P. F. retirees formed a homogeneous class, even though pension retkees alone did constitute a homogeneous class within which any further class notification for the purpose of a liberalised pension scheme was impermissible. it was held that P.F. retirees and pension retirees constitute different classes and it was never held in Nakara that pension retirees and P. F. retirees formed a homogeneous class, even though pension retkees alone did constitute a homogeneous class within which any further class notification for the purpose of a liberalised pension scheme was impermissible. It was pointed out that in Nakara, it was never required to be decided that all the retirees for all purposes formed one class and no further classification was permissible. We have referred to this decision merely to indicate that another Constitution Bench of this Court also has read Nakara decision as one of limited application and there is no scope for enlarging the ambit of that decision to cover all claims made by the pension retirees or a demand for an identical amount of pension to every retiree from the same rank irrespective of the date of retirement, even though the reckonable emoluments for the purpose of computation of their pension be different." 29. In Union of India v. P.N.Menoii and Others, (1994) 4 SCC 68 ], the Apex Court again considered the question in context of retirees prior to 30.9.1977 and those retired thereafter. By the office O.M dated 25.5.1977, a portion of dearness allowance was treated as pay for the purpose of retirement benefits in respect of Government servant who retired on or after 31st September, 1977. The Apex Court held in the aforesaid case that any revised claim in respect of post retiral benefits if implemented with a cut off date, which can be held to be reasonable and rational in the light of Article 14 of the Constitution need not be held to be invalid. In the above case, the following was observed in paragraph (8): "8. Whenever the Government or an authority, which can be held to be a State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution frames a scheme for persons who have superannuated from service, due to many constraints, it is not always possible to extend the some benefits to one and all, irrespective of dates of superannuation. As such any revised scheme in respect of post retirement benefits, if implemented with a cut off date, which can be held to be reasonable and rational in the light of Art. 14 of the constitution need not be held to be invalid. As such any revised scheme in respect of post retirement benefits, if implemented with a cut off date, which can be held to be reasonable and rational in the light of Art. 14 of the constitution need not be held to be invalid. It shall not amount to 'picking out a date from the hat' as was said by this Court in the case of D. R Nim v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1301 , in connection with fixation of seniority. Whenever a revision takes place, a cut off date becomes imperative, because the benefit 'has to be allowed within the financial resources available with the Government." 30. The Apex Court hekl that cutoff date 31st September, 1977 as fixed in the O.M cannot be said to be arbitrary. Following was laid down in paragraph (14): "14. According to us, for the reasons disclosed on behalf of the appellant-Union of India for fixing 30-9-1977 as the cu-off date, which date was fixed when the price index level was 272, cannot be held to be arbitrary. The decision to merge a part of dearness allowance with pay, when the price index level was at 272, appears to have been taken on basis of the recommendation of the Third Pay Commission. As such it cannot be held that the cut-off date has been selected in a arbitrary manner. Not only in matters of revising the pensionary benefits, but even in respect of revision of scales of pay, a cut-off date on some rational or reasonable basis, has to be fixed for extending the benefits. This can be illustrated. The Government decides to revise the pay scale of its employees and fixes the 1st day of January of the next year for implementing the same or the 1st day of January of the last year. In either case, a big section of its employees are bound to miss the said revision of the scale of pay, having superannuated before that date. An employee, who has rertired on 31st December of the year in question, will miss that pay scale only by a day, which may affect the pensionary benefits throughout his life. No scheme can be held to be foolproof, so as to cover and keep in view all persons who were at one time in active service. An employee, who has rertired on 31st December of the year in question, will miss that pay scale only by a day, which may affect the pensionary benefits throughout his life. No scheme can be held to be foolproof, so as to cover and keep in view all persons who were at one time in active service. As such the concern of the court should only be, while examining any such grievance, to see, as to whether a particular date for extending a particular benefit or scheme, has been fixed, on objective and rational considerations." 