ORDER : Challenging the Notice Inviting Tender dated 22.08.2014 issued by the Jharkhand State Tribal Cooperative Development Corporation Limited for selection of suitable Private Sector Operators for Upgradation, Operation, Maintenance and Management of existing 9 MESO hospitals in Jharkhand and seeking direction upon the respondents to renew/extend the existing agreement with the petitioners for a further period of five years in terms of Clause 5.1 of MoU dated 04.02.2009, the present writ petitions have been filed. 2. It is stated by the counsel for the petitioners that in all the writ petitions similar prayer has been made and a common question of law is involved in all the writ petitions and therefore, all the writ petitions were heard together and by this common order, the writ petitions are disposed of. Mr. Jitendra Singh, the learned senior counsel advanced argument referring to W.P.(C) No.4450 of 2014, the facts of which are noticed in detail. The counsel appearing in other cases adopted his argument. W.P.(C) No.4450 of 2014 Briefly stated, the petitioner-Institute of Continuing Education Research and Training, a non-governmental organisation, is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, which is involved in various social welfare activities. Under the MESO project, for operation of the hospitals the government took a decision vide Memo dated 16.03.2006 to entrust the work of running the hospitals to nongovernmental organisation, private organisation and corporate organisation, for which a tender notice was issued. The petitioner submitted its Expression of Interest with proposal for running and managing 7 hospitals for which, it gave its presentation on 4th and 5th April, 2006 before the Committee constituted by the State Government. The said Committee after detailed scrutiny of the credibility, capability and objectivity of the parties, shortlisted 5 organisations including the petitioner for operation of 14 hospitals in Public Private Partnership Model. The petitioner and other successful participants were informed vide letter dated 16.10.2007 the decision of their selection for running 50beded MESO Rural hospitals. A draft MoU was handed over to the successful participants and a meeting was convened in the office of Tribal Welfare Commissioner, Jharkhand on 24.10.2007. Finally, on 04.02.2009 Memorandum of Understanding was signed with the petitioner for Upgradation, Operation, Maintenance and Management of MESO Rural hospital, Basardih, Lohardaga and MESO Rural Hospital, Kuchai, Saraikella-Kharsawan. A draft MoU was handed over to the successful participants and a meeting was convened in the office of Tribal Welfare Commissioner, Jharkhand on 24.10.2007. Finally, on 04.02.2009 Memorandum of Understanding was signed with the petitioner for Upgradation, Operation, Maintenance and Management of MESO Rural hospital, Basardih, Lohardaga and MESO Rural Hospital, Kuchai, Saraikella-Kharsawan. It is stated that the petitioner has been operating both the hospitals successfully and the work executed by the petitioner has been found satisfactory during each visit/inspection and verification. The Project Director and Civil Surgeoncum-Chief Medical Officer, Saraikella-Kharsawan conducted an inspection on 08.01.2014 and he also recorded his satisfaction to the performance of the petitioner, a copy of which has been communicated to the Tribal Welfare Commissioner vide letter dated 09.01.2014. The Tribal Welfare Commissioner visited the hospital on 12.06.2014 and he has also expressed his full satisfaction in the inspection report. Similarly, the Project Director (Integrated) Tribal Development Authority, Lohardaga communicated his satisfaction to the Tribal Welfare Commissioner of the successful performance by the petitioner, vide letter dated 15.01.2014. Prior to expiry of the period of 60 months for which MoU was signed on 04.02.2009, the petitioner submitted applications dated 19.09.2013, 20.01.2014 and 12.03.2014 for renewal or extension of the period of MoU. However, no decision was taken and on 22.08.2014, a Notice Inviting Tender was published by the Jharkhand State Tribal Cooperative Development Corporation Limitedrespondent no.6 for selection of suitable Private Sector Operators for Upgradation, Operation, Maintenance and Management of existing 9 MESO hospitals in Jharkhand. It is stated that the Jharkhand State Tribal Cooperative Development Corporation Limited has no jurisdiction or authority to interfere with the functioning of MESO Rural hospitals and it has no jurisdiction or authority to select and appoint Private Operators for Upgradation, Operation, Maintenance and Management of MESO Rural hospital. W.P.