JUDGMENT Hon’ble Akhtar Husain Khan, J.—Present appeal has been filed by State of U.P. under Section 18 of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 against judgement and order dated 23.7.2010 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 6/Special Judge Gangster Act, Allahabad in Miscellaneous Case No. 5 of 2009 (Nasim Khan v. State of U.P.), Miscellaneous Case No. 3 of 2009 (Abdul Nafis v. State of U.P.), Miscellaneous Case No. 4 of 2009 (Sayeed Khan and another v. State of U.P.), Miscellaneous Case No. 2 of 2009 (Nizam v. State of U.P.) and Miscellaneous Case No. 6 of 2009 (Salim Khan v. State of U.P.) arising out of Crime No. 254 of 2007, under Section 2/3 of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986, Police Station Handia, District Allahabad whereby Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 6/Special Judge Gangster Act, Allahabad has allowed applications under Section 16 of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 moved in aforesaid each miscellaneous case and has set aside order dated 30.1.2009 passed by District Magistrate, Allahabad under Section 14(1) of Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986. Affidavits have already been exchanged between the parties. 2. Shri Narendra Dev Roy, learned A.G.A. appeared for State of U.P. Shri Daya Shankar Mishra as well as Shri Mukhtar Alam appeared for respondents. 3. I have heard learned A.G.A. as well as learned counsel for respondents and perused the record. 4. Learned A.G.A. contended that impugned judgement and order passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 6/Special Judge Gangster Act, Allahabad is against provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 as well as evidence on record. 5. Learned A.G.A. contended that impugned judgement and order dated 23.7.2010 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 6/Special Judge Gangster Act, Allahabad should be set aside and impugned order 30.1.2009 passed by District Magistrate, Allahabad should be restored. 6. 5. Learned A.G.A. contended that impugned judgement and order dated 23.7.2010 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 6/Special Judge Gangster Act, Allahabad should be set aside and impugned order 30.1.2009 passed by District Magistrate, Allahabad should be restored. 6. Learned counsel for respondents contended that impugned order has been passed under Section 17 of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as “Act”) and there is no provision of appeal against order passed under Section 17 of Act either in the Act or in Chapter XXIX of Criminal Procedure Code which has been made applicable on appeals against judgement and order passed under the Act per Section 18 of the Act. 7. Learned counsel for respondents further contended that learned trial Court has passed impugned judgement and order after having considered all evidence and submissions made by the parties. The impugned judgement and order passed by trial Court is in accordance with provisions of the Act as well as evidence on record. 8. Learned counsel for respondents contended that appeal has no merit and it should be dismissed. 9. In reply learned A.G.A. contended that appeal is maintainable against impugned judgement and order in view of Section 18 of the Act. 10. Learned A.G.A. placed reliance upon judgement of Division Bench of this High Court rendered in the case of Manzoora v. State of U.P. through Secretary Home, Government of U.P., Lucknow and others, 2008(63) ACC 687. 11. In view of contentions made by the parties following points for determination arise in this appeal: 1. Whether appeal filed by State of U.P. is maintainable in view of Section 18 of the Act against impugned judgement and order passed by trial Court. 2. Whether impugned judgement and order passed by trial Court is against provisions of the Act as well as evidence on record. 12. Admittedly, District Magistrate, Allahabad passed order of attachment of property of respondents under Section 14-(1) of the Act against which respondents made representation before District Magistrate for release of property under Section 15(1) of the Act. 2. Whether impugned judgement and order passed by trial Court is against provisions of the Act as well as evidence on record. 12. Admittedly, District Magistrate, Allahabad passed order of attachment of property of respondents under Section 14-(1) of the Act against which respondents made representation before District Magistrate for release of property under Section 15(1) of the Act. But District Magistrate, Allahabad did not release property attached and referred the matter under Section 16-(1) of the Act to the Court having jurisdiction to try offence under the Act, whereupon trial Court made inquiry under Section 16(3) of the Act and ultimately passed impugned order under Section 17 of the Act whereby he has allowed the applications of respondents moved under Section 15-(1) of the Act and has set aside order dated 30.1.2009 passed by District Magistrate, Allahabad under Section 14(1) of the Act. 13. Section 18 of the Act provides provisions for appeal. Section 18 of the Act is reproduced below: “The provisions of Chapter XXIX of the Code shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to an appeal against any judgement or order of a Court passed under the provisions of this Act”. 14. Reading of Section 18 of the Act shows that it does not speak about judgements and orders which are appealable. It says only that Chapter XXIX of the Code (Criminal Procedure Code) shall mutatis mutandis apply to an appeal against any judgement or order of a Court passed under the provisions of the Act. 15. In view of Section 18 of the Act it is relevant to go through provisions of Chapter XXIX of the Criminal Procedure Code. Heading of Chapter XXIX of the Criminal Procedure Code is “appeals”. This Chapter consists of Sections 372 to 394, out of which Section 372 provides that no appeal shall lie from any judgement or order of a Criminal Court except as provided for by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force. Section 373 of the Chapter provides provision for appeal against orders requiring security or refusal to accept or rejecting surety for keeping peace or good behaviour. Section 374 of the Chapter provides provision for appeal from convictions. Section 375 of the Chapter provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 374, where an accused person has pleaded guilty and has been convicted on such plea, there