31. Similar ratio is laid down in another judgment of the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goval and others, (2005) 6 SCC 754 . In the above case, the respondents were the employees of Government of Punjab who retired during the period 31.7.1993 - 31.3.1995. In the above case, the benefit of circular dated 13.12.1996 under which the Government employees who retired or died on or after 1.4.1995 were entitled to get retirement gratuity/death gratuity, on the basis of addition of certain portion of the dearness allowance to the basic pay, was also claimed and it was contended that the fixation of date 1.4.1995 for computation of benefits is arbitrary and hit by law laid down by the Apex Court in D.S.Nukam's case (supra). The Apex Court distinguished the law laid down in D.S.Nakarufs case (supra) in following manner in paragraph (29): "29. D.S. Nakara ( 1983 (1) SCC 305 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 145) which is the mainstay of the case of the employees, arose under special circumstances, quite different from the present case. It was a case of revision of pensionary benefits and classification of pensioners into two groups by drawing a cutoff line and granting the revised pensionary benefits to employees retiring on or after the cutoff date. The criterion made applicable was "being in service and retiring subsequent to the specified date". This Court held that for being eligible for liberalised pension scheme, application of such a criterion is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution, as it was both arbitrary and discriminatory in nature. The reason given by the Court was that the employees who retired prior to a specified date, and those who retired thereafter formed one class of pensioners. This Court held that for being eligible for liberalised pension scheme, application of such a criterion is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution, as it was both arbitrary and discriminatory in nature. The reason given by the Court was that the employees who retired prior to a specified date, and those who retired thereafter formed one class of pensioners. The attempt to classify them into separate classes/groups for the purpose of pensionary benefits was not founded on any intelligible differentia, which had a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. However, it must be noted that even in cases of pension, subsequent judgments of this Court have considerably watered down the rigid view taken in D.S. Nakara ( 1983 (1) SCC 305 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 145) as we shall see later in T.N. Electricity Board v. R. Veerasamy, 1999 (3) SCC 414 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 717 ("Veerasamy"). in any event, this is not a case of a continuing benefit like pension; it is a one time benefit like gratuity." . 32. The learned Single Judge in his judgment apart from relying on D.S.Nakara's case (supra) and Amur Nath Goyal's case (cited supra), have referred to the Union of India and another v. SPS Vains IRetd.) and others, {2008) 9 SCC 125. In the above case, the pensionary benefits with regard to the rank of Major General and Brigadier came up for consideration. Prior to IVth Pay Commission, Major General always drew more pension and family pension than a Brigadier. The anomaly arose with the acceptance of the Government the recommendation of the Vth Pay Commission which created a situation whereby, Brigadiers began drawing more pension and, therefore, receiving higher pension and family pension than Major Generals. Anomally when pointed out, the Government has step up the pension of Major General, who retired priopr to 1.1.1996. The facts of the case were noted in paragraph (6), which is extracted as follows: "6. The anomaly arose with the acceptance by the Government of the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission which has created a situation whereby Brigadiers began drawing more pay than Major Generals and were, therefore, receiving higher pension and family pension than Major Generals. In view of the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission, a Brigadier was given a pay scale of Rs. In view of the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission, a Brigadier was given a pay scale of Rs. 15350-450-17600 together with rank pay of Rs.2,400/- whereas a Major General was given a pay scale of Rs. 18400-500-22400. In other words, the maximum pay in the pay scale of Brigadier is 17,600/- and the minimum pay in the pay scale of Major General is Rs. 18,400/-. Inasmuch as, no rank pay was provided for beyond the rank of Brigadier, the minimum pay provided for a Major General became less than that of a Brigadier who may had reached the maximum point in his scale. Consequently, on retirement, the pension of a Brigadier became more than that of a Major General, since rank pay is also taken into consideration for the purpose of calculating pension and family pension. The pension of a Major General thus became Rs.9,200/-, while that of a Brigadier was Rs.9,550/-." 33. In the facts of the above case, the challenge was made based on D.S.Nakara's case (supra). In the above case, following was laid down by the Apex Court in paragraphs (28) and (31). "28. The question regarding creation of different classes within the same cadre on the basis of the doctrine of intelligible differentia having nexus with the object to be achieved, has fallen for consideration at various intervals for the High Courts as well this Court, over the years. The said question was taken up by a Constitution Bench in D.S.Nakara where in no uncertain terms throughout the judgment it has been repeatedly observed that the date of retirement of an employee cannot form a valid criterion for classification, for if that is the crieterion those who retired by the end of the month will form a class of themselves. In the context of that case, which is similar to that of the instant case, it was held that Article 14 of the Constitution had been wholly violated, inasmuch as, the Pension Rules being statutory in character, the amended Rules, specifying a cut-of date resulted in differential and discriminatory treatment of equals in the matter of commutation of pension. It was further observed that it would have a traumatic effect on those who retired just before that date. It was further observed that it would have a traumatic effect on those who retired just before that date. The division which classified pensioners into two classes was held to be artificial and arbitrary and not based on any rational principle and whatever principle, if they was any, had not only no nexus to the objects sought to be achieved by amending the Pension rules, but was counterproductive and ran counter to the very object of pension scheme. It was ultimately held that the classification did not satisfy the test of Article 14 of the Constitution. 