(C) No. 4526 of 2014 The petitioner-Research Institute for Civil Health Integration is a Trust registered under the Indian Trust Act. It has signed four separate MoUs on 04.02.2009 for upgradation, operation, maintenance and management of MESO Rural Hospitals at Arki, Jonha, Litipara and Kathikund. Vide letter dated 07.10.2013, the petitioner requested the Tribal Welfare Commissioner for renewal of MoUs for further five years from 04.02.2014 to 03.02.2019. Further letters have been written by the petitioner on 30.12.2013 and 12.03.2014 however, no decision has been communicated to the petitioner. Vide letter dated 07.10.2013, the petitioner requested the Tribal Welfare Commissioner for renewal of MoUs for further five years from 04.02.2014 to 03.02.2019. Further letters have been written by the petitioner on 30.12.2013 and 12.03.2014 however, no decision has been communicated to the petitioner. After the expiry of the period of MoUs, the MESO Hospitals at Arki, Jonha, Kathikund and Litipara were inspected on 18.02.2014, 25.01.2014 and 16.01.2014 and certificates have been issued to the effect that these MESO Hospitals have been running successfully. The Tribal Welfare Commissioner also inspected MESO Hospitals at Arki and Jonha and reports showing successful running of the MESO Hospitals have been prepared. W.P.(C) No. 4635 of 2014 The petitioner-Dynamic Tarang (P) Ltd. is a company registered under the Companies Act. It has signed two separate MoUs on 04.02.2009 for upgradation, operation, maintenance and management of MESO hospitals at Sahibganj and Jamtara. Vide letter dated 12.09.2013 and 03.01.2014, the petitioner requested the Tribal Welfare Commissioner for renewal of MoUs for further five years. Before the expiry of period of MoUs, the MESO hospitals at Sahibganj and Jamtara were inspected on 18.01.2014 and certificate has been issued to the effect that these MESO hospitals have been running successfully. W.P.(C) No. 4895 of 2014 The petitioner-Vikas Bharti Bishunpur is a company registered under the Companies Act. It has signed MoU for upgradation, operation, maintenance and management of MESO hospital at Ban Makai on 04.02.2009. Vide letter dated 07.10.2013, the petitioner requested the Tribal Welfare Commissioner for renewal of MoU for further five years. The MESO hospital at Ban Makai was inspected and report was communicated to Tribal Welfare Commissioner by Project Director (Integrated) Tribal Development Authority, Jamshedpur on 11.02.2014 and certificate has been issued to the effect that the MESO hospital has been running successfully. COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT/ AFFIDAVITS 3. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent nos.26 stating that the Welfare Department, Government of Jharkhand resolved to issue fresh tender notice on 22.08.2014 inviting proposals from the Private Sector Operators for running the MESO Rural hospitals. The extension Clause provided in the MoU is not mandatory. The Welfare Department is the sole arbiter to decide whether extension in terms of Clause 5.1 of MoU is to be granted or not. The said Clause does not create any enforceable legal right in favour of the petitioner for claiming extension of the period for running the MESO hospitals. The extension Clause provided in the MoU is not mandatory. The Welfare Department is the sole arbiter to decide whether extension in terms of Clause 5.1 of MoU is to be granted or not. The said Clause does not create any enforceable legal right in favour of the petitioner for claiming extension of the period for running the MESO hospitals. The MESO hospitals have been constructed by the State Government and there is no estoppal against the State Government for awarding the work to successful candidates selected pursuant to NIT dated 22.08.2014. 4. A supplementary counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent no.2 stating that the validity period of MoU was 60 months and thus, after the expiry of said period MoU ceases to operate. The MoUs were signed by the Tribal Welfare Commissioner on behalf of the Welfare Department and it was never objected by the petitioner/petitioners. The Principal Secretary/Secretary, Welfare Department, Government of Jharkhand is the Exofficio Chairman of JSTCDC, Ranchi. It is stated that the Welfare Department, Government of Jharkhand operates various welfare schemes through the office of (i) Tribal Welfare Commissioner, Ranchi (ii) Jharkhand State Scheduled Caste Cooperative Development Corporation Limited (iii) Jharkhand State Tribal Cooperative Development Corporation Limited (iv) Jharkhand State Other Backward Classes Cooperative Development Corporation Limited and, (v) Jharkhand State Minority Finance Corporation Limited and all these Undertakings/Corporations are units/instrumentalities of the Welfare Department, Government of Jharkhand. The Jharkhand State Tribal Development Corporation Limited is a Stateowned corporation, is admitted by the petitioner. It is further stated that the decision for inviting fresh tender with respect to MESO Rural hospitals was taken in the Review Meeting dated 03.01.2014 of the Hon'ble the Chief Minister. 