shall be no appeal. Section 374 of the Chapter provides provision for appeal from convictions. Section 375 of the Chapter provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 374, where an accused person has pleaded guilty and has been convicted on such plea, there shall be no appeal. Section 376 of the Chapter provides provision for no appeal by convicted person in certain petty cases. Section 377 of the Chapter provides provision for appeal by State Government against the sentence on the ground of its inadequacy. Section 378 of the Chapter provides provision for appeal in case of acquittal. Section 379 of the Chapter provides provision for appeal against conviction by High Court in certain cases. Section 380 of the Chapter provides that notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, when more persons than one are convicted in one trial, and an appellable judgement or order has been passed in respect of any of such persons, all or any of the persons convicted at such trial shall have a right of appeal. Section 381 of the Chapter provides provisions that appeal to the Court of Session shall be heard by the Sessions Judge or by an Additional Sessions Judge. Section 382 of the Chapter provides that appeal shall be made in the form of petition in writing. Section 383 of the Chapter provides procedure of appeal when appellant is in jail. Section 384 of the Chapter provides provision for summary dismissal of appeal. Section 385 of the Chapter provides procedure for hearing of appeals not dismissed summarily. Section 386 of the Chapter provides provisions regarding powers of the appellate Court. Section 387 of the Chapter contains provisions regarding judgements of subordinate appellate Court. Section 388 of the Chapter provides that order of High Court on appeal shall be certified to lower Court. Section 389 of the Chapter provides provisions regarding suspension of sentence during pendency of appeal or release of appellant on bail. Section 390 of the Chapter provides provisions regarding arrest of accused in appeal from acquittal. Section 391 of the Chapter provides that appellate Court may take further evidence itself or direct it to be taken by a Magistrate, or when the appellate Court is a High Court, by a Court of Session or a Magistrate. Section 392 of the Chapter provides procedure where Judges of Court of Appeal are equally divided. Section 391 of the Chapter provides that appellate Court may take further evidence itself or direct it to be taken by a Magistrate, or when the appellate Court is a High Court, by a Court of Session or a Magistrate. Section 392 of the Chapter provides procedure where Judges of Court of Appeal are equally divided. Section 393 of the Chapter provides that judgements and orders passed by an Appellate Court upon an appeal shall be final, except in the cases provided for in Section 377, Section 378, sub-Section (4) of Section 384 or Chapter XXX. Section 394 of the Chapter provides provisions regarding abatement of appeals. 16. After having gone through Chapter XXIX of Criminal Procedure Code it is apparent that this Chapter provides provisions for appeal against judgement and order of conviction or acquittal or order requiring securing or refusal to accept or rejecting surety for keeping peace or good behaviour. In this Chapter there is no provision for appeal against order passed in respect of attachment, release or disposal of property. There is no provision either in Section 18 or anywhere in Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 also to provide right of appeal against order passed under Section 17 of Act by trial Court regarding release or disposal of property attached by District Magistrate under Section 14(1) of the Act where as Section 372 of Chapter XXIX of Criminal Procedure Code clearly provides that no appeal shall lie from any judgement or order of a criminal Court except as provided by Criminal Procedure Code or by any other law for timing being in force. In view of Section 18 of the Act and Chapter XXIX of Criminal Procedure Code order passed under Section 17 of the Act is not an appelable order. 17. But in the case of Manzoora v. State of U.P. and others, (2008) 63 ACC 687, Honourable Division Bench of this High Court in a writ petition filed against order passed by District Magistrate under Section 14(1) of the Act has made a remark to the effect that the order passed under Section 17 of the Act is subject to an appeal to the High Court under Section 18. This remark has been made casually without going through provisions of Section 18 of the Act as well as Chapter XXIX of Criminal Procedure Code. 18. This remark has been made casually without going through provisions of Section 18 of the Act as well as Chapter XXIX of Criminal Procedure Code. 18. In the case of Mamleshwar Prasad and another v. Kanhaiya Lal (dead) through L.Rs., 1975 (2) SCC 232 , Hon’ble Apex Court in para 7 of the judgement has observed as follows: “Certainty of the law, consistency of rulings and comity of Courts - all flowering from the same principle ? converge to the conclusion that a decision once rendered must later bind like cases. We do not intend to detract from the rule that, in exceptional instances, where by obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reached, it may not have the sway of binding precedents.” 19. In the case of State of U.P. and another v. Synthetics and Chemicals Limited and another, 1991 (4) SCC 139 , Hon’ble Apex Court in para 40 of judgment has observed as follows: “Incuria” literally means ‘carelessness’. In practice per incuriam appears to mean per ignoratium. English Courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The ‘quotable in law’ is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, ‘in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority’. (Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., (1994) 1 KB 718 : (1944) 2 All ER 293. Same has been accepted, approved and adopted by this Court while interpreting Article 141 of the Constitution which embodies the doctrine of precedents as a matter of law.” 20. In view of above pronouncements of Honourable Apex Court I am of the view that the issue as to whether order passed under Section 17 of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 is an appelable order and appeal is maintainable under Section 18 of the Act should be referred to Division Bench for consideration. Let the records be placed before Hon’ble The Chief Justice for order. ——————