31. We, accordingly, dismiss the appeal and modify the order of the High Court by directing that the pay of all pensioners in the rank of Major General and its equivalent rank in the two other wings of the Defence Service be notionally fixed at the rate given to similar officers of the same rank after the revision of pay scales with effect from 1-1-1996, and, thereafter, to compute their pensionary benefits on such basis with prospective effect from the date of filing of the writ petition and to pay them the difference within three months from date with interest at 10% per annum. The respondents will not be entitled to payment on account of increased pension from prior to the date of filing of the writ petition." 34. In the above case, the ratio of D.S.Nakara's case (supra) was clearly applicable wherein, direction was issued that pay of all pensioners in the rank of Major General and its equivalent in the two other wings of the Defence Service be notionally fixed at the rate given to similar officers of the same rank after the revision of pay scales with effect from 1.1.1996. The above judgment was on its own fact and has no application in the facts of the present case as noted above. 35. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.A No.2430 of 2009 further contended that the reassessment dated 1.4.1998 in which petitioner was assessed as less than 20% was never communicated to the petitioner and he came to know about the said reassessment only in March, 2000 when in his pension, disability element was taken away. The learned counsel submit that even order dated 27.8.1998 by which the said decision of the Re-survey Medical Board was communicated was never received by the petitioner. The learned counsel submit that even order dated 27.8.1998 by which the said decision of the Re-survey Medical Board was communicated was never received by the petitioner. Hence, petitioner could not have any opportunity to file an appeal. 36. Even if it is accepted that the petitioner did not receive the original letter dated 27.8.1998, petitioner in his writ petition himself has annexed the copy of the letter dated 29.4.2000 (ExtP2) by which the petitioner was communicated about the decision of Re-survey Medical Board dated 16.4.1998 that his disability was assessed as less than 20%. However, vide letter dated 27.5.2000 (Ext.P3), issued by the Assistant Record Officer, it was mentioned that original letter dated 27.8.1998 was sent by registered post. Another letter dated 24.9.1998 issued by Assistant Record Officer has been produced as Ext.P4 along with which letter dated 27.8.1998 was enclosed. In any view of the matter after coming to know about the taking away of the o disability element of pension, petitioner could have immediately filed an appeal. It is further relevant to note that petitioner was again assessed by Re-survey Medical Board in 2002 and by letter dated 12.8.2002 his disability was assessed at 30% and he was granted disability pension @ ?465/- per month w.e.f 6.4.2003. As on die date, the petitioner is receiving disability pension. 37. The petitioner could receive the disability pension due to the reason that he was subjected to Re-survey Medical Board, even after issuance of circular dated 7.2.2001. Petitioner's counsel expressed apprehension that when it was held that petitioner is not entitled for disability pension from 9.9.1998 to 15.4.2003, the respondents may take steps for recovery of disability pension already paid during the aforesaid period till February, 2000. In facts of the present, when disability pension was paid by the respondents themselves to the petitioner in which the petitioner had no role to play, we are of the view that respondents cannot recover any disability pension already paid to the petitioner between 9.9.1998 to March, 2000. 38. Although learned counsel for the petitioner tried to challenge the assessment made in the year 1998 where petitioner's disability was assessed as 20%, we are of the view that the said factual issues cannot be gone into in writ proceedings. As assessment by ex-competent authority on disability normally cannot be interfered with by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Although learned counsel for the petitioner tried to challenge the assessment made in the year 1998 where petitioner's disability was assessed as 20%, we are of the view that the said factual issues cannot be gone into in writ proceedings. As assessment by ex-competent authority on disability normally cannot be interfered with by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. The relief claimed by petitioner in O.P No.33852 of 2001 cannot be granted except that no recovery or disability pension already paid to the petitioner can be made. Coming to O.P No.2300 of 2003, the petitioner having been assessed by Re-survey Medical Board in April, 1996 and his disability was found less than 20%, the said decision has become final and need no interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Coming to O.P No. 13196 of 2002, the disability element of petitioner was reduced w.e.f 30th July, 1996, on the basis of Re-survey Medical D Board held on 18th July, 1996. The said decision also became final and need not be interfered in exercise of writ jurisdiction. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge had committed error WAs.l584,L587&2430/09 in striking down the cut off date 1.1.19% in paragraph (7) of the order dated 7.2.2001. The judgment of the learned Single Judge, thus, cannot be sustained. Therefore, the writ appeals are allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside. We direct that any amount already paid to the petitioner in O.P No.33852 of 2001 towards disability pension be not recovered by the appellants. Parties shall bear their own costs.