5. A separate counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent no.6 questioning the maintainability of the writ petition. After the expiry of the period of 60 months, the Welfare Department decided to handover the management of all 14 hospitals to respondent no.6 and accordingly, the impugned NIT has been issued by the Corporation. A Committee has been constituted under the chairmanship of the Secretary, Department of Welfare, Government of Jharkhand for selection of Private Operators for management of MESO hospitals. The respondent no.6Corporation has been given the responsibility of modernisation and upgradation of the MESO hospitals, so as to make the MESO hospital as First Referal Unit and to provide complete range of OPD and inpatient services. The respondent no.6Corporation has been given the responsibility of modernisation and upgradation of the MESO hospitals, so as to make the MESO hospital as First Referal Unit and to provide complete range of OPD and inpatient services. SUBMISSIONS and DISCUSSIONS: 6. Mr. Jitendra Singh, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in view of renewal clause in Memorandum of Understanding for managing and maintenance of the MESO hospitals, the petitioner has a legitimate expectation that the contract would be renewed for further 5 years. The performance of the petitioner has been satisfactory and the contract was not terminated even after lapse of 5 years. The petitioner has been permitted to continue for more than 8 months beyond the original term of 5 years and thus, there would be a deemed renewal of the contract. It is further submitted that a document has to be read as a whole and mere use of the term “Memorandum of Understanding” is not a determinative factor. On examination of various clauses in MoU, it is apparent that it is a contract which has been acted upon by the parties. Challenging the jurisdiction of Jharkhand State Tribal Cooperative Development Corporation Limited, it is submitted that it is an instrumentality of the State only for the purposes of Part III of the Constitution. The MESO hospital properties are vested in the State and therefore, Jharkhand State Tribal Cooperative Development Corporation Limited-respondent no.6, which is incorporated for a different purpose cannot deal with the properties of MESO hospitals. In view of Clause 15 and 16 of the Rules of Executive Business read with Entry 32 in Schedule III, any decision with respect to government properties can be taken by the state government and merely because some of the officials of the government are holding post in the Corporation and the Principal Secretary, Welfare Department is the ex-officio Chairman of the Corporation, the respondent no.6Corporation is not competent to issue the impugned Notice Inviting Tender and the Principal Secretary, Welfare Department is denuded of power to authorise JSTCDC or deal with MESO hospitals. 7. As against the above, Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned G.P. V submitted that no doubt, the MESO hospitals are the government properties and these properties have not been transferred to Jharkhand State Tribal Cooperative Development Corporation Limited-respondent no.6. 7. As against the above, Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned G.P. V submitted that no doubt, the MESO hospitals are the government properties and these properties have not been transferred to Jharkhand State Tribal Cooperative Development Corporation Limited-respondent no.6. The respondent no.6 has been entrusted to deal with MESO hospitals and it is the prerogative of the State Government to decide how it wants to execute its work. Though, no complaint has been received in running of the MESO hospitals, a policy decision has been taken pursuant to which a new methodology has been adopted for managing and maintenance of the MESO hospitals. The “Memorandum of Understanding” indicates that it is in the nature of an agreement for service and therefore, there cannot be a legitimate expectation. In the review meeting dated 03.01.2014 of the Chief Minister, a decision was taken pursuant to which, the Notice Inviting Tender dated 22.08.2014 has been issued. The different clauses in MoU would disclose that it was a temporary arrangement for 5 years and finally the management of MESO hospitals is to be taken over by the government. The learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions in “Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors.”, reported in (2012) 11 SCC 1 , in “State of W.B. & Ors. v. Niranjan Singha”, reported in (2001) 2 SCC 326 , in “P.T.R. Exports (Madras) (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.”, reported in (1996) 5 SCC 268 , in “Jasbir Singh Chhabra & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.”, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 192 and in “Kerala SEB & Anr. v. Kurien E. Kalathil & Ors.”, reported in (2000) 6 SCC 293 . 8. In reply, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no proof or pleading that finally a society is to be constituted for running the MESO hospitals. Insofar as, payments are concerned, these are in terms of MoU and huge amount of dues of the petitioner is outstanding. Relying on decision in “State of A.P. & Ors. v. Goverdhanlal Pitti” reported in (2003) 4 SCC 739 and in “Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant & Ors.” reported in (2001) 1 SCC 182 , it is further submitted that, the action of the respondent no.6 is actuated with malice in law. 9. Relying on decision in “State of A.P. & Ors. v. Goverdhanlal Pitti” reported in (2003) 4 SCC 739 and in “Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant & Ors.” reported in (2001) 1 SCC 182 , it is further submitted that, the action of the respondent no.6 is actuated with malice in law. 9. I have carefully considered the submission of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. 10. Before dealing with the contention that the petitioner has a legitimate expectation of renewal of MoU and the State Government must be estopped from resiling from the promise made in Clause 5.1 of “Memorandum of Understanding”, the nature of the said clause is required to be examined. Clause 5.1 of MoU is extracted below: 5.1. “The validity of this MoU would be for 60 months from the date of signing of the MoU. Validity of the MoU could be extended further for a further period of five years on the satisfactory performance by the NGO, more so in term of achievement of milestones and reach of the services in the community.” 11. A bare perusal of Clause 5.1 of MoU discloses that there is no provision for renewal of MoU. It only indicates that the MoU could be extended for a further period of 5 years. The extension of MoU is not an option, which could have been exercised by the petitioner rather, it was for the State Government to take a decision whether to renew the MoU or not. No doubt, the MoU could be extended on satisfactory performance and achievement of milestones with reach of the services to the community however, it cannot be construed that on fulfillment of the above conditions, a right has accrued in favour of the petitioner for extension of MoU for a further period of 5 years. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner has submitted that satisfactory performance of the petitioner is admitted by the respondents and it is not the case of the respondents that the petitioner has failed to achieve the milestone and therefore, the petitioner has a legitimate expectation that MoU would be renewed for a further period of 5 years. The contention of the learned senior counsel is though attractive, on closure scrutiny, I find that it is liable to be rejected. In “AttorneyGeneral (NSW) Vs. The contention of the learned senior counsel is though attractive, on closure scrutiny, I find that it is liable to be rejected. In “AttorneyGeneral (NSW) Vs. Quin”, reported in 1990 HCA 21, it has been observed that, “to strike down the exercise of administrative power solely on the ground of avoiding the disappointment of legitimate expectations of an individual would be to set the Courts adrift on a featureless sea of pragmatism. Moreover, the notion of a legitimate expectation (falling short of a legal right) is too nebulous to form a basis for invalidating the exercise of a power when its exercise otherwise accords with law”. It is well settled that even if certain promises are made in a Memorandum of Understanding, that would not give rise to a vested legal right. In the Memorandum of Understanding dated 04.02.2009 executed between the petitioner and the Department of Welfare, I do not find any promise made to the petitioner. It appears that the MoU was liable to be terminated by the Government unilaterally under certain circumstances. There is a provision for financial assistance extended in the form of grantinaid to the private operator. The hospital building and related assets are the properties of the government. In “Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. Vs. Commercial Tax Officer and Ors.”, reported in (2005) 1 SCC 625 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed, “legitimate expectation is different from anticipation or disappointment”. The provision for extension of MoU contained in Clause 5.1 coupled with satisfactory performance may have given rise to anticipation, but an anticipation cannot translate into an assertable expectation, without something more. The learned counsel for the respondentState of Jharkhand has submitted that pursuant to a decision taken in the review meeting held on 03.01.2014, a new methodology has been adopted for managing and maintenance of the MESO hospitals. The decision has been taken in public interest and it was open to the petitioner to participate in the tender process. It is well settled that the Courts must not usurp the discretion of the public authority. I am of the opinion that the Government is entitled to decide the manner in which suitable operator for managing and maintenance of the MESO hospitals would be selected. It is well settled that the Courts must not usurp the discretion of the public authority. I am of the opinion that the Government is entitled to decide the manner in which suitable operator for managing and maintenance of the MESO hospitals would be selected. The exercise of power by the Government has not been challenged on the ground that it amounts to abuse of power or such power has been exercised to extend favour to an individual. It is also not contended that the proposed selection process is not fair or transparent and not in public interest. 12. The documents brought on record clearly demonstrate a significant departure made in the methodology for selecting suitable operator and implementation of the scheme under the impugned NIT. The award of work for upgrading, maintenance and management of the MESO hospitals under the present NIT is in the nature of licence to be granted to the successful operator. It is provided that licence would be granted to lowest bidder. A host of free services have been indicated in the “Request For Proposal” document which have to be provided free of cost. The equipment and infrastructure have to be provided by the JSTCDC. In case of breach of conditions of licence, there is a provision for liquidated damages to be recovered from the licensee. The licensee would be entitled for annual licence fee and in appropriate cases additional financial assistance also can be extended by the Government to the licensee. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that in the Review meeting dated 03.01.2014 under the chairmanship of the Chief Minister a decision was taken to issue fresh advertisement. The correctness of the reason which prompted the Government to take a particular course of action instead of another is not a matter to be investigated in judicial review. 13. The learned senior counsel has contended that non-consideration of the claim of the petitioner for renewal of the MoU amounts to arbitrary action on the part of the respondents and therefore, the impugned Notice Inviting Tender without rejecting the claim of the petitioner is liable to be quashed. The learned senior counsel has relied on the decisions in “Food Corporation of India Vs. M/s. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries”, reported in (1993) 1 SCC 71 and in “Union of India & Anr. Vs. International Trading Co. The learned senior counsel has relied on the decisions in “Food Corporation of India Vs. M/s. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries”, reported in (1993) 1 SCC 71 and in “Union of India & Anr. Vs. International Trading Co. & Anr.”, reported in (2003) 5 SCC 437 . In Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the context of legitimate expectation of a citizen has observed, “whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant's perception but in larger public interest wherein, other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bonafide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny”. In “Union of India & Anr. Vs. International Trading Co. & Anr.”(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that, if it is a question of policy, even by ways of change of old policy, the Courts cannot interfere with the decision. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus: 12. “Doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation cannot come in the way of public interest. Indisputably, public interest has to prevail over private interest. The case at hand shows that a conscious policy decision has been taken and there is no statutory compulsion to act contrary. In that context, it cannot be said that the respondents have acquired any right for renewal”. 14. In view of the language used in Clause 5.1 of MoU, the petitioner may have anticipated extension of MoU for another five years and let us assume it had an expectation of renewal of MoU but when a claim is raised on the ground of legitimate expectation, it has to be seen whether such expectation has any sound legal foundation. In view of the language used in Clause 5.1 of MoU, the petitioner may have anticipated extension of MoU for another five years and let us assume it had an expectation of renewal of MoU but when a claim is raised on the ground of legitimate expectation, it has to be seen whether such expectation has any sound legal foundation. The decision in “Kamdhenu Cattles case” has been considered and explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “State of W. B. and others vs. Niranjan Singha”, reported in (2001) 2 SCC 326 wherein it has been held, “the doctrine of 'legitimate expectation' is only an aspect of Article 14 of the Constitution in dealing with the citizens in a non-arbitrary manner and thus, by itself, does not give rise to an enforceable right but in testing the action taken by the government authority whether arbitrary otherwise it would be relevant.” 15. Referring to para 30 in “M.P. Oil Extraction & Anr. Vs. State of M.P. & Ors.”, reported in (1997) 7 SCC 592 , the learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner legitimately expected that the renewal clause would be given effect to in usual manner. It is further submitted that in view of the said decision, there is no doubt that the doctrine of legitimate expectation constitutes a substantive and enforceable right and therefore, the respondents should be directed to grant renewal of MoU for further 5 years. I find that in M.P. Oil Extraction case, there was a “renewal clause”, the existence of which was unsuccessfully challenged in earlier proceeding. In view of past practice, the Hon'ble Supreme Court found force in the contention that the renewal clause should have been given effect to in usual manner and according to past practice unless there was any special reason not to adhere to such practice. I find that the petitioner has brought on record the document “Request For Proposal” which contains instruction to bidder, draft agreement and project information memorandum. The said document outlines various steps which have to be taken for selecting the suitable partner for running the MESO hospitals. It indicates that several financial incentives have been extended to the PPP partner. As noticed above, Clause 5.1 of the MoU does not contain “renewal clause”. The said document outlines various steps which have to be taken for selecting the suitable partner for running the MESO hospitals. It indicates that several financial incentives have been extended to the PPP partner. As noticed above, Clause 5.1 of the MoU does not contain “renewal clause”. Admittedly, this was first instance when private operators were selected and therefore, there is no past practice of extending the period of MoU. The respondents have specifically pleaded that for selecting suitable NGO/private sector operators, a new methodology has been adopted by the State Government. I am of the view that the “anticipation” of the petitioner that the MoU would be renewal for further 5 years is validly negated in view of the decision taken by the State Government. In “P.T.R. Exports (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.”(supra), it has been held, “the doctrine of legitimate expectation plays no role when the appropriate authority is empowered to take a decision by an executive policy or under law. The Court leaves the authority to decide its full range of choice within the executive or legislative power”. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that even after lapse of 5 years, the contract was not terminated rather, the petitioner has been permitted to continue for more than 8 months and therefore, it would amount to deemed renewal of MoU. Clause 5.1 of the MoU clearly restricts the validity of the MoU for 60 months and therefore, it is not required to be terminated by an express order. Moreover, the impugned Notice Inviting Tender itself is a manifestation of the intention of the respondents that the MoU has lapsed though, the hospitals are managed through the petitioner on previous terms and conditions. The learned counsel for the respondents has rightly submitted that the petitioner has been permitted to continue because till the time the new operator is selected, the MESO hospitals have to be run and in the midway, the existing operator thus could not have been abruptly removed. It is noticed in the “Request For Proposal” (RFP) that 9 MESO hospitals are currently running by private players and the term of the agreement is due to end. Understanding that the continuity of service is of utmost importance, the NIT for management of MESO hospitals has been issued. It is noticed in the “Request For Proposal” (RFP) that 9 MESO hospitals are currently running by private players and the term of the agreement is due to end. Understanding that the continuity of service is of utmost importance, the NIT for management of MESO hospitals has been issued. Insofar as, the claim of deemed renewal is concerned, it also does not merit acceptance. The distinction between the “extension” and “renewal” is well recognised. Merely because the petitioner has continued 8 months beyond the original period of MoU, a deemed renewal of MoU cannot be assumed. In “Provash Chandra Dalui & Anr. v. Biswanath Banerjee & Anr.” 1989 supp. (1) SCC 487, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “14. It is pertinent to note that the word used is “extension” and not “renewal”. To extend means to enlarge, expand, lengthen, prolong to carry out further than its original limit. Extension, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, means enlargement of the main body addition of something smaller than that to which it is attached; to lengthen or prolong. Thus extension ordinarily implies the continued existence of something to be extended. The distinction between “extension” and “renewal” is chiefly that in the case of renewal, a new lease is required, while in the case of extension the same lease continues in force during additional period by the performance of the stipulate act.” 17. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that though the petitioner submitted application seeking renewal, the same has not been expressly rejected. The petitioner has employed huge staff including, apprentices, doctors, nurses besides, other technical and nontechnical staff for managing 50bedded hospitals. It is required to procure medicines and appliances on long term basis. Since the hospitals are running in remote tribal areas, the doctors and staff are unwilling to work on shortterm basis and therefore, the petitioner has to employ staff on a longterm basis. The petitioner has thus, changed its position in view of renewal clause in MoU and the conduct of the respondents in permitting the petitioner to continue 8 months beyond the original period of MoU constitutes a promise by them and therefore, the respondents are estopped from resiling from their promise. As noticed above, the petitioner was granted permission to run the MESO hospitals for 5 years and for that it was required to employ staff and arrange apparatus and instruments. As noticed above, the petitioner was granted permission to run the MESO hospitals for 5 years and for that it was required to employ staff and arrange apparatus and instruments. Merely because, the petitioner has continued 8 months beyond 5 years, it cannot claim that it has changed its position on the promise made by the respondents which is allegedly reflected in their conduct. In Clause 5.1 of the MoU no promise as claimed by the petitioner is reflected. Any claim of promissory estoppel must rest on existence of a valid legal promise. In “Kasinka Trading & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Anr.”, reported in (1995) 1 SCC 274 , it has been held that, “the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract and the courts are bound to consider all aspect including the result sought to be achieved and the public good at large”. 18. The decision cited by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner in support of the contention that it is the content of a document which is determinative and MoU dated 04.02.2009 is in fact a contract, are in the context of lease and licence. Though, there cannot be any quarrel that any document has to be read as a whole and the contents of the documents are determinative in ascertaining the true nature of a document, even if it is assumed that MoU dated 04.02.2009 is a contract, it is not a statutory contract. Every contract entered by the Government Department does not automatically become statutory contract. I find that no legal right flows from MoU dated 04.02.2009 in favour of the petitioner. Issuance of the impugned NIT cannot be challenged on the ground of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectation of the petitioner and it cannot be said that the action of the respondents is actuated with malice in law. 19. The decision in “Western Coalfields Ltd. Vs. Special Area Development Authority, Korba & Anr.”, reported in (1982) 1 SCC 125 , the decision in “Food Corporation of India Vs. 19. The decision in “Western Coalfields Ltd. Vs. Special Area Development Authority, Korba & Anr.”, reported in (1982) 1 SCC 125 , the decision in “Food Corporation of India Vs. Municipal Committee, Jalalabad & Anr”, reported in (1999) 6 SCC 74 and a decision of the Full Bench of Patna High Court in LPA No.1005 of 2011 have been referred to contend that the respondent-Jharkhand State Tribal Cooperative Development Corporation Limited is “State” for the purpose of Chapter III of the Constitution of India and it cannot deal with the property of the State Government. In the counter-affidavit the respondents have taken a specific plea that Jharkhand State Tribal Cooperative Development Corporation Limited is a Government of Jharkhand undertaking, which is responsible to look after the welfare of the most unprivileged section of the society and it has been authorised to issue the impugned NIT dated 22.08.2014. The “Request For Proposal”, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure3 to the writ petition discloses that the Jharkhand State Tribal Cooperative Development Corporation Limited in association with several NGOs and through Tribal Welfare Commissioner is running various rural hospitals and it is responsible for modernising the administrative machinery and upgradation of existing MESO hospitals to match the minimum and desirable facilities, so as to make them function as First Referal Unit (FRU). It is also stated that Jharkhand State Tribal Cooperative Development Corporation Limited is making substantial investments for development of the rural hospitals as FRUs and it has constructed MESO hospitals at various locations in the last few years. A counter-affidavit though has been filed, the jurisdiction of Jharkhand State Tribal Cooperative Development Corporation Limited to issue the impugned NIT has not been challenged. The MoU has been executed between the petitioner and the Department of Welfare which has been signed by the Tribal Welfare Commissioner for the Department of Welfare and when the Department of Welfare asserts that Jharkhand State Tribal Cooperative Development Corporation Limited has been specially assigned the work of selecting the suitable operators for running the MESO hospitals, the petitioner cannot challenge the impugned NIT dated 22.08.2014 on the ground that Jharkhand State Tribal Cooperative Development Corporation Limited has no jurisdiction to issue the said NIT. It has been stated in the counter-affidavit that there are as many as 5 agencies through which, the Department of Welfare executes its programmes and implement the policies; the Jharkhand State Tribal Cooperative Development Corporation Limited being the one. It has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that in the review meeting dated 03.01.2014 of the Chief Minister, a decision was taken pursuant to which the impugned NIT has been issued. I am of the opinion that, in these facts, the petitioner's challenge to the jurisdiction of the Jharkhand State Tribal Cooperative Development Corporation Limited must be rejected. The “Food Corporation of India” and “Western Coalfields Ltd.” cases referred by the learned senior counsel are the cases in which, exemption under Article 185 of the Constitution was claimed by the government company/corporation. The issue involved in those cases is entirely different. I do not find any substance in the writ petitions. I do not find a vested legal right in the petitioners for issuing mandamus to the respondents. 20. In the result, all the writ petitions are dismissed.